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Abstract
The study is to use institutional entrepreneurship  perspective to complement the 
functionalist’s viewpoint to understand the process underlying collective action in a 
mature eco-system and how institutional entrepreneurs manage critical stakeholder 
relations, collective action and discursive activities in technical standard change 
processes. The standard war of Sony  Blu-ray  Disc vs. Toshiba HD DVD is used as a 
critical and intrinsic case. The functionalist’s viewpoints have paid much attentions to 
the numbers of customers adopting new technologies, and etc. By means of institutional 
entrepreneurship  perspective, it claims that it does not matter about the number and 
amount, but it  does matter about how focal firms make the markets believe that they 
have the abilities to win standard wars. The study further claims that the variables 
studied in functionalist’s viewpoint also have the meanings of institutional 
entrepreneurship  perspective. Moreover, the BD and HD DVD standards are 
incremental innovations in a mature field where there are many things are settled down. 
Focal firms can easily forecast the expectations of the dominant institutional logics. The 
study contributes that institutional entrepreneurship perspective still provides the 
process insight to complement the functionalist’s viewpoint. This perspective can be 
applied in emerging field, where it is no dominant logics and the innovations are likely 
to be radical. The BD case represents a critical case. It can makes possible naturalistic 
generalization to other similar contexts. Eisenhardt’s principles are used to build theory 
from the case study. I borrowed techniques of open coding to analyze the data. The 
findings show that collective action (including critical stakeholder management and 
structuring collaboration capabilities) and discursive activities are the central features of 
institutional entrepreneurship. They have mutual relationship with the institutional 
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entrepreneur’s resources (power and legitimacy). Furthermore, good collective action 
and discursive activities can lead to network effects and product performance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction
In 2002, Sony announced that, in cooperation with eight other leading companies, they 
had established the basic specifications for a next-generation large capacity optical disc 
video recording standard called Blu-ray Disc (BD). BD satisfied the demand for much 
higher storage capacity and better copyright protection for DVDs. Shortly afterwards, 
Toshiba, another leading Japanese electronics company, announced the establishment of 
an HD DVD standard in order to compete with Sony. In the competition to become the 
single new generation optical storage device standard, Sony and Toshiba attempted to 
gain the support  of critical actors and interest  groups. They  promoted their own ideas 
and criticized each other’s technical problems using the media, technical exhibitions 
and so forth. Moreover, they sought support from Hollywood studios and PC 
companies. Their efforts to develop  a joint standard and avoid a format war failed. To 
begin with, HD DVD seemed to have gained the lead in terms of support from movie 
studios in 2004, and in terms of market share in 2006. In 2007, however, many studios 
and video retailers announced that they were exclusively supporting the BD format. In 
January 2008, Warner Brothers announced that it would not support the HD DVD 
standard. This announcement caused a chain reaction among DVD retailers. Later, Wal-
Mart announced that it would phase the HD DVD standard out completely  by June 
2008. Subsequently, in early 2008, Toshiba announced that they would no longer 
support any  aspect of the HD DVD format, including its hardware, software and 
supporting specifications. Sony had won the competition and BD had become the new 
technological standard.
15
The existing literature on standard wars identifies various factors that could explain 
their final outcomes, including adoption, timing of entry, product performance and so 
on. Some studies propose integrative frameworks to explain which factors influence the 
likelihood of victory in standard wars. Most of these frameworks are based on a 
functionalist perspective. In general, the perspective attempts to identify the factors that 
determine the outcome of standard wars. For instance, the number of adopters of the 
standard is a crucial factor. It stresses how network effects result  from the number of 
customers adopting the new standard/products. In this vein, customers tend to rationally 
choose the standard with the highest number of adopters in the market. Consequently, 
the functionalist perspective outlines the factors which are seen as actively  contributing 
to the victory of one of the competitors in a standard war. 
However, the functionalist perspective neglects the importance of process, referring to 
the role of the actor in the emergent series of actions and changes bringing about a 
result. This is the focus of the institutional entrepreneurship perspective which stress the 
role of the institutional entrepreneur and the interaction between actors. For example, in 
relation of network effects, it does not only matter how many customers have adopted 
the standard or products. Rather, what also matters is the process that influences 
whether and how actors adopt a specific standard/product. This perspective stresses that 
the actions through which actors define, develop and legitimise a proposed new 
standard, and compete and cooperate with others in order to succeed. Institutional 
theory  also examines the role of cognition in these processes. This study integrates 
contributions from various strands of literature. Most significantly, though, it applies 
institutional theory and, in particular, theories of institutional entrepreneurship in an 
attempt to provide a new contribution to the literature on standard wars.
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The empirical part of this study  is an in-depth single case study  of the standard war 
between BD and HD DVD. Toshiba had gained the dominant position in the previous 
DVD standard and had won two previous wars over earlier standards in the same 
technological field. In the new standard war, Toshiba was in competition with Sony. It 
tried first to upgrade the DVD standard and then proposed the new standard – HD DVD 
– while Sony developed its own brand-new standard – the Blu-ray Disc. Sony  faced a 
competitor who had a dominant position within the previous institutional arrangements 
of this field. It  can be argued that this case presents all the relevant issues identified in 
the literature and provides a useful basis for theory building and development.
Researchers cannot understand the BD-HD DVD standard war without understanding 
the previous standard wars around standards in analog videotape (JVC VHS vs. Sony 
Betamax), CD (Compact Disc), and DVD (Sony’s MMCD vs. Toshiba MD). BD and 
HD DVD are incremental improvements over the previous standards and developed in 
an institutional field with already well established institutions and powerful actors in 
what may be described as a mature eco-system. The new standards follow a mature 
technological trajectory. Many players are involved in the trajectory and group  around 
the technology as well-converged stakeholder groups. This study  aims at 
complementing the functionalist perspective with institutional theory. This will be done 
through an in-depth study of the BD-HD DVD case. 
Chapter 2 of this study reviews the perspectives of the literature on standard wars. In 
general, the relevant literatures can be divided into rational and social accounts. The 
rational account represents the functionalist perspective stressing factor determining the 
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outcome while the social account represents the institutionalist  perspective that stresses 
insight into the unfolding process in a standard war. This study  will further elaborate the 
meanings of rational and social accounts in strategy, industrial economics, social 
cognition, and the stakeholder perspectives. Further, the social account will discuss the 
role of institutional theory in standard wars. 
On this basis it develops an integrative framework with a focus on the role of 
institutional entrepreneurship. This model is then used as a structuring device in the 
analysis of the standard war between Sony BD and Toshiba HD DVD, in order to build 
a new theory concerning standard wars. The new theory builds from the case study 
substantially  retains the categories and relationships of the analytical framework from 
the literature review, but also provides new insights. It highlights factors which are not 
generally  included in other studies, such as human resource management practices in 
relation to core employees, their personal social capital, and the influence of the media. 
This introductory chapter continues by  outlining in more detail the challenges faced by 
focal firms in standard wars. This section leads to the general research question. The 
next section argues for the crucial role of institutional entrepreneurship  in relation to 
different groups of stakeholders. This provides the background for three research sub-
questions. This is followed by a brief presentation of the case: i.e. an account of how the 
actual standard war unfolded. I will argue that this case study  is well suited to the task 
of developing a theory from the theoretical framework. The penultimate section 
concerns the methods used to collect and analyze the case study data. The last  section 
will present the structure of the thesis.
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1.1. The Importance of Studying Standard Wars
When a firm owns a technical standard which it cannot implement well, and/or which is 
misaligned with the firm’s interests, the firm may wish to alter or change that standard. 
However, such a change project is likely to be very time- and money-consuming. 
Moreover, other firms may also propose alternative standards. In order to successfully 
change the standard and to obtain the considerable economic benefits which result from 
it, the firm will ally itself with other firms who have the same goals, stakes and/or 
vision. The advantage of involving many companies is not only  that the costs of 
technological change processes are shared, but also that resources are aggregated which 
will help the new standard to be strengthened and promoted. This will enable the firm to 
compete more effectively with rival companies.
In detail, within these processes of technical change, the focal firm and its partners 
frame their visions, promote their projects, undermine the projects of their competitors, 
and motivate other companies to join their project. At the same time, competitors who 
have developed alternative projects may attempt to gain support from the same 
companies. They therefore position themselves (through public relation, media, 
technical definitions, etc.) so that they can demonstrate the legitimacy of their own 
standards, negotiate support from key actors or stakeholders in the relevant industries, 
release competitive products for market  share, and so on. These focal firms aim to beat 
their competitors by using strategies of various kinds. These actions introduce 
turbulence and uncertainty to the process. Scholars of technology innovation 
management call these processes ‘standard wars’. The price of a standard war can be 
huge. When a firm wins the war and its standard becomes the dominant design, 
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however, it  will gain a monopoly position in the relevant industry, with all the resulting 
benefits.
Standards are crucial for the development of markets. They  provide compatibility 
between systems and products, serve to enhance product quality, reduce uncertainty, and 
establish norms in a given field. In other words, standards elaborate a political, social, 
technical and economic consensus at a particular time, and articulate an improvement in 
market delivery. New standards have to respond not only to the requirement of 
functionality but also to consumer sensitivity  and price. Furthermore, because 
customers’ preferences change quickly, due to shorter product life cycles and the 
convergence of multiple technologies, firms now need to speed up their innovations and 
change their technological standards more quickly than they did in the past. In turn, 
focal firms have to rapidly convince their markets and consumers that their new 
standard is better than the competing standards, in order to recover the huge investments 
involved in standard wars. The focal firms not only ally  themselves with other firms to 
win standard wars and gain a dominant position, but also make efforts to create 
industry-wide understandings in their target fields.
The main aim of this study is to examine how focal firms develop technical standards 
for markets and to determine which practices are deployed in standard wars. There are 
many empirical studies about standard wars in the late 20th century. Most of them 
concern product performance and network effects. A few empirical studies, mainly 
produced in the 21st century, embrace different methods of studying standard wars. 
These new approaches have been developed in fields other than the study of standard 
wars, such as framing in social movements and discursive activities in technology 
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management. Unfortunately, although these studies have produced some interesting 
findings, they have not produced a well-developed theory to integrate their work with 
existing studies (of product performance and network effects). Scholars have indicated 
that standards share attributes with institutions, and that standard wars share attributes 
with processes of institutionalisation, where the processes connote the meaning of 
competition between different existing institutions and new ideas. The study focuses on 
the means by which focal firms succeed as institutional entrepreneurs in standard wars 
against competitors who have held leading and dominant positions in the previous 
institutional arrangements, resulting from victories in previous standard wars in the 
relevant technological field. As a result, this study  proposes that the overall research 
question is as follows:
How can an institutional perspective complement a functional perspective to 
understand the process underlying collective action in a mature eco-system?
1.2. Institutional Entrepreneurship and Stakeholders
Institutional theory has frequently emphasised stability and conformity over change and 
entrepreneurial actions. However, there has recently been an increased interest in 
institutional change and the role of institutional entrepreneurship, defined as the 
‘activities of actors who have interest in particular institutional arrangements and who 
leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones’ (Maguire, 
Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004: 957). The relevant studies have highlighted collective 
actions by which social actors legitimise new institutional arrangements, often through 
the influence of the media. Technical standards can be viewed as institutions: they are 
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not only technical specifications but embody wider characteristics such as rules, norms 
and cultural cognitions. Existing institutions may  be misaligned with the interests of 
social actors and/or with other institutions. Likewise, current standards and their 
institutional aspects may be misaligned with the interests of social actors or not perform 
well enough, and this will trigger the social actors to alter the institutions. Studies of 
institutional entrepreneurship  have highlighted the characteristics and tactics which can 
help  institutional entrepreneurs to change institutions. Such studies indicate that  the 
roles of collaboration and the meanings attached by various actors to new institutions 
are critical in institutional entrepreneurship. As a result, this study will focus on the 
collaborative and discursive aspects of institutional entrepreneurship.
Studies of previous standard wars in the optical storage device industry1, such as that 
between JVC’s VHS (Video Home System) and Sony’s Betamax in the 1980s, and 
between Toshiba’s SD (Super Density) and Sony-Philips’ MMCD (Multimedia 
Compact Disc) in the 1990s, have demonstrated the importance of stakeholders. 
Furthermore, scholars of institutional entrepreneurship view organizations as nexuses of 
stakeholder relationships, where stakeholders include suppliers, manufacturers, 
consumers and professional associations.
Accordingly, this study focuses primarily on the relationship  between institutional 
entrepreneurs and stakeholders. It distinguishes between different groups of 
stakeholders, as well as between those aspects of entrepreneurship which are crucial in 
relation to each group. It identifies three groups of stakeholders: (a) critical 
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1 Optical storage devices are defined as storage devices in which data is written, burnt, and removed by 
using a focused optical beam. Including CD, DVD, HD DVD, and BD can be viewed as a kind of 
standard of optical storage. 
stakeholders, (b) group members, and (c) prospective consumers and competitors. The 
critical stakeholders constitute the close partners of the focal firm (eg. Hollywood 
studios, electronic product manufacturers, games software developers and publishers, 
and the main retailers). The group members are the other stakeholders which cooperate 
with the focal firm with the common aim of winning the standard war. The third group 
consists of all the relevant actors who are not part of the group  organized around the 
focal actor in its effort to win the standard war: firstly, the general public and lead users, 
as well as media and experts who influence the perceptions and interpretations of 
prospective consumers of products which embody the new standard; and secondly, 
competitors and their allies.
The importance of managing the critical stakeholders in institutional entrepreneurship  is 
emphasised in this study. The term ‘critical stakeholders’ refers to reputational actors 
who have critical resources for the organization’s R&D activities, manufacturing and 
marketing as part of processes of technological standard change. The participation of 
such stakeholders directly contributes to the new standards of focal firms, in both 
functional and symbolic terms. Their participation not only influence the network 
effects and product performance of technological standards, but also motivates other 
organizations to engage in a particular collaboration. 
Compared to critical stakeholders, general stakeholders possess resources, which are 
less critical, both functionally  and symbolically. They are unable to directly influence 
the theorisation and specification of new standards, but they can support those materials 
which are co-developed by  institutional entrepreneurs and critical stakeholders. General 
stakeholders have less reputation and credibility  in a given institutional setting. 
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However, the amount of general stakeholders’ support also motivate the actions of 
stakeholders (including prospective consumers and organizations who may or may  not 
be engaged in competitor’s camps) to support the camp of the focal firm.
The study analyses the role of critical stakeholders and distinguishes these stakeholders 
from other, general stakeholders, The criticality of ‘critical stakeholder’ is, of course, a 
continuous variable rather than a dichotomous one. However, for the sake of simplicity 
we merely single out critical stakeholders rather than analyzing degrees of criticality. 
Institutional entrepreneurs may initiate many different tasks simultaneously. Because no 
individual organization can efficiently complete all of tasks, institutional entrepreneurs 
have to select qualified stakeholders for specific tasks. 
Institutional entrepreneurs face more and more complex tasks and resistance in the 
process. In order to deal with them and defeat rivals efficiently, the institutional 
entrepreneur tends to establish a ‘stakeholders pool’ in the beginning. The pool can be 
seen as a group of stakeholders with applicable skills and resources (functional and 
symbolic) who are available for the institutional entrepreneurship. Having the pool in 
the beginning has two advantages in the process. First, in the symbolic aspect, the 
institutional entrepreneur can use the stakeholders as signals. These signals can be used 
to keep motivating more and more organizations to engage in the project. Second, in the 
functional aspect, having the pool can make the institutional entrepreneurs better 
understand the capabilities of the various stakeholders. Moreover, the institutional 
entrepreneurs can make the stakeholders understand the evolving plan as well as 
possible. Hence, the inclusion of such stakeholder at  an early stage can help the 
institutional entrepreneur to efficiently  deal with the tasks when the role of the 
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stakeholder becomes functionally crucial. At the moment, the criticality of the 
stakeholder is high. In this vein, the criticality of stakeholders will be high when they 
are functionally crucial but will be low when they are not. In this vein, the profile and 
criticality of stakeholders are dynamic in the process.
In previous studies, the ways in which institutional entrepreneurs interact  with critical 
stakeholders, for example by constructing identities to obtain their support, have 
received only limited attention. However, both Sony and Toshiba understood that, for 
instance, Hollywood studios were critical stakeholders. The products and services of 
these content providers can significantly increase the network effects of standards, and 
it is therefore crucially important to identify how their relationships with crucial 
stakeholders are managed. The stakes are high, and institutional entrepreneurs need 
close relationships with these critical stakeholders. They may radically alter the 
situation by moving their support, and it is crucial to keep them satisfied and on board 
through continual interaction, convincing them to collaborate, and providing exclusive 
support and resources, etc. This is termed ‘critical stakeholder management’ in this 
study, and it encompasses more than just economic and technical factors. The study also 
examines the ways in which institutional entrepreneurs change their technological 
standards from sociological and management viewpoints. Technology is seen as 
emerging from socio-political processes. The specifications of new technology can be 
seen as the result of negotiation between the institutional entrepreneur, critical 
stakeholders and other member organizations in collaborations. Moreover, the 
possession of superior technology does not guarantee that the focal firm will win the 
standard war. The socio-political and managerial processes within standard wars are 
crucial in this respect.
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Figure 1.1 illustrates how institutional entrepreneurs manage their relationships with 
critical stakeholders and maintain close relationships with them. The study aims to 
uncover the practices through which institutional entrepreneurs manage stakeholders in 
standard wars. This is the first research sub-question:
1. How do institutional entrepreneurs manage critical  stakeholders in 
technological standard change processes?
In institutional entrepreneurship, institutional entrepreneurs do not just need the support 
and resources of critical stakeholders, but must also ally themselves with other partners. 
Institutional entrepreneurs can be expected to have distinct methods of cooperating with 
them, which are distinct from their links with critical stakeholders. They may  also strive 
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to have more members, i.e. organizations, on their side, which will increase their ability 
to spread their standard across other technological fields and applications.
A discussion of the role of critical stakeholders and a new theory concerning the 
practices (i.e. critical stakeholder management capability) used in standard wars is one 
of this study’s main contributions to research. Unlike existing empirical studies, this 
study explicitly discusses the role of critical stakeholders, identifies their importance in 
standard wars, and describes the essential practices involved in critical stakeholder 
management capability. It  suggests that institutional entrepreneurs should cooperate 
with two kinds of stakeholders (critical and general) in standard wars. Institutional 
entrepreneurs prefer to maintain intensive relationships with critical stakeholders, rather 
than general stakeholders, because of the critical nature of their physical and symbolic 
resources. Initiating technological standard change projects requires careful planning. 
Institutional entrepreneurs should invite a number of critical stakeholders to become 
part of the processes of theorising the specification of their new standard and of 
establishing their marketing campaign. There are almost certainly no critical 
stakeholders who are suitable for every task. For this reason, focal firms need to select 
different types of critical stakeholders in the beginning of the process, and, at the same 
time, institutional entrepreneurs should be able to select suitable critical stakeholders for 
collaborations. These critical stakeholders should, as a result, be able completely to 
engage in the development of specifications and standard wars, and should understand 
which actions and strategies are appropriate for new standards. This discussion 
demonstrates that the role of critical stakeholders in standard wars is both primary and 
essential.
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Furthermore, critical stakeholders may  bring their connections to other organizations to 
bear on the institutional entrepreneur’s projects, as shown in Figure 1.2. Institutional 
entrepreneurs, critical stakeholders and other member organizations construct a web that 
can be mobilized for collective action in an institutional change project. Previous 
studies of institutional entrepreneurship and standard wars have paid attention to the 
role of collective action, which is seen mainly as establishing professional associations 
in institutional entrepreneurship. However, the relevant studies have not identified the 
practices that should be included in collaborations for collective action. Hence, the 
second sub-research question is: 
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2. How do institutional entrepreneurs use collective actions to manage all group 
members, including critical stakeholders, in technological standard change 
processes? 
Institutional entrepreneurs need to manage both critical and general stakeholders by 
using collective action in standard wars. In this study, collective action includes critical 
stakeholder management and collaboration structuring capabilities. Collaborations can 
be viewed as professional associations within institutional entrepreneurship. The aim of 
such associations is to enact specifications of new institutions and diffuse them into 
their particular fields. In order to effectively manage the actions of member 
organizations within collaborations, institutional entrepreneurs need ‘collaboration 
structuring capability’, which will establish a set of membership rules in order to assign 
and manage responsibilities and obligations. Institutional entrepreneurs need to 
cooperate with their partners, and align and adjust their interests and actions. To 
summarize, studying the role of collaboration in institutional entrepreneurship will 
demonstrate the role of collective action. In the case of the standard war between BD 
and HD DVD, Sony  had very  intensive relationships with both Panasonic and Phillips. 
They  not only co-developed the blu-ray disc technology, but also initiated critical issues 
and co-managed the BDA. These three companies can therefore be seen as a hardcore 
group2  in the BDA. This study will discuss them as part of the group of critical 
stakeholders in this standard war. Appendix 3 discusses further the role of the hardcore 
group.
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2 This study suggests that a hardcore group is a central or fundamental group and usually enduring group 
which forms a loyal faction. This study will count the group as a critical stakeholder.
Membership  rules play three critical roles in institutional entrepreneurship: sharing and 
exchanging resources, professionalisation and the maintenance of legitimacy. Moreover, 
institutional entrepreneurs use specialized practices for critical stakeholders. By doing 
this, such critical stakeholders maintain routines, procedures, and structures that show 
who can legitimately make decisions or speak on behalf of the collaboration. On the 
other hand, institutional entrepreneurs use generalized practices for general stakeholders 
in collaborations. By doing this, the strength of the general stakeholders’ resources, 
knowledge and efforts is combined to reach a goal shared by all parties. As a result, 
group structure (membership), commitment (from all partners), and communication are 
the three elements of collective action. In addition to the first two, institutional 
entrepreneurs use communication to link people together and create relationships. In 
this way, collective action can be conceptualized as a set of communicative practices 
which take into consideration interactions between, and engagement of, people.
Whereas Figure 1.2. illustrates the internal interactions in the standard war alliance 
which are mobilized by  the institutional entrepreneur, Figure 1.3. shows the activities of 
the entrepreneur and the allied group, including critical stakeholders and general 
member organizations, directed towards external actors. Institutional entrepreneurs 
mobilize their resources in cooperation with other internal ‘stakeholders’ in order to 
make the public understand the new technology and convince them that it  is superior to 
the competing standards. Throughout this process, the group  targets other organizations 
and critical stakeholders who have not engaged in their projects. Because of this, the 
group is able not only to influence public perceptions and understanding, and to recruit 
new members, but also to undermine those competitors who are proposing alternative 
new technologies and engaging in institutional entrepreneurship themselves.
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These activities towards the external actors are mainly discursive, although efforts to 
attract new critical stakeholders also may  involve the provision of incentives in the form 
of more tangible support. This study suggests that skills which enable the 
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implementation of discursive strategies by communicating information and constructing 
the meanings of new technology are crucial assets for institutional entrepreneurs. By 
using discursive activities, institutional entrepreneurs are capable of both convincing the 
public to adopt their new technologies and undermining the proposals of their 
competitors. Hence, the third sub-research question is:
3. How do institutional entrepreneurs manage all external groups and internal 
group members by using discursive activities in technological standard change 
processes?
Managing discursive activities and discussing the discursive activities used in 
technological standard change processes is another contribution to research of this 
study. As the discussion in the previous section argued, social movement and 
technology management studies have discussed framing and discursive activities 
separately. Existing standard war studies do not pay enough attention to this issue. The 
major task of framing is to establish and sustain agendas in the audience’s mind. The 
eventual goal is to change their minds and motivate them to adopt specific actions. 
These agendas aim to retain and sustain the influence of discourses in the audience’s 
mind. However, existing empirical studies fail to identify the focal firms or actions 
which are used in standard wars. Based on this sub-research question, this study will 
further show which discursive activities can be used in standard wars.
However, a few conditions should be taken into account. Firstly, using discursive 
activities with internal group members does not contradict the function of 
communication in collective action. Having communication in collaborations can 
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ensure the establishment of cooperation and coordination among group members. Using 
discursive activities can also further enhance their commitment in standard wars. 
However. enhancing the commitment of internal group members is a side effect of using 
discursive activities in standard wars. By  using collective action, group members to 
some extent have understood and endorsed the collaboration’s marketing campaign and 
other ongoing plans. In a sense, their commitment has been increased. Thus, the study 
defines the audience of discursive activities as an external group.
Secondly, this study does not ignore the role of the media in standard wars. This study 
defines external groups as the media, leading users, the general public and potential 
partners (including the partners of competitors and independent stakeholders). 
Institutional entrepreneurs use discursive activities to influence the perceptions of lead 
users and then to further affect the rest of the public through those lead users’ 
connections. They use such activities to influence the perceptions of potential partners 
and then further motivate them to engage in their collaborations. Institutional 
entrepreneurs also use these activities to influence the media. Hence, the media may 
report press releases which give favorable reports of specific standards. In particular, the 
media also plays a mediating role in which institutional entrepreneurs use discursive 
activities to influence these internal members and external groups. Although the 
research question does not mention the role of media, the study does not ignore it.
Finally, the competitor’s group  is part of the external group. The sub-research question 
mainly points out that institutional entrepreneurs can motivate competitors to engage in 
their own collaborations by using discursive activities. However, in practice, 
interactions with them are not only discursive, but include other aspects, including 
33
financial incentives. However, there is a limit to the amount of information which can 
be accessed in order to analyze and triangulate the data. Although this aspect is not 
included in the research sub-questions, I will include it as part of the answer to the 
overall question.
To summarize, this study  proposes three sub-questions based on the main research 
question. As well as its research into collective action, studies of critical stakeholder 
management and discursive activities are the main contributions to research of this 
study. The study will demonstrate the importance of critical stakeholders and discursive 
activities. Further, it will describe the practices of critical stakeholder management and 
discursive activities used in standard wars. These are the main contributions of this 
study.
1.3. The Case Study
In order to answer the general research question and the three sub-questions, this study 
examines the standard war between Sony Blu-ray Disc (BD) and Toshiba HD DVD 
from 2002 to 2008 as a critical case exemplifying the nature of a standard war in a 
mature field.
BD and HD DVD are standards of optical storage which arose from the previous 
standards, Sony’s MMCD and Toshiba’s DVD and SD during the 20th century. Two 
previous standard wars constitute important historical preconditions for the BD versus 
HD DVD standard war. They  are incrementally  developed from these previous 
standards. In the 1980s, Sony promoted the Betamax standard which was defeated by 
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JVC’s VHS, and, in the 1990s, Toshiba SD defeated Sony MMCD. Toshiba held the 
leading position in the DVD standard until the standard was between BD and HD DVD 
standard in 2002 when Sony was the challenger. Both firms gained valuable experience 
of standard wars within the industry. Both firms used collaborations (the DVD Forum 
and the Blu-ray Disc Association, BDA) and utilized discursive media activities in this 
standard war. This study  therefore claims that  the BD-HD DVD standard war is an 
appropriate case to study in order to answer the research question. The BD-HD DVD 
case is useful for exploring the role of institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars for 
three reasons. Firstly, it is an intrinsically interesting case. It  concerns a standard war in 
a mature technological field with well-established institutions and well-converged 
actors. Few previous studies have studied standard war in such mature ecosystems. 
Secondly, it is a critical case in the sense of a‘least likely case’ in relation to showing the 
importance of an institutional perspective as a complement to a functionalist 
perspective. There seems to be far more room for institutional entrepreneurship  in case 
of a newly developed technology  with emerging institutions and actors than in the BD-
HD DVD case characterized by an already fully developed institutional field with 
established institutions, roles, actors and institutional logics. Emerging fields have 
unsettled sets of principles to follow. The innovations in this field are more likely to be 
radical or not on a settled trajectory. The chosen case, on the other hand, is a ‘least 
likely’ case for showing the need for complementing the functionalist case with an 
institutionalist perspective. Thirdly, it echoes the importance of the network effects and 
collective action which have been discussed in the relevant previous studies. Fourthly, it 
highlights the role of communication, the ability to respond to problems and the 
construction of an identity for their new standards to stakeholders and markets. Fifthly, 
it also explicitly highlights the importance of power, legitimacy and discursive 
35
activities, as they have been discussed in institutional entrepreneurship studies during 
this period. Sixthly, although the case is unique and radically different from most other 
standard wars, there are opportunities for generalizing the concrete conclusions from the 
study. The thick description makes possible naturalistic generalization to other similar 
contexts, including mature and emerging fields. 
In conclusion, the case is a critical case that provides an opportunity to look at how 
institutional entrepreneurship perspective complements a functional perspective to 
understand standard wars. The case relates to the most  important issues covered in other 
studies of standard wars, and, furthermore, although the concrete findings in this unique 
case are not  directly  relevant in other standard war contexts, there are possibilities for 
naturalistic generalization because of the thick description of the case. 
The functionalist’s perspective has dominated the relevant studies of standard wars 
several decades. This suggests that the focal firm can defeat its competitors in standard 
wars by  having greater network effects and better product performance. However, this 
viewpoint ignores the contribution of of institutional theory to understanding the 
process and outcome of standard wars. We can define standards as institutions. A 
standard has the characteristics of rules, norms, and beliefs. In this study the firm is seen 
as an institutional entrepreneur and its behavior analysed in line with institutional 
theory. 
In order to verify the role of institutional theory  in explaining a standard war, this study 
uses critical case study to do so. In a sense, critical case means ‘if it is valid in this case, 
it is valid for all cases’. So, if we can find a critical case which can verify the 
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importance of institutional theory  in standard war, this general finding can be 
generalized to all other cases. 
The BD and HD DVD standards are incremental innovations originating from the 
previous standards. The main players have a pretty  clear understanding of the context, 
who the other main actors are, what their priorities and competences are, and what to do 
about it. Sony and Toshiba can relatively easy  forecast the expectations of the other 
players in the standard war. In other words, the BD case takes place in an institutional 
field where the relevant players are well-converged and the overarching sets of 
principles in the field have been identified and are well known. Furthermore, the case is 
not only mature in the sense of an established institutional field. It  also concerns a 
mature technology. Both competing standards can be expected to be the last optical 
media standard based on home theater technology, which will be replaced by constant 
streaming and/or server based entertainment storage and playback, like cloud 
computing. Although it is expected that the functionalist’s approach can explain such a 
standard wars well, this study  represents an attempt to show that institutional 
entrepreneurship can add valuable insights in addition to the functionalist perspective. 
By providing a thick description of the case, my case and findings can give other 
readers the means necessary for adapting the conclusions from this study to other 
studies of standard wars (naturalistic generalization). To apply thick description means 
to study the case as comprehensively as possible. I not only use different data sources to 
triangulate a finding, but I also provide rich information relating to the case to make it 
possible for other researchers to relate the findings to their own cases and possibly 
transfer or adapt part  of the conclusions from this study. Thus, other researchers should 
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be aware of the differences between the study in question and my study but if this is so 
selective generalization of the findings is possible.
1.4. A Brief Presentation of the Case
In March 2008, Toshiba announced that  they would no longer produce hardware and 
software for the HD DVD standard. The announcement terminated the standard war 
with Sony’s Blu-ray  Disc which had lasted since 2002. Although Toshiba possessed the 
DVD standard and leading position in the DVD Forum, an international consortium of 
hardware, software, media, and content companies that use and develop the DVD 
standard, Toshiba’s HD DVD standard still could not obtain sufficiently wide support 
from content providers. For Sony, the victory in this standard war could be seen as a 
sweet revenge. Sony lost the previous standard wars concerning media devices to JVC’s 
VHS in the 1980s, and Toshiba’s DVD in the 1990s. The BD standard gave Sony  and 
other leading partners a chance to dominate the development of optical storage devices.
Having gained experience from previous standard wars, Sony understood wide support, 
network effects and other tactics to be critical factors when fighting a standard war in 
the optical storage device industry. But, Toshiba had similar experience and stressed the 
same factors in more or less the same ways.
Firstly, both camps perceived the Hollywood studios to be critical stakeholders because, 
using their pre-recorded products, Sony and Toshiba could increase the network effects 
of their standards using these complementary  products. As a result, both Sony and 
Toshiba aimed for Hollywood’s support. Toshiba invited them to engage in the DVD 
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Forum and to take part in the development of the HD DVD standard. Sony established a 
Blu-ray  Disc Association and also invited Hollywood to take part in it. In this standard 
war, both camps tried to persuade Hollywood studios to exclusively support their own 
standard.
Secondly, both camps used game consoles as the main medium through which to 
promote their disc players. Sony produces an outstanding game consoles series, 
PlayStation (PS). In 2004, Sony decided that it would use PS3 (PlayStation 3) to 
promote BD players in this standard war. The previous version of PS, PlayStation 2, had 
a widely installed base in the market. Using the PS3 as a trojan horse, the network 
effects of the BD standard could be increased not only  by  Hollywood movies but also 
by games software. Toshiba did not have any game consoles but decided to choose 
Microsoft’s Xbox 360 to promote the HD DVD standard. In 2005, Toshiba invited 
Microsoft to engage in the DVD Forum. Toshiba also announced that they would allow 
users to copy the content of discs onto their computers and their home network. 
Microsoft wanted to use HD DVD players to dominate the home entertainment market 
by using their operating system (Windows). However, this announcement was in 
opposition to the interests of Hollywood studios. Moreover, the Xbox 360 was not 
integrated with HD DVD players. In other words, although consumers could now buy 
an HD DVD players module for the game consoles, the final price of this was more 
expensive than that of the PS3.
Thirdly, both companies realized that a copyright protection mechanism was one of the 
critical aspects of the optical storage device standard. At the beginning of the standard 
war, both companies announced that they were adopting the Advanced Access Content 
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System (AACS) as their copyright protection technology. This was because it is critical 
for Hollywood studios to protect the copyright  of their content, and to therefore be able 
to secure their sales revenues. In fact, Sony had believed that its copyright protection 
technology was better than that of Toshiba in the SD-MMCD standard war, but, at that 
point, many stakeholders had forced Sony to integrate with Toshiba’s MMCD standard. 
In turn, Sony announced in 2007 that the BD standard had adopted an additional 
technology, called BD Plus (BD+), which included additional copyright protection 
technology. This announcement met the expectations of many  Hollywood studios. In 
addition to this, Toshiba and Microsoft announced that they would allow users to copy 
disc content  onto their PC and home network in 2005. The announcement not only 
made Hollywood studios question the safety of the HD DVD standard but also gave a 
tactical opportunity to the BD standard. Consequently, after this announcement, many 
Hollywood studios announced that they would participate in the BDA and inclusively or 
exclusively  support  the BD standard. After the introduction of the BD+ technology, 
these studios further confirmed that the BD standard was better than HD DVD.
Toshiba had the leading position at the beginning of the standard war, because they 
claimed that  the HD DVD standard could be manufactured cost-effectively. The HD 
DVD standard was seen as an upgraded DVD standard. It had lower storage capacity 
but cheaper manufacturing costs, while the BD standard had greater capacity but higher 
manufacturing costs. As a consequence, most Hollywood studios and manufacturing 
companies initially supported the HD DVD standard. Moreover, the HD DVD standard 
was generally compatible while the BD standard was not. In other words, Toshiba 
wanted to retain its advantage of the DVD standard and also to further dominate the 
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new optical standard. In turn, before their engagement of Microsoft, Toshiba had the 
support of more Hollywood studios and also participated in the DVD Forum.
At the same time, Sony invited more and more companies with diverse backgrounds 
and opinions to be part  of the new standard. In 2002, Sony  established the BDA 
forerunner, Blu-ray  Disc Founders (BDF), which included Hitachi, LG Electronics, 
Matsushita, Pioneer, Royal Philips Electronics, Samsung, Sharp, Sony and Thomson 
Multimedia. Moreover, at the same time, the BDF announced that they were releasing 
the primary version of the BD technical specification. Before the BDA was officially 
established in 2004, Sony  further invited HP, Dell, JVC and TDK to participate in the 
BDF. At that  point, the BDF consisted not only of consumer electronics manufacturers, 
electronics equipment manufacturers and content providers, but also PC companies and 
disc manufacturers. Although the Toshiba camp had the endorsement of the whole DVD 
Forum, its consortium had split up, because most of the founders of the BDF were also 
member organizations, or even on the Steering Committee, of the DVD Forum. 
Moreover, Toshiba had initially chosen NEC as their main partner. NEC is a leading 
electronic equipment manufacturer, but not a leader in consumer electronics.
During the period between 2002 and Q1 2005, the BD and HD DVD camps were 
engaged in a struggle to develop  the optical storage device standard which would be 
strongest from both a technical and an economical point of view. At the same time, 
Sony announced that it  would integrate PS3 with BD players. When this information 
about PS3 was unveiled, some analysts and news reports said that it would have a big 
impact on the HD DVD standard. Some Hollywood studios began to waver between the 
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BD and HD DVD standards. After Microsoft’s engagement in Q2 2005, the 
announcement encouraged these studios to move away from the HD DVD camp.
A critical event also took place that demonstrated the importance of news reports in the 
media. In January  2007, the New York Times reported that HD DVD had been hacked by 
an individual who identified himself as Muslix64, demonstrating that the BD standard’s 
content protection mechanism was better than that of the HD DVD. Although the BD 
and HD DVD standards had both adopted AACS’s encryption mechanism, the BDA 
used an additional software-based component that made it possible to modify the copy 
protection scheme on new discs if the existing one was broken by hackers. Muslix64 
posted a demonstration of his hacking on the YouTube which has since been viewed 
many times. He identified a file which was the key to decrypting AACS protected 
movies and claimed that, if users could hack this file, this meant anyone could decrypt 
HD DVD movies. As a result, the legitimacy of the HD DVD standard was undermined 
by its weakened encryption system, and it  lost the support of the Hollywood studios. 
This may  also have caused some consumers to support the BD standard, and may  have 
given the BDA an advantage by allowing it to offer a wider range of content.
However, after news of the hacking had appeared in the New York Times, Paramount 
and DreamWorks announced that they had chosen to support the HD DVD standard 
rather than BD. Market said that  Toshiba had offered them huge financial incentives, 
such as marketing support and cash payments. At this stage, the market share of HD 
DVD disc players was greater than that of the BD players, because of their cheaper 
pricing strategy. However, when unit sales of PS3 were included in the results for disc 
players, the share for BD was greater than that for HD DVD The HD DVD standard’s 
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network effects and product performance were much poorer than those for the BD 
standard.
A few days after Paramount and DreamWorks had announced their preference for HD 
DVD, the BDA’s official website showed the comments of Michael Bay and Steven 
Spielberg about these announcements. The title of Michael Bay’s comments was: 
‘Michael Bay Responds to Paramount's Decision: "No Transformers 2 for Me!"’ The 
title expressed very clearly  Michael Bay’s unhappiness about the announcements. On 
the other hand, although Steven Spielberg did not use any emotive words, the website 
cited the statements of his spokesman, who claimed that Spielberg supported the BD 
standard.
These events highlight several elements of the BD-HD DVD standard war. Firstly, both 
Sony and Toshiba used their resources in the standard war to change and upgrade the 
DVD standard, and then to make consumers adopt their proprietary standard. Both Sony 
and Toshiba used their experience of previous standard wars to persuade Hollywood 
studios to adopt their own standard.
Secondly, both focal firms established or used collaborations to research and develop 
specifications of hardware and software for their standards. Sony used R&D activities to 
develop their higher storage capacity and their copyright protection mechanism (BD+), 
and to make their standard compatible with PS3. Although the storage capacity  of HD 
DVD was less than that of BD, they put much effort into decreasing its manufacturing 
costs and speeding up its manufacturing processes.
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Thirdly, both focal firms promoted their own advantages and undermined those of their 
rivals by  using media communications (such as PR). They and their partners also used 
media marketing campaigns to promote their disc players, game consoles (Microsoft’s 
Xbox 360 and Sony’s PS3) and pre-recorded products. These promotions aimed to make 
other companies understand what they were doing, to persuade those companies and 
consumers to adopt the standard, and to increase the sales of their products.
Finally, Toshiba and Sony were able to use the DVD Forum and BDA to help them 
accumulate further R&D capabilities. With more companies engaged in collaborations 
and media promotions, their standards could further permeate these companies’ 
networks with other companies. In turn, both BD and HD DVD could strengthen their 
influence in the relevant industries and markets.
In this way, both Sony or Toshiba established alliances with other companies in order to 
establish collaborations. The aims of collaboration are to make their standards 
reasonable, and to strive for understanding, acceptance and exclusive support from the 
target market. In order to achieve the goals of change projects, institutional 
entrepreneurs increase their use of collective action and apply  strategies for establishing 
continuous interaction with other organizations in order to create new institutions.
Rather than focusing on how firms apply institutional entrepreneurship by leading other 
member organizations successfully  according to deliberate strategies, scholars studying 
organizational institutionalism pay more attentions to how this happens as a by-product 
of the organization’s daily routines and practices. Institutional entrepreneurship  is not 
seen as a sequence of predetermined well considered actions by a ‘heroic agent’. It is 
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rather a capacity for constant adaptation to new circumstances in an ongoing complex 
process with competing institution al logics and where unpredictable events happen all 
the time. Also, human beings have ‘bounded rationality’ so even in a field with only one 
dominant institutional logic, it does not  mean that there is no any possibility of which 
the unexpected events will not happen. 
1.5. Research Method and Data Analysis Procedures
In order to answer the research questions, this study uses a critical case study method to 
respond to the research questions, and to construct a new theory which will explain how 
institutional entrepreneurs use institutional entrepreneurship to become the dominant 
participants in processes technological standard change. The study  uses the standard 
war between BD-HD DVD as its single case study. It systematically  compares and 
contrasts the BD and HD DVD standards throughout the whole standard war. Although 
this is a single critical case, it reflects many key elements of other studies of standard 
wars and institutional entrepreneurship and it might make naturalistic generalization to 
other similar contexts. The case also highlights the role of critical stakeholders 
throughout the change process and shows how different (tangible and intangible) 
resources of institutional entrepreneurs may lead to the use of different strategies 
throughout institutional change processes. 
In order to analyze the case, I collected media reports, official technical documents, the 
archives of official websites, databases and the annual reports of the focal firms, and 
also conducted several interviews with a Sony manager and with media journalists. Due 
to the limited data on the HD DVD website (including data about the standard war and 
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the interviewees), I used a large quantity of media reports and other complementary 
data in my analysis. Due to the nature of Japanese culture, Toshiba people did not agree 
to be interviewed about this standard war. For this reason, I could not access any useful 
information from Toshiba’s 2003-2008 annual reports, and I also could not interview 
any member of the senior management team in Toshiba. I collected a large quantity of 
media reports and complementary data, in order to research Toshiba’s actions in this 
standard war., Many  expert opinions, reviews and analyzes can be found in the reports 
generated by journalists working in the media. Having a large number of media reports 
and complementary  data allowed me to understand Toshiba’s actions in this standard 
war.
The study uses Eisenhardt’s (1989) principles as its theoretical basis. Eisenhardt’s 
empirical studies using these principles have been published in many first-tier academic 
journals (e.g. Administrative Science Quarterly and Academy of Management Journal). 
However, these principles do not suggest any appropriate way of analysing the data. In 
order to ensure credibility, transferability and dependability  (Gill, Johnson, & Clark, 
2010), the study borrows the technique of open coding to analyze the qualitative data. In 
general, I have disaggregated these media reports into smaller units and materials by 
using open coding. 
Within the data analysis, further questions and viewpoints emerged from the open 
coding stage. More research was therefore undertaken to answer them, which used 
official documents concerning the standards, archives of the official websites, sales 
figures and figures for market share found in the Datamonitor and Euromonitor 
databases, company profiles from these databases and the focal firms’ annual reports. I 
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also used my primary findings to construct questions which I used in an interviews with 
my informant at Sony’s head office in 2009 and with a journalist. My informant is a 
general manager in Sony’s BD division who was involved in the entire standard war. 
The journalist works for the New York Times and specialized in consumer electronics 
during the period of this standard war. This data analysis procedure enabled me to 
satisfy the reliability and validity  of this case study. In addition, the procedure is also 
satisfied in the criterion of triangulation.
1.6. Structure of the Thesis
Chapters 2 to 4 of this study are the literature review. Chapter 5 presents its conceptual 
framework. Chapter 6 gives the research methodology. Chapter 7 presents the final 
findings based on chronology. Finally, Chapter 8 contains the conclusions, discussions 
and limitations of the findings, and also proposes the implications for future research.
Chapter 2 focuses on the definition and attributes of standard wars and reviews the 
relevant literature. The relevant literature is organized into rational versus social 
accounts. These two accounts represent different approaches to understanding standard 
wars. Besides, this study highlights the role of stakeholders, which has been paid less 
attention to many empirical studies of standard wars. Furthermore, this study 
distinguishes stakeholders by their criticality for the focal firms. This chapter will also 
demonstrate how the study’s discussion of critical stakeholder management and 
discursive activities is one of main contributions to research. The section will discuss 
the profile and criticality of stakeholders as well. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on institutional change. Before standardisation, new technological 
standards can be seen as prototypes of institutions (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002). 
They  are narrowly  diffused and weakly entrenched. Once these prototypes are 
successfully  institutionalized into fields, they can be seen as institutions. In this way, 
standard wars can be seen as processes of institutional change and institutionalisation.
Chapter 4 focuses on institutional entrepreneurship, and suggests that institutional 
entrepreneurship  and entrepreneurship both aim to increase economic returns. However, 
institutional entrepreneurs aims at achieving economic returns by changing existing 
institutions, whereas traditional entrepreneurs propose new technologies within current 
institutions. This chapter develops organizational institutionalism studies to show that 
power, legitimacy, collective action and discursive activity are the attributes of 
institutional entrepreneurship.
Chapter 5 presents the conceptual framework derived from the literature review. This 
chapter not only proposes the framework but also the guidelines for each variable. 
These guidelines determine which information should be collected in the dataset, and 
derive from the research framework. In general, the power and legitimacy of 
institutional entrepreneurs can be seen as being resources. They have mutual 
relationships with collective action and discursive activity, which are at the heart  of 
institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars. Effective collective action and 
discursive activity therefore lead to product  performance and network effects. This 
study also finds that effective product performance will also produce network effects.
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Chapter 6 describes the research methodology. This study  uses a critical case study 
method and builds a theory from the analysis of the BD-HD DVD case. The BD case 
shows that  the functional perspective cannot explain standard wars alone but has to be 
complemented with an institutional entrepreneurship perspective, even in case of 
standard wars in a mature field with well established institutions, actors and institutional 
logic(s). The BD-HD DVD case is a critical case for showing the importance of an 
institutionalist perspective in the sense that ‘if it  is so in this least likely case it is also so 
in other more likely cases’ Thus, as it is shown that the institutional entrepreneurship 
perspective is needed in order to explain an incremental innovation embedded in a 
mature field it can be concluded that the institutional perspective is also important, and 
probably  even more so, in case of standard wars in other less mature technological 
fields. Apart from this general conclusion, it  is of course not possible to generalize the 
concrete conclusions from this study directly to other standard wars. The BD-HD DVD 
standard war took place in a mature ecosystem. It is unique and extreme in this respect. 
However, the thick description of the case makes possible naturalistic generalization to 
other standard war contexts, including radical innovations embedded in emerging fields. 
Besides, I adopt  the principles outlined in Eisenhardt’s (1989) article: Building Theory 
from Case Study Research as the basis for this qualitative study. Eisenhardt constructs 
rigorous principles which respond to issues of validity  and reliability  in the case study 
method. This study applies these principles in the design of its practical strategies. 
Research information and data are sourced from various content providers including 
New York Times, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), Financial Times, San Jose 
Mercury News, The Economist, BusinessWeek and many trade publications, official 
documents (downloaded from bluraydisc.com and dvdforum.org), market reports 
(DataMonitor and Euromonitor), patent data statistics (World Intellectual Patent 
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Organization, WIPO), and the annual reports of the focal firms (Toshiba and Sony). In 
order to satisfy the quality requirements of qualitative studies, I employed the 
systematical analysis procedures of open coding to analyze the entire dataset.
In order to clearly  describe and analyze the standard war between BD and HD DVD, I 
divide the whole analysis into two parts. Chapter 7 presents the findings of the study 
whereas the process of data analysis by means of open coding is documented in 
Appendix 3. The appendix outlines: (1) the concepts included in a variable; (2) the 
definition of each concept; (3) how the concept is analyzed using the dataset; and (4) the 
definitions of the relationships between variables.
Chapter 8 has five sections. The first  section will show how the findings elaborate the 
original theoretical framework. The second section will present the new theoretical 
framework. The third section will discuss the analytical propositions of the study, and 
compare and contrast it with previous studies, including studies of standard wars and of 
institutional entrepreneurship. The fourth section will discuss the limitations of the 
study. Finally, the fifth section will outline future research. I propose that the changing 
practices of institutional entrepreneurs in a configurational approach, and the role of 
social capital in institutional entrepreneurship  have the potential to be subjects of future 
research.
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Chapter 2. Standard Wars
2.1. Introduction
Traditionally, studies of technology  have focused on its physical characteristics. Such 
studies view technology as a system comprising components and connections between 
them (Constant, 1980; Hughes, 1983). More recently, scholars have considered 
technology to be socially  constructed (Pinch & Bijker, 1987). It is recognized and 
protected as a property  right through the institutions of royalties or patents (Nelson, 
1996), and has social and economic meanings when it  is created to serve a specific 
functional need (Thirtle & Ruttan, 1987).
Technology is a complex artifact, which evolves in the form of a nested hierarchy of 
technology cycles (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). A complex technological artifact  can 
include non-assembled products, simple assembled products and complex systems 
(Utterback, 1994; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). A non-assembled product has no 
separable components (e.g. screws), while a simple assembled product is made from a 
few simple components and sub-systems (e.g. hard disk drives). A complex system, 
however, is made of a set of technological sub-systems connected to each other through 
specific interfaces (e.g. personal computer, laptop etc.). When a firm decides to design a 
complex technological artifact and successfully  standardizes it, “the greater is the 
number of actors needing to be aligned for a technological design to achieve dominance 
and thus the more complicated the sponsoring role becomes” (Suarez, 2004: 275). In a 
complex technology, standards represent interface specifications that dictate how 
different components combine to provide utility to users (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 
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1993). In short, a complex technological artifact  requires standards in order to 
coordinate different components in a unified way.
In modern economies, a standard performs a variety of functions. It provides 
compatibility between products or systems. It  may serve to enhance technology or final 
product quality. It  may reduce variety  and promote the understanding of a technology 
by providing information (DTI Economic Paper, 2005). These statements echo the idea 
that standards also have system and knowledge characteristics (Murmann & Frenken, 
2006). The system characteristic has led to increases in the number and variety of 
specifications which affect industries and markets. The knowledge characteristic has led 
to increases in the property rights and potential economic value of standardisation when 
companies sponsor their own new technologies as dominant designs in given fields. 
Furthermore, this study suggests, that standards also have stakeholder characteristics. 
This is a protocol (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990) that constitutes and typifies the 
interests of different stakeholders about common problems. In order to successfully 
develop a standard, the focal firm should strike a balance between the requirements of 
different users, such as critical manufacturers, consumers, main retailers and so on 
(Tassey, 2000). 
This study defines a standard as a “set of specifications to which all elements of 
products, processes, formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction must 
conform” (Tassey, 2000: 588). Technical/technological standard3  are known as 
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3 Standards have been categorized on the basis of several distinctions, such as technical and non-technical 
standards and process and outcome standards (Brunsson, Rasche, & Seidl, 2012). This study only focuses 
on technical standards. Scholars (Brunsson et al., 2012) indicate that these different types of standards 
have common characteristics.  In general, standards have attributes of institutions while standardization 
have attributes of institutionalization.  This study will further illustrate this viewpoint in the following 
sections and chapters. 
compatibility or interface standards (David & Greenstein, 1990). Such standards are 
aimed at ensuring compatibility and interoperability among the components of a 
technological system (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). Either technical or non-technical 
standard, a standard is one of the key elements of an industry, and represents 
specifications which dictate the ways in which different components of technological 
systems work together for the benefit of users (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993). A 
standard has to be agreed before users exchange and evaluate products in the 
marketplace (Garud & Rappa, 1994). A successful standard should, if possible, be a 
response to all these evaluations and to all the requirements of users. If this is so, when 
the standard is unveiled in the marketplace, it will obtain the support of users to as great 
an extent as possible.
Successful standardization can help a new technology  to be locked into markets. As a 
result, the focal firm can earn a considerable economic return. A standardization process 
is also a socio-political process designed to reach agreement between divergent 
stakeholders in a particular industry. When a focal firm is promoting a new technology, 
it should possess sufficient skills to justify  its plans, when presenting its considered plan 
concerning how it would alter the current standard. This plan should present compelling 
reasons and also motivate other organizations to engage with it for change (Fligstein, 
1997; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Garud et al, 2002; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Within this process, several competitors are likely to emerge, who 
will propose alternative plans. In such a case, the focal firm has to compete with a 
number of other firms until one new technology emerges as the victor (Clark, 1985). 
This process is known as a ‘standard war’.
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The outcomes of standard wars often determine which technologies succeed and which 
fail, and also determine the fate of the firms that sponsor them. These outcomes also 
determine the fate of a number of complementary goods and services which are offered 
around each of the competing alternatives, deciding which succeed and which fail. In 
standard wars, founder firms and participants have mutual relationships. They cooperate 
in researching and developing new specifications and many other activities in 
connection with the standards they promote.
Standard wars bring both benefits and risks to founder firms and participants. A new 
standard may refine the trajectory of a particular technology. At the same time, new 
standards shape the problem-solving techniques which are used in that industry. This 
results in an adhesive technological paradigm which influences future technological 
inquiry  in the field (Dosi, 1988). When founder firms successfully  standardize new 
standards in a particular field, the standards adopted usually  generate considerable 
revenue for them. As a result, they have leading advantages. These advantages can lead 
them to explore new opportunities so that they  can further develop and refine the 
technologies in the future (Schilling, 2002). When a standard is widely adopted, 
complementary  products are often developed which specialized in order to operate 
alongside this standard. The participants who can manufacture these complementary 
products can also earn considerable revenues. These effects constitute positive 
feedback, which results in a reinforcing mechanism. When positive feedback is strong 
enough, firms with dominant designs in network industries may foster winner-take-all 
scenarios. A single product and its founder firm can lock in the entire market for a given 
product or service.
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On the other hand, one risk of developing a standard is technological lock-out 
(Schilling, 1998). A firm may be technologically  locked out because the standard is 
rejected in favor of a competing standard. It will also be locked out if it is unable to 
develop products which are compatible with or superior to the existing standard in the 
market. When there are many different  competitors in a market, they make an effort to 
invest resources and achieve their final goals. This is because the loser of such a 
competition will waste valuable resources and may own redundant technologies.
The outcome of a standard war cannot be understood by looking at  the role of the 
founder firm alone. It is rather the case that dominant designs emerge from a process of 
negotiation among founders and relevant firms, social groups, institutions, and 
regulatory actors (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994; Suarez, 
2004; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992; Van de Ven & Garud, 1993). Standard wars should 
therefore also be viewed as inter-organizational processes (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; 
Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009).
Scholars have adopted many perspectives to explain the emergence of one dominant 
technology over several competing ones. They have identified different factors, such as 
the technological characteristics of the product (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; 
Christensen, Suarez, & Utterback, 1998); the firm’s resources and capabilities (Klepper 
& Simons, 2000; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Schilling, 1998; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; 
Suarez & Utterback, 1995); density, entry/exit rates and the industry life cycle 
(Christensen et al., 1998; Klepper, 1996; Hunt & Aldrich, 1998; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 
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1998; Van de Ven & Garud, 1993; Wade, 1995); and the role of institutional actors 
(Scott, 2008; Garud & Karnøe, 2003). 
Moreover, this study also examines the role of stakeholders in standard wars. 
Surprisingly, this perspective is not explicitly  covered in most earlier studies of standard 
wars. However, it  is not difficult to uncover their influence in previous studies. For 
instance, Sony’s SD and Toshiba’s MMCD engaged in a standard war in the 1990s. At 
the time, IBM and other PC companies played the role of stakeholder, requesting that 
Sony and Toshiba combine their own standards into one. Consequently, Toshiba’s 
MMCD was victorious, and their new standard is the DVD standard. However, less 
attention is paid in the relevant  studies to the issue of stakeholders. The previous section 
suggested that  focal firms should strike a balance between the requirements of users, 
such as critical manufacturers, consumers and main retailers, among others in order to 
reach agreements. As a consequence, this study claims that this issue should be included 
in a new theory of standard wars.
Further, the various perspectives can be categorized into two overall approaches: 
rational versus social accounts (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010). These two accounts 
provide different approaches to studying the process by  which a standard become the 
dominant design by means of increasing diffusion and adoption of new technologies. 
The former account has roots in economic literature and build on the rational actor 
model. Rational users are more likely to adopt a new standard in case, of greater 
network effects, better product performance, and rational strategies of focal firms are 
directed towards aiming for such outcomes. The effects of the variables in the rational 
account can be quantified. For example, this approach will calculate how many market 
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calculate indicators of better product performance than competitors (product 
performance). 
In contrast, the social account has basic roots in sociological literature and focuses on 
the social embeddedness of actors. Based on this viewpoint, social actors’ actions and 
behaviors are influenced by their families, colleagues, and so forth. Once more and 
more members of these communities have developed a favorable view if the new 
technology and adopted a specific technologies or products, they also typically  adopt 
these technologies or products These members embrace the strong-tie connections and 
have a certain degree of reciprocal obligations, intimacy, and emotional intensity 
(Granovetter, 1973). Their opinions and behaviors are m difficult to quantify  the effects 
and numbers matter less. .What does matter is is how you make the markets believe that 
you have better product performance than your competitors. If you are successful in this 
respect you are capable of increasing network effects in markets and counteracting 
initial differences in adoption ratios. 
Further, this study  suggests that many variables relating to standard wars have the 
meanings of rational and social accounts at the same time. For example, network effects 
is a typical variable in industrial economic, which can be seen as related to the rational 
account. However, it does not only  matter ‘how many customers’ having adopted the 
standard. In social accounts, perceptions and connections also influence the decision to 
adopt the specific standard or product. This chapter will compare the meanings of 
different perspectives in rational and social accounts. 
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The aim of this chapter is to suggest  that focal firms must have sufficient skills and 
tactics if they  are to compete with other firms in standard wars. I will use different 
perspectives to explain the nature of these skills. This chapter has several sections: 
Section 2.2 will discuss the benefits of winning standard wars, while Section 2.3 will 
discuss the risks of developing standard wars which initiate standards. The stand-alone 
value and network externality value of technology are generated by lock-in, increasing 
return and winner-take-all. These two values are major revenues for firms which win 
standard wars. Section 2.4 will discuss the factors which can influence standard wars. In 
general, this study will categorize the relevant literatures into rational and social 
accounts and compare their meanings. Section 2.5, derived from these perspectives, will 
identify four attributes of standard wars: framing, mobilizing collaboration, network 
effects and product performance. These four attributes constitute the essential 
characteristics of standard wars. In the end of the section (2.5.5), I will present the role 
of these attributes in previous standard war studies. And Section 2.5.6. will review the 
relevant BD-HD DVD standard wars studies in SSCI database. Finally, Section 2.6 
forms the conclusion of Chapter 2. 
2.2. Benefits of Winning Standard Wars
Stand-alone and network effects can bring in considerable revenue when firms win 
standard wars (Schilling, 2002). In order to earn this revenue, focal firms should 
develop strategies to produce these effects. Firstly, by developing such strategies, focal 
firms can increase the network effects of new standards. When they  can make new 
products comply  with new standards, consumers will be keen to buy them. Secondly, 
stand-alone value depends on transactions. When the stock of popular items in a 
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particular location is almost exhausted, consumers are willing to pay more than the 
usual asking price, rather than spending time and effort to get it  more cheaply 
elsewhere. Various factors may influence the stand-alone value, such as place, delivery, 
use, supplements, maintenance, disposal, and so on (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). In this 
way, focal firms can develop strategies to make users to believe that  the new standards 
are popular in terms of function, qualities, use and etc.
In general, network effects are created not only  by the stand-alone benefits and cost of a 
technology, but also by  the size of its installed base and the availability of 
complementary  products. In standard wars, when a new standard is recognized to have 
major network effects, this value is even higher. Furthermore, if new standards have 
stand-alone value, they  are seen as having performing better than their competitors. The 
discussion of network effects and stand-alone value reflects Suarez’s (2004) view of the 
role of strategic manoeuvring in standard wars. Moreover, its performance is evaluated 
by stakeholders. When consumers compare the value of new standards with those of 
existing ones, they evaluate objective and subjective information. In order to make 
stakeholders believe that a new technology is better, according to Kaplan and Tripsas 
(2008), focal firms should communicate information about it and present an attractive 
image to them. To achieve this, focal firms should focus attention on their discursive 
activities. These discourses should not generate information asymmetry, as asymmetric 
information may impede standardization processes and prevent focal firms from 
winning standard wars.
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2.3. Risks Involved in Developing Standards
The major risk involved in developing standards is technological lock-out  (Schilling, 
1998). This refers to a situation in which firms find themselves unable to develop or 
competitively sell products or services to a particular market  because standards cannot 
be adopted (Schilling, 1998).
Two major problems exist which cause the market to reject standards: failure to 
generate network effects, and failure to respond to the expectations of stakeholders. 
According to a resource-based view, the core capabilities of a firm often give it 
advantages over a competitor (Barney, 1991). These capabilities include distinctive 
competencies (Hitt & Ireland, 1985; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980); core competencies 
(Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990); firm-specific 
competence (Pavitt, 1991); resource deployments (Hofer & Schendel, 1978); and 
invisible assets (Itami & Roehl, 1987). These factors are said to be a set  of capabilities 
which allow focal firms to be competitive in the marketplace. When firms invest in new 
technologies, they  exploit, combine, and recombine existing knowledge and experience. 
This bricolage process means that focal firms can move from local inputs to higher 
degrees of functionality through gradual transformation (Garud & Karnøe, 2003). In this 
way, the absorptive capability  of a firm plays a critical role. This capability may 
influence focal firms by increasing their future ability  to assimilate information, acquire 
knowledge and develop technologies (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Failing to invest in 
absorptive capability may influence the ability of firms to develop  new core capabilities. 
It also influences their ability  to evaluate the importance and merit  of intermediate 
technological advances and then to form more accurate expectations of their 
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commercial return. Thus, a failure of absorptive capability  may  mean that firms are 
unable to immediately  or accurately  respond to the expectations of stakeholders. This in 
turn may cause lock-out.
On the other hand, in network industries, conflicting with the expectations of 
stakeholders (mostly complementary product manufacturers) could lead to lock out. 
New technologies are not useful or desirable to customers if they are not associated with 
a set of complementary goods. Firms producing technologies for which there are no 
complementary  products are likely to have their technologies rejected (Choi, 1994; 
Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986, 1994). Furthermore, the size of the 
installed base may  influence manufacturers of complementary products. It  will be more 
valuable to these stakeholders to support  a technology with many users than one with 
few users. In turn, the availability  of complementary  products influences the technology 
adoption of consumers, and then further increases the installed base (Schilling, 1998, 
2002). If providers of complementary products do not support a technology, or if these 
providers provide less productivity or lower quality price or performance, the founder 
firm may find that their new technologies are locked out of the market.
 
To summarize, winning standard wars may generate considerable revenue for founder 
firms. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, I discussed the potential benefits and risks when firms 
initiate standard wars. These risks can also be seen as opportunities. These 
‘opportunities’ can remind focal firms to pay attention to absorptive capabilities, 
network effects, and stakeholder’s expectations. Section 2.4 will review the relevant 
perspectives which can identify the attributes of standard wars. 
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2.4. Comparison and Contrast of Rational and Social Accounts
In general, we can view the purpose of a standard war as increasing diffusion and 
adoption of new technologies and/or products which are then becoming the dominant 
designs in a field. The relevant literatures can be characterized by two sets of 
explanations: rational and social accounts (Ansari et al., 2010). The rational account 
builds on the rational actor model and is rooted in the economic literature. The 
perspective conceives of adopters of new technologies and products as rational actors. 
They  scan their environment and efficiently make their choices. It represents the most 
dominant perspective in the literature on diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 1995; David, 
1985; Suarez, 2004, Schilling, 2002). 
In contrast, the social account is more closely associated with a sociological 
perspective. The rational account suggests that the technologies and products adopted 
by rational actors are the effective ones. Hence, the weaker existing products or 
performers will tend to be weeded out. However, the social account addresses how 
social actors frequently imitate other actors’ actions or are forced/influenced to adopt 
particular innovations for other reasons than efficiency  reasons. This account points out 
that in order to achieve legitimacy and conformity with norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), social actors may  sometimes adopt inefficient or even 
harmful innovations (Strang & Macy, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 1997). 
Although each account  portrays social actors’ behavior in standard wars in different 
aways, this study  suggests that the two approaches are not exclusive. Rather, within all 
the reviewed perspectives there is research that study the evidence from either arational 
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or a social account. Thus, this study  suggests that even though a seemingly 
unambiguous perspective (e.g. industrial economic and institutional theory) can be 
categorized into either rational or social account, they still also include the meaning of 
the other account. 
The structure of this section will present the idea of each perspective. Then, I will 
further outline what the rational and social accounts involve in each perspective. 
2.4.1. The Social Construction Perspective
The aim of this perspective is to try  to draw other people’s attention to the meaning of 
an object or action and possibly control and manipulate people’s actions by such means 
(David & Strang, 2006; Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998). In general, the perspective 
persuades and makes audience believe that the meaning of the object  is better than the 
others by means of narratives. In a way, this perspective typically represents the social 
account. In contrast, some empirical studies use the budget spending in the media to 
measure the performance of social construction process. In this vein, this perspective 
includes some meanings of the rational account as well. The structure of this section 
will briefly discuss the role of social cognition in standard wars. Then it  will briefly 
present the relevant empirical findings in each account. 
This perspective suggests that the selection of technology occurs through a process of 
negotiation between relevant social groups and reflects the extent to which evaluation 
criteria are influenced in favor of the technology (Bijker et al., 1987; Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008). It involves a system of judgments as to which factors are important, how each is 
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measured, and how they are to be valued (Wojick, 1979). The characteristics of 
technology and its effects should be regarded as a product of human interpretation and 
negotiation between social groups, rather than a reflection of the inherent capabilities of 
the technology and of random technological breakthrough. In turn, standard wars can be 
seen as a socio-political process and a collective technological frame (Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008), which is produced by interactions between various agents.
The view of this perspective is that this frame plays a critical role in standard wars. The 
frame aims to influence the belief, perception and appreciation of the audience, as 
subsequent interpretations are filtered through all three of these factors (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Gilbert, 2006). Using framing, new 
technologies can be justified as indispensable, valid, and appropriate, or rejected, as not 
having these qualities (Rao, 1998; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). Framing also can help focal 
firms to motivate other organizations (including stakeholders), together with consumers, 
making them willing to become involved in the changing plan of the focal firm or to 
purchase a specific technology product (Fligstein, 2001; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). In 
short, the frame plays an important role in shaping the perceptions of stakeholders in a 
nascent technology. 
This perspective has recently converged with a political approach to technology 
(Symon, 2008). The main viewpoint of the political approach is that groups of 
individuals with divergent  interests are seen as wishing to influence the process of 
change, because they wish to make it beneficial to their own interests. Within this 
process, focal firms frequently take an active role in communicating, responding to, and 
dealing with the requirements of these groups. Focal firms can also convince group 
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members of their credibility. The literature suggests that senior management teams 
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2007), strategic alliances (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008) and founders 
of startup firms (Beckman, 2006) can all convince groups that they are credible and 
have the will to do some form of joint experimentation in standard wars. This study 
integrates the social construction perspective and the political approach, to argue that 
the political interests of stakeholders should be considered in standardisation processes 
(Symon, 2008). 
All other things being equal, the greater credibility of the focal firm, the higher its 
likelihood of winning a standard war. For instance, in the 1990s, Sony successfully  used 
their credibility to influence the perceptions of the market and then take Nintendo’s 
leading position in the game console industry after launching PlayStation (PS) 
(Gallagher & Park, 2002). This case suggests that, using an interactive process, focal 
firms are able to move the industry  towards a specific collective frame associated with a 
specific standard. Further, in the social construction processes, the role of stakeholders 
cannot be ignored. The stakeholder perspective suggests that “if we adopt as a unit of 
analysis the relationships between a business and the groups and individuals who can 
affect or are affected by it, then we have a better chance to deal effectively with these 
problems” (Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & de Colle, 2010: 405). In this 
way, focal firms must convince different stakeholders that standard wars are necessary. 
Focal firms also have to convince these stakeholders that winning these standard wars 
can bring them considerable revenues (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Walsh, 2005).
The social construction perspective may  present the typical meaning of social account. 
Focal firms should include narratives as part of their framing processes. They should be 
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capable of telling stories to develop their visions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and to make 
the visions attractive to a variety of audiences (Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby  & 
Greenwood, 2005; Hartelius & Browning, 2008). Such storytelling is legitimized by the 
employment of well-established discursive activities in order to construct substantive 
patterns of imagery  which lend coherence and meaning to plans and standards (Morrill 
& Owen-Smith, 2002). As a result, focal firms should have narrative capability, making 
them able to present particular events or practices in more trustworthy  and general terms 
that will make them attractive to a variety of audiences (Morrill & Owen-Smith, 2002; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Zilber, 2007).
On the other hand, some scholars suggest that focal firms can also have influence 
through the media and advertising (Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Gregan-Paxton & John, 
1997). Generally  speaking, this stream suggests that by spending a certain amount of 
marketing budget in the media, focal firms can enforce or reinforce their position in 
markets and promote their products. For instance, Rindova and Fombrun (1999) 
indicate that IBM reinforced its dominant position in markets by influencing the 
understanding of the industry  structure and its competitive advantage. Lampel (2001) 
further indicate that focal firms may  produce “technological dramas” in the media in 
order to influence the perceptions of the audience regarding a new technology. Often, 
these dramas take the form of product demonstrations and product announcements 
together. The focal firms have to spend budgets for advertising in the media. In this way, 
focal firms can influence how audience interprets the data and the categorization of the 
new technology in audience’s mind (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). 
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2.4.2. The Stakeholder Perspective
Many studies of standard wars have outlined the role of stakeholders but not given them 
the same level of attention as in empirical studies. This study suggests that the issue 
should be discussed separately and explicitly. Drawing on a stakeholder perspective, a 
corporation can be understood as a set of relationships among social groups, each of 
which has a stake in the activities which comprise the business (Freeman, 1984; Walsh, 
2005). The actions and products of focal firms should be evaluated and approved by 
stakeholders or the behavior of organizations be influenced by stakeholders’ actions and 
strategies. In this vein, this perspective represents a social account. However, the 
perspective is also used instrumentally in strategic management (e.g. Harrison, Bosse & 
Phillips, 2010; Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Puncheva, 2008) and marketing (Polonsky, 
Suchard & Scott, 1999), where it is used to calculate how much stakeholders 
management practices influence economic performance (including financial 
performance). Thus, the perspective can represent the rational account as well (Parmar, 
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & de Colle, 2010). 
The term ‘stakeholder’ is conceived more broadly  than ‘shareholder’ or ‘stockholder’. 
Scholars provide various typologies in order to understand the profile of stakeholders in 
environments. For example, according to Frooman (1999), a stakeholder is dependent 
on, or interdependent with, the focal firm through its resources. According to Mitchell, 
Agle and Wood (1997), a stakeholder has power and legitimacy; sometimes it may have 
an urgent claim. The stakeholders in a standard war are all the organizations involved, 
the government and consumers. Following these two definitions, agents of change face 
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many different pressures from different stakeholders. They  will then be exhausted by 
responding to these various pressures on its power and legitimacy.
Economic performance is the primary dependent variable in the strategic management 
variant of the stakeholder perspective. This approach represents the rational account in 
this study. The relevant variables include financial performance, including shareholder 
returns, return on assets, and so on. In general, the empirical studies suggest  that 
beneficial stakeholder relationships can enhance the wealth-creating capacity of the 
focal firm (Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002a), allying with excellent reputational 
stakeholders are more attractive to potential business partners and customer (Fischer & 
Reuber, 2007), and allying with stakeholders can facilitate the formation of alliances 
and long-term contract (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). In this study, allying with an 
appropriate number of stakeholders can be seen as advantageous to focal firms in 
standard wars. 
In contrast, some empirical studies in this perspective suggest  that individuals tend to be 
susceptible to social influence, and habituated to tradition and societal expectations 
(Verbeke & Tung, 2013). This approach suggests that firms are social constructions, 
which operate within socially constructed limits (Oliver, 1997). In other words, this 
approach tends to encompass social justification and social obligations (Zukin & 
DiMaggio, 1990) and trigger public and regulatory pressures and industry  wide rules, 
norms and beliefs to define or enforce socially acceptable behavior. In this vein, the this 
perspective of stakeholders shifts away from supporting resource heterogeneity  towards 
seeking more homogeneity in industries. For instance, firms holding powerful buying 
capabilities and/or leading position in an industry may apply pressures on their buyers 
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or followers, and compel the latter to conformity with particular standards or products. 
In this vein, the influencing beliefs and enforcing organizations to adopt particular 
standards or products represents the social account in this study. 
2.4.3. The Institutional Theory
Institutional theory is typically  identified as representing the social account. This 
approach is used to focus on how subjective experiences, including routines, patterns of 
interaction, and social roles, become and appear as an objective reality. However, a few 
decades ago, this approach was used to trace the diffusion of a particular practice or 
structural features across a field of organizations. The core idea of this stream was to 
observe how organizations become more similar to each other as they respond to their 
common institutional context (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This stream draws from a 
functional epistemology (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009), It defines the institutional 
contexts as stable environments and tends to identify measurable elements of 
organizations that change as a result  of shifting institutional pressures. This represents a 
rational account. By contrast, the other stream is necessary  to trace the values, norms, 
and ideologies underpinning the elements of organizations structure. Then, this stream 
suggests that  the patterns of diffusion are the consequences of institutional dynamics. In 
this vein, although institutional theory typically seems to represent the social account, 
some empirical studies in this approach also includes the meanings of the rational 
account. 
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The discussion of institutional entrepreneurship is the heart  of this thesis. They will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 in detail. Thus, this section will only briefly  present each 
different stream. 
Seen from the rational account, institutional theory can be described as the conditions 
under which organizations adopt practices (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), enter new markets 
(Greve, 1995), engage in decoupling of activities (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), construct 
alliances (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002), and so forth. For example, Haveman’s study  of 
mimetic isomorphism defines the dependent  variable as the rate of entry  into new 
markets by  loan and saving organizations. Westphal et  al (1997) measures the adoption 
rate of TQM  (total quality management) practices by general medical surgical hospitals 
in the US from 1985 to 1993. This study defines the independent variable as diffusion of 
a practice. Thus, the number and adoption rate of the specific practice is analysed as the 
effect of institutions as independent variables in an approach representing a rational 
account. For example, the links between organizations (Davis & Greve, 1997), the role 
of professional networks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the influence of particular 
organizations that act as benchmarks (Haunschild, 1993) have been defined as 
independent variables. 
In contrast, the social account version of this perspective pays attention to the ways in 
which social actors apply meaning to institutionalized practices and structures. For 
example, a study  of ‘Kodak’s moment’ (Munir and Philips, 2005) views Kodak’s main 
achievement in its standard war as the way in which they changed the meaning 
associated with the roll-film camera. Taking photo was viewed as a professional activity 
before Kodak initiated the new camera. However, Kodak successfully linked the camera 
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with the meaning of ‘holiday’. The study does not calculate the marketing budget spent 
in the media or the adoption rate of the product. Rather, they trace how Kodak used the 
discursive activities to put the new meaning of camera into audience’s head. Similarly, 
Maguire et al. (2004) examine the emergence of the Canadian Treatment Advocates 
Council (CTAC) and how to lobby pharmaceutical companies on treatment issues. They 
reveal how different types of power, associated with particular political skills for 
theorization, can be used by the focal firms to create new organizational forms and 
associated practices. 
In summary, the two research streams represent two different accounts. The first stream 
represents the rational account and a functionalist epistemology while the social account 
focuses on the interpretive approach to understand institutions as emergent clusters of 
interactions among and between social actors. 
2.4.4. The Industrial Economic Perspective
The pure economic viewpoint is based upon cost and benefit issues. The industrial 
economic perspective further suggests that each product represents a particular 
technological network, and that the benefits to users depend not only on the attributes of 
each product but also on the relative size of the installed base of each network compared 
to those of its rivals (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Traditionally, this perspective has had a 
range of empirical studies suggesting the size of the installed base playing a critical role 
in standard wars. No doubt, the perspective represents the rational account. However, 
recently, some scholars try to revisit the network effects and bring the meaning of the 
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social account together (Suarez, 2005). This study will briefly introduce the findings in 
the aspect of rational account then discuss the findings in the other aspect. 
Standards play an important role in new industrial developments. They allow producers 
to achieve economies of scale, and enable markets to carry out transactions in efficient 
ways (Tassey, 2000). Producers promote their technologies and strive for acceptance. In 
network industries, if none of a consumer’s friends have a specific product, then that 
product is of little value to that consumer. According to this view, network effects 
(Rohlfs, 1974) form a critical variable in the industrial economic perspective. Network 
effects occur when the value of a product or service to a consumer is contingent on the 
number of people using it. This is true of such products as telephone networks, fax 
machines, railway networks, game consoles and so on (Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1986, 1994). The perspective suggests that focal firms should develop 
strategies in order to generate, increase, and maintain network effects in standard wars.
Collaborations plays strategic roles in standard wars (e.g. Dranove & Gandal, 2003; 
Lawrence et  al., 2002). Collaborations can help firms to secure supplementary 
resources, to increase production effectively, and to diffuse the products. Using the 
amount of member organizations and their network connections, the standard can be 
rapidly diffused to markets. For example, in 1996, the DVD Forum unveiled the 
specifications of DVDs (Dranove & Gandal, 2003). The DVD standard was defined as 
an open standard. Any machine carrying the DVD logo could play any DVD. All DVDs 
would be encoded with the Dolby Digital sound process and other sound processes, 
such as the Dreamworks DTS surround process. Before the DVD standard became 
officially  available, Warner Home Video (and its sister companies such as HBO and 
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New Line), Columbia Tri-Star, MGM/UA and Polygram were already committed to 
producing DVD videos. Some studios reserved their support for DVDs because of 
concerns about the potential success of the technology and also because of fears of 
piracy. However, by August 1998, Universal, Disney, Paramount and 20th Century  Fox 
were all committed to the DVD standard. In this case, Warner, Columbia and Polygram 
were collaborators in the DVD Forum. They  developed and endorsed the new standard 
and then promoted it to the market. Soon afterwards, the DVD standard had been 
widely  accepted in the market, regardless of the technological concerns of some smaller 
studios.
By contrast, in the social account version, researchers pay attention to the concept of 
strong-ties network effects as a key  determinant of technology adoption in standard 
wars (Ahuja, 2000; Rindfleisch & Moorman, 2001; Suarez, 2005). The hypothesis of 
the relevant studies is that, for given users, the strong-ties part of networks may  be 
decisive for technology adoption. The influence of these ties on the adoption of a new 
standard is much greater than the influence of a big network og only  weak ties. The 
strength of ties is measured as a function of frequency of contact. In particular, strong-
ties also comprise reciprocal obligations, intimacy, and emotional intensity 
(Granovetter, 1973). Kraatz points out that small networks with strong ties are valuable 
in “facilitating organizations’ attempts to adapt their core features in response to 
environmental change” (Kraatz, 1998: 623). Moreover, standard wars normally 
represent a period of turbulence. In these uncertain environments with uncertain 
information, the value of strong-tie network effects is greater than classical (weak) 
network effects (Hansen, 1999; Suarez, 2005). In short, even in the typical rational 
account like the industrial economic perspective, they realise that in standard wars the 
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influence of a small group of friends may be greater than a large group of people with 
weak ties. 
2.4.5. The Perspective of Strategy
Also this perspective can present either a rational or a social account. A strategy is 
defined as a pattern in a sequence of actions, which is usually  deliberately  produced, 
and undertaken by firms in order to attain a corporate goal. In both rational and social 
accounts’ view, technology sponsors engage in a series of strategic actions in order to 
promote their particular technology  in standard wars. For example, in the rational 
account, this approach can be used to underpin the marketing strategies for 
demonstrating a technology’s effectiveness (e.g. Meyer, Tertzakian & Utterback, 1997). 
In the social account, it  can underpin the rhetorical strategies for persuading the 
audience’s interpretations and behavior towards a specific technology  (Munir & Philips, 
2005).
In the marketing stream, this approach clearly demonstrates a technology’s 
effectiveness. It suggests that the better a technology performs in relation to its 
competitors, the greater the likelihood that it will become dominant. Obviously, in this 
context the strategy is based on the rational account. In contrast, based on the social 
account, it may become a marketing strategy for influencing the perceptions of a range 
of actors regarding a new technology (Lampel, 2001). In David’s (1986) study, the 
sponsor of QWERTY keyboard used speed-typing contests to draw attention to the 
keyboard design. The goal is to shape the technological frames of constituents regarding 
the new technology. Consequently, some empirical studies have found that 
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technological superiority does not always play  a significant role in standard wars 
(Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987). 
Collaboration has been seen as another critical factor in this perspective (e.g., Hargrave 
& Van de Ven, 2006). Collaboration is defined here as “cooperative, inter-organizational 
relationships which rely  on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control to 
ensure cooperation and coordination and, instead, are negotiated in ongoing, 
communicative processes” (Heide, 1994; Lawrence et al., 2002; Milne, Iyer & 
Gooding-Williams, 1996; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000, 2004; Powell, 1990; and 
cited Lotia & Hardy, 2008: 366). There are two main goals of collaboration in standard 
wars. Firstly, a collaboration should coordinate the differences among participants in 
order to produce innovative and synergistic solutions and to balance divergent 
stakeholder concerns (Hardy, Lawrence & Grant, 2005). Establishing collaborations can 
help  focal firms to gain and guarantee supports from stakeholders for their new 
technology in a standard war (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992; Garud et 
al., 2002; Khazam & Mowery, 1994; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). The logic of this 
approach is to increase the number of member organizations, so that  the focal firms can 
gain as much support and resources as possible. In this vein, it can represent the rational 
account. 
Secondly, motivating other organizations in relevant industries to collaborate can make 
symbiotic relationships. A symbiotic relationship  rests on the notion that  both founder 
firms and participants are likely to continue the relationship for as long as both continue 
to benefit (Etzioni, 1964; Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). Having symbiotic 
relationships in collaborations helps focal firms to maintain the momentum of their 
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R&D activities in these collaborations. Moreover, selecting and having more 
reputational partners in the collaboration can enhance the focal firms’ social status (Hitt, 
Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000) and social justification and obligation (Zukin & 
DiMaggio, 1990). In this vein, using the strategy  of collaboration in standard wars can 
be seen as representing the social account. The aim is to make markets believe that the 
new technology is trustworthy and appropriate. 
Section 2.4.5 outlines a new interpretation of the perspective on standard wars. Each 
perspective includes the meanings of rational and social accounts at the same time. It 
depends on how you study  the field. The difference between the two approaches does 
not simply claim that  the rational account uses quantitative method while the social 
account uses qualitative approach. Rather, it depends on how you define and frame your 
study. 
2.4.6. The Application of Social Account in Standard Wars Studies
Based on the foregoing sections, in the body of standard wars studies, the scholars have 
paid less attention to the social account while the rational account has dominated the 
relevant studies during several decades. The aim of this section is to apply the 
discussion of the social account to standard wars studies. 
Organizations do not constitute closed systems. Rather, an organization is an open 
system, which is embedded in a field. In the stakeholder perspective, organizations are 
embedded in a nexuses of relationships with other organizations in an organizational 
field. All stakeholders, both critical and general, have their own interests and 
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expectations towards the new standards. In organizational institutionalism, 
organizations have to respond to multiple expectations (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 
2010) because they  are embedded in organizational fields. Their stakeholders can 
become the sources of various expectations. Recently, institutionalist scholars name 
these expectations as institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) and multiple logics 
as institutional complexity  (Greenwood; Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 
2011). In order to conclude about the importance of the social accounts in understanding 
standard wars, the following section will refer to relevant concepts of organizational 
institutionalism. However, the detailed discussions relating to organizational 
institutionalism and institutional entrepreneurship will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In current  studies of institutional complexity and logics, there is an increased focus on 
the interaction between institutional pressures and organizational responses (e.g., Oliver, 
1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) and on cognitive viewpoints (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). Institutionalists define situations with multiple 
institutional logics, as characterized by  ‘institutional complexity’ (Greenwood et al, 
2011), referring to the number of logics and the degree of incompatibility between 
them. Organizations face institutional complexity when they confront incompatible 
prescriptions from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). Institutional 
logics is defined as overarching sets of principles that prescribe “how to interpret 
organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to 
succeed” (Thornton, 2004: 70). Institutional logics provide guidelines on how to 
interpret and function in social situation. Because logics can be seen as bundled sets of 
higher rules, norms, values and meanings framing how social actors make sense of the 
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world around them (Cloutier & Langley, 2013). These logics help  to frame collective 
action as well. 
Institutional logics are enacted by representatives having influence on the social actors 
in the field. These representatives can be seen as the organizations’ stakeholders. For 
instance, in Greenwood and his colleagues’ study, regional logics are ‘particularly 
potent when the activities of firms, especially  of large firms, are concentrated in regions 
whose governments champion regional distinctiveness and where the regional activities 
of the firm are significant’ (Greenwood et al., 2010: 521). These regional logics are 
represented by local councils and the firms’ actions are influenced by the councils. In a 
way, the councils can be seen as the stakeholders of the firms embedded in the field. In 
order to gain legitimacy from the stakeholders by fulfilling the appropriate requirements 
ruled by the institutional logics, the organizations have to respond the stakeholders’ 
expectations in the field. However, there are many different stakeholders holding 
different institutional logics in a field, and different institutional logics may have 
competitive relationship with each other (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). They may make it 
important for organizations to satisfy different, even controversial interests at the same 
time. For instance, in the BD-HD DVD standard war, Hollywood studios and customers 
possessed different logics. The former stakeholders asked institutional entrepreneurs to 
pay attention to copyright protection while the latter requested opening of the protection 
mechanism. For Sony  and Toshiba, it was a major challenge to respond to these 
controversial requirements. Consequently, how to respond to these different institutional 
logics is one of the main questions in institutional theory.
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Further, the maturity and stability  of institutional complexity may vary in different 
fields. Greenwood et al (2011) argue that mature fields are more settled and stable than 
emergent fields. The critical difference between mature and emerging field is the 
regularized inter-organizational relationships, which are identifiable patterns of 
interaction among organizations in the field (Greenwood et al., 2011). In a mature field, 
institutional complexity at the organizational level will be lower because the inter-
organizational relationships are more settled. They have certain degrees of maturity and 
stability  for institutional complexity. Thus, in mature fields organizational are better 
able to ‘predict the demands from institutions. Hence, organizations should be better 
able to strategically respond with appropriate practices. For instance, before the BD-HD 
DVD standard war, the optical storage device industry had at least two standard wars, 
VHS vs. Betamax and SD vs. MMCD. These standard wars provided valuable 
experience concerning the importance of capacity and network effects but also of the 
role of stakeholders (in particular, content providers). Moreover, in the digital era, these 
content providers pay much attention to copyright protection technology. In turn, the 
protection can be viewed as the dominant institutional logic in the field. In other words, 
the predictability as an effect  of established institutional logics can be expected to 
enable institutional entrepreneurs to learn how to respond and mitigate the challenges of 
institutional complexity. This study shows that by responding to the demand from a 
dominant institutional logic (copyright protection) in a mature field in an appropriate 
way (providing safer technology), institutional entrepreneurs can obtain rewards (the 
victory of standard war).
Consequently, studying standard wars, we cannot ignore the influence of other 
organizations which are embedded in the same field and cannot ignore the established 
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technology trajectory either. Moreover, although the settled things make the field 
mature and more easily predictable, it also knit a complex web for the focal firms who 
want to alter these settled things. In a way, we can say that the focal firms need 
deliberate plans for changing the settings. 
Suarez (2004) proposed an integrative framework to explain the process of 
standardization, producing this framework by integrating the literature of industrial 
economics, technology management, and institutional theory. Certainly, this framework 
can be used to explain how to win standard wars. The framework suggests that the 
outcome of standard wars is influenced by firm-level and environmental factors. The 
firm-level factors that may influence technological dominance include the firm’s 
technological superiority, complementary  assets and credibility, installed base, and 
strategic manoeuvring. Environmental factors which influence dominance and intervene 
in relations between firm factors and dominance include institutional regulations, 
network effects, environmental regimes and characteristics of the field itself. Suarez 
clearly  demonstrates the importance of strategic manoeuvring in standard wars. In order 
to gain the support of other organizations, focal firms have to make them understand the 
meanings of new technological artifacts (Bartel & Garud, 2009). However, he fails to 
identify the importance of the construction of meaning.
Suarez’s (2004) model is a simple linear model discussing five phases in the process of 
technological dominance. In a temporal order, R&D buildup, technical feasibility, 
creating the market, decisive battle, and post-dominance are identified as the five 
critical phases in standard wars. 
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Figure 2.1. Suarez’s Simple Linear Model of Technological Dominance
Source: Suarez (2004)
In the model, each phase is characterized by the main tasks to be completed. The model 
implies that when the main tasks of each phase are completed then the focal firms can 
go further to the next one. 
Table 2.1. Key Factors of Success at Each Stage of the Dominance Process in 
Suarez’s Model
Source: Suarez (2004)
Actually, Suarez’s (2004) further proposes a typology and points out that what kind of 
tasks should be completed in each phase (Table 2.1.). For example, in phase I, focal 
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firms should build up  the firm’s credibility, establish the complementary assets of new 
standards and determine the regime of appropriability and the characteristics of the 
technological field, which determine the level of the competition and collaboration that 
will exist among different technological trajectories. Based on the outcomes of the 
phase I, the firms can further build up the technological superiority  and the regulative 
attributes of new standards in phase II and likewise. 
This study  suggests that the phases of standard war cannot be distinguished clearly. The 
critical events can trigger a new phase of the standard war but this does not mean the 
previous phase is ended. Focal firms and partners’ tasks are becoming more and more 
complex along with time development. The importance of the various factors shifts over 
time according to the sequence of Suarez’s model but many tasks happen 
simultaneously. 
The focal firm needs a deliberate plan. During this process, they need to theorize, 
engage in R&D, develop  the specifications of new standards, establish plans for 
promoting them and initiate any  other necessary  activities. The focal firm selects a 
number of stakeholders when the plans are put into action. It is unlikely that there will 
be stakeholders who are suitable for every  task. Rather, the focal firm therefore needs to 
select different types of stakeholders at the beginning of the process and invite them to 
form collaborations. Some will focus on R&D activities while others will concentrate 
on marketing campaigns. Even though some stakeholders are not critical in the 
beginning stages, by  selecting them to engage in the collaborations, focal firms can 
utilize them as symbol. Their inclusion may not be functionally relevant but it is 
symbolically important because it shows that the new standard is endorsed by these 
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stakeholders. Later, when the new technologies are presented to the market, focal firms 
tend to cooperate intensively with stakeholders with complementary products. Their 
main task at this stage is to promote the final products in the market as quickly  as 
possible. In this vein, this study stresses that the profile and the criticality of 
stakeholders are dynamic in standard wars. Before discussing the issues, we need to 
clarify the difference between critical and general stakeholders. 
2.4.6.1. The Profile and Criticality of Stakeholders in Standard Wars
Rather than adopting broad definitions of the term ‘stakeholder’ (e.g. Mitchell et al., 
1997; Frooman, 1999), I adopt a strict perspective concerning its use in standard wars, 
which I term ‘critical stakeholders’. ‘Critical stakeholders’ refers to reputational actors 
who have critical resources for the organization’s R&D activities, manufacturing and 
marketing as part of processes of technological standard change. The participation of 
such stakeholders directly contributes to the new standards of focal firms, in both 
functional and symbolic terms. Their participation not only influence the network 
effects and product performance of technological standards, but also motivates other 
organizations to engage in a particular collaboration. In accordance with this definition, 
many stakeholders, such as governments, are excluded from this study. In a nation-state 
setting, government policies should be seen as a basis for organizations. Although 
government policies influence the actions of focal firms in specific ways, initiating 
standard wars means that focal firms are able to compete equally with their rivals for the 
dominant position in a market. If Firm A receives an exclusive favor from the 
government, however, Firm B will not be able to compete equally with it. As a result, 
this situation cannot be defined as a standard ‘war’.
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Focal firms should view such critical stakeholders as symbiotic partners. In comparison 
with other general stakeholders, who have fewer critical resources, both functional and 
symbolic, critical stakeholders possess the critical resources required by focal firms in 
standard wars. Standard wars can seldom be implemented without support, so firms 
must typically  mobilise collaborations, and cultivate cooperation with stakeholders 
(Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002; Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence et al., 2002; Rao, 
1998). In collaborations, focal firms must  define the responsibilities and obligations of 
members. These responsibilities and obligations are capable of putting them in the right 
position to seek divergent change (Scully & Creed, 2005). Focal firms are generally 
likely to invite stakeholders in relevant industries to engage in collaborations. If such 
invitations are accepted, focal firms are able not only  to secure information, and to 
exchange and share resources (Nahapiet  & Ghoshal, 1998), but also to turn these 
stakeholders into symbiotic players, thus reinforcing their influence on standard wars. In 
order to maintain the quality of their relationships with these critical stakeholders, focal 
firms must deal with them using reciprocity.
By using reciprocity, focal firms will acquire the ability  to prevent, or decrease the 
likelihood of, resistance and misunderstanding. If such situations occur, focal firms 
must devote greater effort to repairing the relationships with their stakeholders. The 
literature of networks therefore suggests that they are willing to choose critical 
stakeholders with whom they  have strong, long-standing ties (Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1995, 
1998; Rosenkopf, Anca & Varghess, 2001). This is because nurturing symbiotic 
relationships with organizations which have weak ties with the focal firms is risky and 
consumes both time and money. Instead, focal firms are more likely  to choose critical 
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stakeholders who have or have had intensive relationships with them in promotional, 
R&D, manufacturing and marketing activities, and, as a result, have strong ties with 
them. They have much greater communication frequency, mutual trust, emotional 
intensity and reciprocal service (Granovetter, 1985). Focal firms are more likely to 
establish groups in standard wars with these critical stakeholders than with other 
stakeholders, in order to make essential decisions.
This does not mean that other, more general, stakeholders are not important. General 
stakeholders are not able to directly influence the theorisation and specification of new 
standards. However, they can support those materials which are co-developed by focal 
firms and critical stakeholders. General stakeholders have less reputation and credibility 
in a given institutional setting. However, the amount of support provided by general 
stakeholders will also motivate the actions audience toward the focal firm’s camp 
(where the audience includes prospective consumers and organizations who have or 
have not engaged in the camps of competitors). As a result, focal firms should establish 
different strategies for critical stakeholders and the general member organizations with 
which they collaborate in standard wars (Hardy et al., 2005). Focal firms should have 
specialised strategies for critical stakeholders, which respond to the expectations and 
requirements of such stakeholders, and thus motivate them to engage in their groups. 
Thus, focal firms and their critical stakeholders can rapidly research and develop  the 
specifications of a new technology, or perform other activities which are critical to 
standard wars. Focal firms should have more generalised strategies for other member 
organizations, in order to further broaden and permeate the influence of critical 
stakeholder groups, and to establish more technical specifications for their new 
technologies. In turn, focal firms are able to produce efficient specifications for new 
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technologies and to broaden the economic scale of new technologies in a particular area. 
In short, having a mixture of strong and weak ties in a collaboration can increase the 
collective performance of that collaboration (Hardy et al., 2005).
Having the support of critical stakeholders generally has two advantages for firms 
engaged in standard wars. Firstly, if critical stakeholders are motivated to engage in 
groups established by focal firms, they will legitimize new technologies and bring their 
own connections with other organizations into these groups. In strategic management, 
Choi and Wang (2009) suggest that having good relationships with critical stakeholders 
not only enables a focal firm to perform more strongly in terms of new technology, but 
also helps poorly  performing firms to quickly  improve. When critical stakeholders have 
a good reputation, focal firms gain the appearance of legitimacy by being allied with 
them (Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006). If critical stakeholders are symbiotic allies in 
standard wars, they  are more likely to share information and give support in ways that 
produce greater efficiency and innovation (Harrison et al., 2010). In this way, 
networking with critical stakeholders, together with strong performance, make them 
more attractive to prospective organizations and to customers in a particular 
marketplace (Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Fombrun, 2001; Puncheva, 2008).
Secondly, if focal firms have critical stakeholders, they can rapidly promote new 
technologies and achieve penetration into markets. Marketing theory tends to view the 
external environment as an uncontrollable constraint (Polonsky et al., 1999). However, 
according to the stakeholder perspective, a focal firm and its environment are extremely 
interdependent. Many elements of the external environment are influenced by the firm. 
They  further suggest that focal firms should use stakeholders to integrate a wider set of 
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relationships into a model of marketing interactions, resulting in more options for the 
firm and thus more opportunities to create value.
This study suggests that the criticality of stakeholders could be dynamic. Focal firms 
have to achieve different tasks in different stages of standard wars. However, no one 
individual organization can achieve all of them. Some of stakeholders may be more 
capable of achieving some tasks and others may efficiently achieve others. Focal firms 
should select qualified partners to achieve specific tasks. They should keep an arms-
length relationship with stakeholders. Then they  can recognize who have sufficient 
capabilities to play  the critical role on some tasks. In a sense, the term ‘critical 
stakeholder’ does not point out that specific organizations have close relationship  with 
the focal firms. Rather, the term means that if the organization has sufficient  capability 
to complete specific tasks in standard wars, the organization can be called as critical 
stakeholder for the focal firm. Thus, not only the criticality  of stakeholder but also the 
profile of critical stakeholders is dynamic in standard wars. They are task-oriented.
2.5. Attributes of Standard Wars
Integrating rational and social accounts, this study identifies four attributes of standard 
wars: framing, collaboration, network effects, and product performance. The social 
construction perspective claims that the focal firms can use discursive activities to 
frame new technologies to their audience during standard wars. The body of literature 
on the industrial economic perspective pays attention to network effects and product 
performance in standard wars. The strategy and stakeholder perspectives demonstrate 
that focal firms should develop skills which enable them to establish collaborations and 
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influence critical stakeholders, enhance the quality  of new technologies and promote 
new technologies to the public. The institutional theory  perspective provides a different 
view. The new standard can be seen as a kind of institution when it has been 
successfully  standardized in markets. The SI approach suggests that many social, 
economic, political, organizational and technical factors can influence standard wars. 
This approach underlies the perspectives used in the study of standard wars, and this 
section will define and elaborate the role of these attributes in standard wars.
2.5.1. Framing
The aim of framing is to create a vision for standard wars. Focal firms must craft a 
vision for change, focusing on the misalignment of current standards. In order to ensure 
that the interests of social actors are satisfied, focal firms should create strategies to 
enable the new standards to be altered or the misalignment to be changed.
Using social movement studies, firms often utilize framing strategies to present  the 
promoted standard as a solution to the needs of the public and those of prospective 
organizational purchasers. Communication studies (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972) 
show that the framing discourses of focal firms should present their understanding of 
the views of the audience. Thus, focal firms should set  up and maneuver agendas which 
appear on various media, including mass media. Scholars distinguish three dimensions 
to this agenda-setting process: (1) the problem it helps to resolve; (2) the existing 
arrangements to which it is preferred; and (3) the compelling reasons which motivate it 
(Snow & Benford, 1988). Social movement studies further show that these dimensions 
are translated into three different types of functional framing: diagnostic framing, 
88
prognostic framing, and motivational framing (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; 
Markowitz, 2007; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008).
Firstly, diagnostic framing seeks to explicitly make known the problems with current 
standards and assign blame for them (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Some studies call 
these problems contradictions (e.g. Seo & Creed, 2002) or discontinuity (e.g. Anderson 
& Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). The diagnostic framing strategy 
informs the audience clearly that existing standards contradict the interests and 
expectations of social actors.
Secondly, prognostic framing presents the promoted new standards as being superior to 
the misaligned standard and/or those alternatives which are supported by  competitors 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). This strategy also presents the new standards as having 
won some attention or support from critical stakeholders. This strategy implies that the 
theorisation and/or specifications of new standards resonate with the interests and 
values of prospective organizational purchasers, and show awareness of their 
requirements (Fligstein, 2001).
Thirdly, motivational framing provides compelling reasons to support the new standard 
being promoted (Misangyi et al., 2008). Focal firms should be capable of clearly 
recognizing and identifying the interests of prospective organizational purchasers 
(Fligstein, 1997) and responding to their requirements. In order to successfully  motivate 
others to collaborate, they should possess the skills to identify  their essential audience, 
together with the ability to analyze and secure cooperation in collaborative entities and 
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to assess the network configuration of the positions of partners and of other relevant 
actors in the given field.
These different types of framing highlight the role of discursive activities in standard 
wars. Discursive activities help focal firms to promote their ideas and to persuade 
different actors in the field or in the competitor’s camp. Zott and Huy’s (2007) study, a 
two-year field study of British ventures, shows that firms initiating new ventures are 
more likely to acquire resources and support if they perform discursive actions. In their 
study, discursive activities are defined as “the actor display[ing] or tr[ying] to draw 
other people’s attention to the meaning of an object or action that goes beyond the 
object or action’s intrinsic content or functional use” (Zott & Huy, 2007: 70). They 
show that conveying the firm’s credibility, professional organization, organizational 
achievement and quality  of stakeholder relationships can help  it to obtain more 
resources and achieve a lower level of information asymmetry than is the case among 
firms who do not do this.
The framing strategy also outlines the role of collaboration in standard wars. A 
successful framing strategy can divert the audience’s attentions to the misalignment of 
the existing standard. It can also motivate them to find solutions collaboratively. In 
summary, if focal firms have a good reputation and/or are partners in collaborations, 
they  may be able to motivate other prospective organizations to engage in their projects 
(Stuart, 2000).
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2.5.2. Mobilizing Collaboration
Firms typically need to mobilize collaboration and cultivate cooperation by investing in 
relevant activities in standardisation processes (Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence et al., 2002; Rao, 1998). In order to manage the actions of 
participants, appropriately, focal firms should be capable of defining and assigning their 
responsibilities and obligations in standard wars (Scully & Creed, 2005).
Implementing standard wars is both costly and challenging. The main goals of 
collaborations are to mobilize resources, exchange and share ideas, coordinate the 
different opinions of members, and establish mechanisms to govern the management of 
the tangible and intangible resources in standard wars (Battilana et al., 2009). Tangible 
resources, like financial assets, can be used to counter the liability of focal firms in the 
early period of standard wars. The meanings and usages of new standards can easily be 
ignored, because the public is not familiar with them (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Garud et al., 2002). By using financial resources, focal firms can encourage some of 
their critical stakeholders to favor the promoted new standards (Demil & Bensédrine, 
2005)
Intangible resources are concerned, social positioning can help firms to mobilize 
collaborations, which again supports the implementation of standard wars. Sherer and 
Lee (2002) suggest that high status firms can leverage their network status, in order to 
impose changes in a particular field of activity. The focal firm can also leverage the 
endorsement of such higher status firms in order to increase the legitimacy of new 
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technologies (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) and then mobilize other actors to take part 
in the achievement of change.
This discussion demonstrates the importance of networks in standard wars. Both Lin 
(2001) and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) indicate that social resources embedded in 
social connections play  important roles in the interaction between social structures and 
individual actors. Firms are able to access and use social resources to maintain or 
promote their interests in a social structure. A collaboration can be seen as a community 
which is subject to similar regulatory  pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, Ruef, 
Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). When reputable and high-status firms (including focal firms 
and stakeholders) collaborate, they do not only jointly own many resources but they 
create a powerful atmosphere. This can construct equally powerful meanings which 
influence the perceptions and actions of prospective organizations. In turn, as other 
organizations cannot easily ignore the promoted new standards, focal firms can make 
them think again about the possibility of collaborating (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008).
Furthermore, focal firms are more likely to choose partners who have joined them in 
intensive activities, such as R&D, or who engage in such intensive activities 
themselves. These activities create strong ties, which can facilitate in-depth, two-way 
communication and the exchange of detailed information between or among related 
parties (Granovetter, 1985; Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). In addition, when firms are 
considering standard wars, they may need richer and more detailed information about 
the implications and practices of new standards. If they already have strong 
collaborative ties, focal firms can ensure that social resources are exchanged and shared 
between these member organizations. Focal firms can easily define these participants as 
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symbiotic players associated with the enactment of standard wars (Lepak & Snell, 
1999). This symbiotic relationship enables both partners to mutually  adapt to the 
changing demands of the new standards. In this way, choosing organizations who 
already have strong ties as symbiotic partners in standard wars is an effective strategy.
Consequently, aside from the membership structure of collaborations, I would suggest 
that focal firms should know how to make use of their symbiotic partners in standard 
wars. This view recalls the role of the critical stakeholder. Although every participant 
has, to some extent, a stake in the needs of focal firms, critical stakeholders can most 
easily become symbiotic partners. This is because symbiotic partners have an intensive 
relationship  with focal firms. Once a participant has an intensive relationship with, and 
a critical stake in, the focal firm, the focal firm can be certain of winning its 
engagement. 
2.5.3. Network effects
Network effects occur when the value of a product or service to a consumer is 
contingent on the number of people using it. Examples of this include telephone 
networks, fax machines, railway networks, game consoles, etc (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1986, 1994). 
Poor availability of complementary  products increases the likelihood of technological 
lock-out for their firm that sponsors the technology. Gupta, Jain, and Sawhney (1999) 
determine that  the actions of the manufacturers of complementary products play  a 
critical role in the consumer adoption process. They also suggest that the suppliers of 
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television programming have a significant impact on the installed base growth and 
diffusion of the standard of high-definition television. In this way, producers who are 
also stakeholders may hold substantial influence over consumer expectations 
concerning the core product, even after dominant standards have emerged (Clements & 
Ohashi, 2005).
The scale of network effects may be influenced by the performance of both frames and 
collaborations. This is because they can influence development specifications and 
increase the legitimacy of new technologies. The former may  strengthen product 
quality, product price and so on, while the latter can influence a greater number of 
prospective organizations to take notice of the development of a promoted new standard 
and take action. This study  suggests that an effective frame and effective collaborations 
may in turn lead to network effects in standard wars.
2.5.4. Product Performance
The aim of product performance is to increase market share, achieve economies of scale 
by selling a new product which holds the new technological standard, and respond to 
the expectations of stakeholders. Product performance has been seen as a determining 
factor in studies of competitive advantage (e.g. Barney, 1991; Montoya-Weiss & 
Calantone, 1994; Henard & Szymanski, 2001), as well as being a factor which is 
evaluated by  both the market  and stakeholders. In short, product performance should 
demonstrate the specifications of new standards which have been successfully 
integrated with the views of collaborating stakeholders.
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Even if products display  superior performance and have the support of stakeholders, 
some empirical studies show that they may  still not be accepted by the market. This is 
because the products of one or more competitors have established a large installed base 
with the earliest  versions of those products (David, 1985; Cusumano et al., 1992). A 
focal firm which owns a product which gains the endorsement of stakeholders and a 
large installed base before it  is unveiled, should clearly  maintain the leading position in 
that standard war. However, if the focal firm contradicts the stakeholders’ expectations, 
even though the product has been presented to the market, the stakeholder will move 
away or realign themselves with the focal firm’s competitors. For example, Sony’s Blu-
ray Disc (BD) and Toshiba’s HD DVD standard used the same copyright protection 
mechanism (Advanced Access Content System, AACS) to protect the intellectual 
property  rights of content providers. However, in 2005, Toshiba invited Microsoft to 
join them on the side of HD DVD, and announced that they would allow consumers to 
copy HD DVD content  on to their own home network. This announcement strongly 
contradicted the interests of content  providers. Later, in 2007, Sony announced that the 
BD standard would provide more protection, a development they called BD-Plus. In 
other words, the BD standard provides greater security  for one highly  critical 
stakeholder, the Hollywood studios. As a result, even though Toshiba had the leading 
position in the DVD standard and had the support of Microsoft, many Hollywood 
studios changed their mind and exclusively supported the BD standard. 
Effective product performance is led by  collaboration in standard wars. During the 
specification development process, the focal firm will use a framing strategy to make 
use of pre-launch promotion, and ensure that the audience is aware of new 
developments. Product performance during standard wars is strongly  influenced by 
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R&D activities in which stakeholders participate. Such path dependence manifests itself 
in positive feedback or opportunities for leading firms to further consolidate their 
leading position (Arthur, 1996). In other words, there is a propensity for the strong to 
grow stronger and the weak to grow weaker (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). If the leading 
firm becomes unable to retain the support  of its stakeholders, it may also rapidly lose its 
leading position. In this way, the leading firm has to not  only keep promoting the 
development of the new standard to the market, but also keep the expectations of 
stakeholders in mind, and make those expectations material in the specifications of the 
new product.
2.5.5. Discussion of these Attributes in Existing Studies
In fact, framing, collaboration, network effects, and product performance are all 
explicitly or implicitly  mentioned or discussed in existing studies. Most studies of 
technological standard change have paid a great deal of attention to the issues of 
collaboration, network effects and product performance (e.g. Clement & Ohashi, 2005; 
Besen & Farrell, 1994; Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1986, 1994; 
Krugman, 1991; Hovav, Hemmert & Kim, 2011; Cusumano et al., 1992). Scholars 
cluster these concepts together to produce functionalist  arguments. The literature 
concerning social movements also examined the role of frames (e.g. Battilana et al., 
2009; Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004), which has received less attention in functionalist 
arguments. This section will discuss the attributes of standard wars as they appear in 
actual standard wars and elsewhere. A review of actual standard wars and their 
attributes can also be used to demonstrate the importance of these attributes, and this 
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discussion can also be used to further highlight the research gaps identified by this 
study.
Framing strategy is mainly  discussed in the literature of social movements (Battilana et 
al., 2009; Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004). When focal firms identify opportunities in 
institutional settings, they frame interpretations, social constructions and attributions 
within processes of change. Framing then plays a mediating role between these 
opportunities and collective actions. For example, Garud et al. (2002) implicitly 
mention the role of framing in their study of the Java case. They determined that Sun 
sponsored Java technology in an open-system strategy. Sun framed open-system 
strategies to allow software developers and manufacturers of complementary products 
to easily access Java technology. In this example of technology sponsorship, Garud et 
al. paid attention to the role of framing. By using framing in the media, Sun was able to 
attract the attention of its audience and to change their perceptions of its new standard. 
For example, Sun announced that ‘write-once, run-anywhere’ was its promotional 
slogan for the technology.
The case also showed that Sun understood that software developers were their most 
important audience. Based on the sub-research question proposed in this study, these 
software developers could be seen as Sun’s stakeholders. Garud et al. detailed the 
process of interaction between Sun and these stakeholders. The company  allowed third-
party  developers to download Java from its official website free of charge. It  also 
trained these software developers in using Java to develop Java-based software. As a 
result, Sun defeated Microsoft in the area of technology sponsorship.
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However, the Java case fails to explain the ways in which focal firms use a larger 
number of discursive activities to maintain their changing discourses in the minds of 
their audiences, and then to further influence their actions so that they support the new 
standard. It  also fails to explicitly discuss the ways in which focal firms use collective 
actions to encourage their most important stakeholders to share their commitment and 
alignment of interests, and to coordinate their actions in standard wars (Gulati, 
Wohlgezogen & Zhelyazkov, 2012). Firstly, the one of major tasks of framing is to 
establish and sustain agendas in the mind of the audience. For this reason, focal firms 
not only frame visions of their new standards in the mind of the audience, but must also 
use sequential discursive activities to promote standards, undermine the alternative 
standards of competitors, and discuss the advantages of their standards. Generally 
speaking, these agendas aim to retain and sustain the influence of discourses on the 
audience. Some empirical studies simply mention the role of framing, as in the Java 
case. Other empirical studies, such as those by Zilber (2007, 2006, 2002), have 
examined the ways in which two contradictory narratives compete for the dominant 
position in their social settings. However, they fail to identify  which actions are used by 
focal firms or actors in standard wars. This study aims to fill this research gap, 
something which will be one of the major research contributions of this study.
Secondly, to initiate standard wars, focal firms must share and coordinate the 
commitments, visions, and common actions of many other partners. To some extent, this 
viewpoint overlaps with the argument for collective action in standard wars. This is 
because, as social movement studies demonstrate, framing aims to motivate the 
audience to act favorably towards the concept of the focal firm. If they have more 
participants in their camps, focal firms have traditionally  found it easier to achieve their 
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goals in standard wars. However, simply collaborating with partners does not  guarantee 
that the theorisation of a technological standard is successfully achieved. Without 
considering the roles and influence of different stakeholders, focal firms find it difficult 
to finalize the specifications of standards and to achieve their final goals. For this 
reason, focal firms would be better employed managing critical stakeholders to theorize 
their specifications. They should keep  certain intensive relationships with focal firms. 
Their role in standard wars is different from that of other general stakeholders and from 
the traditional definition of stakeholders. The viewpoint and contribution of critical 
stakeholders will be further discussed later.
In contrast to their treatment of framing, the existing studies discuss the other three 
attributes more explicitly. These attributes can be generally clustered as functionalist 
arguments. They argue that the use of collective action in standard wars leads to the 
generation of wider network effects and better product performance. They in turn aim to 
improve the efficiency of a new standard and then an increase in revenue. This section 
will discuss the network effects and product performance of actual standard wars, and 
then discuss the role of collective actions and how they relate to the outcomes of those 
standard wars.
Proponents of network effects, for example, Clements and Ohashi (2005) suggest that 
many products exhibit network effects, in which the value of a product to its customers 
increases with the total number its of users. In their study of the U.S. video game 
market, they show that expanding the variety of complementary products (in this case 
gaming software) makes the original product  more effective. According to Besen and 
Farrell (1994), network effects can be seen as being a demand-side economy of scale. 
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Therefore, since the purchasing decisions of buyers are strongly  influenced by forecasts 
of future sales, “there can be large rewards to affecting these expectations” (118). In 
their view, therefore, an inferior product “may be able to defeat a superior one if it is 
widely  expected to do so” (118). (See also Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986, 1994; Krugman, 1991).
Generating network effects can be associated not only with economic factors but also 
with social characteristics. Hovav, Hemmert and Kim (2011) suggested that network 
effects created by South Korean government support for IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 
6) acted as an adoption driver, which combined with social characteristics to promote 
the technology. Their study found that the South Korean government’s IPv6 strategy 
focused on extensive investments in the development of related technology in order to 
demonstrate the technical capabilities of IPv6 and create network effects. Their study 
also showed that socio-political dynamics created by the South Korean government’s 
support for IPv6 also acted as an adoption driver. Their study suggested that normative 
pressure has a salient influence on adoption decisions. In this case, this was because 
South Korea is a collectivistic and high power-distance society, so that leading 
organizations in Korean society tend to exert strong influence over the behaviour of 
other organizations (Biggart, 1997). Government policies and the influence of leading 
organizations in South Korea created the expectation that IPv6 would become a 
dominant design in that  country. The social characteristics of Korea meant that 
normative pressure and network effects were the main adoption drivers of IPv6. As a 
result, their study indicated that socio-political factors should be considered when 
studying standard wars.
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Product performance is also seen from a functionalist  viewpoint in the existing 
empirical studies. In general, such scholars have argued that the adoption of standards is 
positively associated with higher levels of operational performance. According to 
marketing and stakeholder perspectives, product performance is a very important factor 
when securing customer satisfaction and loyalty. For example, the case of Betamax vs. 
VHS (Video Home System) highlights the importance of this aspect  of product 
performance (Cusumano et al., 1992). Their study shows that the key differences 
between Betamax and VHS in terms of technical performance were tape length and 
image quality. Betamax offered sharper recording as well as clearer sound and image, 
but could only  hold an hour of content, as opposed to the two hours of VHS. Although 
clearer image and sound also satisfied the requirements of Hollywood studios, larger 
capacity lowered the costs of these content  providers, as well as saving space for the 
retailer. Moreover, between 1977 and 1983, Sony was the first company to offer multi-
function machines (including scan, slow and still functions), and high fidelity (hi-fi) 
sound. JVC were generally  able to match Sony’s new features within a few months, and 
occasionally more quickly. They study shows that the extent of superiority is not 
defined only by customers, but also by stakeholders (in the case, Hollywood studios, 
retailers and so on). Although Sony was generally  considered to have produced a 
superior product in this case, it still lost the standard war because it contradicted the 
interests of stakeholders.
Finally, the role of collaboration has also been examined closely in empirical studies of 
standard wars. For example, Garud et al.’s study (2002) of the Java case showed that 
Sun established its own collaborations in order to frame and define the specifications of 
Java, and to communicate them to the market. Hovav et al.’s study (2010) of the South 
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Korean IPv6 case showed that the South Korean government collaborated with leading 
organizations in order to shape normative pressure and generate network effects. Such 
normative pressure made other South Korean organizations believe in the advantages of 
the technology and adopt the IPv6 technology. Cusumano et al.’s study (1992) of the 
standard war between Betamax and VHS explicitly shows that the JVC’s collaborations 
with other organizations was the critical factor in the victory of VHS. Furthermore, their 
study also demonstrate that a focal firm must collaborate with stakeholders. In a 
standard war, product performance needs to be evaluated and endorsed by such 
stakeholders, and then promoted to markets. As a consequence, these studies conclude 
that a collaboration should be seen as a core concept in a standard war. Its function to 
help  the specifications of standards and activities to be theorized (using framing, 
network effects and product performance).
This finding shows that focal firms need to establish certain relationships with 
stakeholders who have a certain reputation in relevant industries. Hollywood studios not 
only provided their movie titles as complementary products but also used their 
reputations to attract  consumers to purchase the VHS standard. For this reason, 
Hollywood studios were critical stakeholders in the case. This study also shows that 
before they generate network effects and product performance, focal firms need to 
collaborate with critical stakeholders who have reputations, relationships and common 
experience which are relevant to the standard. These features differentiate critical 
stakeholders from general stakeholders. Because of this, focal firms need to instigate 
collective actions with two groups of stakeholders. This study suggests that, at first, 
focal firms should ally themselves with critical stakeholders in order to theorize the 
specifications of new standards and to establish primary plans at the beginning of 
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standard wars. The outcome of this can be used primarily  to legitimize the new 
standards and to motivate more organizations to participate in their camp. Later, focal 
firms should collaborate with all participants in their camps (including critical 
stakeholders) to discuss the plans being used in the standard wars. If they have well-
established members in their camps, the specifications of new standards may be 
finalized as completely as possible. As a result, new standards, which have been 
theorized by critical stakeholders and produced by majority organizations, can generate 
wider network effects and better product performance than those standards which have 
been produced by lesser organizations.
This section has examined the four attributes of standard wars (framing, collaboration, 
network effects and product performance) in existing studies of actual standard wars. 
The role of framing has formed part of social movement studies, while the other three 
are discussed in empirical studies of standard wars. Discussing these attributes also 
highlights some previously unnoticed lacunae in existing studies. Firstly, these studies 
fail to show the ways in which focal firms use a range of discursive activities to 
maintain the audience’s attention, and to change their actions in other ways in standard 
wars. Social movement studies show that  focal firms must diagnose the problems of 
existing standards, and suggest potential solutions to the social actors who must deal 
with these problems. For this reason, focal firms need to keep their ideas in the mind of 
the audience. One of the main contributions of this study is to fill this gap in the existing 
research. It proposes new ways in which focal firms can use discursive activities to 
influence the perceptions of the audience in a standard war. Secondly, social movement 
studies also demonstrate that focal firms will be able to motivate the actions of the 
audience after they have successfully  transmitted diagnostic and prognostic messages to 
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them in a standard war. According to functionalist arguments, establishing collaboration 
can lead to standards having network effects and higher product performance. However, 
this study  further suggests that the establishment of collaborations in a standard war is a 
dynamic process. Focal firms need to use a number of critical stakeholders to theorize 
the specifications of a new standard and set up a primary plan before they do anything 
else. They can then invite other general stakeholders to discuss the specifications 
further, and then, if necessary, change this plan. In other words, they should use their 
well-established membership  and a variety of practices to manage their critical and 
general stakeholders. This argument does not contradict the functionalist arguments 
proposed in this section, but shows that the profile of critical stakeholders may be 
dynamic as standard wars change over time. This is another main contribution of this 
study to research, as it  discusses the ways in which focal firms manage critical 
stakeholders in standard wars.
2.6. Conclusion
In the digital era and times of economic recession like the present, the preferences of 
users and the magnitude of technological standards change quickly, due to the shorter 
life-cycles of products and the convergence of multiple technologies. Firms need to 
speed up  both innovations and standardisation. Moreover, in a recession scenario like 
the present one, new standards must respond not only  to the requirement of 
functionality but also to consumer sensitivity  about price. Consequently, producing 
standards becomes a longer and harder process. Understanding the processes of 
standard wars can help us to know what strategies should be used and which attributes 
of standard wars need to be taken into account. Focal firms must not delay in making 
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markets and consumers believe that their new standards are better than those of their 
competitors.
This chapter has discussed the benefits and risks of initiating standard wars. It has also 
outlined five perspectives on standard wars: strategy, industrial economic, social 
construction, institutional theory and stakeholder. All of them contribute different 
viewpoints to the study of standard wars. The outcomes of network industries are 
influenced by increasing returns and positive feedback which lead to adoption. When 
network effects are high, a technology produced by a single firm may lock in the 
market. Conversely, the products of competitors may be locked out. Therefore, in 
standard wars, in particular network industries, the outcome will be a classic “winner-
take-all” game. Thus, although firms may confront risks in the future, their considerable 
benefits still encourage firms to initiate standard wars.
 
The empirical studies made using these perspectives indicate different attributes of 
standard wars. This chapter has determined that framing, collaboration, network effects 
and product performance as the attributes of standard wars. We are keen to draw up a 
more useful theory that  will lead to a better understanding of the processes of standard 
wars. Although this chapter has identified four attributes of standard wars, we still need 
a theoretical framework to explain the relevant exogenous and endogenous variables. 
This new framework would better integrate the different  viewpoints discussed in the 
chapter and proposed by Suarez (2004), Murmann and Frenken (2006), and Kaplan and 
Tripsas (2008) model. In this way, this study proposes a proper theoretical framework to 
explain the processes: institutional entrepreneurship.
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The institutional theory perspective gives a different viewpoint from the other four 
perspectives. It suggest that standard wars can be seen as processes of institutional 
change. This perspective also suggests that  social actors are embedded in existing 
institutional environments. As they can reflect and have self-knowledge, they  are able to 
recognize and perceive their own needs and opportunities, together with the appropriate 
course of actions which can collectively change existing standards (Benson, 1977; Seo 
& Creed, 2002). They are capable of reflecting, examining and acting in ways which 
run counter to those rules which are generally taken for granted (Giddens, 1984; Garud 
& Karnøe, 2003). When existing standards fail to meet the interests and needs of social 
actors, these standards will force these knowledge-holding agents to be institutional 
entrepreneurs.
In the institutional entrepreneurship perspective, social actors can be seen as purposeful 
actors. They deliberately create a new system which combines and recombines the 
functionalities of different knowledge sets. They  define, legitimise, combat, and/or co-
opt other organizations in order to achieve their goal of change (Scott, 1994). As a 
result, they  devote much effort to motivating collective action and developing strategies 
to establish stable and secure interactions with other organizations to create new 
systems. These actors not only perform the role of traditional entrepreneurs in the 
Schumpeterian sense, by discovering opportunities, combining and/or recombining 
existing resources to produce new products or services; they also help to establish 
institutions through their processes or business activities (Li, Feng, & Jiang, 2006). In 
this way, I would suggest that institutional entrepreneurship in technological change has 
a similar logic to that of standard wars. In the next chapter, on institutional change, I 
106
will focus on processes of institutional change and describe the similarities between 
institutions and standards.
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Chapter 3. Institutional Change
3.1. Introduction
Rules, norms, and beliefs represent the three pillars (regulatory, normative and cultural-
cognitive) which underlie institutions (Scott, 2008). The regulatory pillar is involved in 
the establishment of rules, and attempts to influence the behavior of social actors, 
through a knowledge of the rules to which they conform, and the, manipulation of 
sanctions to which they are subject. The normative pillar emphasises the normative 
rules which introduce prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimensions into 
institutional domains. When aligned with norms and values, it defines objective goals 
and indicates the appropriate way  to proceed. The cultural-cognitive pillar denotes the 
shared conceptions which construct the nature of social reality through its meanings. 
Using discourses, the information perceived by  an audience can become objective in its 
mind. The given discourses must be aligned with larger belief systems and associated 
with the experience of the audience in a particular field (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). If 
this does not happen, new standards and institutions are easily ignored or resisted.
Standards represent rules of engagement that  dictate the ways in which different 
components of technological systems work together to provide utility  to users (Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1993). If producers do not comply  with these specifications, they may 
be not allowed to develop  relevant products of the necessary quality. In this way, 
technological standards also have regulative attributes. New technological standards can 
also be diffused through professionalization and then become either norms or taken for 
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granted. In this way, standard wars can be seen as processes of institutional change 
(Garud, et al., 2002).
Scholars categorize institutional research into organizational field as organizational 
institutionalism (Boxenbaum & Rouleau, 2011), which includes isomorphism, and 
studies of institutional change (e.g. Castel & Friedberg, 2010; Battilana et al., 2009; 
George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Greenwood, et al., 2002; Seo & Creed, 
2002). It is a brach of institutional theory which has proliferated within organizational 
theory  (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). The studies of institutional 
change suggest that institutions are not  only constituted by the three pillars, but  also 
established by the sequential actions of social actors. Institutions can also be changed by 
the deliberate actions of social actors. Studies of institutional change arrive at a variety 
of conclusions. Generally, endogenous institutional contradictions and/or exogenous 
variables, such as shocks and crises, turn social actors into agents of change. These 
actors can be both aware of these uncertainties and capable of making problems known, 
framing solutions to those problems, and motivating other actors to deal with the 
contradictions identified. Such conclusions demonstrate that agents of change who 
initiate institutional change projects are purposeful actors. They often cause other social 
actors to pay attention to such problems using their network connections, discursive 
activities and other strategic actions.
New standards are used to reduce the uncertainties or contradictions associated with 
existing standards. I would suggest that not only are the characteristics of standards 
similar to those of institutions, but processes of standardisation are similar to those of 
institutionalization. Both these processes are understood as cyclical processes (Zucker, 
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1988; Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Standards and institutions aim to remove existing 
misalignments with the interests of social actors. When they  are adopted as dominant, 
due to the bounded rationality of human beings, these dominant standards and 
institutions may be the cause of additional contradictions and changes to processes.
In processes of institutional change, the response of focal firms may or may not increase 
the commitment of the audience to the status quo (Cooper & Schendel, 1976). This is 
because, all social actors – agents of change among them – are embedded in 
interconnected networks. Existing institutions are connected by  industry-wide 
procedures, traditions and techniques which permit technical problem-solving to occur 
incrementally (Constant, 1980). Once firms intend to institutionalize new institutional 
arrangements in a particular field, they may bring the whole community into a period of 
chaos or turbulence (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). During the process, other 
organizations in the field may resist change, or be forced to rethink the reasoning behind 
existing institutions. As I argued in Chapter 2, focal firms must invest considerable costs 
and develop strategies in order to achieve their goals.
 
Existing studies of institutional change focus on purposeful actors and their deliberate 
actions. The essential issues are networks and identities. Firstly, networks are the basis 
of processes of institutionalization (Zucker, 1988). Zucker claims that organizations are 
pressured to become increasingly similar, sometimes because of their network 
connections with other organizations. These connections mean that  agents of change are 
embedded in a particular field. It is difficult to change institutions without altering other 
elements with which they are interconnected (Zucker, 1988). Similarly, rationalized 
myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) are also seen as mechanisms which produce similarity 
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between organizations. Rationalized myths turn social purposes into rational ones, and 
hence specify technical rules for them. In short, they suggest that  procedures can be 
used to order and control human behaviour in various ways. They are also highly 
embedded in society and thus are beyond the influence of any individual. This means 
that they are taken for granted without being questioned (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Secondly, organizational institutionalism studies suggest that agents of change can 
purposefully  change institutionalized meanings, and utilize the network connections in 
their field. In short, networks and institutionalized myths can be seen as conduits of 
institutionalization while projects of change are initiated. Agents of change should also 
develop strategic actions which promote their vision of change through these conduits. 
In institutional change processes, particular agents of change, known as ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs’, ally  themselves with other participants in order to establish 
collaborations. They utilize networks to diffuse the ideas of change projects and to 
construct their meanings. They motivate other companies in the same field to establish 
collaborations, the goals of which are to legitimize their projects and to strive for 
exclusive support from stakeholders in their field. This process of institutional 
entrepreneurship  can be seen as the ‘activities of actors who have [an] interest in 
particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new 
institutions or to transform existing ones’ (Maguire et al, 2004: 957).
I will discuss the four elements of the institutional change process in organizational 
institutionalism: institutions, actors, networks, and identity. The strategic actions 
initiated by institutional entrepreneurs will be discussed in the next chapter, which is 
devoted to institutional entrepreneurship.
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3.2. Relationships between Institutions, Social Actors, Identity and Networks
The definition of institutions in this study represents two saliences. Firstly, institutions 
explain ‘what is and is not’ to social actors in given fields. They  are understood as 
substantive guides to the actions of social actors. This salience reflects the traditional 
definition of institutions as being the “establishment of relative permanence of a 
distinctly  social sort” (Hughes, 1936: 180). Secondly, this definition also states that 
institutions are the products of specific actions which are taken by social actors in order 
to reproduce and alter them. This salience reflects the viewpoint of organizational 
institutionalism. I will mainly focus on this second salience, and explain ‘how 
institutional entrepreneurs use institutional entrepreneurship to defeat competitors in 
institutional change processes.’ The view of this study is therefore that institutions can 
be changed, even by actors who are embedded within them.
3.2.1. Social Actors
Why social actors become institutional entrepreneurs? In studies of institutional change, 
environmental shocks, crises and institutional contradictions lead to uncertainties within 
fields. In environmental terms, uncertainties are ‘the degree to which future states of the 
world cannot be anticipated and accurately  predicted’ and, in economics, refers more 
precisely to situations in which actors cannot define rational strategies because they 
cannot calculate probabilities for the outcomes of decisions (Beckert, 1999). In 
endogenous terms, institutional contradictions refer to “misalignment[s] between the 
existing social arrangements and the interests and needs of actors who constitute and 
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inhabit those very arrangements” (Seo & Creed, 2002: 232). The concept of 
contradiction is of critical importance to an understanding of endogenous change in 
institutions. This is because these contradictions result  from the bounded rationality 
and/or network connections possessed by human beings. Social actors have bounded 
rationality (Williamson, 1981). It results in institutions which are produced and 
reproduced by  the sequential actions of actors and are incomplete. Thus, institutional 
contradictions are inevitable in institutions (Seo & Creed, 2002).
Not every social actor can be aware of those existing institutions which do not meet 
their needs and interests (Seo & Creed, 2002; Fligstein, 1997). At the same time, not 
every  social actor can mobilize a collective understanding of their conditions and of 
themselves, and take collective action to reconstruct the existing institutional 
arrangements and themselves. Having these critical awareness and understandings, 
these actors should also have political and strategic actions embedded in a 
interconnected institutional setting. If this is the case, they can be called institutional 
entrepreneurs.
3.2.2. Networks
DiMaggio (1988) suggested that the institutional change process can follow an internal 
logic of contradiction which causes institutionalization to proceed. Scott (2003) 
suggests that institutions are able to “provide stability and meaning to social life” (p. 
48), by using symbolic and relational systems, routines and artifacts in processes of 
institutionalization. Symbolic and relational systems communicate this information 
through network connections. Routines and artifacts represent particular meanings to 
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the audience who will recognise their characteristics and locations. For these reasons, I 
would suggest that networks and identity are also the important  mechanisms in 
processes of institutional change.
Networks may cause institutional contradictions or make some social actors aware of 
these contradictions. As social network studies demonstrate, social connections can 
cross the boundaries between organizations and fields. They not only constrain people, 
but also act as conduits which communicate information across organizations or their 
equivalents. For this reason, networks are essential mechanisms for the triggering of 
both isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and processes of institutional change 
(Battilana, 2006; Battilana, et al., 2009).
Generally speaking, networks increase coherence and interconnections in a social 
system. According to Zucker (1988), networks can also increase the stability of those 
institutions in which all social actors are embedded in institutionalized fields. The 
organizational field is defined as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce the service or 
products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). This approach is similar to the stakeholder 
theory  discussed in chapter 2. In terms of the organizational field, organizations can be 
seen as nexuses of relationships with other organizations. According to this conception, 
networks also play a critical role in organizational institutionalism. 
However, because network connections may cross the boundaries of organizational and 
institutional settings, they may, directly  or indirectly, cause contradictions. In the direct 
114
effect aspect, networks may interfere with existing institutional environments in which 
social actors are embedded (Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Networks 
may introduce institutional arrangements which have been produced by other fields and 
may counteract the current institution. For example, Cooper and his colleagues (Cooper, 
Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996) posited a process in which such institutional 
contradictions are common, rather than a distinct transformation in which one logic 
does away  with another. This is because it can be said that institutional contexts 
comprise different layers, and are interconnected. When one institution changes, it could 
cause other institutions to change as well. If this is case, incompatibility may be the 
result.
In the indirect effect  aspect, according to Bourdieu (1990), fields are structured by 
systems of networks within which competitions take place over resources, stakes and 
access. Depending on the positions which actors occupy in networks, those actors have 
different views of the field and different levels of access to resources in those fields 
(Bourdieu, 1990). In other words, they are competing for resources. New ideas, whose 
aim is the further acquisition of resources, may be provoked by both weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1975) and strong ties (Hansen, 1999). In this way, networks may 
introduce opportunities to social actors, and then cause them to become institutional 
entrepreneurs.
Networks can assist institutional entrepreneurs to disseminate their rationalized myths 
in a variety of ways (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). According to DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), the growth of professional networks has been responsible for disseminating a 
variety of organizational practices in different fields. Thus, networks are essential 
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elements in the establishment of connectedness in organizational fields (Lauman, 
Galaskiewicz, & Marsden, 1978). Networks can shape patterns of information 
exchange, and create a set  of structures which channel the flow of information and 
personnel within a particular field. When a firm is positioned in a central position in 
such a field, it can easily disseminate information and resources to other points in that 
field. Its practices can also be disseminated to other firms using personal flow. These 
other firms will imitate the practices of the central firm in order to decrease 
uncertainties (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). 
3.2.3. Identity
Identity can be viewed as an important mechanism which links institutions and the 
actions of social actors (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). The construction of identities has been associated in many studies with the 
development of professions (Brock, Powell & Hinings, 1999; Covaleski, Dirsmith, 
Heian & Samuel, 1998, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). An emphasis on the construction 
of identities was at the heart of institutional studies (Zilber, 2008). Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) used ‘institutional myths’ to emphasise the importance of identities in processes 
of institutionalization. They  stated that institutionalized myths relate to ‘rationalized and 
impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes as technical ones and 
specify  in a rule-like way the appropriate means to pursue these technical purposes 
rationally ... [These myths are] beyond the discretion of any individual participant or 
organization ... [They are] taken for granted as legitimate, apart  from evaluations of 
their impact’ (1977: 343-344). Instead, according to studies of institutional change, the 
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task of constructing identities is central to the creation, framing and maintaining of 
institutions (e.g., Lok, 2010; Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010).
The construction of identities is central to institutional change because it describes the 
relationship  between social actors, networks and the field in which they  operate 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Institutions can be seen as being systems of meaning. 
Recent studies of institutional change have suggested that institutions can be influenced 
through the ‘construction’ and ‘performance’ of particular identities (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). Institutional entrepreneurs can find a solution to institutionalized 
claims of incompatibility, and change the enactment of their institutional roles with a 
reconciled identity. In change processes, institutional entrepreneurs should promote new 
arrangements through subsequent identification with the proffered new identity 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). For these reasons, the construction of identity  is central to 
the attempts of institutional entrepreneurs to frame the need for change (Greenwood, et 
al., 2002).
Institutional entrepreneurs are also embedded in existing institutions. When they wish to 
demonstrate that  they  are credible agents of change projects, they should build on the 
discourses already established by existing institutions. If they  do not do this, they may 
fail to obtain sufficient resources because of a perceived lack of legitimacy (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1988). Such discourses also convey 
socially constructed meanings beyond their intrinsic content or evident functional use 
(Morgan, Frost, & Pondy, 1983). As a result, institutional entrepreneurs can shape the 
perceptions and interpretations of audiences, and then construct new identities. By using 
the artifacts and practices, institutional entrepreneurs can communicate their 
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performance to their audiences through symbolic and relational systems which are 
embedded in their particular field (Scott, 2003).
3.3. Social Actors
This study defines institutional entrepreneurs as purposeful actors who possess critical 
thinking and awareness concerning existing institutional contradictions. The existing 
literature suggests that the social position of institutional entrepreneurs in the network 
(Battilana, et al., 2009) and the strategic capabilities of such entrepreneurs (Seo & 
Creed, 2002) play critical roles throughout the process.
Previous institutional theorists have not presented an “explicit or formal theory of the 
role that interests play in institutionalization, and which consequently de-focalize, or 
distract attention from, the ways in which variation in the strategies and practices of 
goal-directed actors may be related to variation in organizational structures, practices, 
and forms” (DiMaggio, 1988: 4). Although they  have not denied the importance of goal-
directed behaviours, they have tended to ignore the role played by the interests of social 
actors. From the 1990s onwards, more and more studies have attempted to study  the 
active role of organizations in institutional settings (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Oakes, Townley 
& Cooper, 1998). These studies developed the idea that institutions not only constrain 
the behaviour of social actors but also provide the basis for strategies.
Rather than seeing them as conformist, scholars prefer to view social actors as 
knowledgeable agents who have the capacity of reflexivity (Giddens, 1984; Garud & 
Karnøe, 2003). Seo and Creed (2002) further show that embedded actors are capable of 
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perceiving and recognizing their own needs and opportunities, together with appropriate 
courses for collective action which can change existing institutional arrangements when 
institutional contradictions emerge. Battilana et al. (2009) suggest that the position of 
social actors in networks is also a factor which causes them to become institutional 
entrepreneurs. They further suggests that central network positions are more likely to 
cause their owners to access more resources, and nurture and develop their capabilities.
3.3.1. Social Position
The positions of social actors in networks may affect their views, resources and 
information flow, as well as the likelihood of their becoming institutional entrepreneurs. 
This is because social position may affect not only an actor’s perception of a field 
(Bourdieu, 1977), but also his/her accessibility to the resources which are needed to 
engage in processes of institutional change (Lawrence, 1999).
The importance of the social position of an institutional entrepreneur is more relevant to 
centrality and to structural holes in networks. In network analysis, degree centrality and 
betweenness are useful tools for understanding the role of social position. ‘Degree 
centrality’ is defined as the number of links incident upon a node. ‘Degree’ is often 
interpreted in terms of the immediate ability  of the node to apprehend whatever 
information is flowing through the network. ‘Degree betweenness’ is defined as a 
centrality which can be understood as direct links within a network. Direct links occur 
when many of the shortest paths between other links have higher betweenness than the 
longer paths. If firms have a greater degree of centrality and betweenness, they will 
have more constraints on their actions. Those actors who possess central network 
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positions are more likely to retain existing institutions in order to maintain their own 
vested interests. In turn, many institutional studies have explored the idea that 
peripheral actors in the network are more likely to initiate projects of institutional 
change (e.g. Garud et al., 2002; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Hirsch, 1986; Kraatz & Zajac, 
1996; Leblebici, et  al., 1991; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). However, some recent 
studies have found that  such change can be initiated by powerful organizations (e.g., 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002; Sherer & Lee, 2002), which are 
said to be at the centre of a network (Shils, 1975).
Secondly, the term ‘structural holes’ refers to the absence of ties between two parts of a 
network (Burt, 1992). Actors need ‘bridges’ in order to cross the gap between two 
separate groups in a network. A bridge is manifested in an actor’s network of 
relationships when the focal actor is tied to others who are not themselves connected 
(Burt, 1992). If an actor possesses a bridge, that actor will have considerable advantages 
in terms of range (Reagans & McEvily, 2003), brokerage (Xiao & Tsui, 2007; Fleming 
& Waguespack, 2007), and efficient  and non-redundant accessibility to resources and 
information. Network positions can provide focal actors with opportunities that shape 
intentions to capture “accumulative advantage“ (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Such 
advantages can amplify  future change in the structural characteristics of networks by 
reinforcing the brokerage position of prominent actors over time (Fleming & 
Waguespack, 2007).
If they possess degree centrality, betweenness and structural holes in networks, social 
actors become more capable of becoming institutional entrepreneurs and initiating 
projects of institutional change. Although some studies claim that these central actors 
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are committed to existing institutional arrangements, such network properties enable 
these central actors to contribute solutions to problems and referral, together with 
problem reformation, validation and legitimation (Cross & Sproull, 2004).
3.3.2 Capabilities to Manipulate Discourse
The capability to communicate is the essential issue in Fligstein’s studies (1997, 2001). 
Many studies, including his, have demonstrated the importance of discourses in 
institutional change (e.g. Fligstein, 1997, Lawrence, et  al., 2002; Rao, 1998; Greenwood 
& Suddaby, 2006; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Zilber, 2007). Hardy, et al. (2005) suggest 
that institutional entrepreneurs can strategically maneuver discourses to mobilize 
collaboration, increase the commitment of participants, and establish identities. In 
addition to this, according to an early approach (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983), discourse can be used to institutionalize myths and rationalize 
prescriptions that “identify  various social purposes as technical ones and specify in a 
rule-like way  the appropriate means to pursue these technical purposes 
rationally” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 343). In this section, which deals with the 
capabilities of social actors, the focus will be on the ways in which institutional 
entrepreneurs manipulate discourses to construct meanings and establish identities in 
their processes of institutional change. 
Discussing the role of discursive activities in institutional change processes can further 
strengthen the role of frame in standard wars. By using frame to audience, institutional 
entrepreneurs should employ various discursive practices, including narratives, 
rhetorics, and so on. Because, for many social actors, a new technical standard is a new 
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idea to solve the existing standard which is misaligned with social actors’ requirements. 
In order to successfully  standardize a new standard, a focal firm should persuade 
audiences to accepting the idea. These discursive practices aim at retaining and 
sustaining the influence of discourses in audience’s mind. The goal is to change their 
minds and motivate them to adopt specific standards. 
Surprisingly, the role of discursive activities has not been paid much attention in 
empirical standard wars studies. Especially, scholars did not discuss institutional 
entrepreneurs’ detailed practices of discursive activities in the limited studies (Munir & 
Phillips, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Suddaby  and Greenwood indicate that 
describes the role of discursive activities in legitimating profound institutional change. 
They  describe how the purchase by a Big Five accounting firm triggered a struggle 
within accounting and law over a new organizational form, named as multidisciplinary 
partnerships. They analyze the discursive struggle that  ensued between proponents (the 
Big Five accounting firms) and opponents (other accounting firms) of the new 
organizational form (multidisciplinary partnerships) in 1977.  
According to the study, institutional entrepreneurs are likely to use discourses to capture 
the attention of audiences and influence their perceptions, before obtaining legitimacy 
from them (Suchman, 1995). In practice, timing, place and audience characteristics are 
also crucial when using discourses to construct the meanings of identities. These 
characteristics have not been paid attention in the relevant studies. For example, 
professional technological exhibitions and conferences are crucial places for the 
presentation of discourses. Firms can contact many  professional media, companies from 
many relevant industries, buyers and many other potential stakeholders in one place. 
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Institutional entrepreneurs can also present less professional discourses in such media. 
They  can also construct a general consensus or identity which explains or diffuses the 
new technological standard to the audience. Chapter 2 has discussed frames, 
collaborations, network effects and product performance. These four attributes are all 
strongly related, to some extent, to discursive activities.
3.4. Networks 
The core ideas of social networks are embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996); 
the utility of network connections (Burt, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998); and social 
relations (Freeman, 2004). New theories and research relating to network theory is 
derive from these ideas (Kilduff & Brass, 2010). Embeddedness has been discussed in 
previous chapters, which have suggested that, institutional entrepreneurs are embedded 
in existing institutions. Utility and social relations demonstrate that  institutional 
entrepreneurs can and must access resources and information through networks. This 
section will discuss the role played by these two ideas in processes of institutional 
change.
3.4.1. The Utility of Network Connections
The term ‘utility of network connections’ refers to those connections that both constrain 
and facilitate outcomes which are important  to individuals and groups (Kilduff & Brass, 
2010). Networks can assist social actors to learn the characteristics of a particular field 
(including environmental and firm-level factors), and further explore opportunities in 
that field (Battilana et al., 2009). Networks correspond to the set  of social actors to 
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whom they are directly linked (Aldrich, 1999); affect their perceptions of their 
particular field, and, as a result, their likelihood of becoming institutional entrepreneurs 
(Dorado, 2005; Battilana et  al., 2009). Central actors are more easily  able to observe 
different types of contradictions or field-level conditions and to take the opportunities 
afforded by networks. In turn, they  are more likely to establish collaborations in order to 
share and exchange opinions and information, before obtaining collaborative benefits 
(Kilduff & Brass, 2010).
In addition to environmental and firm-level factors, networks can make social actors 
aware of the degrees of heterogeneity and institutionalization in an institutional setting. 
Firstly, as discussed above, the heterogeneity of institutional arrangements in a field can 
be diffused and penetrated through network connections. They  are likely  to give rise to 
institutional incompatibilities that can become a source of internal contradiction. Thus, 
network connections can stimulate and assist social actors to explore opportunities, and 
then cause them also to become institutional entrepreneurs.
Secondly, a degree of institutionalization may influence social actors to become 
institutional through affecting the agency of actors (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Lower 
levels of institutionalization are associated with higher levels of uncertainty in the 
institutional context, so that they may provide opportunities for institutional 
entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Phillips et al., 2000). This view does 
not imply that higher levels of institutionalization cannot be conducive to institutional 
change. Highly  institutionalized fields can also be changed by institutional 
entrepreneurs (Beckert, 1999). The ownership  of different social positions and network 
connections can lead to different degrees of information access. Battilana et al (2009) 
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suggest that, this can result in social actors becoming institutional entrepreneurs and so 
initiating institutional change processes.
3.4.2. Social Relations
According to studies of institutional change, social relations enable institutional 
entrepreneurs to obtain information and political support. Institutional entrepreneurs can 
utilize social relations to motivate others to establish collaborations. These social 
relations may also enable institutional entrepreneurs to champion and orchestrate 
collective action among diverse stakeholders (Maguire et al., 2004).
According to the relevant studies, institutional entrepreneurs use their position and 
relations to access resources and enhance the legitimacy of their projects of change. In 
regard to structural holes, institutional entrepreneurs may  act as brokers who mediate on 
behalf of the mutually established best interests of different groups (Fligstein, 1997). 
For example, before the European Union single market was launched, the eighth 
President of the Union, Jacques Delors pursued strategies to mediate between the 
disparate members of the EU. Before becoming President, Delors toured European 
capitals to speak to those governments who were no longer engaged in dialogue. Delors 
told them that the EU had to launch a range of projects in order to move forward. 
Eventually, the single market emerged as the most viable project in the history  of the 
EU. In this way, Delors acted as a broker to introduce the vision of the EU to its 
member states and to persuade them of its vision.
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In addition to this, institutional entrepreneurs also make use of the centrality associated 
with their social relations within the network. Their reach centrality is defined as the 
access they have to a large number of members of the network through a limited 
number of intermediaries (Oliver & Montgomery, 2008). If they are not  central in a 
field, they  may seek to make connections with actors  who do have such reach centrality 
(Battilana et al., 2009). In this way, institutional entrepreneurs are able to secure support 
and endorsement from other actors and gain access to the resources they control 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). They can enhance the legitimacy of their projects of 
change by mobilizing support for them among such stakeholders as highly embedded 
agents (Lawrence et al., 2002), professionals and experts who operate at the centre of 
the relevant field (Hwang & Powell, 2005), and so forth.
3.5. Identity
Identity is thought to form a link between institutions and organizational behaviour 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Lok, 2010). The concept of 
identity  has given rise to various issues that deserve our attention and are central to the 
current institutional research agenda. These include a focus on actors and interests (e.g., 
Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009); the socio-political context and embeddedness of 
agency (e.g., Clemens & Coot, 1999); frames (e.g., Kaplan, 2008); and institutional 
entrepreneurship  (e.g., Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Constructing identity is also to 
construct common understandings and meanings for the new institution, and to convey 
them to other social actors who are embedded in the particular organizational field. 
When an institution is created, stakeholders and other prospective organizations in the 
given field will be uncertain about its nature or its future performance. In a context of 
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such uncertainty, institutional entrepreneurs need to understand the situation before they 
can act (Weick, 1995).
Most studies of technological change have focused on the role taken by the actions of 
producers in shaping the direction of a technology (e.g. Utterback, 1994). Except 
Kaplan and Tripsas (2008), although many studies have attempted to provide an 
integrated framework to explain the road map  for dominant design (Suarez, 2004; 
Murmann & Frenken, 2006), they  do not pay attention to the roles played by identity 
and cognition. This is because the identity of new institutions is generally treated as the 
temporary outcome of a struggle between institutional entrepreneurs. It is seen as the 
outcome of a truce until the start of the next episode of institutional contradictions or 
standard wars (Suddaby  & Greenwood, 2005). For this reason, to discuss the role of 
identity  is not  only to demonstrate its importance in studies of institutional change but 
also to complement studies of standard wars.
Identity construction aims to establish clear boundaries (Lamont & Molnar, 2002) 
which can help institutional entrepreneurs to establish stable identities for those people 
who exist within the institutional boundary (DiMaggio, 1987; Douglas, 1986; Mohr & 
Duquenne, 1997). Institutional entrepreneurs and those who interact with them can 
make differences to institutions and similar organizations.
A new identity should be able to affect audiences’ perceptions of new institutional 
prototypes (Verdaasdonk, 2003; Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Zuckerman, 2004), and of 
their value (Zuckerman, 1999). Although establishing identities is understood to be an 
institutional resource (Rao, et al., 2000), activities which establish new identities should 
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be aligned with the previous activities of the institutional entrepreneur, as well as the 
existing institutional context (Lounsbury & Pollack, 2001). This is because both 
existing institutions and newly created ones are embedded in broader interpretations of 
the accepted cultural history of a field. The existing meanings both shape and constrain 
the audience’s interpretations. To some extent, these meanings predetermine the 
development of new institutional identities (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010). In other words, 
the content of a new identity should not be too radical, or, it will not be easily accepted 
and understood by the audience.
There are many  different institutional prototypes in the change process. These different 
institutions have competitive relationships with each other, and are seen as battling with 
each other for supremacy until eventually  one institution defeats all the other prototypes 
and becomes, temporarily at least, the new dominant institution (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011). Within this process, institutional entrepreneurs should ally  themselves with other 
participants in order to construct a specific identity for the promoted institution. This 
identity should be capable of responding to most of the stakeholder’s requirements.
Thus, the identities of new institutions should be able to guide stakeholders and 
consumers towards commonly held assumptions about the comparability, relative value 
and similarity of products in the process(Urban, Hulland, & Weinberg, 1993; 
Zuckerman, 1999). These shared understandings allow for assessments of value, and for 
smooth transformations between different institutional domains (Hsu & Hannan, 2005; 
Lounsbury & Rao, 2004). In turn, institutional entrepreneurs must rely on their ability  to 
mobilize other actors to establish collaborative frames and identities which can critically 
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engage with historical meanings in ways reinterpret the history of the field and its logics 
of new institutions.
In studies of both institutional theory and technology management, using discursive 
activities is seen as a critical facet of the construction of identity  through networks, 
routines, and artifacts, in what are called ‘institutional conduits’. Using discursive 
activities echoes the importance of symbolic systems and artifacts in processes of 
institutionalization (Scott, 2003), and responds to the role of framing in standard wars 
(Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). In addition, students of technology management suggest  that 
producers of new technologies can shape the performance criteria which are applied in 
the new domain (Moreau, Markman, & Lehmann, 2001).
3.6. Conclusions
Chapter 3 has discussed the idea that social actors, institutions, networks, and identity 
are the four critical elements in processes of institutional change. This chapter has also 
suggested that institutional entrepreneurs can use their positions and relationships, 
together with their ability to construct the meanings of new institutions, and shape 
identities into new myths and then institutionalize them through networks.
Technological change can be seen as a kind of institutional change. Networks and 
identities can result in the stability  of institutions. As a result of the connections of 
networks with other organizations, those organizations are pressured to become similar 
to other organizations in the same domain. These network connections make it  difficult 
to change any one element without altering other interconnected elements (Zucker, 
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1977). Identities emerge from rational myths, and in studies of institutional 
isomorphism, they are seen as the mechanisms that create similarity between 
organizations.
Studies of institutional change focus on the fact that institutional contradictions are 
inevitable in institutional domains. Moreover, exogenous variables may also make 
existing institutions incompatible with new interests which result from unexpected 
events or technological upheaval. These contradictions and uncertainties cause social 
actors who possess reflexivity, knowledge, a critical social position and understanding 
to reflect, consider and act in ways which run counter to the taken-for-granted rules. 
This chapter also suggests that social actors who have a central position in networks can 
sense the degree of heterogeneity and institutionalization in those networks, and then 
create fresh opportunities for new institutions. These critical positions put these actors 
in a privileged position to access first-hand information about opportunities, and to 
control the information flow. In addition, these actors need to be especially  skilled in the 
manipulation of discourses to shape meanings and establish identities. As a result, they 
are able to define the boundaries of new institutions and differentiate their advantages 
from those of other options. To summarize, institutional entrepreneurs can manipulate 
strategies and use the advantages conferred by networks and identity construction to 
institutionalize their new institutions.
 
This chapter has mainly focused on the discussion of institutional change and the role of 
four critical elements in processes of institutional change. These elements respond to the 
four attributes of standard wars, frame and collaboration in particular. However, 
although we have discussed the similarities between institutional change and standard 
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wars, this does not mean that we can simply integrate these different viewpoints to 
explain and answer the research question of how firms defeat competitors in standard 
wars. In Chapter 2, I asserted that firms should ally themselves with critical 
stakeholders in order to jointly  develop new standards, and to obtain their endorsement 
as a form of legitimacy. Chapter 3 showed that the degree centrality, betweenness, and 
structural holes possessed by social actors can gain them the resources required (such as 
reputation) to become institutional entrepreneurs. Earlier studies also demonstrated that 
conflicts of interest existed in the early  development of institutional theory. Although 
the issues of power and influence have been given less attention in recent years, they are 
central to the development of institutional theory. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
suggested that we should associate them with different perspectives of institutional 
theory to provide a comprehensive viewpoint on studies of institutional change.
As a result, we need a general theoretical framework to explain how institutional 
entrepreneurs strategically achieve institutional change. Moreover, within this process, 
institutional entrepreneurs should be able to manage critical stakeholders, collective 
action and discursive activities. This study  makes use of institutional entrepreneurship 
to discuss and explain the processes involved in the strategic actions of institutional 
entrepreneurs in processes of institutional change. Chapter Four of this study will 
discuss institutional entrepreneurship.
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Chapter 4. Institutional Entrepreneurship
4.1. Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that processes of institutional change are initiated by these 
critical factors. Those discussions provided a plausible explanation of the greater ability 
of central organizations in networks to initiate processes of institutional change. This 
was essentially because these central organizations possess a certain degree of power 
and legitimacy. Their power and legitimacy can be seen as resources which they 
accumulate from the performance of existing products. In this way, when they initiate 
processes of institutional change, their activities can easily gain the attention of critical 
stakeholders, prospective organizations and the media. As a result, an effective study 
should consider not only the critical elements discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 but also 
power and legitimacy. If institutional entrepreneurs do not possess these resources, new 
institutions will be ignored as entropies (Zucker, 1988).
In order to understand the importance of these resources, one should start by examining 
the origins of institutional entrepreneurship. The concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship is produced by integrating the concepts of institution and 
entrepreneurship. Traditional entrepreneurship theory explains the actions of 
entrepreneurs who undertake innovations and gain business understanding in an effort 
to transform innovations into economic goods in the business world. In contrast, 
institutional entrepreneurship is clearly in line with the tradition of research that views 
entrepreneurs as agents who create new business models for the businesses they initiate 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Schumpeter, 1942). This theory  also combines ideas from 
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studies of social movement (e.g., Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Snow & 
Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1986), the aim of which was to 
study the non-business world. As a result, the opening of Section 4.2 will further discuss 
the distinctions between institutional entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship.
This study will also suggest that we can understand the importance of power and 
legitimacy  in institutions by examining the development of institutional theory. 
Different facets of organizational institutionalism have been identified during its 
development from 1977 (Greenwood et al., 2008). Before 1977, the early viewpoint of 
institutionalists emphasised issues of conflict, power and influence. Organizational 
institutionalism focuses on routine and isomorphic pressures which are oriented towards 
isomorphism in organizational fields (Lawrence, 1999). This study will also 
demonstrate that social actors have the ability  to change existing institutions. Although 
the issue of power has been given less attention in studies of organizational 
institutionalism, it is central to the development of institutional theory. For this reason, 
although this study will certainly  use ideas of organizational institutionalism to explain 
institutional entrepreneurship, I also suggest that the issue of power should be 
associated with this approach. It can widen our understanding in studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship and institutional change.
Chapter 4 has several sections. Section 4.2 will provide an overview of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The study will argue that both perspectives are based on egoism in 
this section. Institutional entrepreneurs can earn economic returns by changing the 
arrangements of existing institutions. Moreover, this section will emphasise the role of 
legitimacy  in institutional entrepreneurship. Section 4.3 will discuss the role played by 
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power in organizational institutionalism. Although many studies of institutional change 
have given much more attention to the importance of cognition, the study suggests that 
we also cannot ignore power. Section 4.4 will argue that power, legitimacy, collective 
action and discursive activities are the four attributes of institutional entrepreneurship. 
Sections 4.5 to 4.8 will discuss each attribute separately. Finally, Section 4.9 will 
conclude Chapter 4.
4.2. The Overview of Institutional Entrepreneurship
The conception of institutional entrepreneurship is similar to DiMaggio’s (1988) view 
of institutional change. He argues that “new institutions arise when organized actors 
with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value 
highly” (DiMaggio, 1988: 14). According to DiMaggio’s viewpoint, the conception of 
institutional entrepreneurship reintroduces the importance of conflicts of interest in 
organizational institutionalism.
Clarifying the difference between entrepreneurship and institutional entrepreneurship 
can assist us in understanding that the power and legitimacy of institutional 
entrepreneurs should be discussed in studies of institutional change.
Institutional entrepreneurship is associated with ideas of institutions and 
entrepreneurship. Institutions can be seen as performance scripts which provide “stable 
designs for chronically repeated activity  sequences” (Jepperson, 1991: 145). Any 
deviation from this produces institutions that are counteracted by sanctions or are costly 
in some way (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007). In studies of entrepreneurship, however, 
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it is seen as “an engine of economic growth with the introduction of new technologies 
and the consequent potential for obsolescence serving to discipline firms in their 
struggle to survive perennial gales of creative destruction. The disruptions generated by 
creative destruction are exploited by individuals who are alert enough to exploit the 
opportunities that arise” (Kirzner, 1997; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; cited from 
Garud et  al., 2007: 959-960). Studies of institutions focus on continuity while studies of 
entrepreneurship  focus on change but suggest that it is difficult to accomplish. However, 
the difference between entrepreneurship and institutional entrepreneurship remains 
fairly unclear today.
Li, et al. (2006) demonstrate that institutional entrepreneurs are businessmen/women 
who expand their business ventures and need to destroy the prevailing non-market 
institutions in order for their ventures to be successful. However, this definition 
excludes some social or political factors. The next cases show that even social actors 
who do not work in business or commerce can become institutional entrepreneurs, and 
adapt existing institutions to suit their interests. For example, Holm (1995) analyzed the 
institutional battle between fishermen and fish merchants in Norway. He described the 
“rise and fall of a specific institutional form, the mandated sales organization (MSO), in 
Norwegian fisheries” (Holm, 1995: 398). His study focused on the interconnection 
between practical and political levels of action and the interaction between practices, 
interests and ideas. The MSO idea was in conflict with the economic interests of 
Norwegian fishermen. In order to create a new institution to benefit their own economic 
interests, Norwegian fishermen used power strategies in political way to change the 
practices of the MSO in order to protect their own power (i.e. their economic interest).
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Holm’s study  also points out issues of legitimacy in studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The Norwegian MSO was created in 1929 in a process that was full of 
conflict. “During the next decade, the MSO form gained legitimacy and proliferated 
rapidly throughout the [fisheries] sector. Between 1950 and 1980, the MSO form was 
institutionalized and remained a taken-for-granted part of the sector. Then, during the 
1980s, the MSO form lost legitimacy, and the number of MSOs rapidly declined.” This 
was because, in the 1980s, liberalist ideas took on a new legitimacy in many Western 
countries. De-regulation and privatization were central to the “new right” movement, 
and so the MSO case reflected a broad ideological shift. This case also conforms to the 
expectations of organizational institutionalism. Within this perspective, we see the 
proliferation throughout society of new institutional forms, which are adopted as the 
rationalized myths on which their legitimacy rests (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983).
4.3. The Role of Power in Organizational Institutionalism
The essential intention of organizational institutionalism is to “understand how 
organizational structure and processes acquire meaning and continuity beyond their 
technical goals” (Suddaby, 2010: 14). Suddaby (2010) indicates that organizational 
institutionalism owes a debt to the views of Zucker (1977), Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Firstly, Zucker (1977) described the ways in which 
actors use cues from the organizational environment in which they are embedded to 
attribute meaning to events. Secondly, Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) theory  of institutional 
myths argued that the formal structures of organizations represent the myths of their 
environments rather than the needs of their activities. Thirdly, DiMaggio and Powell 
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(1983) suggested that organizational isomorphism results when firms have a similar 
structural position in the organizational field.
Phillips and Malhotra (2008) derive a more restricted view from these classical works of 
organizational institutionalism, indicating that the nature of institutions is primarily 
cognitive4. They suggest that  social rules, norms and other institutional practices are 
capable of enabling and constraining the actions of actors. These shared understandings 
result in certain organizations having to perform certain activities regardless of their 
purpose. This is because they  have a taken-for-granted nature of those shared 
understandings. In other words, “actions do not become institutionalized by themselves 
but only when they  become understood in a particular way” (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008: 
713). In organizational fields, because of their similar structural position, organizations 
will become isomorphic within a common institutional environment (Suddaby, 2010).
However, it is too risky to underemphasize the role of power, in the manner of these 
early studies. Indeed, cognition is one of the critical elements which have been 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. This study  does not claim that institutions are only 
constructed using cognition. As discussed above, organizational institutionalism is 
rooted in the views of early institutionalists. These early views were affected by the 
ideas of classical sociologists. For example, Spencer argued that social systems are 
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4 Several recent studies elaborate the role and importance of cognition in organizational institutionalism 
(e.g., Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, 1999). Institutional logics is defined as 
overarching sets of principles that prescribe “how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes 
appropriate behavior,  and how to succeed” (Thornton, 2004: 70). Institutional logics provide guidelines 
on how to interpret and function in social situation. In order to gain endorsement from important 
audiences and because logics provide a means of understanding the social world and for acting 
confidently within it,  organizations comply with these logics.  For instance,  in the BD-HD DVD standard 
war,  Hollywood studios and customers possessed different logics. The former asked institutional 
entrepreneurs to pay attention to copyright protection while the latter requested opening of the protection 
mechanism. Thus, how to respond to these different institutional logics is one of the main questions in 
institutional theory. 
made up of a series of subsystems in which institutionalized structures perform 
distinctive functions for societies. He argued for the utilitarian view that social 
structures arise through a process of competition and exchange between social actors, 
who are rationally pursuing their own self-interests. When institutionalized 
arrangements fail to allow actors to achieve their objectives, they are likely to pursue 
purposeful change (Hinings & Tolbert, 2008).
In early institutionalism, any new interests combined with the existing institutions can 
be seen as a result of political tradeoff. Institutionalization is one of the methods of 
preserving the vested interests of power holders. These powerful actors are more likely 
to maintain the long-term stability of institutions. According to Spencer, powerful actors 
will force other social actors in the field to accept their interests and join them in 
changing societal systems. Suddaby  (2010) argues in a article about ‘challenges for 
institutional theory’ that power is largely  missing in current efforts within institutional 
theory to understand why and how organizations attend to their institutional 
environments. In fact, power was paid much attention in old institutionalism and in the 
early stage of organizational institutionalism. For example, in studies of decoupling, 
power mediates the desire to decouple and the action of decoupling (Boxenbaum & 
Johnson, 2008). Meyer and Rowan (1977) pointed out that organizations share the same 
environmental pressures that tend to take on a similar form as efficiency-seeking. 
Decoupled actions mean that the organization abide only superficially to institutional 
pressures and adopt new structures without implementing related practices. In this vein, 
scholars suggest that more power increases the resistance of organizations to external 
pressure for change (Boxenbaum & Johnson, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010).
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The study  of institutional stability  was more common in early  institutionalism the 
classical sociological view also considers issues of power. For this reason, we cannot 
ignore issues of power when studying organizational institutionalism.
4.4. The Attributes of Institutional Entrepreneurship
Power, legitimacy, collective action and discursive activities are the four attributes of 
institutional entrepreneurship (Lawrence, 1999). We can summarize this by  saying that, 
early institutionalism emphasised issues of power and collective action while 
organizational institutionalism is focused on the ways in which focal firms strategically 
manage their legitimacy and discursive activities in order to initiate isomorphism and/or 
institutional change. Lawrence (1999) suggested that ‘the symbolic elements and 
attention to power associated with the old institutionalism [i.e. early  institutionalism] 
can be brought together with the new institutionalism’s [i.e. organizational 
institutionalism] cognitive insights and attention to legitimacy, [so that] institutional 
theory  can provide an excellent foundation for understanding the relationship between 
organizations, their strategies and their institutional contexts’ (p. 162). For this reason, 
this study defines power, legitimacy, collective action and discursive activities as the 
four attributes of institutional entrepreneurship.
At Chapter 2, I suggested that the roles of frame and stakeholder should be considered 
into standard wars studies. The former concept is borrowed from social movement 
studies. It is also a gap which should be fulfilled in the existing studies. In this chapter, I 
will further broaden the role of frame to discursive activities. There are many studies 
have mentioned and discussed the role of discourse in institutional change processes. 
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However, they are failed to discussing detailed practices in change process. Except from 
the issue, the relevant studies did not account for the role of critical stakeholder (e.g. 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Garuda et al., 2002). They  lack a 
critical aspect of which institutional entrepreneurs collaborate with and motivate these 
stakeholders to theorizing specifications of new standards. Thus, the existing empirical 
studies have also implicitly mentioned the issue of stakeholder but have not paid more 
attention on the issue. I suggested that the stakeholder issue should be considered as 
another gap in the existing studies.
Organizational institutionalism is beneficial to the development of studies of 
institutional change in several ways. Firstly, the study develops a framework to describe 
the profile of institutional strategies. These strategies are seen as managing stakeholders 
and other prospective organizations which compete for resources in processes of 
institutional change. For this reason, we should pay  attention to the abilities of 
institutional entrepreneurs to change existing institutions (e.g., Garud et al., 2002). 
Because existing institutions penetrate and combine various subsystems and practices, 
institutional entrepreneurs need to leverage and motivate sufficient resources to alter 
them, using collective actions (including critical stakeholders) and discursive activities. 
According to this view, they need to motivate other actors to establish inter-
organizational collaborations, a term which refers to cooperative relationships between 
organizations in which participants depend on neither hierarchical nor market 
mechanisms of control in order to gain cooperation from each other (Phillips et al., 
2000; Lawrence, et al., 2002).
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Secondly, as a result of their network positions, especially when they have central 
positions in networks, institutional entrepreneurs can be empowered by power and 
legitimacy  so that  they can create and maintain new institutions. Power and legitimacy 
can be seen as resources used by institutional entrepreneurs in processes of institutional 
change. Returning to my first point, by using discursive activities, institutional 
entrepreneurs can attract the attention of audiences to their previous performance in 
existing institutional settings. This suggests that institutional entrepreneurs are able to 
leverage the knowledge, skills and resources and apply them to develop innovative, 
synergistic solutions to complex problems.
Thirdly, based on the literature of institutional change, these four attributes may have 
reinforcing effects. For example, Hardy  and Phillips (2004) suggest that discursive 
activities and power may be mutually  constitutive. Discourses not only  communicate 
information to audiences, but also construct meanings and influence the perceptions of 
audiences. In institutional entrepreneurship, discursive activities may shape cognitive, 
personal, structural, procedural, consequential, dispositional and exchange legitimacy 
(Zott & Huy, 2007). In turn, discursive activities can be used to construct the legitimacy 
of a new institution, enhance the power and legitimacy  of institutional entrepreneurs, 
promote product performance, increase network effects, and so on.
4.5. The Power Issue in Institutional Entrepreneurship
There are two types of power, according to studies of institutional entrepreneurship. 
One of these types is rooted in institutional practices, and the other in the strategic 
actions of institutional entrepreneurs. This study will call the former type systemic 
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power and the latter type episodic power (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1977; Hardy  & Clegg, 
1996; Lawrence, 2008).
Power is traditionally seen as a commodity. Social actors can possess it, hold it or keep 
it in reserve, like the social power described by  French and Raven (1959). Instead, this 
study will argue that power is a relational phenomenon and an effect of social relations, 
rather than a commodity (Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck & Kleysen, 2005; Lawrence, 2008). 
Systemic power works through ongoing practices and routines to give advantage to 
existing institutions. This mode is the traditional focus of institutional theory. It reflects 
the idea that institutions constrain the actions of actors, in such ways as socialization 
and technological standards. When the practices of one organization are imitated by 
another, the knowledge of that organization is professionalized in the other one. To 
some extent, these benchmarking practices can be seen as the source of power of  focal 
firms. For instance, Meyer and Rowan suggested that powerful myths are “highly 
institutional, and thus in some measure beyond the discretion of any individual 
participant or organization” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 344). Power is applied in this way, 
in ongoing practices and routines, which give certain advantages to those organizations 
which possess power (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1977; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Lawrence, 
2008).
Episodic power refers to relatively  discrete strategic acts of mobilization which are 
initiated by self-interested actors (Clegg, 1989). The episodic approach examines the 
power in action. Its focus is on how power is used, on how it effects changes through 
time (Cobb, 1984). It reflects the idea that human beings are knowledgeable actors with 
the ability  to reflect, examine and act in ways which run counter to taken-for-granted 
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rules (Giddens, 1984). This mode of power has also been the traditional focus of 
organizational research and theory. This is why social actors are prompted to become 
institutional entrepreneurs when existing institutions produce contradictions which 
misalign their interests and needs.
 
If they well use the power, institutional entrepreneurs can strategically influence and/or 
compel5  other actors in institutional settings through the mobilization of resources, 
relationships and discursive strategies. As a result, institutional entrepreneurs are more 
easily able to successfully accomplish institutional change (Garud et al., 2002; Maguire 
et al., 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005); construct the identities of actors when 
putting their institutional strategies into effect (Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Hensmans, 2003); influence field development (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Munir & Phillips, 2005); and implement processes by 
which practices move through time and space (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005; 
Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).
This study bases its argument on the preceding discussions, and suggests that social 
relations, network positions, mobilization of resources, and discourse are the four 
sources of power used by institutional entrepreneurs (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Whittle, Mueller, & Mangan, 2008). Making use of these 
elements, institutional entrepreneurs can institutionalize the new institutions associated 
with their interests into institutional settings. In other words, central players are referred 
to as social actors who have central positions in networks. They are able to access more 
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5 Influence is understood as the ability of one actor to persuade another to do something they would not 
otherwise do (Clegg, 1989; French & Raven,  1959; Lukes, 1974). Force, understood as a basis for 
institutional agency, is associated both with attempts to disrupt institutionalized practices and with efforts 
to maintain institutions (Lawrence, 2008).
information and obtain more attention from the media by using discursive strategies 
when they promote their new institutions. Moreover, as embedded actors, central 
players normally  conform with existing institutional settings, and, as a result, possess a 
certain degree of power. Thus, at the start of a process of institutional change, central 
actors incur lower costs when establishing their base of power and legitimacy. As a 
result, this study  will claim that central and powerful organizations are more able to 
become institutional entrepreneurs and initiate institutional change.
4.5.1. The Sources of Power in Institutional Entrepreneurship
Having a central position in a network, institutional entrepreneurs can be more 
powerful. When this is the case, institutional entrepreneurs are able “to exercise power 
through constituting alliances, integrating rather than merely dominating subordinate 
groups, winning their consent, achieving a precarious equilibrium” (Fairclough, 1992: 
94). This section will argue that social relations, network positions, and the mobilization 
of resources and discourse are the three sources of power available to institutional 
entrepreneurs.
Firstly, central actors are favored by the existing institutional arrangements, which 
constitute a source of power for them (Fligstein, 1995; Hensmans, 2003). They hold a 
privileged situation. Compared to peripheral actors, central actors in networks possess 
higher reputation and status6  and a more dominant  position (Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008). By  possessing these attributes, central organizations are able to demonstrate that 
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6  Status is ‘a socially constructed, intersubjectively agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking’ of 
social actors (Washington & Zajac, 2005: 284). Reputation is a generalized expectation about the future 
behaviour or performance of organizations, which is based on their past behaviour or performance 
(Ferguson, Deephouse & Ferguson, 2000).
they  are trustworthy and reliable. They are able to access greater amounts of 
information about innovations, new ideas and opportunities.
Secondly, because of their central network position, institutional entrepreneurs are able 
to obtain more resources. Having sufficient resources may lead to the endorsement of 
other actors in processes of institutional change (Misangyi et al., 2008). Tangible 
resources can be used to motivate other actors to engage in collaborations which 
implement processes of institutional change. Institutional entrepreneurs can also 
leverage intangible resources in order to influence others and the rest of the field. These 
intangible resources can enable institutional entrepreneurs to lead collective action 
among a range of stakeholders (Maguire et al., 2004). In this way, institutional 
entrepreneurs present themselves as brokers who mediate on behalf of the mutual best 
interests of different groups (Fligstein, 1997), and control information flow to the 
participants of those groups (Burt, 1992).
Thirdly, discourses are another source of power. In the past, the importance of 
discourses was examined by Meyer and Rowan’s studies of institutionalized myths 
(1977). Discourses form a boundary within which only certain actions are possible. 
Moreover, they can shape power relations whilst, conversely, power relations can shape 
discourses over time. In a historical and social context, discourses can structure 
collections of texts, and are associated with practices of textual production, transmission 
and consumption (Hardy  & Phillips, 2004; Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Parker, 1992). In 
this way, institutional entrepreneurs should be able to have effective capabilities to 
construct appropriate meanings with which to develop  power relations in processes of 
institutional change.
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4.5.2. The Consequences of the Possession of Power for Institutional 
Entrepreneurship
Due to their central network position and the imbalance of resources, a powerful 
organization has a greater ability to win the attention of the media, and to motivate 
stakeholders and prospective organizations to engage in their projects in the field. The 
consequence of possessing power for institutional entrepreneurs, is that it  gives them the 
ability to initiate collaboration and discursive activities.
Firstly, if they possess power, institutional entrepreneurs become able to achieve the 
goal of collective action by enabling themselves to function effectively  (Gulati, Nohria, 
& Zaheer, 2000). Rather than controlling the perspective of an inter-organizational 
relationship  (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), institutional entrepreneurs are more likely 
to use collaborations to manage the collective actions they  perform which are associated 
with member organizations. Power can be used by  one party over another as a way of 
maintaining stability within relationships (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Thus, a powerful 
organization may be able to establish rules which govern the responsibilities and 
obligations of members of collaborations. Institutional entrepreneurs also wish to 
establish groups associated with critical stakeholders in order to co-manage 
collaborations.
Secondly, powerful organizations can easily  engage the attention of the media and the 
public. Powerful organizations are generally those that have existed within the field for 
a long time. They are aware of the kind of information that is required by the media and 
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the public. Institutional entrepreneurs can utilize their relevant experience of public 
relations to provide appropriate information to the media and the public. Additionally, 
because the actions of powerful organizations are the normal focus of related 
organizational fields, the media is more likely  to pass on the information they present. 
Consequently, powerful actors in networks have a much higher reputation, status and 
dominant position than more peripheral actors (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). When 
these organizations become institutional entrepreneurs, their power can be used to 
motivate collective action and utilize discursive activities.
4.6. The Legitimacy Issues in Institutional Entrepreneurship
Legitimacy  can be viewed as an organizational or collective resource that firms acquire 
from their environments and that they  subsequently  use to meet established goals 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; DiMaggio, 1988; Durand & McGuire, 2005). Once 
organizations possess legitimacy, they have the right to act.
The definition of legitimacy in this study relies on that of Suchman: ‘Legitimacy is a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 571). Three general types of legitimacy have been 
identified: pragmatic/regulatory, cognitive and moral/normative (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 
1995). Pragmatic/regulatory legitimacy is based on formal and informal institutions 
defining the rules and laws that provide the basis for stable societies (Scott, 1995). 
Moral/normative legitimacy ‘reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization 
and its activities’ (Suchman, 1995: 579). Finally, cognitive legitimacy requires 
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collaborations or organizations to engage in actions that fall within the beliefs of 
society’s cognitive structures.
Institutional entrepreneurs’ actions and practices are embedded in the general system of 
society. Once they gain conformity, they have, to some extent, the basis of legitimacy. 
In an organizational field, legitimacy is predicated on an actor’s understanding of, and 
conformity to, institutional rules. Especially in a time of economic recession like the 
present, the fundamental legitimacy of a high-tech product is based on value for money 
and technical performance. If they possess legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurs are 
capable, during standard wars, of institutionalizing standards in various ways. For this 
reason, I mainly focus on pragmatic legitimacy in my study  of standard wars, rather 
than moral or cognitive legitimacy. This is because technical performance and the 
quality of specifications are the essential elements of new technologies. Particularly  in 
an economic recession, greater technical performance and a more competitive price are 
the main factors that concern critical stakeholders, prospective organizations and 
customers, as these factors directly  influence the willingness of these organizations to 
engage in production and purchasing behaviours.
Legitimacy  stems from expectations which are placed on a focal firm or a group by 
stakeholders, nations or any other actors which have collective authority over what is 
acceptable (such as  lawyers, accountants etc) (e.g. Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1996; 
Deephouse & Carter, 2005). These ‘gatekeepers’ are situated between institutional 
entrepreneurs and their own communities. They can decide which information should 
be passed to members of their communities. In order to diffuse the new institutions in 
the field, institutional entrepreneurs usually  confront the challenges and questions of 
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these gatekeepers. In institutional entrepreneurship, although the conformity  of an 
organization is the basis of legitimacy  in institutional contexts, institutional 
entrepreneurs should have other methods of obtaining legitimacy. This study  will 
identify other two methods: use of the media and inter-organizational relations.
4.6.1. The Sources of Legitimacy in Institutional Entrepreneurship
Firstly, media reports are extremely important indicators and sources of legitimacy for 
institutions (Baum & Powell, 1995). Deephouse (1996) suggested that media reports not 
only reflect but also influence the opinion of the general public (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Different media have different audiences. Deephouse 
and Suchman (2008) point out  that prestige media figure prominently in studies of 
legitimacy. These prestige media have various ways in which they can broaden their 
influence. For instance, paper versions of newspapers are collected by libraries. Their 
presence in libraries makes them suitable for study by researchers in history, 
management and many  other fields (Mezias & Boyle, 2005). Many other types of media 
will also quote from the reports and opinion pieces found in newspapers. In this way, 
the crossover between different media and different approaches broadens the legitimacy 
of prestige media.
Theoretically, the audience for prestige media is made up of societal elites who hold 
powerful or central positions in their particular fields. Prestige media are particularly 
likely to influence those sectors which they are seen as reaching. Therefore, prestige 
media are routinely targeted by  organizations and institutional entrepreneurs who are 
seeking to build legitimacy. Furthermore, prestige media may tend to be conservative, 
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and intend to act as a stabilizing force in society. Once these media criticize actions of 
an organization which they dislike, they may  hasten the de-legitimation of that 
organization (Gitlin, 1980).
Secondly, inter-organizational relations comprise another source of legitimacy. 
Sometimes, organizations become legitimate because they  are connected to other 
legitimate organizations (Galaskiewicz, 1985). Governments and strategic alliances 
with prestigious partners have been identified as important sources of legitimacy 
(Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; Higgins & Gulati, 2003, 2006). In the study by 
Singh, Tucker and House (1986), the amount of legitimacy possessed by a voluntary 
social service organization depended on whether it was listed in the community 
directory of metropolitan Toronto, which was registered as a bona fide charity with 
Revenue Canada. As this demonstrates, even when institutional entrepreneurs have been 
identified as legitimate players in their fields, they  need to make connections with other 
legitimate organizations in order to seek greater legitimacy  at the beginning of their 
institutional entrepreneurship.
4.6.2. The Consequences of the Possession of Legitimacy in Institutional 
Entrepreneurship
Institutional entrepreneurs are able to use legitimacy to obtain the resources they need 
and to further strengthen their legitimacy. Firstly, the accumulation of resources is an 
obvious benefit which can be gained after firms have gained legitimacy. If they possess 
legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurs can obtain resources from stakeholders who are 
willing to only  exchange resources with legitimate organizations, and are not willing to 
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engage in transactions with less legitimate other organizations. Many studies have 
suggested that legitimacy influences market access: “An organization which can 
convince relevant publics that its competitors are not legitimate can eliminate some 
competition” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 194; see also Brown, 1994, 1998; Deephouse 
& Carter, 2005).
Secondly, when they  possess legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurs are able to use 
discursive strategies to construct  the meanings of new institutions (e.g., Green, 2004; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, institutional change is 
facilitated by the manipulation and reconceptualization of meanings (Miller, 1994; 
Orlikowski & Yates, 1994). The importance of discourse has been studied as a method 
of diffusing new practices in a given field (Nelson, Megill & McCloskey, 1987; Simon, 
1989; Bazerman & Paradis, 1991, Zilber, 2006; 2007). For example, some studies use 
rhetorical analysis to understand the role of language in structuring social action (e.g. 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Zilber, 2007). This method adopts a socio-cognitive 
perspective on discourse, and assumes that institutional entrepreneurs make use of 
genres of speech and writing that reflect and manipulate the values and ideology of 
particular communities (Berkenkotter & Huckin, 1995). By using discursive strategies, 
institutional entrepreneurs can utilize symbolic management to acquire critical resources 
(Zott & Huy, 2007). Discourse conveys socially constructed meanings beyond its 
functional use and intrinsic content (Morgan, et al., 1983). In this way, institutional 
entrepreneurs can use discursive activities to convey the intrinsic and fundamental 
meanings of their new institutions (Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998). Consequently, 
stakeholders may be willing to commit their resources to institutional entrepreneurs 
(Bhide, 2000; Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001).
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4.7. The Collective Action Issue in Institutional Entrepreneurship
The process of collective action involves performing complicated tasks in order to 
achieve its goals. Group structure, commitment and communication are the three 
elements of collective action (e.g. Ostrom, 2000; Koehler & Koontz, 2008; Payan & 
Svensson, 2007). Group structure allows for the execution of effective actions to 
achieve stated aims. Commitment to collective action is a critical element in deciding 
whether these aims will be successfully achieved. Collective action engages participants 
in an intensive process of consensus building, which can lead to more creative solutions. 
Communication is a human activity that links people together and creates relationships. 
In this way, collective action is conceptualized as a set of communicative practices 
which take into consideration the engagement of, and interactions between 
organizations. This study will suggest that we can understand the collective actions of 
institutional entrepreneurs by observing their collaborative actions. Collaboration is the 
highest order of collective action, and is dependent on achieving a virtuous cycle of 
interaction, commitment and the achievement of outcomes, between the collective 
action and the outside community (Imperial, 2005).
In turn, the establishment of collaborations is critical. Collaborations can be defined as 
“cooperative, inter-organizational relationships which rely on neither market nor 
hierarchical mechanisms of control to ensure cooperation and coordination and, instead, 
are negotiated in ongoing, communicative processes” (Lotia & Hardy, 2008: 366). 
Collaborations can be viewed as professional associations in institutional 
entrepreneurship. The aim of such an association is to enact specifications of new 
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institutions and diffuse them into their particular field. In order to effectively manage 
the actions of member organizations in collaborations, institutional entrepreneurs need 
to establish a set of membership rules in order to assign and manage responsibilities and 
obligations. To summarize, if one studies the role of collaboration in institutional 
entrepreneurship, one can also demonstrate the role of collective action.
The rules and specifications of membership exert coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures in order to strengthen isomorphic effects for the institutionalization of new 
practices (Lawrence, 1999). In order to do this, institutional entrepreneurs need to 
coordinate the different interests and opinions of members.When processes of 
institutional change are taking place, institutional entrepreneurs can sustain legitimacy 
and obtain resources through such interorganizational relationships. They can also 
promote their new practices or institutions, and collect feedback through the network 
connections of partners.
Studies of institutional change have investigated the importance of collective actions 
(Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006). Van de Ven and 
Hargrave (2004) suggest that collective action examines “the political opportunities 
structures and framing processes surrounding institutional arrangements, as well as the 
networks of distributed, partisan, and interdependent actors who become embedded in 
these collective processes” (p. 277). In order to achieve the goals of institutional 
projects, institutional entrepreneurs and partners increase their efforts toward collective 
action, and apply  strategies to establish stable and secure sequences of interaction with 
other organizations to create new institutions (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).
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Collaboration has been used as a method of gaining legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985); 
power (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001); and competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). This 
is because institutional environments need organizations and collaborations to conform 
to the prevailing social norms. Collaboration may confer legitimacy by providing a 
symbol of their conformity to institutions. By participating in collaborations, 
organizations can gain legitimacy by being members of reputable prestigious 
organizations. As a consequence, as a collaboration attracts more and more 
organizations, a positive spiral may be set in motion. This means that members of 
collaborations (including institutional entrepreneurs) can be further legitimated and 
empowered in institutional entrepreneurship.
Moreover, by  establishing collaborations, organizations develop  strategies to increase 
the effectiveness of their performance. Studies of social networks have indicated that 
collaborations characterised by a mixture of strong ties, which enable efficient and rich 
exchange, and weak ties, which enable greater exploration and flexibility, are likely  to 
perform well (Uzzi, 1997; Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009). This suggests that, by using both strong and weak ties, institutional entrepreneurs 
will have different modes of association with critical stakeholders and with other 
member organizations. In the next sections, I will elaborate upon the roles of 
membership rules in institutional entrepreneurship, and the ways in which specifications 
can be developed using collaborations. Furthermore, I will suggest  that institutional 
entrepreneurs should have different  modes of association and practices from those of 
critical stakeholders and other members of collaborations.
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4.7.1. The Role of Membership Rules in Institutional Entrepreneurship
Membership  rules can be central to the formation of networks of interested parties. 
Membership  rules play three critical roles in institutional entrepreneurship: sharing and 
exchanging resources, professionalization and the maintenance of legitimacy. Firstly, in 
a well-established body of literature in inter-organizational studies, scholars have 
identified important relationships between resources, networks and competitive success 
in collaborations. Membership strategies delineate the exclusionary boundaries of 
members and the space in which members can operate. Within these boundaries, 
members can share and exchange resources with each other.
Secondly, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), professionalization is “the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of 
their work” (p. 152). In this way, professional associations are regulatory  agents. When 
other organizations adopt the practices authorized by  these professional associations, 
these practices generate an isomorphic effect in their particular field. In other words, 
these associations provide “isomorphic stability” (Greenwood, et al., 2002: 59). This 
demonstrates that professional associations play a role in compliance which is 
associated with normative and coercive expectations.
Thirdly, the establishment of inter-organizational relations is a method of maintaining 
and further achieving legitimacy in processes of institutional change. Institutional 
entrepreneurs may ally themselves with critical stakeholders in the beginning of a 
process of institutional change. In particular, when the allies consist of a large number 
of prestigious companies, they can offer legitimacy to other companies who are willing 
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to engage in the project (Doz, Olk & Ring, 2000). When collaboration is being 
mobilized, institutional entrepreneurs may continually select other leading companies to 
play  important  roles in the collaboration. Their engagement may  enhance the quality of 
specifications and the legitimacy of promoted institutions.
4.7.2. The Role of Building Specifications in Institutional Entrepreneurship
The other critical element in collective action is the theorizing and diffusing of 
specifications. Theorization develops and elaborates the chains of cause and effect in 
new institutions. It simplifies and condenses the properties and characteristics of new 
institutions, and explains the outcomes they produce. In mature or highly professional 
settings, theorization plays a particularly important role. This is because boundaries and 
templates are well established and well structured in these settings (Lawrence, 1999). 
Without  the strong development and elaboration of chains of cause and effect, new 
institutions are unlikely  to be accepted by their audience (Powell, 1985; Abbott, 1988). 
This is because theorization also enables the formation and reproduction of shared 
understandings and meanings with audiences, such as the marketplace, other 
professions, stakeholders, nations and even professional associations themselves. (Ruef 
& Scott, 1998; Scott & Backman, 1990).
Diffusion occurs after theorization, and indicates the diffusion of new institutions to 
audiences in order to gain social consensus about their pragmatic value (Suchman, 
1995); and increase their adoption in organizational fields (Kraatz, 1998; Palmer, 
Jennings & Zhou, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Culati & Shortell, 1997). 
Diffusion occurs only if new practices or institutions are compellingly presented as 
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being more appropriate than existing ones. Strang and Meyer describe as follows: 
"Models must make the transition from theoretical formulation to social movement to 
institutional imperative" (1993: 495). Using discursive activities, institutional 
entrepreneurs can highlight the functional superiority of new practices or institutions. 
They  can then diffuse them using mass communication media and interpersonal 
communication.
4.7.3. The Role of Having Stakeholders in Collaborations
If its member organizations include stakeholders who are centrally embedded within 
their industry network (Powell et al., 1996) as well as a range of other partners (Baum, 
et al., 2000), a collaboration can generate greater collaborative performance for 
institutional entrepreneurs. However, in practice, to establish strong ties, institutional 
entrepreneurs incur greater costs, including those of both tangible and intangible 
resources, than when they establish weak ties. Network research shows that  when 
partners have greater trust (Sivades & Dwyer, 2000), communication (Larson, 1992), 
cooperation (Lorange & Roos, 1993), and coordination (Mohr & Spekman, 1994), they 
work together better and are more likely to obtain the benefits of ties. Thus, institutional 
entrepreneurs are more willing to choose partners who already have strong ties, and 
stakes, and who have experienced with ties in order to establish collaboration (Burt, 
1992; Gulati, 1995, 1998; Rosenkopf, et al., 2001).
The rationale for this is that, at the beginning of an institutional entrepreneurship, things 
are very uncertain. According to resource dependence theory, institutional entrepreneurs 
are likely  to form allies with experienced stakeholders in order to decrease the level of 
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uncertainty over resources (Dickson & Weaver, 1997; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996). As a consequence, this study will suggest that institutional entrepreneurs not only 
need to establish membership rules, but also need to particularize their practices for the 
benefit of stakeholders.
Moreover, this study will also suggest that motivating stakeholders to engage in 
collaborations can be viewed as a strategy for impeding their rivals. Institutional 
entrepreneurs form particular relationships with critical stakeholders that define an 
unique and symbiotic interdependence. This is because this can increase the 
commitment of them, clarify  their roles and bond their resources to institutional 
entrepreneurs. Once a new technology is accepted, these symbiotic members are able to 
earn considerable economic benefits, achieve financial success, and become more 
central and valuable players in their field. Institutional entrepreneurs and rivals tend to 
seek support from the same stakeholders. Using appropriate strategies to advocate new 
technologies to the same stakeholders can be seen as a competitive strategy in highly 
networked industries.
4.8. Discursive Activities
In institutional entrepreneurship, discursive activities play an important role in 
exchanging information and constructing meanings. If stakeholders and the public 
misunderstand information about the functions and characteristics of new innovations, 
institutional entrepreneurs will have to devote much effort to correcting these erroneous 
perceptions and interpretations. This type of situation may result from information 
asymmetry. Although institutional entrepreneurs and partners possess the correct 
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information, they cannot, or do not know how to, convey this correct information to 
their audience. As a result, this may cause adverse selection.
Discourses can display  both symbolic and intrinsic dimensions (Lievens & Highhouse, 
2003; Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004). For example, if an institutional entrepreneur 
makes a speech at a prestigious conference to disseminate knowledge, this can be seen 
as information exchange. That entrepreneur is also conveying a message in order to 
establish meaning and to influence the perceptions of audiences, a process known as 
meaning construction.
4.8.1. The Information Communication in Institutional Entrepreneurship
In the beginning of an institutional entrepreneurship, institutional entrepreneurs need to 
make prospective organizations and stakeholders understand their actions and 
intentions. In order to avoid information asymmetry, institutional entrepreneurs must be 
able to attract the attention of the media and enable their journalists to report their new 
institutions correctly. Scholars have shown that chief executive officers (CEOs) can 
influence journalists and the content of those journalists’ reports about corporate leaders 
and their firms (Westphal & Deephouse, 2011). Media reports can have a significant 
influence on the reputation and legitimacy of companies and can communicate 
information to their audience. Journalists can generate new knowledge about 
corporations by  interpreting and assembling information from different sources and 
transmitting that information to stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1998). Consequently, 
journalists can influence the perceptions of a wide range of stakeholders, including 
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customers, suppliers, public policy  makers and the public itself (Deephouse, 2000; 
Graber, 2004; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005).
In practice, senior managers who work for the organizations of institutional 
entrepreneurs need to be able to influence the reports of journalists. Positive media 
coverage can enhance the power of new institutions (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 
2004). Conversely, negative media coverage can diminish their power (Wiesenfeld, 
Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008). This means that senior managers should develop 
ingratiatory forms of behaviour that will create social influence by invoking the norm of 
reciprocity from journalists. The norm of reciprocity is a nearly universal rule which 
governs social behaviour. When an individual receives a personal favor, he/she feels 
morally and socially obligated to return it (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).
4.8.2. The Construction of Meaning in Institutional Entrepreneurship
The construction of meaning is important in the creation and disruption of institutions. 
We can define the actions of institutional entrepreneurs as social expressions that  can 
“incorporate both intrinsic and symbolic dimensions extend[ing] the view of a symbol 
as either a rhetorical device with little substantive action or as a socially  legitimate 
verbal statement decoupled from any implementation” (Zott & Hoy, 2007: 72; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1998; Zbaracki, 1998). The intrinsic dimension is equivalent to objective or 
tangible functions, while the symbolic dimension refers to meanings that are evoked, 
because of which people make inferences about objects using shared interpretations.
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Institutional entrepreneur’s actions as well as objects can display  both intrinsic and 
symbolic dimensions. For instance, institutional entrepreneur speaking in at prestigious 
conferences can be seen as an intrinsic way (disseminating knowledge) and also a 
symbolic way (conveying message then establishing people recognize his/her 
expertise). Defining an action as a social expression that we can extend the view of 
symbol as a socially legitimate verbal statement decoupled from any implementation 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Consequently, in some extent, Zutt and Huy’s study can be 
used to integrate the meaning construction and information communication. 
Discourses can help social actors to frame social situations or to interpret ambiguous 
ones (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997). In institutional entrepreneurship, it is not known if 
new institutions will be successful before they are fully developed and marketed (Gort 
& Klepper, 1982). Thus, institutional entrepreneurs should be responsible for 
constructing the meanings of new institutions clearly  during the process of institutional 
entrepreneurship.
In practice, institutional entrepreneurs need to understand which kinds of information 
and which activities that construct meaning are appropriate for which recipient and 
which situation. For instance, in technological change, professional technological 
exhibitions or conferences are the critical places for the presentation of discourses. Each 
party  can contact a wide range of professional media, companies from many relevant 
industries, buyers, and many other potential stakeholders in one and the same place. 
Different media have different  audiences. The subscribers to professional media are 
normally their audiences. Deephouse (1996) pointed out that media reports not only 
reflect but also influence the opinions of the audience. Theoretically, therefore, 
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professional media often set the agenda for less professional media, and are routinely 
read by organizations in the relevant industries. Once institutional entrepreneurs seek to 
construct meanings, and to build or repair the legitimacy of new institutions, contacting 
these professional media should be prioritized. However, I would suggest that less 
professional media also have influence. Their audiences are less likely to work in 
professional or prestige organizations. However, institutional entrepreneurs can also 
present a less professional discourse in these media. They can also construct a general 
consensus which explains or diffuses a new technological standard to the population.
4.9. Conclusions
This chapter has suggested that institutional entrepreneurship  can provide an integrative 
framework to explain standard wars. This study integrates the views of early 
institutionalists with organizational institutionalism to propose a main framework and to 
identify four attributes of institutional entrepreneurship: power, legitimacy, collective 
action and discourse activities.
Due to the network positions and social relations possessed by  institutional 
entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs have a certain degree of power and legitimacy at the 
beginning of processes of institutional change. This study suggests that power and 
legitimacy  can be seen as resources which they  possess. They can utilize these resources 
to motivate collective actions, establish collaborations and construct discursive 
activities. Chapter 4 also reinforced the views of stakeholders which were discussed in 
Chapter 2. Furthermore, this study suggests that  institutional entrepreneurs should 
differentiate their practices for critical stakeholders and for other member organizations. 
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Institutional entrepreneurs should establish allies before establishing collaborations. The 
main tasks of a ally are to increase the commitment of critical stakeholders to new 
institutions and to act strategically to motivate more and more prospective organizations 
to engage in the collaboration.
However, the performance of collective action and discursive activities (three elements 
which I describe as ‘institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars’) contribute to the 
accumulation of power, legitimacy, network effects and product performance of new 
institutions – a stage I call ‘outcomes’. The issue of power and the accumulation of 
legitimacy  is related to the number of members, the performance of R&D activities, and 
discursive activities. Firstly, as well as powerful and critical stakeholders, institutional 
entrepreneurs also need to motivate other prospective organizations to become member 
organizations. Secondly, researching and developing the technical specifications of new 
standards is the main task of collaboration in standard wars. If it has better 
specifications, the new standard can give a better performance. Thirdly, the more 
positive news reports there are about the institutional entrepreneur, the more their power 
and legitimacy are enhanced as well. In short, the resources of institutional 
entrepreneurs (i.e. power and legitimacy) have mutual relationships involving their 
collective actions and discursive activities.
The outcomes of establishing collaboration and constructing discursive activities are to 
produce a final product which is capable of responding to the requirements of critical 
stakeholders, and then convince them to produce an increasing number of 
complementary  products, in order to create a larger number of network effects for the 
final products. In this way, product performance mediates the relationship between 
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‘institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars’ and network effects. Moreover, 
institutional entrepreneurs also promote their final product to consumers. When more 
and more consumers buy a specific product, network effects can also be generated.
So far, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 have described in depth the attributes of standard wars and 
of institutional entrepreneurship. This study argues that we can use this integrative 
conceptual framework to explain the main question and the three sub-research 
questions: how do firms defeat competitors in standard wars? How do institutional 
entrepreneurs sufficiently manage critical stakeholders, collective actions and discursive 
activities in processes of technological standard change? Chapter 5 will provide a new 
conceptual framework in figures. The chapter will also provide guidelines of each 
variable.
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Chapter 5.  Conceptual Framework
Figure 5.1 shows the conceptual framework of the study based on the literature review. 
Rather than discussing the antecedents of institutional entrepreneurship and the 
characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs, it focuses on the application of institutional 
entrepreneurship in standard wars. 
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The figure shows both critical stakeholder management and collaboration structuring 
capabilities in a dotted square. They represent the collective actions in this study. The 
study suggests that critical stakeholders and other member organizations are all 
members of the collaboration. The difference between them is that critical stakeholders 
play  management roles in the collaboration, as they have critical stakes in institutional 
entrepreneurs. They have reputations in the relevant industries, and are also central 
organizations within the industries. In order to obtain the resources of these critical 
stakeholders, institutional entrepreneurs manage them using specialised practices. This 
study suggests that these practices can also be described as critical stakeholder 
management capability. Through these practices, critical stakeholders devise routines, 
procedures and structures that delineate who can legitimately  make decisions within the 
collaboration or speak on behalf of it. In short, the critical stakeholder partners are 
symbiotic partners of the institutional entrepreneur.
In addition to critical stakeholder partners, institutional entrepreneurs also need a 
number of member organizations to promote the new standard throughout their 
network. I suggest that institutional entrepreneurs use collaboration structuring 
capability to manage these member organizations (which include critical stakeholders). 
This study views collective action as actions or behaviours of a group working toward 
common goals. The group’s resources, knowledge and efforts are combined to reach 
these goals. Collective action is therefore seen as a generalized practice, rather than 
practices which are specific to the critical stakeholder.
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The three elements of collective action are group  structure, commitment and 
communication (e.g. Ostrom, 2000; Koehler & Koontz, 2008; Payan & Svensson, 
2007). Group structure allows for the execution of effective actions in order to achieve 
the common goal. Commitment to collective action is a critical element when 
explaining whether the goal is achieved. It  engages participants in an intensive process 
of consensus building which can lead to more creative solutions. Communication is a 
human activity that links people and creates relationships between them. As a result, 
collective action can be conceptualised as a set of communicative practices which take 
into consideration people’s interactions and engagement. This study suggests that we 
can understand the collective actions of institutional entrepreneurs by  observing actions 
within the collaboration. The collaboration is the highest order of collective action and 
is dependent on the achievement of a virtuous circle of interaction, commitment, and 
achieved outcomes between the collective action and the outside community  (Imperial, 
2005).
However, due to the limitations of data, it is impossible to directly observe the 
commitment of participants within the collaboration It is also impossible to directly 
observe the content of their formal communication and the status of their informal 
communications within the collaboration. For these reasons, I only  observe the 
frequency of formal communications within the collaboration.
The structure of Chapter 5 is as follows. Section 5.1 clarifies the relationships in the 
framework. This section has two aims. Firstly, it concludes the literature review begun 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Secondly, it  paves the way  for Section 5.2, which makes 
operational the concepts included in the framework.
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5.1. Clarifying the Relationships within the Framework
Two types of resources for institutional entrepreneurship are identified in Figure 5.1: 
power and legitimacy. These resources are produced when a firm has a central position 
in a network; such relationships will lead such focal firms to gain even more power and 
legitimacy  within a given industry. Having central positions within networks means that 
institutional entrepreneurs can directly  access other firms (both critical stakeholders and 
other organizations). Firms with previous good product performance will have more 
influence than firms in a given industry whose performance has been less good. Other 
firms will imitate the product if its performance is outstanding and dominant, in terms 
of its network effects and financial returns, among other factors. Hence, a firm with a 
dominant product will influence the development of new products in the industry. 
Moreover, many other organizations will establish relationships with the focal firms, 
such as buying relationships, alliances, co-development of R&D activities and so forth. 
Accordingly, focal firms with established relationships may more easily communicate 
influence and information to other organizations in their field. This view reflects the 
importance of degree centrality and betweenness discussed in Chapter 3. And these 
firms are easily to have power and legitimacy. 
This study suggests that power is a relational phenomenon. Powerful focal firms can 
shape relationships and constrain the actions of other organizations. Power also enables 
institutional entrepreneurs to gain the attention of the media and its audience in order to 
promote their new standards and to motivate other companies to engage in their change 
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projects. The power of the institutional entrepreneur can be further accumulated as a 
result.
Similarly, their previous product performance in product lines relating to the new 
standards and to the relationships with other leading companies can be seen as 
important sources of legitimacy. This study focuses on pragmatic legitimacy. As a result 
of their experience of developing their previous products, institutional entrepreneurs 
provide evidence that they  are able to produce the new standards. The performance 
convinces the audience that the new standards promoted by such firms are predictable 
and achievable. Legitimacy enables institutional entrepreneurs to obtain support from 
other players in the field who are only  willing to invest  resources in legitimate 
organizations, and are not willing to engage in transactions with other organizations. In 
addition, legitimate institutional entrepreneurs can more easily attract media attention, 
and then communicate information about new standards, and construct meanings for 
them, through media reports. It is more likely that  the relevant professional media will 
report the actions of firms whose previous related products have performed well 
compared to those of other firms. Such media reports will influence the audience’s 
perceptions. Thus, information about, and meanings of, the new standard will be further 
promoted to the audience. Moreover, relationships with leading legitimate companies 
provide institutional entrepreneurs with additional legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
Such relationships can be seen as a kind of endorsement of the actions of institutional 
entrepreneurs. This study  suggests that, in addition, effective collective action and 
discursive activities will further enhance the legitimacy of institutional entrepreneurs.
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This study  identifies critical stakeholder management, collaboration structuring 
capabilities, and discursive activities as the crucial aspects of institutional 
entrepreneurship. Figure 5.1 indicates (by  means of the dotted square around the two 
concepts) that critical stakeholder management and collaboration structuring 
capabilities should be bonded together as collective action. These concepts affect the 
outcomes (network effects and product performance) in separate ways. This study 
suggests that institutional entrepreneurs should develop specialised practices to manage 
critical stakeholders. This is because they have critical stakes. In this study, 
manufacturers of consumer electronic products and content providers which make 
complementary products all have critical stakes in the needs of institutional 
entrepreneurs. In standard wars, these stakeholders can help institutional entrepreneurs 
by means of cooperation in relation to research, the development of specifications and 
the enhancement of the network effects of the new standards. Hence, institutional 
entrepreneurs will establish alliances with critical stakeholders, and develop and 
manage forms of collaboration suited to the performance of their activities. Chapter 4 
argues that institutional entrepreneurs can assign different responsibilities and 
obligations to member organizations of collaborations by using different types of 
membership. While collaborations with critical stakeholders require specialised 
management practices, institutional entrepreneurs will utilize generalised practices with 
other member organizations. Based on the specifications developed by allies, member 
organizations can further test the new standards, produce compliances, and initiate plans 
for promoting them to the audience. Although these are not critical stakeholders,  power 
and legitimacy can be further accumulated by increasing the number of members of 
collaborations.
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Discursive activities are important in different ways in the various stages of standard 
wars. At the beginning of a standard war, the audience has limited cognitive attention 
(Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990; Guthrie, 1993), and institutional entrepreneurs must use 
discursive activities to make them aware of the problems that  may be solved by the new 
standard (Weick, 1979, 1995; Phillips et  al., 2004). When institutional entrepreneurs 
have enabled actors to understand what is happening and which corrective changes will 
be made (Gephart, 1993), they should use discursive activities to promote the details of 
the change project and thus obtain legitimacy (Phillips et  al., 2004). Later in the 
process, discursive activities are responsible for advertising the products made by the 
new standards. In general, the aim of discursive activities is to provide correct 
information and to construct meanings for new standards. Such meanings may  include 
superior performance, better price and any evidence provided by institutional 
entrepreneurs and their critical stakeholders.
Finally, the outcomes of standard wars, network effects and product performance will 
result from effective critical stakeholder management, collective action and discursive 
activities. Because institutional entrepreneurs develop specifications of new standards 
and promote new standards to markets in collaboration with other firms, these outcomes 
are significantly influenced by collective action and discursive activities. Moreover, 
effective product performance will result  in network effects. This is because effective 
product performance will lead customers to purchase products from a similar standard.
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5.2. Data Themes which should be Collected
This section aims to provide observable themes for each variable. These will convey 
information in textual or descriptive form, which can include both statements of fact 
and statements of opinion. Such themes can show me the kind of information to collect. 
In the case study method, it  is necessary to explain the data collection protocol in a 
systematic way. The data collection protocol is the procedure for using the conceptual 
framework in the data collection process. It includes a plan for monitoring the data as it 
is collected, to ensure high data quality. Thus, in the following sub-sections in Section 
5.2, I will discuss the role of each variable in the study in systematic way then propose 
their themes. 
5.2.1. Institutional Entrepreneurship in Standard Wars
The previous section argued that institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars is the 
heart of this study. It should therefore be prioritized.
The framework distinguishes between three aspects of institutional entrepreneurship: 
critical stakeholder management, collaboration structuring capabilities and discursive 
activities. These three aspects are derived from the literature review, and are the core 
concepts of this study. Clearly, any activity  involved in collective action has discursive 
meanings. For example, when a focal firm provides simple information to its audience, 
this information has symbolic meanings. A prestigious office address could serve the 
intrinsic purpose of being a place where people work, but could also symbolically 
suggest prosperity and high status (Oldham & Rotchford, 1983).
172
To make a clear distinction between them, this study  defines critical stakeholder 
management and collaboration structuring capabilities as activities which exclude the 
meanings of those actions which distinguish discursive activities. The aim of discursive 
activities is therefore to communicate information about, and construct meanings for 
standards and for the actions of institutional entrepreneurs and their partners. Thus, 
discursive activities communicate and construct not only the meaning of the standards 
themselves, but also the meaning of the collaborations, and thereby influence the 
perceptions of the audience. 
5.2.1.1. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities
This study suggests that institutional entrepreneurs should use different practices for 
critical stakeholders than they do for other member organizations. Interactions between 
institutional entrepreneurs and critical stakeholders make up the core of institutional 
entrepreneurship. These interactions contribute to the establishment of achievable 
specifications of new technology, and the power and legitimacy of the institutional 
entrepreneur accumulates as a result. Institutional entrepreneurs are more likely to 
collaborate with critical stakeholders with whom they have existing relationships.
The aim of critical stakeholder management capability is to understand and respond to 
the expectations of such stakeholders throughout  the process, to provide them with 
incentives for further cooperation, and to commit them to provide continual feedback. 
Although this study suggests that players with the required resources are more likely to 
become institutional entrepreneurs, they  require more legitimacy and power in order to 
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influence their audiences. In this way, they initiate strong ties with critical stakeholders, 
and in particular with those who have leading positions in the relevant industries.
By interacting these critical stakeholders, institutional entrepreneurs respond to critical 
stakeholders’ expectations what they assumed. At the same time, these stakeholders may 
express their expectations to institutional entrepreneurs. Institutional entrepreneurs 
should document how the actual performance of new standards has taken into account 
those stakeholders’ concerns. This documentation can be seen as comprising 
declarations or assurances that institutional entrepreneurs will take a particular acton or 
guarantees that a particular action will take place. Consequently, these critical 
stakeholders are more likely to engage in the camp and establish the specifications of 
the standard what the institutional entrepreneurs want. Hence, this study  presents the 
following themes: 
Theme 1. The specific responses of institutional entrepreneurs to the expectations and 
requirements of critical stakeholders.
Theme 2. The specific expectations about the new standard, as announced by critical 
stakeholders in media reports.
Theme 3. The specific performance of new standards, related to the expectations of 
critical stakeholders.
Theme 4. The actions of groups of critical stakeholders which establish the primary 
specifications of standards what the institutional entrepreneurs want.
174
5.2.1.2. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities
Efforts to successfully achieve the common interests of institutional entrepreneurs and 
their partners include their engagement in collaborations. In this context, we focus on 
the collaboration of many member organizations within a formal membership structure, 
with the aim of organizing the collaboration as a professional body. This can generate 
isomorphic effects in the field. In particular, as the number of members reaches a 
critical mass, having well-managed rules of membership not only helps institutional 
entrepreneurs to manage complex relationships, but also helps each collaboration to 
become a new ‘industrial section’. The term ‘industrial section’ refers to a sector, an 
area or portion of the relevant industry  that is distinct from others. Within this new 
industrial section, while firms are embedded in the current institutional settings, they 
adopt new standards and specifications to produce new products (Van de Ven, Polley, 
Garud & Venkataraman, 1999). This group of companies then plays diverse roles in the 
transformation of a technological community into a commercially  viable industry 
(Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006).
As discussed in Chapter 4, I study collaborations as collective actions. Collaboration is 
a synergistic way of achieving outcomes (Imperial, 2005). The word ‘synergistic’ 
implies the capacity of the partnership  to achieve synergy, i.e. the degree to which the 
total effect  is greater than the sum of the individual effects. Moreover, collaborations 
have clear mission statements and defined perceptions of roles and responsibilities, and 
involve engagement in activities in order to achieve a specific purpose through formal 
arrangements (McGuire, 2006). Moreover, collaboration is generally achieved through a 
high level of communication between members. In collaborations, trust is increased and 
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this further increases the amount of communication of the information needed to 
achieve desired outcomes.
The membership structure refers to the collaboration’s clear rules and objectives, and 
the provision of decision-making roles for collective action. Within processes of 
collective action, members have different opinions and interests, and so they need 
mechanisms to govern potential conflicts and coordinate divergent interests. Having a 
clear membership structure will allow their concerns to be presented to the mission 
(Astley & Van de Ven, 1983) and overcome the free rider problem (Olson, 1965).
Theme 1. The membership structure of a collaboration.
In order to maintain the membership  structure, institutional entrepreneurs should present 
a mission statement to members and ensure good communication between members. 
The membership structure should be responsible for developing the technical 
specifications of new standards and many other activities in the standard war. Firstly, 
the mission statement refers to clear objectives which provide direction for the 
collective action. It  should allow the different members to function as a unit, in order to 
attain their goals more easily (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Within the unit, members 
should prioritize clear goals, objectives, actions and timeframes that result in a more 
effective collective action, which will achieve their interests and goals (Astley & Van de 
Ven, 1983).
I cannot directly observe the quality and the amount of money invested in R&D 
activities in a particular standard war, and so I also cannot observe the commitment of 
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the participants within a collaboration. However, in a project of technological standard 
change, these goals, objectives, actions and timeframes relate to the R&D activities and 
promotion for the new standard. In particular, the R&D activities decide the product 
performance of the standard, and so not only  the mission statements of the collaboration 
should be clearly defined, but also its R&D activities.
Theme 2. The mission statements of different member organizations in 
collaborations.
Theme 3. Collaborative R&D activities in relation to the specifications of the new 
standard.
Formal interaction and frequency  of interaction are the two main aspects of 
communication. Formal interactions can be easily tracked and observed, when they do 
not use informal types of communication, such as email, voice message, telephone and 
face-to-face discussion,. Members of collaborations are more likely  to discuss relevant 
issues and get official approval within such formal interactions. Frequency is another 
component of communication which affects collective action (Koontz & Bodine, 2008). 
Recurring communication reinforces trust among members who are confronting 
collective action dilemmas (Raymound, 2006), encourages members to take part  in 
collective action (Imperial, 2005), and reduces the transaction costs of starting new 
memberships.
Theme 4. Formal communications between members in collaborations.
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5.2.1.3. Discursive Activities
At the beginning of a standard war, an institutional entrepreneur must present the whole 
vision of the change project to its market. This stage uses framing processes. The aim of 
this stage is not only to provide compelling reasons which will capture its audience’s 
attention, but also to shape a discourse battle with its competitors. The purpose of such a 
battle is to initiate a set  of intensified competing discourses, which are likely to have 
negative performance consequences for the firm’s competitors (Rindova, Becerra & 
Contardo, 2004). These competing discourses are intended to undermine the power and 
legitimacy  of the existing standards and the competing alternatives. Moreover, 
institutional entrepreneurs simultaneously seek legitimacy for their new standard. By 
using these discursive activities, institutional entrepreneurs may obtain and enhance the 
legitimacy of the new standards: 
Theme 1. The discursive activities directed to the audience which provide compelling 
reasons for adoption of the new standard.
Theme 2. The discursive activities directed to the audience which undermine its rivals 
and the existing standard.
Theme 3. The discursive activities which seek legitimacy of the new standard from the 
audience.
Following the initial framing stage, institutional entrepreneurs aim to further promote 
their new standard and to influence the audience’s perceptions and interpretations. 
When an institutional entrepreneur with a strong base of power and legitimacy initiates 
a change project with a group of critical stakeholders, they  can more easily catch the 
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audience’s eye than can peripheral actors. However, if they cannot explain how the 
project fits the needs of critical stakeholders and of social interests (Green, 2004), the 
new project could easily lead to entropy (Zucker, 1988). Thus, they  must demonstrate 
the performance of their primary products and answer the questions and criticisms of 
rivals and stakeholders. In particular, technological exhibitions and conferences are 
critical places to present such discourses. These occasions give each camp an 
opportunity to contact media, criticize rival’s standards, respond and answer external 
groups’ criticisms and questions.  
At this stage, institutional entrepreneurs should ensure that  their information and the 
meanings of the new standard and the relevant products are unified. They can then 
become reified and taken for granted (Phillips et  al., 2004). In order to make such 
messages unambiguous, having spokespersons in standard war is critical. They can help 
the institutional entrepreneur to impose his desired agenda onto the media (Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992; Staw, McKechnie & Puffer, 1983). Moreover, spokespersons can initiate 
multiple discursive activities (including responding criticisms and questions and 
promoting the new standards) to media in the exhibitions or elsewhere. Without unified 
information, the institutional entrepreneur may invest resources into fixing or repairing 
the confusion.
In the processes, institutional entrepreneurs use discursive activities promote the 
instrumental and symbolic meanings of the new standards. In general, institutional 
entrepreneurs aim at  presenting that  the product performance of the new standard is 
better than rivals and the specifications can satisfy the audience’s interests. Hence, the 
institutional entrepreneurs can increase external groups’ adoption and exclusive support. 
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In this vein, although the study can list several different discursive activities, their 
effects are connected with each other. 
Theme 4. The discursive activities which respond to criticisms and questions proposed 
by competitors and  audience. 
Theme 5. The discursive activities which promote the new standard and its 
performance.
Theme 6. The discursive activities which are presented in professional exhibitions 
and conferences.
Theme 7. The discursive activities initiated by spokespersons.
5.2.2. Power
This study suggests that power and legitimacy are resources which can be proactively 
activated to initiate institutional entrepreneurship. Having power and legitimacy makes 
it possible for institutional entrepreneurs to gain effective outcomes and compete with 
rivals who propose alternatives in the field (Rindova et al., 2004). Mutual relationships 
exist between these resources and collective action and discursive activities. The next 
two sections discuss the guidelines of power and legitimacy.
As outlined in Chapter 4, institutional entrepreneurship contains both systemic and 
episodic power. Rather than focusing on the characteristics of the commodity of power, 
this study  intends to focus on ‘soft power’. Power is a relational phenomenon and an 
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effect of social relations, something that has been discussed in Chapter 4. ‘Soft power7’ 
also refers to the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through 
coercion (Nye, 2004). It is derived from illusion, the exploitation of the tendencies of 
others, and time (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Firstly, illusion is the use of deception, 
such as exaggerating one’s importance to gain advantage and shielding intentions 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Institutional entrepreneurs should present their experience 
of previous standard wars and their connections with critical stakeholders and 
professional associations. Such experience and networking, rather than exaggerations or 
deceptions, will make the audience believe that the institutional entrepreneur’s actions 
are genuine.
Secondly, rather than attempting to force others to act in a desired way, institutional 
entrepreneurs exploit  the audience’s natural tendencies (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). By 
understanding the expectations of critical stakeholders and other member organizations, 
institutional entrepreneurs can better target their requirements, respond to their 
expectations and successfully persuade them to engage in their change projects. In 
standard wars, not only institutional entrepreneurs themselves but also critical partners 
are viewed as conduits to an understanding of the tendencies of dynamic markets and 
customers. Moreover, within professional associations related to the new standards, 
institutional entrepreneurs can also show that they understand the market’s tendencies.
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7 By using the concept of soft power does not conflict with the discussion of power issue in Chapter 4. 
According to the latest study of Lawrence, Malhorta, and Morris (2012), systemic power is able to “ 
institutionalize radical change when the systems associated with it are legitimated by the skilled use of 
language by key actors and then left to operate independently by those actors.” (p. 102) Episodic power is 
able to “ initiate and energize radical change when it represents a significant break from traditional 
authority structures and is legitimated through appeals to traditional organizational values.” (p. 102) 
Based on the discussion, by using soft power, institutional entrepreneurs can use discursive activities to 
establish systemic power and use collaboration to theorize and legitimize the specifications of new 
institutions. 
Finally, institutional entrepreneurs need time to cement their actions in the audience’s 
mind. It takes time to successfully  change people’s perceptions. We can imagine, that 
feeding the audience with information about the new standard is a kind of 
“brainwashing”. It is difficult to immediately  convince the audience to accept a 
particular new product. They need time to change their minds, so institutional 
entrepreneurs should provide them with detailed information about the standard war 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Rindova, Pollock & Hayward, 2006).
In a sense, the concept of soft power is similar to the additional insight provided by 
Steven Lukes’s three-dimensional view of power (Lukes, 1974). Rather than one- and 
two-dimensional views focusing on observable conflicts, the third dimension focuses on 
not only observable but also latent conflicts. A can “exercise power over actor B by 
influencing, shaping, or determining his wants and preferences” (Lorenzi, 2006: 91). In 
other words, A makes B believe that the superiority of things produced by A is taken-
for-granted. Thus, by using soft power, A makes B believe that A has experience and 
knowledge required for the new institution. By  feeding the relevant information in a 
long run, B will eventually believe that A can do it. 
Using soft power to collect the relevant information, I will study the relationships 
between institutional entrepreneurs and critical stakeholders, as well as their experience 
of initiating and/or taking part in previous standard wars which relate to the current one. 
They  are familiar with the practices and routines within existing institutional 
environments and standard wars.
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Moreover, I will also collect the continuous R&D activities of institutional 
entrepreneurs in collaboration with critical stakeholders and other prospective 
organizations which relate to the specifications of the new standard. The continuity of 
institutional entrepreneurs’ R&D activities can be seen as their episodic power in 
standard wars. Having more R&D activities which relate to the new standards shows 
that institutional entrepreneurs have an understanding of the latest developments 
concerning the new standard. Moreover, looking at institutional entrepreneurs’ R&D 
collaborations with critical stakeholders and/or prospective organizations presents the 
audience with a space of illusion. This means that institutional entrepreneurs and critical 
stakeholders are not only capable of tracing the latest technologies relating to the new 
standard but also are capable of understanding the needs and wishes of the audience 
(and of prospective organizations) concerning the new standard.
Theme 1. The number of patents relating to the new standard developed by 
institutional entrepreneurs
Theme 2. The number of patents per year related to the new standard produced in 
collaboration by institutional entrepreneurs, critical stakeholders, and prospective 
organizations during the standard war.
The main difference between the first and second themes is that  the latter focuses on 
describing the process of R&D activities in the collaboration, while the former focuses 
on the number of patents related to the new standards. In other words, it presents the 
outcomes of collaborations between institutional entrepreneurs, critical stakeholders and 
prospective organizations. 
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If a company has won a previous standard war, it has a creditable record which it can 
present to the audience in the new standard war. When a firm has lost a previous 
standard war, however, this does not  mean that the firm has no chance of winning the 
next war. On the contrary, it means that the firm has valuable experience and may be 
ready  to apply this experience to the next war. This what the Chinese mean by the 
saying ‘failure is the mother of success’.
Theme 3. Institutional entrepreneurs’ experience of previous standard wars.
5.2.3. Legitimacy
Like power, legitimacy also has mutual relationships with the behaviour of institutional 
entrepreneurs in standard wars. As discussed in Chapter 4, this study focuses mainly on 
pragmatic legitimacy in processes of technological standard change. This study  defines 
critical stakeholders as institutional entrepreneurs’ symbiotic partners. Therefore, one 
should consider not only  the institutional entrepreneur’s pragmatic legitimacy but also 
that of their critical stakeholder partners.
Pragmatic legitimacy relates to the instrumental value of the institutional entrepreneur 
and its critical stakeholder. It  represents what they  are seen to be able to do in order to 
serve the needs and interests of their audiences, and includes the previous product 
performance of institutional entrepreneurs and their critical stakeholder which relates to 
the standard war. They  provide evidence to show that they can improve the economic 
interests of other organizations. 
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Theme 1. The previous product relevant performance of critical stakeholder.  
The rationale of this is that institutional entrepreneurs co-research and co-develop the 
specifications of new standards with their critical stakeholder. For this reason, the 
product performance of these critical stakeholders should be taken into account. Thus, if 
they  have greater product performance in their relevant segments and higher 
productivity  in the standard war, critical stakeholder are able to influence the 
perceptions of their audiences in the standard war.
Theme 2. The previous performance of the institutional entrepreneur’s star products.
Outstanding product performance in product areas relevant to the new standard 
indicates to the audience that the intentions of the institutional entrepreneur are 
achievable and predictable. As a result, the endeavors of the focal firms are appreciated 
(Scott, 1991; Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen & Kurzweil, 1984), something which will 
further enhance the legitimacy of the focal firm.
Theme 3. The business segments relevant to institutional entrepreneurs and their 
critical stakeholders.
Institutional entrepreneurs and critical stakeholders may have star products and 
outstanding products which are not related to the new standard. Because of this, they 
may not be able to show that they have technical legitimacy in relation to the new 
standard. The main products or services of an organization are normally those that give 
it the largest economic returns. These products and/or services will be described as the 
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main business segments of that organization. When the business segments of an 
institutional entrepreneur and a critical stakeholder are evaluated highly  in relation to a 
specific standard, and when they support this standard, the audience may be less likely 
to raise questions about the standard’s technical quality.
5.2.4. Outcomes
The framework includes two types of outcomes: network effects and product 
performance. In standard wars, these outcomes can help the market and other firms to 
evaluate whether the standard is worth supporting. In some cases, the defeated standards 
may co-exist  in the market with the winning standards. However, the market share of 
the defeated one will be too small to generate network effects. For example, in the VHS 
vs. Betamax war, by  1985, Sony had begun to scale back production of Betamax 
recorders. However, the format still survived among professionals for some time 
afterwards. In such a situation, we can say  that the standard war has been won by the 
firm with the larger market share and greater network effects.
Network effects occur when the value of a product or service to a consumer is 
contingent on the number of other people using it  (Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz 
& Shapiro, 1986, 1994). Quantity is critical for measuring network effects of a standard 
war. It includes installed base of a particular products, sales units, and complementary 
goods of the standard. It is important for measuring the installed based of the new 
standard. However, it is critical to measuring the installed base of previous version of 
the product when the new standard provides backward compatibility. 
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This study will look in particular at the number of products and complementary 
products in the market per month associated with particular standards. It will help it to 
show whether the network effects of a particular standard are influenced by particular 
events, collective actions and discursive activities.
Theme 1. The number of installed bases in a particular product (produced by the new 
standard and/or the previous version) before and during the standard war. 
Theme 2. The monthly sales (units) of a product produced by a particular standard 
during the standard war.
Theme 3. The number of complementary goods in the market per month associated 
with a particular standard during the standard war.
Finally, there are many measures of product performance which focus on different 
levels and dimensions (Molina-Castillo & Munuera-Aleman, 2009). This study suggests 
that technical and price performance are proper measurements of product performance 
(Talke, 2007). Financial performance indicates how much revenue is earned by the 
institutional entrepreneur in the standard war. However, the focus of this study is on 
how institutional entrepreneurs maneuver strategies in processes of technological 
standard change. It is a process-oriented study, and so, financial performance is not 
appropriate for it. On the other hand, the technical performance of technological 
products is highly relevant to customer satisfaction (Huang, Soutar, & Brown, 2004), 
and so this study will suggest that technical performance is the proper guideline of the 
performance of the product.
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In addition to technical performance, this study also suggests that price performance 
should be taken into account. Although technical performance is defined by institutional 
entrepreneurs and their critical stakeholders for their customers, if the customer does not 
ascribe good or high value to the product, the product will find it difficult to defeat its 
competitors.
Customers often measure a company’s ratio of outcomes to inputs by making 
comparisons. They constantly  compare it  with its competitors’ offerings. This is not 
only true of the technical performance of the product, but also of its price. For example, 
Cusumano et al. (1992) suggest that  price, capacity, and sound and display  are the 
proper guidelines of the performance of the product. In the digital era, I would further 
suggest that compatibility and copyright protection should be taken into account when 
assessing a process of technological change. This study should therefore collect several 
dimensions of product performance: 
Theme 1. Capacity
Theme 2. Compatibility
Theme 3. Quality of sound and display 
Theme 4. Copyright protection
Theme 5. Price
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Chapter 6.  Research Methodology
By following Eisenhardt’s (1989) principles and open coding techniques of grounded 
theory 8, I use an critical case-study method within a theory-driven approach to study 
this intrinsic case, to answer the research questions, and to construct a new theory  which 
will explain how firms defeat competitors in standard wars (cf. Yin, 1994). The study 
aims to find a causal relationship  between ideas. In the literature review, I cover a wide 
range of perspectives concerning standard wars. The review also identifies several gaps 
in existing studies of standard wars. However, these perspectives do not constitute an 
integrated viewpoint when answering the research questions. It is my aim to provide 
such an integrated approach by  focusing on institutional entrepreneurship, in an attempt 
to outline the relationships between distinct variables.
Traditionally, all social science methods are tested by  internal, external validity and 
reliability  (Kidder & Judd, 1986, Yin, 1994). Rather, qualitative studies tend to use 
different criteria (Gill et al., 2010) (e.g., credibility, dependability, and transferability). 
Some scholars claim that case study is an inferior sort of scientific method. On the 
contrary, the study  is possibly the basic method of science (Holland & Herstad, 2000). 
However, without generalization, we could not interact with our findings in a coherent 
manner. 
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8 The study adopts open coding exclusively. It is the one of analyzing techniques of grounded theory. 
Grounded theory adopts the interpretivist assumption in social science. It enables researcher to seek out 
and conceptualize the latent patterns and structures of researcher’s interest through the constant 
comparison. In contrast, content analysis is the one of multiple contexts for acquiring data. It is a 
methodology in the social science for word counting. Although the method is a summering, quantitative 
analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method, it is somewhat more problematic in that it bears 
positivist assumptions about the relationship between meaning and word frequency (Suddaby, 2006). In 
some extent, adopting content analysis may violate the interpretivist assimptions of grounded theory 
(Krippendorff, 2003).
This study  adopts the idea of naturalistic generalization, advocated by Robert Stake 
(1982). The idea advocates a realignment of the responsibility to generalize away from 
the researcher toward the reader. In order to respond the generalization issue, this study 
will briefly discuss the criteria of transferability in the beginning of this chapter. The 
study will further discuss the evaluations in the following paragraphs.  
The criteria of transferability  is meant to make possible naturalistic generalization. 
which invites readers to apply  ideas from the natural and in-depth depictions presented 
in case studies to other specific contexts. The process of naturalistic generalization of 
findings from research involves a transfer of knowledge from one study to another cases 
based on in-depth knowledge of the specifics of the studied case. In order to make 
possible naturalistic generalization of findings from my research, I have to provide a 
high degree of detail and thick description of the case. This should make the readers 
aware of the differences between the studied case and other cases and, accordingly, 
facilitate transfer of knowledge to the extent that it is relevant.. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that a qualitative inquiry should demonstrate 
trustworthiness, as opposed to the conventional experimental precedent of attempting to 
show validity and reliability. The aim of trustworthiness (credibility, dependability  and 
transferability) is to support  the argument that the findings of a qualitative study are 
“worth paying attention to” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 290). In general, the evaluation of a 
qualitative study is based on thick description. Having thick description, I can use 
different data sources to triangulate a finding. In a sense, the systematic errors could be 
minimized, including researcher idiosyncrasies and the findings may be transferred to 
other similar contexts. 
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According to Gill and his colleagues’ (Gill et al., 2010) general principles, credibility, 
transferability, and dependability, first, internal validity is replaced by credibility. The 
key idea is primarily  established by ‘member checks’. By feeding back to those 
members who are accounted for my study, they can help  me to check out whether or not 
the findings are correct. However, the findings are mainly based on media reports. Lots 
of people working in Toshiba and media do not respond my requirements on interview. 
Although the study conducts few interviews, it is impossible for responding the 
criterion of credibility. Instead, this study uses many data sources to triangulate the 
findings. By using triangulation and thick description, the study can accurately represent 
the case’s subjective dispositions. 
Second, reliability  is replaced by dependability. The criterion is met through the 
provision of the audit trails. It involves documentation of all stages of the study and the 
choices made by the researcher. In order to respond the criterion, I present the 
documentation of the open coding procedures of this study in Chapter 7. I also detail the 
evidence that  is knitted to verify the conceptual framework and produce the new 
findings in Chapter 7. In a sense, this documentation enables other researchers to 
reconstruct the processes in other contexts. 
Finally, the most important feature of building a theory using a case study is its 
transferability (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). It replaces external 
validity. The key is to “provide other researchers with a database which allows them to 
judge the extent to which the findings are transferable to other social settings with 
which they are familiar” (Gill et al., 2010: 228) by producing in-depth accounts of the 
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setting of this study. In order to live up to the criterion, I detail the information and 
evidence as necessary as I can in Chapter 7. Based on enough thick description, I can 
provide a reasoned judgement about the degree of transferability. 
In order to achieve transferability, I have adopted Eisenhardt’s principles, published in 
the Academy of Management Review in 1989, as my guidelines for building a theory 
using case-study research. Although Eisenhardt presents multi-case studies (e.g. Davis 
& Eisenhardt, 2011; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), her 
principles also outline critical rules for conducting explanatory  case studies involving 
single cases. For this reason, I will adopt most of her principles in this study. This is 
discussed in full in Section 6.1.
I have chosen the standard war between Sony  Blu-ray  Disc (BD) and Toshiba HD DVD 
as my critical case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In general, critical case can be defined as having 
strategic importance in relation to the general problem. The concept  was introduced by 
Flyvbjerg in 1991. Selecting critical case provides the possibility to formulate a type of 
generalization. Because, the generalization would be, “If this is (not) valid for this case, 
then it applies to all (no) cases” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). In a way, the chosen 
technologies are pretty mature in the field. The chosen case was happened in a mature 
field where the relevant actors are well-converged and the institutional logic(s) are 
settled down. If the institutional perspective can be verified in the case, the findings can 
be naturally generalized to other similar context, either mature or emerging fields. The 
uniqueness of case represents a critical and intrinsically interesting case rather than 
representative case. 
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As argued in Chapter 1, the fact that the studied standard war is in a mature 
technological field with a more or less established institutional set-up  makes it a critical 
case. It is critical in the sense that it represent a ‘least likely’ case in relation to showing 
the importance of institutional entrepreneurs and an institutional perspective for 
understanding the process and outcome of the standard war relative to a functionalist 
approach. This is premised by the view that even if the case involves competing 
institutional logics it is a well-established institutional field with well-converged actors 
which means that you would presume that there is much less space for institutional 
entrepreneurship  than in emerging fields. It can be expected that the outcome of such a 
standard war can be well understood by a functionalist approach. It is mature 
technological field and the standard can be expected to have relatively  limited duration 
as the functions of optical storage may be replaced by cloud computing in the not too 
distant future. The relevant organizations and customers also have experienced several 
similar standard wars in the not  too distant past, such as the wars around the standards 
for VHS, CD, VCD, and DVD. Based on this experience, Sony or Toshiba understand 
pretty well the expectations of the stakeholders and the rules of the game. Compared 
with standard wars in emerging fields, the BD-HD DVD case happened in a very 
mature field. The characteristic of maturity present the uniqueness of the case. Thus, if 
institutional entrepreneurship  and the institutionalist perspective is crucial in order to 
understand this case it can be concluded that it is also crucial, and probably even more 
so, in other standard wars. However, the exact way in which an institutionalist approach 
is crucial may of course be much different in other standard wars. \However, by using 
naturalistic generalization, the findings of this case may  be generalized to other similar 
standard wars, either happening in a mature or emerging field. 
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The BD-HD DVD standard war can also been seen as an intrinsically interesting case. It 
can be seen as an intrinsic case because of the unique maturity of the case which makes 
it interesting in itself because other standard wars typically concern radical innovation 
and emerging fields. Stake (1997) suggests that an intrinsic case study is often 
exploratory in nature. Rather than extending theory or generalizing across cases, the 
researchers are more likely to explore the intrinsic case as the aim itself. However, the 
studied case also has the characteristic of critical case, because “if this is (not) valid for 
this case, then it applies to all (no) cases” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). Furthermore, by 
providing a thick description of the case, my case and findings can give other readers 
the means necessary for adapting the conclusions from my study to other studies of 
standard wars. Consequently, I believe that the BD case is different from other standard 
war studies. Its own uniqueness, the degree of maturity  of the technology and the field, 
presents that it is both a critical and an intrinsically interesting case. 
This study borrows the technique of open coding to analyze the data. There are various 
ways of analyzing case studies, including quantitative and qualitative methods (Byrne & 
Ragin, 2009). The main advantage of analysing the BD vs. HD DVD case qualitatively 
is that such a method can generate a theory whose causal relationships are appropriate 
for the context. Many of the relevant empirical studies of institutional change contain 
interesting findings which concern discursive activities (e.g. Brown, Ainsworth & 
Grant, 2012; Castel & Friedberg, 2010; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). To summarize, these empirical studies conclude that  neither 
cognitive aspects nor discursive activities should be ignored when studying processes of 
institutional change. Altering the perceptions and behaviors of the audience is required 
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if their existing myths are to be successfully challenged. When this has been achieved, 
institutional entrepreneurs need to establish new myths about their new institutions.
There is no well-accepted method of analysing an explanatory case study. Eisenhardt’s 
principles (1989) simply  propose a few essential practices for the analysis of data. She 
has employed these principles to publish many empirical studies in a range of first-tier 
academic journals, including the Academy of Management Journal (Hallen & 
Eisenhardt, 2012; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) and 
Administrative Science Quarterly (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011). This demonstrates that 
her principles have been accepted as part of management science and the study of 
organizations.
In order to achieve the criteria of transferability, credibility  and dependability  in 
qualitative studies, this study  borrows open coding procedures. Using these procedures 
does not contradict Eisenhardt’s principles. She states that ‘I have drawn upon the ideas 
of theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and overlapped coding, data collection, 
and analysis from Glaser and Strauss (1967)’ (1989:545-546). However, her principles 
are distinct from grounded theory in various important ways. For example, they focus 
on building theory from cases, and the methods that can be used to achieve this. This 
means that  Eisenhardt’s work is the culmination of earlier work, which, together with 
empirical studies, can assist us in defining research questions and shaping the initial 
design of theory-building research. 
Section 6.2 will therefore introduce the use of Eisenhardt’s principles in the analysis of 
case studies. I have chosen four articles published by Eisenhardt and her colleagues in 
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the Academy of Management Journal and Administrative Science Quarterly between 
2009 and 2012, and I will show how these articles use her principles. I will also 
compare them with my  study and show how I use these principles to analyse my data. 
Section 6.3 shows how I used theoretical sampling to choose the standard war between 
BD and HD DVD as my case study. Section 6.4 discusses the data sources, and includes 
a synoptic table showing each guideline and its corresponding data sources. Finally, 
Section 6.5 discusses the process of data analysis using the analytical techniques of 
grounded theory.
6.1. The Case Study Method and Eisenhardt’s Principles
The case study method can describe, explore and explain phenomena within particular 
contexts by using a variety of data sources. Rather than using one viewpoint, the case 
study method uses a variety of viewpoints which allow for several different aspects of 
the phenomenon concerned to be revealed and understood.
According to Yin (1994), case studies can be explanatory, exploratory or descriptive. 
Rather than aiming to describe a phenomenon in its real-life context, or to explore 
situations in which the influences being evaluated are not clearly linked to outcomes, 
explanatory  case studies aim to elaborate causal relationships between constructs in the 
relevant setting. However, while quantitative explanatory  studies only  focus on a small 
number of variables, and only provide a thin description of the phenomena being 
studied, explanatory case studies can be complemented by thick description in order to 
give an account which is appropriate in terms of relevant characteristics, qualities and 
events. In order to conform to the criterion of transferability, case study researchers 
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must collect a sufficient amount of accurate data from various sources, including 
interviews, archives, observations and even questionnaires. This data provides the basis 
of thick descriptions and triangulations (Holliday, 2002; Denzin, 2003; Hammersley, 
Gomm & Foster, 2000). A thick description requires researchers to describe the case 
being studied in detail, while triangulation provides researchers with opportunities to 
discover new ideas or constructs which have previously  not been seen or been ignored. 
Using several different data collection methods, triangulation substantiates the 
constructs and findings. In this way, a researcher using the explanatory case study 
method should set out to collect a considerable amount of data, in order to triangulate 
the analysis and provide a thick description of the phenomenon being studied.
Eisenhardt (1989) developed a model for building theories from case studies, in which 
her principles outline the procedure to be followed. With a few exceptions, I follow 
these principles when using my single case study. (I have, however, been following her 
principles from the beginning of this thesis, when defining my  research questions.) I 
present Eisenhardt’s principles below, and outline the ways in which I have applied 
them. In the body of Eisenhardt and her colleagues’ publications, they build or extend 
theories by using multiple case studies. The essential difference between their studies 
and mine is that their cases are representative whereas my BD case study is intrinsic and 
critical. However, this study is still a case study. Although the case cannot be 
representative, the case can further extend our understanding about standard wars 
because it  is critical and intrinsic. Consequently, Eisenhardt’s principles are seen as 
applicable also in this study and will be used to ensure the quality of the findings of the 
case. 
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Firstly, it is important to define the research question, in order to determine the 
boundaries and focus of the study. According to Eisenhardt (1989), if studies do not 
have a clear research focus, they  can easily  become overwhelmed by  the sheer volume 
of data. The focus of this study has been developed through a review of existing 
theoretical works concerning the attributes of standard wars and institutional 
entrepreneurship, together with the connections between them. This is a means of 
clarifying the research questions as well as guiding analysis of them.
Secondly, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests using ‘theoretical sampling’ when selecting the 
case study. In short, ‘theoretical sampling simply means that cases are selected because 
they  are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and logic 
among constructs’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 27). In a quantitative study, the choice 
of an appropriate sample makes it possible to generalise its findings. In the case-study 
method, the case is chosen for theoretical rather than statistical reasons (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Rather than obtaining accurate statistical evidence about the distribution 
of variables within the population by means of statistical sampling, theoretical sampling 
may be chosen in order to replicate previous cases, or to fill theoretical categories and 
provide examples of particular types (Eisenhardt, 1989).
This study aims to develop a new theory  in order to explain how standard wars can be 
won using institutional entrepreneurship. This section will explain in more detail how I 
used theoretical sampling to choose my single case study, the standard war between 
Sony Blu-ray Disc and Toshiba HD DVD. In general, using the data which was 
available to me, this case study reflects the attributes which are usually discussed in 
studies of standard wars and institutional entrepreneurship. Section 6.2 will discuss the 
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reasons for this in detail. Using a single case study requires careful investigation of the 
case and that  misinterpretation of the data should be minimized. Using theoretical 
sampling allowed me to predict where and how I could find the data I needed to fill 
gaps and to fully satisfy  each category. In short, using this technique ensured that  I 
constructed full and robust categories, and led me to clarify the relationships between 
different categories.
Thirdly, Eisenhardt (1989) also emphasises the importance of using a variety  of data 
sources in case studies. Case study  research utilizes both qualitative and quantitative 
data (Yin, 1984), while multiple data sources provide the basis for thick description and 
triangulation. It is important for the researcher to have sufficient material to enable him 
to illustrate and develop the categories identified in his conceptual framework. Before 
undertaking my data analysis, I surveyed the available data, and also collected data from 
websites, interviews and the databases of the focal firms and their main collaborators. 
The media reports I used are from different kinds of publication. This dataset provided 
me with information about business strategies and analyses, product reviews, company 
history, market sales figures, and details of the actions of both camps and the reactions 
of the news media, among other things.
The data sources used in this study are different from those used in the majority of 
studies that apply open coding. Traditionally, participant observations and interviews 
have been seen as the primary data sources. Moreover, the barriers of language and 
culture encountered in Japan make traditional observation and interviewing very 
difficult, so analysing media reports is an alternative way of exploring the context. 
Media reports, websites and so on provide most of the data. However, they  are 
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complements by  interviews with a Japanese informant and with journalists. The aim of 
these interviews is to triangulate the findings from the media reports and to saturate the 
data collection.
Moreover, during the data collection stage, it  is important for the researcher to make 
notes of any impressions which occur during the process of data collection, as good 
notes stimulate the researcher to develop further questions. The ideas that emerge from 
them will shape his future actions, areas he can investigate and questions he can pose 
when analysing the data.
Fourthly, Eisenhardt recommends ‘analysing within-case data’, as well as ‘searching for 
cross-case patterns’. This study  adopts the principle of ‘analysing within-case data’, but 
identification of cross-case patterns is not relevant in this single-case study. Eisenhardt 
suggests a very  flexible strategy for analysing within-case data. In general, the aim of 
this stage is to gain familiarity  with the data and to generate a preliminary theory. A 
useful starting point is to construct an array  or display of the data. A display is a visual 
format, which presents information systematically so that valid conclusions can be 
drawn from it. Once the display has been constructed, the researcher should begin to 
look for explanations and causal links. Following Miles and Huberman (1994), I used a 
‘causal network’ to search for explanations and causality within my single case. A 
causal network is a ‘display of the most important  independent  and dependent variables 
in a field study and of the relationships among them’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994:153). 
The technique is associated with analytical texts which describe the meaning of the 
connections between factors.
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At this point, the researcher should strive for coherence and correspondence in single-
case studies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Coherence is produced if the different parts of 
the arguments fit with each other, and also fit the data and the emergent theory. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that even if such notes are only descriptions, they can still 
lead to important insights. They also make it possible for the researcher to cope with the 
volume of data collected early  in the analysis process, which is often enormous. If 
coherence and correspondence are achieved, researcher idiosyncrasies can be 
minimized and authentic representations of the research settings under investigation can 
be produced. 
Fifthly, Eisenhardt proposes the principle of ‘shaping hypotheses’. This study aims to 
generate hypotheses concerning causal relationships. To do this, Eisenhardt suggests a 
two-step process. The first step is to refine the definition of the construct, and to build 
evidence which measures it  within the case. This is done through constant comparison 
between the constructs and the data, and means that the researcher produces a well-
defined construct by  accumulating evidence from diverse sources. The second step is to 
verify  the relationships which emerge between the constructs and the evidence in each 
case. Following a logic of replication, these relationships, when confirmed, increase 
confidence in the validity of the relationships.
Sixthly, Eisenhardt proposes ‘enfolding literature’. In this stage, the emergent 
constructs, theories and relationships are compared with the extant literature. The 
rationale is to ask ‘what is this similar to, what does it contradict, and 
why?’ (Eisenhardt, 1989:544). If the researcher ignores conflicting findings, confidence 
in the findings is reduced. More importantly, instances of divergence from the literature 
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will present future research opportunities. To some extent, comparison with the 
literature will lead to collection and analysis of further evidence, data or even additional 
case studies. The process of including further data should progress until ‘theoretical 
saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) is achieved. This is when the marginal value of 
the new data is minimal. Following this principle, I will compare and contrast my 
findings with the extant literature in Chapter 8.
Seventhly, according to Eisenhardt, the final stage is ‘reaching closure’. This is when 
the process of iterating between theory and data is ended. Compared to multi-case 
studies, a single-case study will has a clearer boundary  in this respect. This aim of this 
thesis is to study the standard war between BD and. HD DVD, so the boundary of the 
case is the actions and strategies of both Toshiba and Sony from 2002 to 2008.
In this section, I have outlined the rigorous principles of the single-case study method 
proposed by Eisenhardt. Eisenhardt’s principles are useful for junior researchers when 
designing an appropriate procedure of study. In this research, I have followed her 
principles in the design of a practical case-study procedure (except in the areas of cross-
case pattern searching and the shaping of my hypothesis). 
6.2. Using Eisenhardt’s Principles to Analyze a Case Study
Since 2009, Eisenhardt and her colleagues have published several management and 
organization studies in the Academy of Management Journal and Administrative 
Science Quarterly, all of which use her principles. These articles include a review of 
existing studies which are relevant to the specific topic. In order to describe the 
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practices clearly, this section will take one of these articles as an example, and 
demonstrate the process by  which Eisenhardt uses her principles to establish and 
address a research question. It will then make a comparison between my study and other 
studies by Eisenhardt and show the similarities between them. I believe that these 
similarities will further strengthen the legitimacy of the ways in which this study uses 
Eisenhardt’s principles. 
In Hallen and Eisenhardt’s article Catalyzing strategies and efficient tie formation: How 
entrepreneurial firms obtain investment ties, (2012) they claim that the strategies which 
executives use to form ties have been relatively unexplored by scholars, even though 
network ties are crucial for the performance of firms. At the beginning of the paper, they 
review a wide range of network studies, and conclude that network ties, portfolios and 
network levels all suggest that the performance of firms is increased when they have a 
large number of network connections, of different strengths and with the right partners. 
However, they also show that, although an emerging stream of research takes a strategic 
view of the formation of ties (Vissa, 2010), research in this area has yet to address the 
efficiency of tie formation or clarify the range of relevant strategies. Their research 
question therefore asks how companies form inter-organizational ties efficiently, 
especially with low-power actors such as entrepreneurs, and how this shapes critical 
network outcomes.
In order to address this research question, they focused on venture executives seeking 
new investment ties with corporate venture capital investors. They  selected nine internet 
security ventures founded in 2002. They selected these ventures from the Venturexpert 
database, which provides accurate data about U.S. venture financing. In keeping with 
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their theory-building approach, they  used theoretical sampling to select them, while also 
choosing ventures with at least one investment tie.
In keeping with their theory-building approach, the definition and assessment of tie 
formation efficiency were given by  their informants. In general, they established several 
criteria (e.g. investment completion, time taken to form, investor desirability  and so on). 
They  used these criteria ‘because they indicate situations in which executives have not 
only successfully formed a tie, but have done so with a desired partner and/or from 
among desired partners’ (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012:42). They also used the individual 
case histories to conduct within-venture analysis, and then linked these activities to the 
outcome of each round. Each round provided capital for the near future and included 
one or more investors on the same terms. As a consequence, they engaged in repeated 
iterations until theoretical saturation occurred, closing the match between theory  and 
data.
By using these criteria and data analysis procedures, they proposed two paths towards 
efficient tie formation. The first path resulted from those existing studies which show 
that firms have strong direct ties to desired potential partners. The second path, which 
they  called catalyzing strategies, comprised their main findings and contributions. This 
second path occurs when firms lack strong direct ties or when desired potential partners 
lie outside the local network. With time variation, a focal firm uses casual dating 
(adding potential partners to the network), timing around proofpoints (sending strong 
signals about the quality of the focal firm’s idea), scrutinizing interest (culling potential 
partners with faked interest), and crafting alternatives (sending strong signals about 
scarcity). By using these principles, they  clearly suggest  that the finding can be 
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generalised, and they believe that ‘[c]atalyzing strategies are likely to be most germane 
for firms with intermediate embeddedness and quality’ (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012:56).
Having generalised their results, they proposed four analytical propositions, believing 
that these propositions can illustrate causal relationships in which an entrepreneur uses 
catalyzing strategies to form inter-organizational ties to promote the efficient 
performance of the firm. At the discussion stage, they stated their belief that this is a 
major contribution to the literature of networks and signaling: the new concept of tie 
formation efficiency. Their major insight is that those firms which form ties efficiently 
are more likely to achieve superior ties, portfolios and network outcomes. Their 
secondary  contribution is their identification of two paths for the efficient formation of 
ties between firms. Unlike the existing work on strong ties, the second path relies on the 
new concept of catalyzing strategies. Their article also describes the use of different 
strategies at different stages of the process. Their third contribution is to link social 
embeddedness and information signals, as they clarify the ways in which these 
mechanisms relate to each other and are interconnected.
My work in this study follows Eisenhardt’s theory-building principles. Eisenhardt and 
her many colleagues examined the existing literature before beginning their own data 
analysis. They located the lacunae in this existing research and then, as a result of this, 
established their own research question. These principles are reflected in her other 
studies. Firstly, for instance, in an article published in Administrative Science Quarterly, 
she and Davis (2011) addressed the following research question: why do some inter-
organizational relationships produce technological innovations while others do not? 
They  identified a major gap  in the existing studies, which is that partners have their own 
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established processes for innovation, which may  conflict with each other. These 
conflicts may challenge technological collaborations and the management of symbiotic 
relationships. They  identified this research gap by  reviewing a large number of studies 
of collaborative innovation before conducting their analysis. By using this method of 
defining a research question, I formulated my research questions in Chapter 1: firstly, 
how do firms defeat competitors in standard wars? Secondly, how do institutional 
entrepreneurs manage their critical stakeholders, collective actions and discursive 
activities in processes of technological standard change? In Chapters 2 to 4, I further 
reviewed many  studies of standard wars and institutional entrepreneurship, and 
established that discursive activities and the management of critical stakeholders are 
absent from existing studies. Therefore, using this principle, I was not only  able to find 
theoretical omissions in existing studies, but also to construct a original conceptual 
framework for my own study. This conceptual framework, which is presented in 
Chapter 5, was my guide when conducting this analysis.
Secondly, in order to address another research question, Ozcan and Eisenhardt’s article 
Origin of alliance portfolios: Entrepreneurs, network strategies, and firm performance, 
published in the Academy of Management Journal in 2009, theoretically sampled the 
U.S. wireless gaming industry. This industry is comprised of several types of often 
interdependent firms: handset makers, games platform providers, brand owners, games 
publishers and developers. This interdependence between portfolios is both common 
and important within the industry. The wireless gaming industry  is also relatively new, 
so it is easier to follow the formation of portfolios. Ozcan and Eisenhardt chose 
entrepreneurial firms because they could track their portfolios from the firms’ inception. 
By using these principles of theoretical sampling, I was able to briefly present my 
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chosen critical case, that of the standard war between Sony BD and Toshiba HD DVD. I 
will further explain the reasons for this in the next section.
 
Thirdly, in order to analyse their data, Eisenhardt and her colleagues varied their 
methods of data collection. In Hallen and Eisenhardt’s (2012) article, they established 
several criteria before analysing their data, with the exception of the interview data. 
These criteria were determined by their informants. They conducted a large number of 
pilot interviews with two types of informants: venture executives with key 
responsibilities for raising a round, and representative investors who invested in it. 
Because the study was nascent, they depended on these pilot interviews to reveal 
practical information about catalyzing strategies. These criteria also encouraged them to 
focus on practical information. By using these principles to establish my data collection 
criteria, I was able to establish a number of criteria for each concept in the framework. I 
present these criteria in Chapter 5.
As well as interviews, Eisenhardt has also used a large amount of archival data in other 
studies. An instance of this is Santos and Eisenhardt’s article, Constructing markets and 
shaping boundaries: Entrepreneurial power in nascent fields, published in the Academy 
of Management Journal in 2009. They used in-depth archival data to closely follow the 
ways in which five new firms in different nascent markets shaped their organizational 
boundaries during their initial years of existence. They used a number of audio/video 
sources, internal sources (e.g. all the press releases since the founding of the firm) and 
external sources (e.g. media articles about each firm, identified using ABI Inform) as 
their archival data. Following this principle of data collection, I used both interviews 
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and archival data (including both internal and external data). Section 6.5 will further 
describe my methods of data collection.
Fourthly, Eisenhardt uses a large number of cases, to allow her to build her theories. She 
claims that using many cases enables the researcher to build a more robust and 
generalisable theory than using a single case. However, in her 1989 principles, she also 
suggests a very flexible strategy for analysing data gathered from the case study. These 
procedures have been discussed in the previous section. In general, I use a ‘causal 
network’ to examine the causality of my one case and to explain it. By using open 
coding, I was able to generate texts which describe the meanings of materials. 
Fifthly, Eisenhardt (1989) uses an emergent conceptual framework when discussing the 
extant literature, in order to refine their definitions of constructs, levels of abstraction 
and theoretical relationships. She and Hallen claim that the extant literature helped them 
to sharpen their underlying arguments. They made repeated iterations until they 
achieved a close match between the data and their theory. Following this example, I 
compared my  new theory with other studies of standard wars, including empirical 
studies, to test its potential as an explanation of them.
6.3. Theoretical Sampling: Sony Blu-ray Disc vs. Toshiba HD DVD
As my one case study, I have chosen the standard war between Sony’s Blu-ray Disc and 
Toshiba’s HD DVD. This case incorporates most of the aspects of standard wars as 
outlined in the relevant literature. It has well-converged players and mature 
technologies in a mature institutional field. The technology is an incremental innovation 
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and numerous stakeholders are identified. Sony and Toshiba could easily identify who 
are the stakeholders in the field and were capable of foreseeing the potential 
development of critical events. Firstly, the companies, such as JVC, Phillips and 
Panasonic, had experience of developing relevant standards, . Secondly, the content 
providers and retailers were also well established stakeholders with considerable 
logistical networks who could help the institutional entrepreneurs to provide and issue 
the complementary products. Thirdly, because of the incremental characteristics of the 
mature technology, the institutional entrepreneurs were easily capable of understanding 
the expectations of the stakeholders although they  chose to give priority  to different 
expectations. Toshiba emphasized the manufacturing costs of HD DVD while Sony 
focused on the capacity and copyright protection mechanism of BD.
In addition, there is a great deal of readily available written data concerning this 
standard war, including media reports, official reports and the news archive, among 
other things. I have supplemented this with data collected in interviews. I also have 
connections with a high-level Sony manager who works at Sony’s headquarters in 
Japan. He is one of the senior managers in the Sony BD Office, which is responsible for 
managing BD affairs for Sony. This connection provided me with access to the data 
which has not so far appeared in media reports and other public data sources. In this 
section, I will introduce the case and give a detailed rationale for choosing it.
Theoretical sampling means seeking the data which will enable one to elaborate an 
emerging theory. Its main purpose is to elaborate and refine the categories which 
constitute the building blocks of the theory concerned. The technique is emergent, as it 
involves constructing tentative categories. Before the researcher starts working on a 
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study, he needs an overall picture which will show him what he should study and what 
data he should collect. He should also ensure that the critical data sources are available 
or can be replaced. During the process of data analysis, this technique will show the 
researcher who he should interview or what he should next observe, according to the 
state of theory generation at that point.
I believe that the BD vs. HD DVD standard war clearly presents the issues of 
institutional change and standard wars, and also fits the features of institutional 
entrepreneurship. There are three main reasons why the BD-HD DVD case is suitable 
for this research. First, the literature review highlights the role of network positions and 
social relations in the field, which show how important it is for participants to have had 
experience of previous standard wars. It was apparent from media reports that both 
Sony and Toshiba had much experience of previous standard wars.
Secondly, other studies of institutional entrepreneurship also emphasise the importance 
of discursive activity and of alliances with stakeholders in implicit way. For instance, 
Garud et al. (2002) stress the way in which Sun persuaded important stakeholders to 
engage in their alliance with Java. Moreover, by using discursive activities, Sun was 
able to teach independent software developers and publishers the nature of the Java 
technology. In the BD vs. HD DVD case, both Sony and Toshiba made alliances with 
critical stakeholders, including consumer electronic product  manufacturers and content 
providers, throughout the standard war. They  also engaged in discursive activities to 
communicate information to, and construct meanings for, their critical stakeholders, 
prospective organizations, and consumers demonstrating the advantages of the BD 
standard.
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Thirdly, the issue of power has attracted increasing attention in recent studies of 
organizational institutionalism. For instance, Suddaby (2010) argues, in his discussion 
of the ‘challenges for institutional theory’, that the role of power has largely  been 
neglected, and should be given a central place in current efforts to understand why and 
how organizations attend to their institutional environments. The BD vs. HD DVD case 
not only reflects the attributes that have been identified in earlier  standard wars studies, 
but also integrates crucial developments and viewpoints. In turn, the findings produced 
by analysing the standard war can be generalised in order to understand both the process 
of standard wars and also institutional entrepreneurship in general.
6.4. The Data Collection Process
Data for this study  was collected from a variety of sources. Media reports were 
collected from Birkbeck Library (using Business Source Premier), Senate House 
Library (News ProQuest9), and City Business Library (Euromonitor and DataMonitor). 
Other types of data, including patent data (from WIPO, the World Intellectual Patent 
Organization), official documents and market sales figures, were collected from official 
websites and other databases. I also conducted several interviews, both face-to-face and 
email, with a Japanese corporate manager and a New York Times journalist. The media 
reports in the dataset included those from magazines (Business Week, The Economist, 
Black Enterprise, economist.com, Marketing, Newsweek, TWICE, U.S. News and World 
Report, Wired, and Video Business), newspapers (Financial Times, New York Times, San 
Jose Mercury News, The Wall Street Journal Eastern Edition, and TechWeb), and trade 
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9  I downloaded the data from Business Source Premier and News ProQuest databases and reformatted 
their font size and space to a PDF file, mainly to save paper.
publications (EBN (Electronic Buyers News), Computer Technology Review, 
Dealerscope, Emedia, Computerworld, Broadcasting & Cable, ft.com, DSN Retailing 
Today, Brandweek, AdvertisingAge, Electronic Business, EventDV, TelevisionWeek, 
Network Computing, New Media Age and Retailing Today). Table 6.1 summarizes the 
names of databases and the number of reports which were included in the dataset.
Table 6.1 Summary of Databases and Numbers of (News) Reports
Database Number of (News) Reports
Business Source Premier (Birkbeck) 888 (only trade publications 
available)
News ProQuest (Senate House Library) 1840 (including trade publications, 
newspapers, magazines)
DataMonitor (City Business Library) 4 reports from Business Insights
DataMonitor Company profile reports for 14 
companies
DataMonitor 7 Industry Profile reports
Euromonitor (City Business Library) Statistics
BD archival data BD news releases from 2002 to 2008
BDA by-law v.1.9
Sony website Annual reports from 2002 to 2008
Toshiba website Annual reports from 2002 to 2008
WIPO Patent data of BD and HD DVD
DVD Forum archival data DVD information and limited HD 
DVD information
Source: Author
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In this dataset, it was very difficult to access information from the Toshiba camp, 
including from the DVD Forum and Toshiba’s official website. This is because the 
relevant information has been removed from the websites. When I conducted the 
interview with my Japanese informant in Tokyo, he also stated that it is very difficult to 
persuade Toshiba people to talk about this standard war, because they do not want to 
lose face again. For this reason, I tried to search HD DVD relevant information in 
Toshiba annual reports from 2002 to 2008. No piece of information relating HD DVD in 
2003 report. Few information in 2004 (3) and 2005 (5). Rather than illustrating the 
technology, the reports “announced” that HD DVD will differentiate Toshiba from its 
competitors moving toward high definition content. Interestingly, in 2006, the annual 
report has more information about the standard. The report has few pages about 
‘Interview with the President’. The interview mentions the launch of HD DVD. 
However, the president  (Atsutoshi Nishida) does not mention any piece of information 
about HD DVD. Instead, the rest of report promotes that Toshiba led the world in 
commercialization of HD DVD players (HD-XA1). The 2007 report releases not only 
product launch (the second HD DVD player: HD-XA2) but also some discursive 
activities for customers. However, the relevant information can be found in many media 
reports. Finally, in the 2008 report, I expect that Toshiba would discuss the standard 
wars. However, the report devotes only a few pages to HD DVD. In particular, it  does 
not contain any discussion about the reasons for Toshiba’s defeat in this standard war. I 
therefore attempted to collect a greater number of media reports and other data about 
this standard war, in order to accrue more information about Toshiba’s strategies. 
The dataset excludes other interview data from critical stakeholders in the study. It was 
very difficult to access informants from these stakeholders. Because, I do not have the 
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connections with them and do not have budgets to conduct the interviews. This study 
aims at answering how institutional perspective can complement the functionalist 
perspective to understand the institutionalization processes in mature eco-system. In the 
standard war, Sony and Toshiba’s actions intensively  associated with the stakeholders’ 
actions and response. In some extent, collecting and studying the focal firms’ activities 
in the standard war can capture and grasp  the stakeholders’ activities towards the 
standards. Consequently, this study safely ignore in a sense that I do not conduct 
interviews with the stakeholders but collect much more media reports to grasp their 
activities with regard to the standards. 
The process of data analysis led to the collection of further material. At the beginning of 
the data analysis, I read the media reports and memos, and used open coding to analyze 
both. The results of this prompted me to collect more data from other sources. For 
example, in order to understand the sales figures, I collected data from the Datamonitor 
and Euromonitor databases in City Business Library. I collected other relevant data 
about the BD vs. HD DVD standard war, as well as about other standard wars such as 
VHS vs. Betamax and SD vs. MMCD, from the SSCI database. In order to analyze the 
roles played by  video game consoles and the profiles of video gamers, I collected the 
profiles of video gamers in the United States between 2005 and 2010. I also collected 
data from Datamonitor and Euromonitor concerning the market size of computers and 
video players in U.S. between 2005 and 2010, as well as those of video games hardware 
and software, home audio and cinema, televisions and projectors in the U.S. between 
2005 and 2010. In order to understand the histories of other standard wars, I collected 
six studies from the SSCI database. My research into the histories and strategies of 
Sony, Toshiba, and Microsoft  involved collecting reports from Datamonitor, including 
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data on the game console industry, the future digital home, movies and entertainment in 
North America, and PCs in the U.S.. To understand the structure of BDA and the BDA 
by-law (v1.9), I collected data from the BD official website, www.blu-raydisc.com10. 
Finally, to understand the development of the optical patents of Sony  and Toshiba, I 
collected data from WIPO.
Finally, the establishment and management of collaborations is an extremely  critical 
issue in a standard war. The BDA website allows access to official documents 
concerning the collaboration. However, in order to collect  further inside information 
about the BDA, I conducted a face-to-face interview in Tokyo, Japan, in March 2009. 
This was made possible through a research grant from the University  of London Central 
Research Fund. The questions are listed in Appendix 1. Many  questions emerged during 
the interview as ways of following up the answers of my informant.
This interview provides the study with many  critical viewpoints. After I had conducted 
it, I began analysing the dataset in detail. In 2011, I conducted a second interview with 
the same Japanese informant via email. Further, in order to triangulate my  primary 
findings, I also emailed questions to several journalists, columnists and scholars. Their 
names were obtained using media reports and research articles; I obtained their email 
addresses from Google. However, only one journalist, a writer for the New York Times, 
responded to the questions. The questions from the secondary interviews are listed in 
Appendix 2.
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10 The relevant information concerning HD DVD has been removed by the DVD Forum.
In order to clearly identify  the relationships between the guidelines proposed in Chapter 
5 and the data sources, I prepared a synopsis table (6.2), in order to show each guideline 
and its corresponding data sources.
Table 6.2. Synopsis of Data Themes and the Corresponding Data Sources
Guidelines Main data sources
Power
The number of patents relating to the new 
standard developed by institutional entrepreneurs. 
WIPO database
The number of patents per year related to the new 
standard produced in collaboration by 
institutional entrepreneurs, critical stakeholders, 
and prospective organizations during the standard 
war. 
WIPO database
Institutional entrepreneurs’ experience of 
previous standard wars. 
Media reports, eg. Belson, K., & 
Sorkin, A.R. Sep. 15, 2004. Buying 
MGM may give Sony more leverage 
to set a new DVD standard. The 
New York Times, C.6.
Legitimacy
The previous product relevant performance of 
critical stakeholder partners.
Datamonitor reports (company 
profiles)
The previous performance of the institutional 
entrepreneur’s star products. 
Datamonitor reports (company 
profiles)
2. Annual reports and official 
websites
The business segments relevant to institutional 
entrepreneurs and their critical stakeholders. 
Sony, Toshiba and many other 
critical stakeholders’ Annual 
Reports Datamonitor reports 
(company profiles)
Critical Stakeholder Management Capability
The specific responses of institutional 
entrepreneurs to the expectations and 
requirements of critical stakeholders. 
Media reports, eg. Nakamoto, M., 
21 Apr 2005. ‘Blu-ray disc set to be 
the basis’, ft.com, p.1
BDA website, news archive
Interview with New York Times 
journalist
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Guidelines Main data sources
The specific expectations about the new standard, 
as announced by critical stakeholders in media 
reports. 
Media reports, eg. Chmielewski, 
D.C., 15 Jul 2004. ‘Consortium to 
set rules for successor to DVD’, San 
Jose Mercury News, p.3C. 
BDA website, news archive
Interview with New York Times 
journalist
The specific performance of new standards, 
related to the expectations of critical 
stakeholders. 
Media reports, eg. The Economist, 
14 Dec. 2004. ‘Battle of the blues’, 
(8303, p.14)
BDA website, news archive
Interview with New York Times 
journalist
The actions of groups of critical stakeholders 
which establish the primary specifications of 
standards what the institutional entrepreneurs 
want.
Media reports, eg. Anthes, G. H., 26 
Apr 2004. ‘Optical storage sings the 
blues’, Computerworld, 38(17): 
22-23.
BDA website, news archive
Interview with New York Times 
journalist
Collaboration Structuring Capability
The membership structure of collaborations. BDA and DVD Forum websites
Interview with Japanese informant.
The mission statements of different member 
organizations in collaborations
BDA and DVD Forum websites
Interview with Japanese informant.
Collaborative R&D activities in relation to the 
specification of the new standard. 
BDA and DVD Forum websites
Interview with Japanese informant;
WIPO database
Formal communication between members of 
collaborations. 
BDA and DVD Forum websites
Interview with Japanese informant.
Discursive Activities
The discursive activities directed to the audience 
which provide compelling reasons for adoption 
of the new standard.
Media reports, eg. Kerschbaumer, 
K., 25 Oct 2004. ‘Seize the day’, 
Broadcasting & Cable, 134(43): 28. 
BDA website, news archive
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Guidelines Main data sources
The discursive activities directed to the audience 
which undermine its rivals and the existing 
standard. 
Media reports, eg. McBride, S. 9 
December 2004. ‘Disney to support 
Sony DVD format’, Wall Street 
Journal, B.8. 
BDA website, news archive
The discursive activities which seek legitimacy 
of the new standard from the audience
Media reports, eg. Zaun, T., 30 Nov 
2004. ‘Four studios give backing to 
a format for DVD’s’, New York 
Times (East Coast), p: C6.
BDA website, news archive
The discursive activities which respond to 
criticisms and questions proposed by competitors 
and audience. 
Media reports, eg. Yoshida, J. & 
Hara, Y., Nov. 17 2003. ‘New DVD 
format mired in debate: Rival camps 
battle for control of high-definition 
standard’, EBN, p: 3.
BDA website, news archive
The discursive activities which promote the new 
standard and its performance. 
Media reports, eg. The Economist, 
13 May 2006. ‘Business: Everything 
to play for; video games’, Volume 
379: 79.
BDA website, news archive
The discursive activities which are presented in 
professional exhibitions and conferences. 
Media reports, eg. Dritsas, D. Nov 
2004. ‘Signs from the east’, 
Dealerscope, 46(11): 60.
BDA website news archive
The discursive activities initiated by 
spokespersons. 
Media reports, eg. Wingfield, N. 20 
Oct 2005. ‘H-P seeks compromise 
with Microsoft’, The Wall Street 
Journal (East edition), p: B3.
BDA website news archive
Network Effects
The number of particular products (produced by 
the new standard and its previous version) before 
and during the standard war. 
The accurate data is not available, 
but there are some relevant numbers 
and statistics in the database and 
media reports, eg. The Economist, 
18 Nov 2006. ‘Playing a long 
game’, Volume 8504, p: 71.
Datamonitor database
Euromonitor database
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Guidelines Main data sources
The monthly sales (units) of a product produced 
by a particular standard during the standard war. 
The information is not available. 
The database, Nielsen Videoscan, 
may provide the data, but it is not 
available, either. 
The number of complementary goods in the 
market per month associated with a particular 
standard during the standard war. 
The monthly number is not 
available, but there are some 
relevant numbers and statistics in 
the database and media reports, eg. 
Belson, K., 17 Aug 2005. ‘Lions 
Gate is said ready to support Blu-ray  
discs’, The New York Times: C4.
Euromonitor database
Product Performance
Capacity Media reports, eg. The Economist, 
14 Dec 2002, ‘Battle of the blues’, 
Volume 8303: 14.
Datamonitor database
Compatibility Media reports, eg. Paone, J., January  
2004. ‘High definition DVD on the 
horizon’, Dealerscope, 46(1): 100.
Quality of sound and display Media reports, eg. Heiland, V., 
December 2004. ‘Blue highways’, 
Emedia, 17(12): 16-21. 
Datamonitor database
Sony and Toshiba official websites
Copyright protection Media reports, eg. Karkoff, J., 1 Jan 
2007. ‘Studios’ DVDs face a crack 
in security’, The New York Times, 
p. C1.
Datamonitor database
Price Media reports, eg. Taylor, P., 26 Feb 
2007. ‘Sony to offer cut-price Blu-
ray player’, FT.com, p:1.
Datamonitor database
Source: Author
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6.5. The Data Analysis Process
Coding is a crucial part in analyzing the data in grounded theory, in particular. Coding 
refers to ‘a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open 
coding, by making connections between categories’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 96). 
Broadly, the activity  of open coding comprises “breaking the data down into discrete 
parts, comparing them for similarities and differences and grouping them under more 
abstract concepts to form categories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 101). Open coding is a 
central first step in the analysis of data in grounded theory. However, it  is not exclusive 
for grounded theory  as a specific approach. More generally, open coding can be seen as 
a systematic way to analyze data which is one of the few common characteristics of 
qualitative studies (Gray, 2009: ch. 18; Bryman & Bell, 2007: ch.22: Saunders et al, 
2012: ch. 13). This study applies open coding in accordance with general principles for 
categorizing and unitizing data in qualitative studies without adopting the subsequent 
steps (axial coding and selective coding) in grounded theory in the way prescribed by 
this approach.
Broadly, I analyze the media reports line-by-line. Because these media reports are not 
messy information. Instead, they have been ‘distilled’ and organized by journalists. I 
can easily understand the information provided by the media report. It is unnecessary to 
analyze the data word-by-word. 
I used Numbers, the substitute software for Microsoft Excel in Mac, to record the codes, 
memos and theoretical perspectives (although many other qualitative study softwares 
exist, such as NVivo, CAQDAS, among others). In order to sharpen my memory and 
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increase my attention to detail, I chose to manually  code the data, so that, I coded nearly 
every piece of data in the dataset for this study, apart from the technical reports.
 
The coding book used to code the media reports has several columns: date and 
publications, statements, categories, and theoretical memos (as in Table 6.3).
Table 6.3. Schematic List of the Stages in the Development of Theory Using 
Analytical Techniques of Open Coding
Columns Comment
1. Date and publications The source (date and publications) of the data.
2. Statements The citations of the data.
3. Categories Use the cited data to develop categories which fit the 
data, together with accumulation of examples of a 
particular category in order to clarify its meaning.
4. Theoretical memos Defining of the categories and recording of the criteria in 
columns.
Grouping of the categories according to the pre-
conceived theoretical framework. Further consideration 
of the relationships and links between the categories.
Where there were additional findings (i.e. unintegrated 
categories), further checking of the definitions, collection 
of further examples, and, in some cases, theoretical 
sampling of further more data.
Table 6.4 includes examples of how I produced theoretical categories in my study. The 
table includes parts of D.C. Chimielewski’s report in San Jose Mercury News on 30 
November 2004, of T. Zaun’s report in New York Times on 30 Nobember 2004, and of 
The Economist on 14 December 2002. These citations are just the small pieces of the 
Appendix 3, Documenting the Process of Data Analysis. 
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I distill categories of ‘Influence of Critical Stakeholders’, ‘First Mover Advantage’, and 
‘Backward Compatibility’. By using comparison, I find out that ‘stakeholder’ is a 
critical part in the standard war. Hence, I further dig into the data, I find out more 
specific categories like ‘responding requirements’, ‘seeking exclusive support’, and so 
forth. Hollywood studios and dealers can be seen as critical stakeholders in theorizing 
specifications of new standard and promoting and shipping products to customers. Thus, 
I claim, having a capability  to manage these critical stakeholders is crucial in standard 
wars. The category ‘critical stakeholder management capability’ is the aggregate 
product of such analytical steps.
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Table 6.4. The Example of Analyzing the Data by Using Open Coding
Date and 
publications
Statements Categories Theoretical memos
D.C. Chmielewski, 
San Jose Mercury 
News, 30 November 
2004
Universal Pictures, 
Paramount Home 
Entertainment and 
Warner Bros. 
announced they 
would release 
movies in HD DVD, 
the new high 
definition DVD 
format developed by 
Toshiba and NEC. 
The studios timed 
the HD DVD 
announcement to 
come well in 
advance of the 
January Consumer 
Electronics Show in 
Las Vegas, where the 
nation's retailers 
make buying 
decisions for the 
coming year. 
Hollywood hopes to 
persuade these 
buyers -- and 
hardware 
manufacturers -- to 
get behind a single, 
next-generation 
DVD format.
Influence of critical 
stakeholders
This report shows 
these studios, from 
the HD DVD camp, 
attempting to 
persuade other 
companies to join 
that camp. As the 
literature review 
suggests, having 
market-leading 
organizations as part 
of its critical 
stakeholders might 
help a focal firm to 
attract other 
companies to join 
that collaboration. 
This is because they 
can attract other 
companies by using 
their existing 
networks. It shows 
that, firstly, the HD 
DVD standard had 
the leading position 
in the market at this 
point. Secondly, 
critical stakeholders 
can use their 
comments might 
influence further the 
perceptions and 
actions of other 
companies.
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Date and 
publications
Statements Categories Theoretical memos
T. Zaun, New York 
Times, 30 November 
2004. 
In addition to the 
Paramount Home 
Entertainment unit of 
Viacom, Universal 
Pictures, Warner 
Brothers Studios and 
New Line Cinema 
also said they would 
release titles in the 
HD DVD format, 
which its creators 
promise will offer 
sharper images and 
more of the 
interactive features 
that have helped 
make DVD's 
popular.
First mover 
advantage
First-mover 
advantage refers a 
edge that a company 
gains by entering a 
particular market 
before any 
competitors. The 
advantages in 
capturing critical 
resources create 
incentives for 
investing in 
technological 
adjustment. In 2004, 
at the very beginning 
of this standard war, 
the HD DVD 
standard had more 
support from film 
studios because of its 
cheaper production 
costs and backward 
compatibility. Based 
on these statements, I 
define that Toshiba 
had first mover 
advantage in the 
standard war. 
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Date and 
publications
Statements Categories Theoretical memos
The Economist, 14 
December 2002. 
NEC/Toshiba design 
will be "backwardly 
compatible" with 
today's DVDs. That 
could be a significant 
advantage in the 
marketplace, saving 
videophiles from 
having to replace 
their film collections, 
or having to use a 
second player for 
older discs.
Backward 
compatibility
Backward 
compatibility’ is 
defined as the ability 
of a new storage 
device to work with 
input generated by 
an older device. This 
compatibility meant 
that Toshiba had 
more support from 
Hollywood studios at 
the beginning of the 
standard war, 
because the 
compatibility can 
result in lower 
production costs to 
Hollywood studios. 
Toshiba announced 
that HD DVD 
players would be 
able to read existing 
DVDs as part of its 
extension of the 
DVD standard, an 
announcement which 
greatly benefited HD 
DVD, even though 
HD DVD did not 
have the greater 
capacity of BD.
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Chapter 7. Data Analysis
In 2002, Sony announced that, in cooperation with eight other leading companies, they 
had established the basic specifications for a next-generation large capacity optical disc 
video recording standard called Blu-ray Disc (BD). The standard was incrementally 
developed by the previous standard (Betamax, CD, and MMCD). Because Sony  learnt 
from the previous standard wars, thus the standard provides higher storage capacity and 
better copyright protection for DVDs. Toshiba also announced the HD DVD standard in 
order to compete with Sony. During 2002 to 2008, there were many  observable events 
can be analyzed, of course. However, the development of both standards result from the 
experience on previous standard wars and their products. Before 2002, both companies 
have had considerable patents relating to the standards. In order to compete with each 
other, during 2002 to 2006, both companies tries to gain the support of stakeholder. 
They  promoted their own ideas and criticized each other’s technical problems using the 
media, technical exhibitions by using their own collaborations and stakeholders. To 
begin with, HD DVD seemed to have gained the lead in terms of support from movie 
studios in 2004. The standard seemed also to have gained the lead in terms of market 
share in 2006. However, many  studios and video retailers announced that they  were 
exclusively  supporting the BD format. In January  2008, Warner Brothers announced 
that it would not support the HD DVD standard. This announcement caused a chain 
reaction among DVD retailers. Subsequently, in early 2008, Toshiba announced that 
they  would no longer support any aspect of the HD DVD format, including its 
hardware, software and supporting specifications. Sony had won the competition and 
BD had become the new technological standard.
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Section 1.4. briefly presents the case in a chronological way. Both companies have had 
the experience on initiating standard wars (Toshiba’s DVD and Sony’s Betamax, CD, 
and MMCD). The BD and HD DVD standards can be seen as incremental innovations 
based on these previous ones. Having these standard wars, the other stakeholders are 
also converged in the mature field. Both Sony and Toshiba, in some extent, have known 
their interests and expectations. In a way, the industry  expects that a new standard 
should have greater storage capacity and better copyright protection mechanism. Even 
so, we believe that the traditional functionalist viewpoint is inadequate to understand the 
institutional forces which are involved in the social shaping of technology even in a 
mature field with established institutional logics such as the BD HD DVD case. 
Consequently, the following data analysis will show that studying the role of 
institutional entrepreneurship in standard war can complement the traditional viewpoint.
Before presenting the analysis of the BD-HD DVD standard war, the study reviews 
many other studies of the same case. A search of the SSCI database showed five other 
studies of this standard war (van den Ende, van de Kaa, den Uijl, & de Vries, 2012; Lee, 
Choi & Cho, 2011; Daidj, Grazia & Hammoudi, 2010; Spark, 2009; Shiu, 2009). 
Because some studies are not available and the subject is so different to mine, this 
section will only discuss the studies of Daidj et  al. (2010), Shiu (2009), and van den 
Ende et al.’s (2012) studies.
Daidj et al. (2010) use game theory to study the case of BD-HD DVD. Although an 
economic approach is not central to their study, they also review the process of the 
standardization. In general, this study  confirms the importance of collaboration in the 
case. However, some of the data and viewpoints in their study are incorrect. For 
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example, the study states that this standard war lasted for five years. This is because 
much of the media began to report the standard war in 2004. However, the BDF was 
established in 2002, so the duration of this standard war was actually seven years. 
Shiu (2009) also uses this case to study innovation behaviours in standard wars. 
Because the article was published as part of the proceedings of a conference which is 
not collected by  the university library, I asked the author for an e-copy. However, he 
told me that he was unable to locate the file and instead sent me the questionnaire only. 
This just focuses on the individual level and is not part of the organizational and inter-
organizational level research in the study. I am therefore unable to refer to Shiu’s work 
or to compare my findings with it.
Finally, van den Ende and his colleagues’ (2012) study focuses on the role of inter-
organizational networks for coordinated action and information exchange in standard 
flexibility. The standard flexibility  refers to “the number and degree of changes to a 
standard over time” (van den Ende et al., 2012: 706). It can enhance both network 
diversity and size and the diversity of standard-supporting networks will have further 
effects on standard flexibility. The study is pretty similar with mine, I will present the 
findings in detail. 
In their research, they study how coordinated action can facilitate cooperative behavior. 
Information can provide actors with opportunities. Thus, having coordinated action can 
lead to exploration of those opportunities (Podolny & Baron, 1997). Moreover, 
collective action leads to an extension of the network of standard stakeholders (the 
study uses ‘supporters’), the legitimacy of the network is often strengthened. The study 
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expects that diverse network members can use their knowledge and the experience 
acquired in the standard diffusion process to define and theorize the future direction of 
the standard. Collective action serves to adapt the standard to the requirements of 
supporters. In this vein, the modification of the standard will attract more members in 
relevant industries, further increasing the diversity and size of the network. 
This study uses three standard wars to explore the process of standard flexibility. BD vs. 
HD DVD is one of the cases. They  suggest  three phases in the development of standard 
flexibility in the standard war. In the first period, a limited number companies from the 
same or relevant industry started developing the standard. In the second period, the 
initiators started inviting companies from other industries. Thus, the initiators started 
adapting the standard. The third phase started when BD standard became dominant, the 
network of supporters became stable although the standard continued to be adapted to 
new requirements. The study  also found that price, early  timing of market  entrance and 
technical superiority are of influence, but are not decisive. 
van den Ende and his colleagues’ study presents the role of stakeholders (network of 
supporters), collaboration (interorganizational networks for coordinated action and 
information exchange) and framing (adapting the standard to the requirements of 
supporters will attract more members in relevant industries) are critical attributes in the 
study. In a sense, having good standard flexibility can be seen as product performance, 
because stakeholders’ information exchange and requirements can make initiators to 
adopt and satisfy their requirements then attract more participation. However, this study 
fails to discuss how to manage initiators’ stakeholders in collaboration and their 
audiences (external group in this study). My study will explicitly discuss not only the 
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role of critical stakeholders and discursive activities but also the practices of them in 
standard wars.
Some of these studies grasp the inward nature of the standard war. For example, Shiu 
(2009) studies the innovation behaviors on individual level while van den Ende and his 
colleagues (2012) focused on the issue of standard flexibility. This insight factor 
approach studies a hidden nature of perceiving in an intuitive manner. Rather, process 
approach takes different manner to analyze the series of actions, changes, or functions 
bringing about the result, like Daidj et al. (2010) and some other distinctive studies of 
institutional entrepreneurship (e.g., Garud et al., 2002, Munir & Phillips, 2005). For 
example, Garud and his colleagues use media reports to generate a chronology of 
critical events in the Java case then recognize the theoretical issues and constructs that 
emerged from the data. Munir and Phillips also use the same approach to chronicle 
critical events and discursive activities of which Kodak managed to “transform 
photography  from a highly specialized activity to one that became an integral part of 
everyday life” (Munir & Phillips: 1665). 
This study will integrate these two approaches to analyze the standard war. The aim of 
this study is to complement the traditional functionalist’s viewpoint on standard wars by 
using institutional entrepreneurship perspective. Not only economic accounts (network 
effects and product performance), based on the research questions and the conceptual 
framework in Chapter 5, this study also pays more attentions on how institutional 
entrepreneurs manage collective action (including critical stakeholder management) and 
discursive activities (social accounts) in technological standard change process. In a 
way, this study is able to grasps the hidden nature of institutional entrepreneurship in 
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standard wars. However, the outcome of this approach is to divide the documentations 
and descriptions of the critical events in a random manner. Consequently, the way of the 
presentation will violate the readability of the empirical case. In contrast, the process 
approach is advantageous on chronicling the critical events of empirical cases in 
sequence and providing thick descriptions. In a way, the causal relationships between 
variables would be found. However, sticking in sequential events may blur the causal 
relationships what the conceptual framework wants to be approved. 
Consequently, in order to clearly document the critical events of the empirical case and 
approve the causal relationships proposed in Chapter 5, this study integrates these two 
approaches. In general, the standard is divided three different phases: before 2002, from 
2002 to 2006, and from 2006 to 2008. In the first phase, the study shows how power 
and legitimacy of the two companies made it possible for them to initiate the 
development of the new standard and to engage in the standard war. Their power and 
legitimacy  are reflected in the performance of their star products, the business segments 
of the companies themselves as well as their critical stakeholders, the experience of 
previous standard wars, and their networking with stakeholders. The analysis of this 
stage will also document that the new standards are incremental innovations of previous 
standards. It will show that the industry  is a mature field where the stakeholders have 
been well-converged by the previous standard wars and/or R&D alliances. 
In the second phase, both Sony and Toshiba collaborated with stakeholders to manage 
various stakeholders, develop the products, organize promotion, and many discursive 
activities, such as promoting, undermining, debating, and so forth. According to the 
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conceptual framework, these activities are the heart  of the institutional entrepreneurship 
in this phase.
The final phase, from 2006 to 2008, can be titled ‘the market war’. Both camps 
launched their disc players associated with the new standards. Sony also launched a new 
game console, PlayStation 3 (PS3) which is associated with the BD standard. It 
functioned as a Trojan Horse to boost the market share of the BD standard in the 
standard war. Furthermore, in order to enhance stakeholders’ exclusive support, Toshiba 
gave financial incentives to Paramount and DreamWorks which had the effect that 
these two studios announced that they would no longer support the BD standard. 
However, in the early 2008, Warner Brothers announced that it wouldexclusively 
support the BD standard. It caused a chain reaction among other stakeholders, such as 
retailers. Later, Toshiba announced that  it would no longer produce the relevant 
hardware and software of HD DVD standard. 
Although the process is divided into three phases, this does not mean that the effects of 
critical variables are only constrained to specific phases. Rather, power, legitimacy, 
collective action, and discursive activities influenced each other interactively 
throughout the process.
7.1. Before 2002: Power and Legitimacy
According to the conceptual framework in Chapter 5, power and legitimacy can be seen 
as institutional entrepreneur’s resources in the standard war. The study finds that the 
institutional entrepreneurs have to establish their power and legitimacy to the new 
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standard before initiating the standard war. This section will review the history of these 
two focal firms and analyze the previous star products performance and the main 
business segment of the focal firms and their critical stakeholders. They may  play  a role 
on the technological trajectory of the incremental innovations. 
7.1.1. Legitimacy: The Performance of Star Products
This section will present the legitimacy of these two institutional entrepreneurs. As 
foregoing discussion in the thesis, the new standards were incrementally developed 
from previous standards. In a way, we need to understand the performance of relevant 
products. The best way is to review the history. 
Before initiating the standard war, Sony and Toshiba are the leading companies in the 
relevant industries. Due to their respective histories, Sony and Toshiba have shown 
outstanding performance for specific products. In general, Sony is more focused on 
consumer electronic products while Toshiba is more of a manufacturer of electronic 
equipment.
7.1.1.1. Brief Presentation of the History of Sony and Toshiba
1. The History of Sony
In 1946, after World War II, Sony was founded as the Tokyo Telecommunications 
Engineering Corporation. The company changed the name to Sony  in 1958. This name 
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was a combination of the Latin word ‘sonus’, meaning ‘sound’, and ‘sonny’, a 
nickname for a young boy.
In the 1960s, Sony  developed the Trinitron technology, which radically improved the 
quality of color television displays. Their CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) television, which 
was based on this technology, later became immensely popular. In 1979, the Sony 
Walkman, a compact cassette tape player, became their biggest success. The Trinitron 
technology and the Walkman led to Sony’s production of high-quality computer 
monitors, home VTRs (Video Tape Recorders), passport-sized camcorders, digital 
cameras and many other products. In strategies developed by Sony, hardware and 
software are seen as the ‘two wheels of a car’. For this reason, Sony initiated a joint 
venture with CBS Records in 1968. Sony acquired the remaining shares of CBS 
Records in 1988 and renamed it Sony Music Entertainment. In 1989, Sony acquired 
Columbia Pictures for $6 billion, and then renamed that organization Sony Pictures 
Entertainment.
In 1993, Sony established Sony Computer Entertainment as a joint venture with Sony 
Music Entertainment. PlayStation (PS) was first released in 1994, and their market 
share rapidly increased. In 2000, Playstation 2 (PS2) was released with a DVD player, 
as well as upgraded music and video features. By 2006, Sony had sold 100 million 
game platforms and 1 billion game titles (Sony Annual Report, 2006, p.28). Later, Sony 
launched its portable PlayStation (PSP), which can access servers through a wireless 
connection. This history  demonstrates why Sony is the leading player in the games 
console business.
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One can see, from this short history, how Sony has grown around its audio and video 
business. It is also capable of seeking opportunities in new businesses such as music, 
film, and games, and, as a result, had developed many outstanding consumer electronics 
before the launch of the BD standard, such as the transistor radio in 1955, the Trinitron 
color television in 1968, the Walkman in 1979 and the PlayStation in 1994. It was also 
one of the initiators of the DVD standard in 1997. Sony has developed many dominant 
designs and dominated the consumer electronic industry throughout its history. The 
‘Sony Style’ is not only the name of its retail store, but also acts as a kind of guarantee 
in terms of product performance, art and design.
2. The History of Toshiba
Toshiba was established in 1875 as the Tanaka Engineering Works, an engineering 
company. The company diversified, evolving into a manufacturer of consumer products, 
and in 1899 was renamed Tokyo Denki (the Tokyo Electric Company).
Among the company’s major successes were the production of Japan’s first washing 
machine and refrigerator, both in 1930, and of Japan’s first vacuum cleaner a year later. 
In 1939, the Tanaka Engineering Works and Tokyo Denki merged, to form an integrated 
electric equipment manufacturer, the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company. In 1984, the 
company changed its name to Toshiba.
Toshiba entered the home video and film business in 1991, acquiring a 12.5% stake in 
Time Warner. Between 2002 and 2008, Toshiba focused solely on the manufacturing of 
electronics equipment. According to Toshiba’s Company Profile in Datamonitor (2010), 
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Toshiba acquired Wuxi Huazhi Semiconductor in 2002, Hawaii Business Equipment 
(one of the world’s main independent office equipment dealers) and GE Automation 
Systems Corporation in 2003, together with Panasonic Shikoku Electronics Company’s 
HDD (hard disk drive) design centre in California, among others. More directly relevant 
to the HD DVD standard were its acquisition of Amuse Pictures in 2003, and its signing 
of an agreement to develop consumer electronics devices and PCs in collaboration with 
Microsoft Corporation.
7.1.2. Legitimacy: The Main Business Segments of Critical Stakeholders
Except for the general histories of these firms, the main business segments of the 
institutional entrepreneurs and their critical stakeholder may decide the legitimacy of 
the new standards and the direction of the technology trajectory. 
A ‘business segment’ is defined as being a component of an enterprise that provides a 
single service product or group of related products. The main products or services of an 
organization are normally those that give it the largest economic returns. They will be 
described as the main business segments of that organization. When the business 
segments of a critical stakeholder are evaluated highly in relation to a specific standard, 
and when they support this standard, the audience may  be less likely to raise questions 
about the standard’s quality.
In order to describe the role of institutional entrepreneurs, and the main business 
segments and patent R&D activities of their critical stakeholders in the optical 
technology industry, I mainly collected relevant data from Datamonitor. 
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Table 7.1 The Main Segments of Critical Stakeholders
Companies Main Segments* 
Sony Electronics (audio, video, television, information and 
communication and others), game (Sony's video games 
consoles and others), pictures (motion picture production, home 
entertainment production, television broadcasting, and digital 
content creation), financial services, and others (Sony Music 
Entertainment and others). 
Dell Desktop PCs, servers, networking products, storage, mobility 
products, software and peripherals, and other services.
Hitachi Environmental systems and industrial plant business. It is also 
engaged in the manufacture of precision machinery, industrial 
machinery, process equipment, steel structure, construction 
machinery and disaster prevention systems.
HP PCs and related access devices, imaging and printing-related 
products and services, enterprise information technology (IT) 
infrastructure and technology services.
LG Trading of commodities, industrial products, information 
technology products and consumer goods.
Panasonic The manufacturing and marketing of audio and video 
equipment, information and communications equipment, home 
appliances, and other components and devices.
Mitsubishi The leading integrated industrial electronics manufacturers in 
the world.
Pioneer Engaged in the manufacturing and sale of electronic products.
Phillips Manufacturing of medical systems, consumer electronics, 
lighting products and semiconductors.
Samsung The leading consumer electronics brand in the world.
Sharp The leading provider of electronic components, computer 
hardware and components.
TDK Manufacturer of recording media, ferrite products and 
recording device products, and a major producer of inductors, 
ceramic capacitors, magnets, hard disk drive heads and other 
components.
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Companies Main Segments* 
Thomson Multimedia 
(now renamed 
Thomson SA)
Provides technology, services, and systems for media and 
entertainment industries.
Toshiba Digital products, social infrastructure systems, electronic 
devices, home appliances etc.
NEC Aerospace, education, government, healthcare, retail and 
telecommunications.
Microsoft Software (including personal, business and home & 
educational), entertainment, hardware and mobile devices.
Source: Company Profiles in Datamonitor
According to media reports in the dataset, Toshiba allied with NEC and Microsoft in the 
HD DVD camp. However, Table 7.1 presents that consumer electronic product is not 
NEC and Microsoft’s main business segment. In the standard war, even though Toshiba 
had the strong support of Microsoft in this standard war (Vista system supported the HD 
DVD standard, but  BD camp could find a way  to minimize the impact), many 
companies still chose the BD standard rather than the HD DVD. In contrast, Sony had 
many other critical stakeholders, who could offer a variety of products and services 
(including consumer electronics, PC, recording media manufacturing, and so forth). The 
body of network literature suggest that if collaborations contain a mixture of strong and 
weak ties, they are more likely to be high performing. Moreover, the finding of this 
section show that the product performance of critical stakeholders can strengthen the 
collective action and discursive activities of institutional entrepreneurs during standard 
wars.
Summarizing for Sony, it  operates in the electronics, gaming, film, and financial 
services segments, among others. In the electronics segment, in particular, it  engages in 
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the design, development, manufacturing and sales of a range of electronic equipment, 
instruments and devices for both the professional and consumer markets. Sony’s games 
segment operates through its subsidiaries, Sony Computer Entertainment Europe 
(SCEE), Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. (SCEI), and Sony Computer Entertainment 
America (SCEA). These subsidiaries own the famous game consoles, the PS2 and PS3. 
The film segment is involved in motion picture and home entertainment production, 
television broadcasting and the creation of digital content. In this segment, Sony 
operates through its subsidiary, Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), the owner of 
Columbia TriStar Pictures. Sony owns game consoles, movie studios, manufacturing 
plants, and many other segments with relevance to the BD standard. In other words, 
Sony contains many elements which are necessary for this standard war.
Toshiba and NEC were the main founders of the HD DVD camp, and Toshiba was its 
leader. According to its company profile report on Datamonitor (2010), Toshiba has 
about 199,000 employees. Toshiba’s main segments are not consumer electronics and 
service. It  is a diversified manufacturer and marketer of advanced electronic and 
electrical products, and its product portfolio includes information and communications 
equipment and systems, internet-based solutions and services, electronic components 
and materials, power systems, industrial and social infrastructure systems and 
household appliances.
To sum up in this section, these company histories demonstrate that Sony and Toshiba 
are positioned in different business segments, and these differences in the two 
companies led them to use different strategies in this standard war. Toshiba’s strategy 
was to emphasise that the HD DVD standard could be produced and upgraded from the 
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DVD standard in an easier and cheaper way. In this way, the HD DVD standard would 
be compatible with the existing standard. Journalists have said that the HD DVD 
standard can be seen as an ‘upgraded DVD standard’. Nevertheless, Toshiba also 
claimed that the HD DVD standard was endorsed by the DVD Forum. The BD standard 
was not compatible with the DVD standard. In addition, in order to achieve greater 
storage capacity, manufacturers needed to invest in cutting edge production plants in 
order to produce BD discs. On the other hand, the BD standard had a better copyright 
protection mechanism (BD+) and greater storage capacity. This was because the 
development of new consumer electronic products is an existing genre within Sony. 
Both camps promoted their advantages throughout  this standard war, and those 
advantages reflected their histories and their main business segments.
Table 7.2 Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s Actions in Legitimacy
Legitimacy Sony Toshiba
The main business segments 
of critical stakeholders
1. It had more number of 
critical stakeholders than 
Toshiba. 
2. Their main business 
segments are not only 
consumer electronic-
related but also PC, disc 
manufacturers. 
1. It had few critical 
stakeholders in the 
standard war. 
2. Their main business 
segments are less 
consumer electronic-
related. 
The performance of star 
products
1. According to Sony’s 
history, it mainly focuses 
on providing new 
experience in audio and 
video-related industries. 
1. According to Toshiba’s 
history, it mainly focuses on 
manufacturing of electronics 
equipment. 
Source: Author
240
7.1.3. Power: Experience of Previous Standard Wars
Besides present the legitimacy, before 2002, Sony and Toshiba also presented that they 
have power for developing the standards and initiating the standard war. Chapter 5 
presents that focal firms can exercise power over the other actors then make other actors 
believe that the superiority  of things provided by them is taken-for-granted (Luke, 1974; 
Lorenzi, 2006). By using soft power, the institutional entrepreneurs make the audiences 
believe that they  have experience and knowledge required for the new institutions/
standard. This section will discuss how the institutional entrepreneurs use their 
experience of previous standard wars and the networking of stakeholders to make the 
audiences to believe their actions. 
‘Experience’ is defined as practical knowledge and skills which are derived from 
participation in those events and activities of earlier standard wars which are relevant to 
the current standard war. It appears that experience can be categorised as legitimacy. 
However, this study utilizes the conceptualization of ‘soft power’, which assists 
institutional entrepreneurs to use understanding to influence the actions and behaviours 
of other social actors. With experience of previous standard wars, institutional 
entrepreneurs are more capable of understanding which factors are important.
The BD and HD DVD standards were incrementally developed from the previous 
relevant standards (Sony’s Betamax and Toshiba’s DVD). In these previous standard 
wars, both companies have learnt the stakeholders’ expectations on the standards of 
storage device while the stakeholders were well converged as well. Hence, we can 
define that the storage device industry is a mature industry. 
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The standard war between VHS and Betamax took place in the 1970s. In early  1971, 
JVC collaborated with Sony and Matsushita to build a standard for home video. Later, 
Sony broke away from this collaboration and then began working on their own 
standard, inventing the Betamax standard in 1974. In general, Betamax had better sound 
and image quality but only  had a capacity of one hour. In contrast, although VHS had 
poorer image and sound quality, it had a larger capacity than Betamax (two hours of 
recording time in its original version). Sony  believed that their standard was good 
enough to win this standard war. They also believed that they were ahead of JVC in 
VCR development, although not  in VCR production. Even though they understood this 
situation, they were “unwilling to compromise on their standard or to help potential 
licensees with OEM shipments“ (Cusumano, Mylonadis & Rosenbloom, 1992: 70).
In contrast, JVC and Matsushita pursued a strategy intended to form as large a group  as 
possible. They aggressively persuaded other companies to join their project and pursued 
both licensing and OEM agreements. JVC wished to invite other companies to join the 
collaboration, and to refine the VHS standard, and so they  provided assistance in 
manufacturing and marketing. Although JVC had less experience making VCRs than 
Sony, they paid special attention to making its VCR easy to manufacture.
Apart from this alliance, the other incentive designed to attract Hollywood studios was 
capacity. The studios agreed to produce pre-recorded movie titles for the market. For 
this reason, by the end of 1978, VHS had a larger market share than Betamax. Although 
Betamax might have been able to maintain a stable share of the market, it could not 
generate the network effects of pre-recorded cassette tapes in the early  1980s. The 
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greater abundance of VHS products and other complementary  products gave consumers 
a much greater incentive to choose the VHS standard, which then led tape distributors to 
stock more VHS tapes. For this reason, Sony had begun to scale back production of the 
Betamax standard in some professional areas by  1985. In 1993, Sony and Philips co-
developed the MultiMedia Compact Disc (MMCD) and were competing with the Super 
Density (SD11) disc, which was supported by Toshiba, Time Warner, Matsushita 
Electric, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, Pioneer, Thomson and JVC. In this standard war, 
the PC industry was the critical stakeholder for both camps. The SD camp approached 
IBM, asking for advice about the file system they should use for their disc. At the same 
time, IBM  were also contacted by the MMCD camp and discussed their development 
project. For this reason, IBM organized a group of companies in the PC industry, 
including Apple, Microsoft, Sun, Dell and others. This group was referred to as the 
Technical Working Group. This group  urged both camps to become a single, converged 
standard; if this did not take place, the group would not support either side. In order to 
avoid another costly standard war in the 1980s, Sony and Philips agreed to unify their 
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11  According to my Japanese interviewee’s response,  Toshiba wanted to copy the experience of SD-
MMCD standard war to the BD-HD DVD standard war. For Toshiba, the SD standard war is successful. 
However, in a sense, Toshiba was satisfied in the previous experience and tended to copy the experience. 
This study suggests that it can be defined as inertia. However, there is no sufficient information in the 
dataset. Thus, I only can refer to few theoretical studies on the issue discuss it in the footnote. 
This study suggests that inertia can be defined as forces which tend to stop organizations from changing 
despite the pressure on them to do so. It is described as a state of being “rooted in part in the stable 
standard operating procedures that initiate and govern organizational action” (Stuart, 2002: 629). 
According to my Japanese interviewee’s response, Toshiba may insist on repeating its successful 
experience of the standard war in the 1990s between SD and MMCD. The inertia in Toshiba was caused 
by rigid thinking by manager. The inertia initiated by the Toshiba manager. He restricted the company’s 
ability to change when they came under environmental pressure.  When organizations are threatened, they 
tend to become rigid in their thinking and unable to pursue innovative change.
Besides, I suspect that the DVD Forum might also have generated network inertia in the HD DVD camp. 
Network inertia can be defined as a “persistent organizational resistance to changing interorganizational 
network ties or difficulties that an organization faces when it attempts to dissolve old relationships and 
form new network ties” (Kim, Oh & Swaminathan, 2006: 704). Toshiba’s network inertia meant that it 
had rigid inter-organizational relationships with its partners in the standard war. The outcome of this was 
two events of 2007,  the actions of the hacker, and the rebellion by Paramount and DreamWorks. 
Consequently, this inertia may have intervened in the relationship between collective action and 
discursive activity, as well as the relationship between Toshiba’s actions and their accumulation of 
resources.
project, choosing to release SD as a single standard. The final specification of this new 
standard was predominantly the same as Toshiba and Matsushita’s SD standard, and 
was known as DVD (Digital Versatile Disk). The first DVD Video was introduced by 
Toshiba in Japan in 1996. In this standard war, Sony was defeated by  Toshiba, although 
this was not very costly for them.
Neither Sony  nor Philips was convinced by this compromise. They both believed that, 
because of its CD technology, the MMCD standard was not secure. That is why  the disc 
safety  of the MMCD standard was totally  different to that of Toshiba’s SD and the later 
DVD standards. In their view, the issue of safety is both basic and critical in a digital 
era. This is why Sony took the standardization of BD so seriously. The disc safety  issue 
was therefore the main talking point when Sony  promoted it to stakeholders, and helped 
to undermine the HD DVD standard in later collective action and discursive activity.
To summarize, Sony has sufficient experience of earlier standard wars concerning 
optical storage devices, video recording products and other video technologies. Sony 
evidently  learned from this experience. In 2004, The Wall Street Journal reported that 
Disney were backing the BD standard (McBride, 2004). The report cited a statement 
from Bob Chapek, President of Disney’s Buena Vista Home Entertainment division, and 
confirmed that Sony had learned from the experience of the earlier war between VHS 
and Betamax.
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7.1.4. Power: Networking
Networking is defined as the practice of making contact and exchanging information 
with other people. In the standard war, the people were critical stakeholders and core 
employees. The dataset demonstrated that the concept of networking in the standard war 
can be divided into two separate ideas: ‘networking with critical stakeholders’ and 
‘networking with core employees’.
Firstly, ‘networking with critical stakeholders’ is defined as the degree of direct links, 
frequent communications and intimate contact which an institutional entrepreneur has 
with its critical stakeholders. The literature review suggests that by possessing a central 
network position and social relations, institutional entrepreneurs possess a reasonable 
amount of power before they initiate a standard war.
 
Sony and Toshiba are members of the Steering Committee of the DVD Forum. 
According to the information provided by the Forum, this committee has nineteen 
members: Disney, Hitachi, IBM, the Industrial Technology  Research Institute (ITRI, 
established by the Taiwanese government), Intel, LG, Memory-Tech, Microsoft, 
Mitsubishi, NEC, Panasonic, Paramount, Pioneer, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Technicolor, 
Toshiba and Warner Brothers. With the exception of the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute, all the members were highly active in the standard war. The existence of the 
Steering Committee shows that both Sony  and Toshiba engage in a certain amount of 
networking with their stakeholders.
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Besides, the DVD Forum was established in the DVD standard war. The DVD Forum 
includes many active participants in the DVD standard war, including Sony and Philips. 
In order to successfully integrate SD and MMCD standards together and well develop 
the specifications of the DVD standard, these members of the Steering Committee 
actively well engage in the relevant R&D activities. 
In order to exchange opinions and approve decisions about the DVD standard, members 
of the DVD Forum have one annual general meeting, while the Steering Committee 
meets three times a year. In addition, there are many informal interactions between the 
members of this committee. Before 2002, Sony had discussed the future of the DVD 
standard with many other members of the DVD Forum. This meant that the members of 
the DVD Forum had two different locations in which to discuss the development of 
optical storage devices, one in the Sony camp and the other in the Toshiba camp. 
Initially, when Sony, Panasonic and Philips led the discussion in their camp, Sony  had 
an intensive relationship  with Philips, and co-developed the MMCD standard with them 
in the 1990s. On the other hand, although Panasonic, whose main business segments 
includes consumer electronics products, supported the JVC VHS standard and beat 
Sony in the standard war of the 1980s Panasonic was in Sony’s camp in the standard 
war. Thus, before the BD standard was launched, Sony, Panasonic, Philips and many 
other companies understood each other’s interests and opinions about the new standard 
because of the frequency of their communications in the DVD Forum, and their 
experience of earlier standard wars. Consequently, the new standards of optical storage 
device were emerged from these discussions and activities.
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‘Core employees’ networking’ refers to the ways in which core employees working in 
focal firms (Sony, Panasonic, and Philips) can convey information and influence 
employees of other companies through personal connections. My discussion of this 
property  is based on the interview I conducted in Japan. According to this interviewee, 
these three engineers not only assisted Sony and its partners to draw up the 
specifications of the BD standard, but also helped to attract other companies to the 
BDA.
Sony, Panasonic, and Philips all employed a famous engineer respectively. My 
interviewee called these three engineers ‘masters’, and told me that their presence was 
the reason why  the BD founders were able initially to create the new specifications of 
BD standard very quickly, and then to motivate more than seventy BDA member 
organizations by 2004. This was because many of the engineers in these other 
companies had been taught by these three ‘masters’. These ‘master engineers’ played a 
critical role not only on the presenting the power of the BD standard but also on the 
framing the standard. 
Due to the frequency of communications within the DVD Forum, Sony were able to 
discuss new development and share information with many other companies. This was 
because they  both had positions in the DVD Forum, and so the ideas for new 
innovations emerged from the discussions they had there. Moreover, the three famous 
engineers were responsible for developing the specification of the BD standard. The 
engineers working for these other companies trusted the abilities of these famous 
engineers, and so Sony, Panasonic and Philips were able to rapidly develop the BD 
standard (specification v.1.0). Some of the companies which took the side of Sony on 
247
the Steering Committee, together with others which had been influenced by these three 
engineers, established and endorsed the primary specifications of the BD standard. As a 
consequence, before the BDA was established, more than seventy  companies had either 
applied for the license and/or joined the BDF.
If they have sufficient experience of previous standard wars, institutional entrepreneurs 
will be able to understand which tactics should be used in a new standard war. In turn, 
they  can attract more companies to the collaboration. This is because their experience 
means that they  will understand what these other companies will want to achieve in a 
standard war. Although Sony had lost the earlier standard wars between VHS and 
Betamax, and between SD and MMCD, they did learn tactical lessons from them. 
This study also found that having a network core employees led to the development of 
specifications and the faster engagement of other companies. This finding shows that it 
is not only the credibility  of institutional entrepreneurs that is critical (Zott & Huy, 
2007), but also the influence of their core employees. Furthermore, this study takes the 
view that institutional entrepreneurs are organizations. Although standard wars and 
processes of institutional change should be considered at the organizational level, these 
findings show that the individual level of these processes should also be studied. 
Furthermore, they also suggest that  the importance of human resource management 
should be taken into account.
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Table 7.3 Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s Actions in Power
Power Sony Toshiba
Networking
Networking with critical 
stakeholders
1. It applied for a number of 
optical patents co-
developed with critical 
stakeholders between 
2002 and 2008. 
2. Some other critical 
stakeholders did not have 
intensive R&D with Sony 
but have signal informing 
the audience. 
1. It applied less optical 
patents co-developed with 
critical stakeholders than 
Sony between 2002 and 
2008. 
2. It also had some intensive 
R&D activities with 
critical stakeholders. 
They also have signal 
meanings. 
Core employees’ networking1. Sony, Phillips, and 
Panasonic’s three master 
engineers not only draw 
up the specifications of 
the BD standard but also 
helped to attract 
prospective organizations 
to the BDA. 
1. According to the dataset, 
Toshiba and its critical 
partners did not have core 
employees as well as 
Sony. 
Experience of previous standard wars
Experience of previous 
standard wars
1. Sony had two previous 
standard wars: JVC VHS 
vs. Sony Betamax and 
Toshiba SD vs. Sony 
MMCD.
2. Sony lost both wars but 
learned much experience. 
1. Toshiba had SD standard 
war with Sony’s MMCD. 
2. It may want to copy the 
experience to the BD 
standard war. 
Source: Author
7.2. 2002-2006: Establishing BDF and BDA
Since 2002, both companies established the collaboration (Blu-ray Disc Founder (BDF), 
it transformed to Blu-disc Association (BDA) in 2004) or used the existing 
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collaboration (Toshiba’s DVD Forum) to employ practices in the collaborations, this 
study names collaboration structuring capabilities. At the moment, both companies also 
employed some specialized practices to their critical stakeholders, this study names 
critical stakeholders management capabilities.
Critical stakeholder management can be defined as the process of managing and 
responding to the expectations and requirements of critical stakeholders. As well as 
critical and general stakeholders, I also discovered a different type of stakeholder who 
do not have direct interests in a standard war, but will influence its outputs. Both the BD 
and HD DVD parties view the media as an effective channel for the communication of 
information and the construction of meanings to audiences. However, the work of 
journalists and columnists may further increase or decrease the influence of standards. 
In this way, institutional entrepreneurs need skills which make them capable of 
influencing the messages of the media in a variety of ways. The relevant findings will 
be discussed below.
Besides, the term ‘collaboration structuring capability’ can be defined as a process of 
establishing formal structures and rules, in order to manage effective collaborations in 
which divergent  members exchange and share opinions and resources in order to 
achieve common goals. Rather than being a specific capability, like communication and 
R&D capability  in a standard war, ‘collaboration structuring capability’ is a general 
term which denotes that an institutional entrepreneur should be capable of setting the 
rules for collaboration in institutional entrepreneurship.
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The membership structure of a collaboration needs to be hierarchical, rather than flat 
(Hardy, et al., 2005). In order to manage collaborations effectively, institutional 
entrepreneurs establish hardcore groups12  before the establishment of formal 
collaborations. Thereafter, they will construct other formal collaborations so that 
different types of companies can be invited to join. In such processes, institutional 
entrepreneurs and the groups of critical stakeholders set up hierarchical structures and 
rules in order to assign different tasks to different members. 
Since 2002, both companies actively used these capabilities in the standard war. 
Analysing the actions of BDA and the DVD Forum in this standard war, I found that 
many of their critical activities were reported in the media. This encouraged me to find 
more evidence to explore the relationships between collective action and discursive 
activities. In this phase, this study not only  documents the critical events in sequence 
but also distills the specific practices of collective actions and discursive activities. 
However, many different practices were happened at  the same time. This reflects that 
institutional entrepreneurs face different tasks and choose different critical stakeholders 
to help them to deal with different tasks. Hence, this study will document the critical 
events in sequence as well as possible. 
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12 In the standard war, Sony allied Panasonic and Phillips to establish a hardcore group. Both Panasonic 
and Phillips are Sony’s critical stakeholders in the standard war. They not only have intensive R&D 
activities among each other but also have common experience in the previous standard wars, including 
VHS-Betamax and SD-MMCD. In the BD-HD DVD standard war, they co-developed the blue laser 
technology and co-applied number of patents. In the later analysis, these three companies co-managed the 
BDA as well. Thus,  this study suggests that these three companies allied a hardcore group in the BDA. 
They are critical stakeholders. They are also capable of initiating issues to the BDA as well. 
7.2.1. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: The Portfolio of the Institutional 
Entrepreneur13 
The portfolio of an institutional entrepreneur’s can be defined as the set of direct  ties 
possessed by that  institutional entrepreneur in a standard war. Toshiba and Sony 
established different types of portfolios in their standard war. Before it began, Toshiba 
possessed, as their portfolio, the Steering Committee of the DVD Forum, which is 
responsible for all official DVD standard specifications. There are nineteen members of 
the committee, including Sony, Samsung, Philips, Panasonic and many other 
companies, who form part of the BD camp as well. Toshiba’s portfolio has dominated 
the DVD market for decades. In 2002, Sony led eight other companies in establishing 
the BDF. Most members of the BDF also had positions on the DVD Forum. Later, in 
2004, BDF became the BDA. These founder-members kept their positions on the Board 
of Directors (BOD) of the BDA, its highest level, which sets an overall strategy and 
approves key decisions. Members can participate in all its activities and attend all of its 
meetings. Most importantly, BOD members have the right to approve or reject any 
decision and suggestion made by its committees.
The BD standard was co-developed by Sony, Panasonic, and Philips. My Japanese 
interviewee, referred to them as the three facilitators. They  were capable of initiating 
essential issues which could then be discussed in the BDA’s annual general meeting. In 
other words, these three companies were more influential than the other members of the 
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13  In 2004, Sony bought the library of MGM (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer). In addition, before the standard 
war began, Sony bought Columbia TriStar and renamed it ‘Sony Picture’. These two acquisitions do not 
have sufficient information from media reports in the dataset. It is difficult to conclude, however,  that 
these deals were done for the benefit of the BD standard. It is also difficult to account the acquisitions in 
the portfolio of the institutional entrepreneurs. Because, these two studios are accounted for Sony’s 
entertainment department. 
BOD. This was because they were not only responsible for initiating issues in annual 
meetings but were also capable of managing the daily tasks of the BDA.
These three companies have several common characteristics. First, they all have 
previous experience of standard wars. Panasonic co-developed the VHS standard with 
JVC and competed with Sony in the 1980s. Philips and Sony co-developed the MMCD 
standard and competed with Toshiba in the 1990s. Secondly, they are all members of the 
Steering Committee of the DVD Forum. As part of this consortium, they have regular 
annual meetings, and often also meet informally. Thirdly, they are all leading companies 
in the consumer electronics industry, and, to some extent, are competitors. However, 
they  know each other’s capabilities and advantages very  well. In the DVD Forum, they 
exchanged and shared ideas about the future of the DVD standard. Thus, they 
discovered that they had a common goal, in other words, the development of a new 
standard to replace the existing DVD standard. They later shared this idea with other 
members of the DVD Forum. Many other companies which were represented on the 
Steering Committee supported this idea, and then established the BDF. This is why 
many founder members of the BDF also have positions in the DVD Forum.
The Secretariat of the BDA, the most powerful part of the organization after the BOD, 
is responsible for the effective management not only of the organization, but also of its 
collaborations. It  consists of five officers: the President, Secretary, Chief Finance 
Officer, Licensing Officer and Enforcement Officer. These officers are drawn from the 
three facilitator companies, which means that these three facilitators have the most 
power in the BDA.
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From 2002 to the official establishment of the BDA in 2004, BDF deliberately  invited 
HP, Dell, TDK, a leading manufacturer of recording media, and JVC, who had defeated 
Sony in the standard war between VHS and Betamax. These companies were all critical 
stakeholders. Originally, the BDF consisted of consumer electronic companies. These 
latter invitations made the portfolio more divergent. When the BDA was established, 
these stakeholders became founder-members of the BOD. Additionaly, throughout this 
standard war, Sony invited many other leading companies to join the BDA and became 
members of the BOD. According to the journalist, Sony  offered incentives to these 
companies. In this way, Sony  attempted to establish a strong and divergent portfolio in 
their standard war.
Sony attempted to establish a high-performing portfolio in this standard war. They 
invited companies who have had intensive R&D activity  and/or intimate connections 
with the development of the optical storage device, or opinions about it. Sony, Phillips, 
and Panasonic manage the entire collaboration. Sony later invited some other leading 
companies, with weak ties, to engage in the BDF/BDA. In this way, Sony established a 
portfolio of divergent and leading companies. This type of portfolio also proved to be a 
source of power and legitimacy  for Sony, because many  of those companies which had 
experience of previous standard wars and/or had outstanding products and performance 
in these fields could then be promoted using discursive activities.
Discursive activity  can be defined as “the actor display[ing] or tr[ying] to draw other 
people’s attention to the meaning of an object or action that goes beyond the object or 
action’s intrinsic content or functional use” (Zott & Huy, 2007: 70).
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Many actions and activities of institutional entrepreneurs have both intrinsic and 
symbolic meanings. In a broader view, these actions can also be seen as discursive 
activities. For instance, in the section on collective action in this study, I showed that, in 
order to respond to the expectations of Hollywood studios about copyright protection 
mechanism, Sony added BD+ as an additional copyright protection technology. This 
action can be seen as a tactical response to expectations. As it also constructs meanings, 
this action also reflects the fact that Sony had a compelling reason for responding to 
these expectations: the DVD standard had a weak copyright protection mechanism. In 
this way, institutional entrepreneurs can use not only  verbal discourses to communicate 
information and construct meanings but also non-verbal discourses.
To summarize, this category describes the role and importance of critical stakeholders 
and hardcore group in standard wars. Institutional entrepreneurs deliberately invite 
critical stakeholders who have a certain level of relationship with them at the start of 
standard wars. Institutional entrepreneurs also share power with them as well. 
According to the information given by  the BDA, Sony and a number of critical 
stakeholders (BOD) determine the direction of entire collaborations. Sony also 
established a hardcore group, consisting of three facilitators (Panasonic and Phillips), to 
determine the direction of entire collaboration. These facilitators can be seen as 
hardcore group members to chair, co-chair, and facilitate the BOD meetings and manage 
the BDA. 
255
7.2.2. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities: Understanding Expectations
‘Understanding expectations’ can be seen as the process of understanding the interests 
and requirements of critical stakeholders in standard wars. Logically, if institutional 
entrepreneurs understand the expectations and requirements of critical stakeholders, 
then they will know how to respond to their requirements. Establishing the portfolios, 
both institutional entrepreneurs can easily  understand these stakeholders’ expectations 
on the new standards. 
In the standard war, both parties promote the idea that their standards are better than 
those of their rivals. San Jose Mercury News reported that Hollywood studios argued 
that copyright protection should be a critical issue in the development of the new high-
definition optical storage device at  the beginning of this standard war (Chmielewski, 
2004). The protection mechanism in the DVD standard was weak, which meant that 
content providers were losing millions of dollars a year through piracy. Because of this, 
Sony agreed that copyright protection should be an essential issue in this standard war.
Based on their experience of earlier standard wars, and their understanding of the 
problems of the DVD standard, Sony  and Toshiba decided to use Blue-laser 
technology14 for their standards. According to the media, Toshiba simply viewed the HD 
DVD standard as an ‘upgraded DVD standard’. Toshiba wanted to keep the leading 
position in the field of optical storage devices. As a result, they decided to lower their 
production costs in order to convince stakeholders to adopt the HD DVD standard. 
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14 My Japanese interviewee told me that blue laser technology was not developed by Sony or Toshiba but 
by a small company called Nichia. This company is run by a famous engineer, who invented blue-laser 
technology. For reasons yet to be uncovered, Toshiba and Sony obtained the technology.
However, Toshiba ignored the fact that, by using cutting edge manufacturing processes, 
many firms which sell manufacturing equipment can also benefit from a standard war, 
even though manufacturers and Hollywood studios incur greater costs because of the 
need to upgrade.
Furthermore, my Japanese interviewee was of the opinion that Sony still believed that 
the copyright protection technology of its MMCD was better than those of the SD and 
DVD standards. However, Toshiba ignored Sony’s opinion in that standard war. At the 
beginning of this standard war, copyright protection was not a critical issue. However, 
as a result of the engagement of a large number of companies in the BDA, and that of 
Hollywood studios in particular, Sony were able to confirm that safer copyright 
protection technology was a requirement of Hollywood studios. For this reason, Sony 
not only adopted A.A.C.S. (the Advanced Access Content System) but also developed 
BD+, and promoted it using discursive activities. As a consequence of their experience 
of previous standard wars, Sony realized that copyright protection was a key 
expectation of their stakeholders. This was despite the fact that both Sony and Toshiba 
were using the same Blue-laser technology.
7.2.3. Discursive Activities: Framing 
‘Framing’ is defined as the use of various verbal and non-verbal discourses to construct 
the identification and expression of a novel understanding of a problem, and to 
explicitly provide compelling reasons to support the new vision being promoted. In 
institutional entrepreneurship, using framing processes offers legitimating accounts of 
the new standard being promoted. Institutional entrepreneurs need to highlight the 
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problems within current institutions and to provide their audiences with solutions in the 
beginning of the standard war. 
Before discussing the framing strategies of both Sony and Toshiba, this study  will 
discuss the ways in which they  attracted the attention of media before this standard war. 
My finding was that their framing strategy  was similar to a combination of their power 
and legitimacy. Both organizations had their own collaborations, and experience of 
previous standard wars. Because of this, their new standards rapidly  won the attention 
of the media. In order to further identify their relationships, I collected additional data 
sources in order to triangulate the viewpoint.
Firstly, my finding was that production costs, copyright protection and capacity issues 
were linked to the comprehensiveness of their main business segments and those of 
their partners15. Sony had more divergent partners in their camp (see Table 7.1). This 
shows that the BD standard was endorsed by many other leading companies in the 
industry. Although consumer electronic products were not the main segments of some of 
these companies, the others provided complementary  capabilities and therefore 
strengthened the BD standard further.
Secondly, this study found that Sony’s actions did not feature in media reports between 
2002 and early 2004. However, these actions were very  important for the standard. 
There is always a ‘time lag’ effect between the launch date of new standard and the first 
media report about it. According to the dataset, the first media report of this standard 
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15  The issues being framed in the standard war was related to institutional entrepreneurs and critical 
stakeholders’ main business segments. These segments present that these organizations have specific 
pragmatic legitimacy for the standards. Table 8.9 has a clear comparison between two camps. 
war was on EBN on 2 September 2002, while the official BD website shows that  the 
launch date of the BD standard was 20 May 2002. This time lag lasted for four months. 
The dataset includes only three media reports about this standard war, two on EBN and 
one in The Economist. By 2004, there were many more media reports about  the 
activities relevant to this standard war. There are two possible explanations for these 
findings. Firstly, they show that even institutional entrepreneurs and their partners can 
be central players in relevant industries, it may be difficult to attract media attention, 
communicate information and construct meanings to the audience. In this case, which 
factors gave rise to the most media reports? Alternatively, we may find that institutional 
entrepreneurs may have acted in ways which have not been reported in the media. If 
that is so, what were their actions in this period?
One potential explanation could be that their actions simply could not attract the 
attention of the media. Alternatively, the explanation might be that their actions were in 
some way secret. This might be due to the BDF’s announcement in 2004 that they had 
launched the BDA. The original group of BDF founder-members increased from nine to 
thirteen when HP, Dell, TDK and JVC all joined. All the members of the BDF 
transferred to the BDA. Interestingly, when the BDA was launched, the association 
included more than seventy members of the BDF. Why was this the case? Were their 
actions during these two years simply unable to attract the attention of the media, or was 
there another reason? This question formed a central part of the interview I conducted in 
Japan. The one of the answers is, Sony, Panasonic, and Phillips all employed a famous 
engineer respectively. These famous engineers was the reason why  the BD founders 
were able initially to create the new specifications of BD standard very quickly. 
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Aside from the issue of ‘masters’, both camps used various discourses in their standard 
war to frame the problems of DVD standards and to find solutions to them. These 
discourses included media reports, their own official technical reports and so on. In 
order to make their strategies more comprehensible, I will now give a short overview of 
the development of high-definition television. In the early 21st century, sales of LCD 
and Plasma televisions demonstrated steady  growth. High-definition television sets 
(HDTV) derived from the integration of ultra-high 2160 pixel resolution technology, 
which showed an increase from the current 1080 and 720 pixels. Compared to the 
traditional RGB (Red, Green, and Blue) pixel technology, HDTV utilizes an additional, 
color, yellow. Moreover, 2160-pixel screens can be divided into a maximum of four 
separate displays, each of which has 1080-pixel resolution. In other words, in the era of 
HDTV, consumers can enjoy a wider range of entertainment from their televisions and 
relevant complementary  products. As a result, the number of households in Europe with 
HD-enabled television sets has grown from 59 million in 2008 to 116 million in 2010. 
By 2018, this figure may reach 220 million. The number of HD channels distributed in 
Europe also more than doubled to 130 in 2008, and by 2013 there could be more than 
600.
Many consumer electronic companies predicted the trend towards HDTV and its 
potential future economic value. After the establishment of the first BD specifications, 
the BDF used a framing strategy towards its audiences. Figure 8.5, which cites the 
White Paper of the Blu-ray Disc Format, demonstrates that the capacity  for growth of 
consumer optical discs evolves naturally. The BD camp gives as an example that the 
traditional audio CD format can only hold 74 minutes of content, and the DVD format 
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only holds 2 hours and 15 minutes of video content in the MPEG-216  format. The BD 
camp suggested that in the HDTV era, its standard would be able to record 22 GB of 
digital content. The storage capacity of BD is almost five times the size of the DVD 
standard. Later, the vast majority of media reports contrasted the similarities and 
differences of the BD and HD DVD standards.
Figure 7.1 The Revolution of the BD Standard
Source: The White Paper of Blu-ray Disc Format
In contrast, Toshiba and NEC co-developed a new standard, based on the same 
technology (blue-violet laser). The primary  HD DVD standard had the 0.6mm disc layer 
used in the current  DVD red laser standard (whereas the BD standard had a 0.1mm disc 
substrate). They claimed that DVD makers could alter their production equipment much 
more easily  and, cheaply, and bring the product to market much earlier. However, this 
new standard player was only capable of reading discs with 10% to 25% less density 
than a BD product (and the original capacity of BD standard was 23 GB).
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16  MPEG-2 describes a combination of audio data compression and loss video compression methods 
which allow the storage and transmission of video content.
Both camps framed the capacity  issue in order to solve one of the problems of the DVD 
standard, its smaller capacity. In the standard war, this issue was not the only  one which 
was framed by both parties. This was also the case with copyright protection. In the 
dataset, these issues of capacity and copyright protection were presented not only  in 
framing but also in other discursive activities. At the beginning of their standard war, 
Sony tried to point out another problem of the DVD standard, its weak copyright 
protection mechanism. This study found that  the reason why Sony used the issue as the 
main framing strategy was their experience of the earlier standard war between Toshiba 
SD and Sony MMCD. According to my Japanese interviewee, this was because Sony 
believed that the copyright protection of its MMCD was better than that of Toshiba’s 
SD. Unfortunately, the MMCD standard was then integrated with Toshiba, which 
weakened it. In this way, Sony, together with Philips, which co-developed MMCD with 
Sony in the 1990s, wished to further highlight the importance of the copyright 
protection issue in the digital era.
The DVD standard is easily  hacked into. Its weak copyright protection mechanism 
means that Hollywood studios lose millions of dollars every  year from pirated DVDs 
(Belson & Sorkin, 2004). In order to strengthen this technology, the BD standard 
adopted not only  A.A.C.S. but also another technology, BD+. In the section on 
collective action, developing new copyright protection technology was shown to 
respond to the expectations of critical stakeholders. In discursive activity, development 
is led by the framing strategy, which provides compelling reasons to support the BD 
standard. In addition, the analysis in this section has also shown that this framing 
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strategy is close to the experience of institutional entrepreneurs in the earlier standard 
war. This idea will be discussed further in the section on power.
7.2.4. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: The Structure of Membership
According to the Collins English Dictionary, the term ‘member’ refers to a social actor 
who belongs to a club or association. ‘Membership’ can be defined as the collective 
members of an organization. A structure of membership is a set of rules which explicitly 
defines the responsibilities and obligations of all the members of a collaboration. In 
processes of institutional change, institutional entrepreneurs may face social actors who 
have fewer networking capabilities or intentions, even including free riders (North, 
1990). In turn, institutional entrepreneurs need a hierarchical membership  to formalize 
the roles of members. These findings also reflect the evidence of the mission statements 
presented in Chapter 5.
Both Toshiba and Sony established a hierarchical membership  to formalize the 
obligations and responsibilities of members. Both collaborations have established 
several sub-groups, each of which is responsible for a different task. However, I have 
been unable to obtain more detailed information concerning the DVD Forum. As a 
result, my analysis will focus on the BDA. Figure 8.3 and 8.4 present the hierarchical 
membership structures and divisions of these two collaborations. Furthermore, 
according to a BDA by-law, member organizations at different levels have different 
responsibilities and obligations.
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Figure 7.2 The Structure of Membership of the DVD Forum
Source: DVD Forum
Figure 7.3 The Structure of Membership of the BDA
Source: BDA
Only some members of the BDA can freely  join these committees or sub-groups. 
General Member is the lowest level, and provides access to specific information from 
discussions of the committee. Companies at this level can attend general meetings and 
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seminars, and can also participate in activities of specific regional promotion teams and 
of the Compliance Committee.
A more advanced level of membership  is that of Contributor. Companies at this level are 
active participants in the creation of formats, as well as other key  activities of the BDA, 
and can also be elected to the Board of Directors. They not only have the rights of 
General Members, but can also participate in Technical Expert Groups and most of the 
Compliance Committee activities. Their membership requires the execution of a 
Contribution Agreement and must be approved by the Board of Directors.
Finally, the Board of Directors is the highest level of the BDA. Companies at this level 
are active participants in the format creation and other key BDA activities. These 
members are elected from among the Contributors. The BOD sets an overall strategy 
and approves key  issues. Its members can participate in all activities and attend all 
meetings. The initial BOD was made up of BDF members. The BD standard was co-
developed by  Sony, Matsushita and Philips, who were the main facilitators of the BDA, 
and were capable of initiating essential issues which could be discussed at the annual 
meeting of the BDA.
Like the Secretariat, which was discussed in the foregoing section, the task force team 
was not established at the time of the standard war. It was formed in May 2009, 
according to the BDA by-law v. 1.9, and was responsible for developing 3-D technology 
to the BD standard. It was made up  of members from the film, consumer electronics and 
IT sectors.
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The BDA is able to fundamentally  differentiate members into different levels. By 
differentiating the membership fee, it is also able to recognise those firms which are 
willing to give more to the collaboration. To summarize, this section has presented the 
guidelines of membership structure and mission statements in collaborations.
7.2.5. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: Product Development Activities 
Product development is a specialized activity. It is done to improve the existing product 
or to introduce a new product in the market. It is also done to improve the earlier 
features or techniques or systems. Although both camps did many R&D activities in the 
standard war, they put much effort on improving the existing features of the new 
standard and integrating the standard and the products and complementary ones, for 
example, Sony PlayStation 3 (PS3). 
Both parties had similar committees or sub-groups which were responsible for 
researching, developing and testing new technologies and specifications for their 
standards. These were the critical tasks for both collaborations. Their importance was 
also reflected in the structure of the collaborations. The DVD Forum set  up a Technical 
and Verification Group (TVG) and other relevant sub-groups and labs, while the BDA 
set up a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and a Compliance Committee (CC) to create, 
develop and test new innovations to the BD standard. According to the BDA by-law v.
1.9, the JTC coordinated and accelerated technical discussions in or among Technical 
Expert Groups17, as well as submitting technical proposals to the BOD for approval, and 
presenting the technical viewpoint of the BDA, along strategic guidelines determined by 
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17 There were five Technical Expert Groups in the BDA: BD RE physical specification, AV application, 
BD ROM physical specifications, BD R physical specifications, and file system and command set.
the Promotion Committee. Moreover, in order to guarantee a consistent experience for 
end-users, the Compliance Committee ensured the compatibility and interchangeability 
of all BD products. It  also supported fast and broad acceptance of BD standards in 
relevant industries. There are three sub-groups in this committee. Firstly, the Test 
Specification Group was responsible for the development of test specifications and 
testing methods, while also approving testing tools and distributing reference discs. 
Secondly, the System Compatibility  Group was responsible for conducting round robin 
compatibility tests and recommending preferred implementation in order to achieve 
industry consensus. It was also responsible for the development of a Compliance 
Committee newsletter to inform members about compliance-related issues. Thirdly, the 
Verification Service Group was responsible for ensuring alignment between the 
different test centers, defining the logistics and technical procedures of those centers, 
and organising market inspections in order to maintain product quality.
According to the limited media reports and information available to me, the product 
development activities of the DVD Forum were less intense than those of the BDA. 
This is because, firstly, Toshiba did not  successfully integrate its product with the 
Microsoft Xbox 360, whereas Sony did. Using the PS3 was a risky decision for Sony. 
This was because the Cell processor and BD players were at that time cutting edge 
technologies. If the PS3 had been unable to seed the BD players into markets or 
successfully  integrate them with BD players, Sony would lose at the same moment both 
its game consoles business and the standard war. However, that  was not the case, and it 
was successful. On the other hand, according to the dataset, Toshiba did not try to 
integrate the Xbox 360 with HD players, but provided an additional HD DVD drive 
costing $199. Choosing the wrong strategy in this way meant that the final price of the 
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Xbox 360 was greater than that of the PS3. Although the launch date of the Xbox 360 
was almost a year earlier than that of the PS3, it did not provide a big push for the HD 
DVD players. As a consequence, the BDA were able to successfully integrate the PS3 
and the BD standard. Since 2006, the PS3 acted as a Trojan horse in its standard war. 
That meant that, consumers buying PS3s also became consumers of BD players. 
Furthermore, the BD standard was also able to increase its network effects by using the 
network effects of game consoles. In this way, effective collaboration did indeed lead to 
network effects.
The second reason is BD+. Initially, although both the BD and HD DVD standards 
adopted the A.A.C.S. encryption mechanism, the BDA used an additional software-
based component that made it possible to modify  the copy  protection scheme of new 
discs if the old system was penetrated by hackers. This technology had not been 
developed by  BDA, but the BDA decided to integrate it  into the BD standard. It  was 
based on an approach pioneered by  a group  of technologists at Cryptography Research 
in San Francisco as a safeguard in the event of the compromise of A.A.C.S. According 
to a report  in Wired, the BD+ was originally  used to respond to the expectations of 20th 
Century  Fox concerning copyright protection. Later, this technology did perform well 
when the HD DVD player was hacked. As this shows, effective collaboration in R&D 
activities can lead to network effects and product performance in a standard war.
To summarize, both parties in a standard war see their collaborations as professional 
associations. In order to create, theorize and test new innovations for commercial 
exploitation, such collaborations establish a number of responsible committees or sub-
groups. Moreover, effective product development activities can also lead to network 
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effects and product performance. To some extent, the outputs of product development 
activities result from the power and legitimacy of institutional entrepreneurs. In a 
standard war, institutional entrepreneurs can also use these outputs as discursive 
activities. This view will be discussed in the section on discursive activities.
7.2.6. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: Frequent Communication
Frequent communication is defined as the formal communications which institutional 
entrepreneurs engage in with members in collaborations, in which they exchange 
opinions, share information, and approve decisions. Due to data limitation, I am unable 
to access the BDA discussion forum and so, for the purposes of this study, frequent 
communication will only denote formal communication.
The role of communication has been discussed in many studies of networks and 
strategic alliances. It is a human activity that creates relationships and links members 
together in collaborations (Mishra & Mishra, 2009). Moreover, the word ‘frequent’ 
means that collaborations should establish rules that ensure that members have regular 
formal meetings each of which is at the same time and place.
The BDA uses general meetings to ensure that formal communication takes place 
frequently. By using general meetings, many  official decisions are approved (including 
those concerning the development of technologies and promotional plans). According to 
the BDA’s bylaw v.1.9, it  has clear regulations about the annual general meeting. This 
meeting will be held once a year at a time decided by the BOD. The meeting will be 
announced in writing by the Secretary to all member organizations at least thirty  days 
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prior to the scheduled meeting date. This means that, in practice, the BDA has four 
general meetings per year, each of which is scheduled for a weekday.
At each general meeting, the BOD gives a report  summarizing the activities of the 
BDA during the period since the last meeting, together with a plan for the next round of 
activities. All members are entitled to attend these meetings and participate in them. The 
President of the meeting is one of the three facilitators. The meeting generally approves 
or makes decisions on (1) the annual membership fees proposed by  the BOD; (2) the 
annual statement of accounts for the BDA, which is submitted by the BOD; and (3) the 
annual budget of the BDA, which is prepared by the BOD. Moreover, my interviewee 
also told me that the Secretariat and other committees also have telephone meetings as 
well as their face-to-face meetings. In this way, frequent communication also plays a 
critical role in the collaboration. Institutional entrepreneurs need to define very clear 
protocols for these formal meetings.
By using such formal communications, Sony have fostered both commitment to the 
collaboration and a desire to participate in it. Moreover, the existence of frequent, 
recurrent formal communication can reinforce trust among members who face 
dilemmas concerning collective action (Raymound, 2006); can encourage participation 
amongst participants in collective action (Imperial, 2005); and can reduce the costs of 
transactions.
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7.2.7. Critical  Stakeholders Management Capabilities: Responding to 
Requirements
‘Responding to requirements’ refers to the process in which the institutional 
entrepreneur takes actions to respond to the expectations of critical stakeholders. This 
category not only relates to ‘understanding expectations’ but also to the product 
development activities of institutional entrepreneurs in collaborations. In the standard 
war, in order to satisfy these requirements of critical stakeholders, institutional 
entrepreneurs need to invest resources in product development activities. The results are 
used to respond to the requirements of critical stakeholders. 
For instance, in the standard war under discussion, both parties adopted A.A.C.S. as the 
main copyright protection mechanism in their standards. However, in 2005, Toshiba 
announced that Microsoft had joined the HD DVD camp. Later, Toshiba and Microsoft 
jointly announced that the HD DVD standard would use a managed copy system. In 
other words, when using HD DVD players, customers would be able to copy disc 
content on to their PCs, and then share it  through home networks. As a result of this, 
content providers could not  fully protect their content. On the other hand, in order to 
obtain the support of 20th Century  Fox, the BD party announced that they would add BD
+18  to the BD standard. In other words, the BD standard not only has the AACS 
mechanism but also BD+. This announcement proved to be a way of also instilling 
confidence into many other Hollywood studios. 
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18 Adopting managed copy system for the HD DVD standard and BD+ for the BD standard seems the 
institutional entrepreneurs respond the critical stakeholders’ requirements. It also can be seen that the 
internal group members have enhanced their commitment by developing these specifications. Although 
internal group members are one of audience in institutional change processes. Their actions present that 
they have received the information in collaborations.
Moreover, when different stakeholders have conflicts of interest, these conflicts may 
force institutional entrepreneurs to stand aside or make compromises. If the decisions of 
institutional entrepreneurs conflict with the expectations of powerful stakeholders, there 
may be negative consequences for institutional entrepreneurs. 
An organization may face different types of pressures from its stakeholders, like 
Toshiba faced two different pressures from Microsoft and Hollywood studios in this 
case. Toshiba chose Microsoft’s but tended to ignore the Hollywood studios’. The 
response leaded to serious negative consequences for participants in the standard war. 
By contrast, BD camp chose Hollywood studios side in BD+ case19. In order to present 
the importance of responding powerful critical stakeholder’s requirements, this section 
will further discuss the event of Microsoft’s engagement in HD DVD camp. 
The engagement of Microsoft was a critical event in this standard war. For Toshiba, 
Microsoft was a critical stakeholder. Understanding the process and strategies of this 
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19  There is an increasing focus on the interaction between institutional pressures and organizational 
responses (e.g., Oliver,  1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Institutionalists define situations with such multiple 
institutional pressures, as characterized by ‘institutional complexity’  (Greenwood et al., 2011), referring 
to the number of logics and the degree of incompatibility between them. Organizations face institutional 
complexity when they confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood 
et al., 2011). 
Pache and Santos (2010) indicate that Oliver’s (1991) model lacks predictive power when discussing 
responses to conflicting demands, in particular.  They believe that organizations sometimes face a 
dilemma. In the sense that satisfying one stakeholder’s demand may violate others (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that mature fields are more settled and stable than emergent fields. This is 
because mature fields have a dominant logic which is not often the case with emergent fields. In mature 
fields, organizations are able to ‘predict’ the demands from institutions. Hence, in this situation, 
organizations should be better able to strategically respond with appropriate practices. 
In the digital era, content providers pay much attention to copyright protection technology. In turn, the 
protection can be viewed as the dominant institutional logic in the field. The predictability as an effect of 
established institutional logics can be expected to enable institutional entrepreneurs to learn how to 
respond and mitigate the challenges of institutional complexity. This study shows that by responding to 
the demand from a dominant institutional logic (copyright protection) in a mature field in an appropriate 
way (providing safer technology), institutional entrepreneurs (Sony) can obtain rewards (the victory of 
standard war). 
event, we can demonstrate the consequences when the intentions of institutional 
entrepreneurs conflict with the interests of the most critical stakeholders. In order to 
understand what happened and its consequences, I collected relevant data from 
Datamonitor and Euromonitor, and analyzed relevant media reports.
In 2005, Microsoft announced that it would support the HD DVD standard, and that its 
Vista operating system would also exclusively support the standard. Microsoft is 
undoubtedly an extremely powerful part  of the PC industry, so that, even though Vista 
did not gain market approval, this operating system and its predecessor, XP, have 
dominated the market for operating systems, with a share of almost 90% in the period 
immediately before the launch of Windows 7.
Microsoft had themselves planned to dominate the home entertainment market. 
According to the Euromonitor database, in the United States, in-home consumer 
electronics (In-home CE)20  shows steady  growth in the category of consumer 
electronics (CE)21. The database shows a similar trend with regard to computers and 
peripherals22. Moreover, the growth rate of in-home consumer electronics is sharper 
than that of computers and peripherals. Figure 7.4 illustrates the relevant trends in the 
United States from 2004 to 2009. It shows that the size of the market for in-home 
consumer electronics increased significantly in 2007. This increase was, in general, the 
result of the launch of Wii in November 2006, together with the launches of Xbox 360 
and PS3 in 2007. However, except the in-home CE, the other two categorizes do not 
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20  In-home consumer electronics consists of home audio and cinema,  televisions,  projectors and video 
players.
21  Consumer electronics refers to sales of computers, as well as peripherals, in-home consumer 
electronics, in-car entertainment and portable consumer electronics to the end consumer.
22 Computers and peripherals includes desktops and portable computers, as well as peripheral electronics 
which are designed for use in conjunction with them.
have significant growth from 2004 to 2009. Instead, consumer electronic goes slightly 
down from 2008 (582,635 thousand unit) to 2009 (577,021 thousand unit). 
Figure 7.4 
Changes in the Size the Consumer Electronics Market in the USA between 2004 
and 2009 (‘000 units)
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Figure 7.5 (from Datamonitor) also shows that the increase of the last figure in 
2007-2008 may have mainly derived from sales of game consoles. According to 
Datamonitor’s report, Games Consoles in the United States, after the launch of the 
Nintendo Wii23, market value in the US reached over 7 billion units a year. However, in 
Datamonitor’s another report, PCs in the United States, comparing to the PC market in 
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23 Wii was Nintendo’s fifth home console. It broke the US record for the highest sales of a console in a 
single month. Wii uses a wireless controller, the Wii Remote, which can be used as a handheld pointing 
device and detects movement in three dimensions. It also enables users to receive messages and updates 
over the internet.
the US, although the value of this market was 45.9 billion units in 2009, it had shrunk 
by 8.6% in 2008.
Figure 7.5 The Sales and Growth Rate of Game Consoles in the USA 
between 2005 to 2009
In this way, we can more easily see that Microsoft rightly  considers game consoles and 
the home entertainment industry  to be its areas of opportunity. This also explains why 
Microsoft has been a part of the video game console industry since 2001. Its first game 
console, Xbox, was released in the United States in November 200124.
Microsoft’s domination of the PC market suggested to them that  their best strategy was 
to allow users to copy  disc content onto their own computers and home networks, which 
would have further boosted the market value of these products in the PC industry. There 
is no evidence to show whether Microsoft had made contact with the BD camp before 
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24 The United States is the biggest market in the world for both films and consumer electronics.  Its games 
console industry, however, is slightly smaller than Europe. In this section, therefore, relevant market 
figures are based on those of the US.
evolving this strategy. However, it suited Toshiba’s DVD standard. It therefore seems 
that Toshiba copied the standard DVD experience in its HD DVD standard, and then 
made the joint announcement, without considering the expectations of content 
providers. This, therefore, is the reason for Toshiba’s alliance with Microsoft, as, with 
Microsoft’s support, Toshiba could use the Xbox 360 to win players of those games, as 
well as other audiences.
According to The Wall Street Journal reports, once Vista exclusively supported the HD 
DVD standard, other PC companies incurred higher costs because they  were forced to 
install BD drivers into their PCs using the Vista system. However, the PC is an open 
structure. The open structure provides the possibility  of a modular construction model 
where everyone designs for everyone on the basis of one shared structure. Everybody 
can contribute parts, components and structures. So there are methods of minimizing the 
impact of the Vista system. Toshiba did not gain much benefit  from allying themselves 
with Microsoft, because BD camp could utilize the open structure characteristic to 
minimize the impact. Therefore, but only succeeded in coming into conflict with the 
expectations of Hollywood studios. As a result, after this announcement, many of these 
studios said that they would non-exclusively  support the BD standard. This had negative 
consequences for Toshiba.
7.2.8. Discursive Activities: Promoting 
After establishing the collaboration in a certain extent and framing the new standard, the 
institutional entrepreneurs needed to use promoting strategies to increase the likelihood 
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of its adoption in order to ensure that the new institution is rapidly adopted by its 
audiences. 
This study defines ‘promoting’ as giving publicity to a standard, collaboration and/or in 
order to increase its sales, adoption and awareness among the public. In the standard 
war under discussion, both parties used media discourses, conferences, technological 
exhibitions and other products to seed their standards into customer’s homes.
Firstly, the promoting strategy in the standard war was used to ensure that the standard 
was legitimized by critical stakeholders. At the time of Microsoft’s engagement in 2005, 
Toshiba used it to promote the idea that the HD DVD standard was endorsed by 
Microsoft and its forthcoming Vista operating system. At the beginning of this standard 
war, Sony announced that it was leading a group of eight other companies to establish 
BDF, in order to design the BD standard and diffuse it  around the world. In their 
announcement, Sony intended to promote the idea that the BD standard had the 
endorsement of these leading companies. Later on, the BDF also announced that HP, 
Dell, TDK and various other companies had joined the BDF. To some extent, these 
announcements not only announced their portfolio, but also promoted the BD standard 
as a legitimate one in order to influence the awareness of the public and other 
stakeholders.
The BD camp also used promoting to place the number of BDA members in media 
reports. In October 2004, the official site of the BDA announced that  they had seventy 
members. In February 2005, the number of members exceeded a hundred, while in 
October 2005, it passed 150. Toshiba also attempted to invite companies to engage in or 
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exclusively  support the HD DVD standard. For example, in 2007, Paramount and 
DreamWorks announced that they would join the HD DVD camp and no longer support 
the BD standard. This suggests that promoting the engagement of stakeholders implies 
that rival standards will no longer receive the support  of stakeholders. In addition, this 
strategy demonstrates the critical role played by legitimacy in this standard war.
Secondly, the promoting strategy was used to promote compelling reasons to the 
audience. After framing the production costs issue in the HD DVD standard in 2004, 
Toshiba further announced that, jointly with Memory-Tech, it had developed a 
production line that could make both HD-DVD discs and DVDs, taking only five 
minutes to switch between the two. Toshiba claimed that this dual-purpose equipment 
would make it easier for disc manufacturers to produce both DVD and HD DVD discs. 
In 2005, after Lionsgate had announced that it would join the BDA, the BD camp 
claimed that, although BD discs were initially likely to be expensive, production costs 
would fall in the years to come. Hollywood studios sell tens of millions of DVDs every 
year, so even a difference of a few pennies in the cost  of the disc manufacturing process 
can eat into profits. Cheaper production costs allow studios to permanently lower the 
retail price of discs. The issue of production costs was the most important  advantage in 
the HD DVD camp at the beginning of this standard war. As more and more studios 
became engaged with the BD camp, Toshiba was progressively losing its advantage. As 
a consequence we can see that promoting compelling reasons in this way does not only 
respond to the questions and expectations of stakeholders, it also makes other 
stakeholders aware of these reasons and motivate them to take action.
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Thirdly, the promoting strategy is also used to promote end products. In the standard 
war, both camps used game consoles and players to promote their standards. The 
promoting strategy  in this stage was mainly intended to increase the network effects of 
their standards. In the case of BD, the BDA decided that the PS3 would be integrated 
with BD players. Its predecessor, the PS2, handed a very  large installed base to the PS3. 
So long as gamers would want also to buy the PS3, the millions of PS3s sold would 
seed the market for BD players, providing huge economic scale and performance for 
Hollywood studios, which are generally reluctant to back two rival standards. In 
addition, Sony needed PS3 to help it maintain its dominance of the game console 
industry in the emerging market for internet video downloads (The Economist, 2006). 
When the PS3 was launched, Sony faced stronger competition than it had done when it 
launched the PS2 in 2000. The PS2 gave Sony 70% of the game console market, 
equivalent to 100 million units. However, the PS3 faced competition from the Microsoft 
Xbox 360 and the Nintendo Wii. In the case of HD DVD, although Toshiba used the 
Xbox 360 to promote the HD DVD standard, they did not integrate the two 
technologies, as was the case with BD and the PS3.
As well as games consoles, both camps used their disc players and PCs to promote the 
standards. Both of them focused on early  adopters. Early  adopters can help focal firms 
to promote their standard using personal, word-of-mouth communication which then 
generates network effects. Focal firms can also collect feedback from these adopters. 
This is why Sony and Toshiba used the PS3 and PCs to promote their standards. PC 
users, gamers, videographers and other interested parties were important early  adopters 
in this standard war. The Wall Street Journal suggested that PC users were good early 
adopters. Bob DeMoulin, marketing manager for Sony, responsible for BD and other 
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optical media products, also pointed out  that millions of HD televisions were already in 
the market and predicted that 50% of all televisions sold in 2006 would be HDTVs.
Both camps therefore used a promoting strategy  to promote their standards, products 
and compelling messages to their stakeholders and consumers, but achieved different 
outcomes in their standard war. Firstly, they used this strategy to promote the idea that 
their standards were both legitimised and endorsed by critical stakeholders. Using the 
strategy not only communicated the power and legitimacy of their standards but also 
showed that the influence of their collaborations was becoming stronger. In other words, 
using discursive activities is also a way of demonstrating collective actions. Secondly, 
they  used this strategy to provide practical solutions, something I discussed in the 
section on framing. However, Sony tried not  only to demonstrate the growing number 
of BDA members, but also to imply that the main advantage of HD DVD, lower 
production costs, had been undermined. In other words, this promoting strategy was 
combined with other strategies to form the discursive activities of this standard war. 
Thirdly, they used the strategy  of using game consoles to promote disc players. My 
analysis also implies that  different outputs of collaborations may lead to different 
promoting strategies.
7.2.9. Discursive Activities: Undermining 
The study defines an undermining strategy as the active use of discourses to implicitly 
or explicitly erode or impede the base of a rival’s standard or collaboration. In this 
standard war, the institutional entrepreneurs were more likely  to use an undermining 
strategy in an implicit way. The definition also shows that the target being undermined 
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is not only  the standard but also the collaboration. According to the Collins English 
Dictionary (1995), the meaning of ‘undermine’ is to insidiously weaken something. In 
this standard war, many discursive strategies formed part  of the undermining strategy. 
There is less evidence in the dataset, however, to show that either the BD or HD DVD 
camps strongly undermined their rival’s standard.
The engagement of Microsoft was a critical event in this standard war, and Toshiba used 
it as the basis of an undermining strategy. However, this action also gave the BD camp 
an opportunity to undermine Toshiba. It not only caused the BDA develop the BD+ 
technology to attach additional copyright protection to the BD standard but also forced 
critical stakeholders to choose a specific standard to support. This section of the study 
will further demonstrate that  the engagement of Microsoft caused the BD camp to 
explicitly use an undermining strategy  to erode the legitimacy  base of HD DVD 
standard.
Microsoft and Toshiba announced that, as part of their collaboration, they  would allow 
users to copy disc content onto their PCs and home network using iHD. The iHD 
technology was a interactivity format developed by Microsoft for the next generation of 
DVDs. The companies used it for interactive services, as well as a feature called 
‘managed copy’, which allows users to copy films on to PCs and other devices. This 
engagement and announcement did put pressure on some PC companies in the BDA, 
because Microsoft  is close to having dominant power in the PC market. Once the Vista 
system had started to provide exclusive support for the HD DVD standard, other PC 
companies which supported the BD standard had to pay additional costs to install BD 
players in their PCs. For this reason, the engagement of Microsoft caused a conflict of 
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interest between the BDA and HP (Wingfield, 2005). In other words, Toshiba used the 
engagement as a strategy to undermine the BDA. As a result of this, HP would later 
force the BDA to follow Toshiba’s policy. 
However, Sony transformed this problem into an opportunity, and demonstrated that the 
BD standard was better than that of HD DVD. In the JavaOne trade show in 2005, the 
BDA announced that Sun Microsystems’ Java software would be included in all BD 
players as a mandatory part of the standard, which they  called BD-J. In contrast with the 
DVD standard, BD-J allows users to access networks, Picture-in-Picture, and expanded 
local storage, contents which the BDA described as “bonus content”. In short, the BD-J 
technology was a alternative iHD technology. All BD players were required by their 
specification to support BD-J, and the BDA explicitly  stated that the BD standard does 
not agree with HP’s proposal to open its copyright protection policy.
After almost a month, the BDA spokesman told Reuters that they would not accept HP’s 
request, but would continue to use BD-J in the BD standard and would not  open the 
content protection mechanism (Belson, 2005). The BDA clearly  understood that they 
had to balance the different expectations of various critical stakeholders, including 
Hollywood studios and manufacturers of PCs, and prioritized the needs of content 
providers.
The BDA did have confidence in their content protection mechanism. This was because 
some Hollywood studios had expressed concerns about Toshiba’s rival managed copy 
mechanism, demonstrating that the mechanism of the HD DVD standard clearly 
contradicted their values and expectations. A few days later, Paramount announced that 
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they  would end their exclusive support of the HD DVD standard (Edwards, Burrows & 
Grover, 2005). On 21 October 2005, the New York Times reported that Warner Brothers 
had announced that they  had also ended their exclusive support of HD DVD and were 
now inclusively  supporting BD (Belson, 2005). Having won the engagement of these 
studios, the BDA further strengthened market confidence in its copyright protection 
technology. Thus, the BDA adopted the BD+ in 2007, as an additional technology for 
the  protection of BD disc content.
Toshiba’s undermining strategy provided new opportunities for the BDA. Firstly, it 
made it possible for them to develop  two new technologies in 2007, BD-J and BD+. 
This meant  that, by extension, they gained the opportunity to strengthen confidence 
Hollywood studios in their copyright protection technology even further. The BDA used 
this strategy as retaliation, in order to undermine Toshiba. This shows that effective use 
of an undermining strategy  can further strengthen the commitment of a collaboration 
and increase the power and legitimacy of the institutional entrepreneur. If it is not used 
well, the institutional entrepreneur may lose the support of its stakeholders. 
Toshiba explicitly used other undermining strategies, in addition to the occasion 
involving Microsoft in 2007, to impede the BDA. In August 2007, The Wall Street 
Journal reported the announcement of Paramount and DreamWorks that they had 
chosen the HD DVD standard over the BD standard. Officially, Paramount said that this 
was because they wanted to devote all their resources to a single format. According to 
the announcements from these two studios, Toshiba clearly  understood that network 
effects and product performance of the HD DVD standard were far behind those of the 
BD standard. But they did not want to surrender so easily. This was why few media 
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reports said that Toshiba had given huge financial incentives to these two studios 
(McBride, 2007), However, neither studios nor Toshiba wanted to comment on this:
The following day, after the announcement of this information on the media, Sony  used 
a ‘undermining’ strategy to respond to this rebellion. Sony used comments from famous 
film directors in their response, and announced a new strategy to lower the price of the 
BD players.
At the same time as The Wall Street Journal reported this news, the BDA’s official site 
(http://www.blu-ray.com) presented the comments of Michael Bay and Steven Spielberg 
on the announcements of the two studios. The title of Michael Bay’s comments 
displayed on the BD site was: ‘Michael Bay Responds to Paramount's Decision: "No 
Transformers 2 for Me!"’ The title expressed very clearly the fact that  the director was 
not happy with the studio’s decision. On the other hand, although Steven Spielberg did 
not speak personally, the BD website quoted a statement from his spokesman, which, 
clearly stated Spielberg’s support for the BD standard25.
As a consequence, analysing undermining strategies highlights the fact that, by using 
discursive activities, institutional entrepreneurs can further impede the power, 
legitimacy, and collective actions of their competitors.
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25 http://www.blu-ray.com/news/?id=568
7.2.10. Discursive Activities: Debating 
The term ‘debating’ is defined as the way in which institutional entrepreneurs 
deliberately  defend and explain their actions and behaviours when they are attacked by 
their rivals in the media. According to the Collins English Dictionary (1995), to 
‘debate’ is to present supporting or opposing reasons or try  to prove a point by 
presenting reasons, a meaning which is quite close to that of ‘argue’.
This strategy normally follows the discursive strategies of competitors. As discussed in 
previous sections of this study, the discursive strategies of institutional entrepreneurs 
implicitly  or explicitly de-legitimise or erode the institutions, products, collaborations 
and other activities of those competitors. In order to defend themselves, convince the 
target market that  their new solutions are better than those of their competitors or 
decrease the suspicions of the market, it is necessary for them to use a debating strategy.
However, my finding was that institutional entrepreneurs occasionally use the strategy 
to aggressively attack competitors. In such a case, both sides argue for their standards 
and actions in a variety of ways. They  often provide statistics or comments from 
stakeholders to argue that their standards and products are better than those of their 
competitors. However, negative information is often disseminated not  by  competitors 
but by the media. In practice, the media provides not only balanced reports, but also 
reviews, editorials, opinion pieces and so on. Sometimes, reports of product tests and 
comments about them undermine the products and actions of institutional entrepreneurs. 
For these reasons, institutional entrepreneurs need to know how to argue their case, to 
refute these claims, and then defend their new institutions in other ways. If they do not 
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do so, they may lose their power and legitimacy. Consequently, although the example 
was happened in 2007, not in the specific time period (2002-2006), the study still 
proposes the practice in this phase. 
Many debates were based on, or derived from, the various implications of the blue-
violet laser, such as capacity  and production costs. Both camps adopted the blue-violet 
laser technology so that they could record a greater amount of content onto a single 
disc. The DVD standard uses a red laser which transmits light at a wavelength of 650 
nm, compared to the shorter 405 nm of the blue laser. This is important, because the 
shorter the wavelength, the smaller the focal point of the laser beam. In order to ensure 
compatibility, the HD DVD standard uses blue-laser to hold up to 20 GB of data while 
the BD standard is able to store 27 GB. This issue was heavily debated throughout the 
standard war. This was for the reason that  a thinner substrate in the disc means that the 
laser can get even closer to the data.
As was demonstrated in the standard war between VHS and Betamax, Hollywood 
studios permanently  require the highest possible amount of storage capacity  for their 
content. At the beginning of their standard war, Toshiba used its other advantages to 
argue that the HD DVD standard would provide lower production costs and greater 
backward compatibility than the BD standard. At this time, they  also had the support of 
many Hollywood studios. The BD camp therefore also used a debating strategy to 
respond to this criticism. The BD camp invited a critical stakeholder to argue in favor 
their policy (McBride, 2004). 
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In this standard war, many debating strategies were initiated by critical stakeholders, 
and/or in major technological exhibitions. By using critical stakeholders, debating 
strategies not only convey their actions and explain them, but also imply that these 
actions are endorsed and adopted by critical stakeholders. 
If these debating strategies are used in the most important technological exhibitions, 
relevant information can win more media attention, because all parties are present at a 
single place and a single time. CEATEC (the Combined Exhibition of Advanced 
Technologies) in Japan, CES (the Consumer Electronics Show) in the United States, and 
many other professional conferences and exhibitions were used as locations at which to 
announce important information and/or argue for the advantages of each camp’s 
standard throughout this standard war.
This study also finds that if institutional entrepreneurs do not use debating strategies 
effectively or respond to the media reports intended to undermine them, negative 
consequences could result. For instance, in January 2007, there was bad news for the 
HD DVD standard. The New York Times reported that it had been penetrated by  a hacker 
calling himself Muslix64 (Markoff, 2007):
Some technical experts said that the method used by  Muslix64 was a partial, but 
incomplete, solution to the challenge of copying digitally protected material. However, 
it was still troubling for the HD DVD camp (Markoff, 2007). The news suggested that 
using only A.A.C.S. to protect the content held by  the HD DVD standard was not 
sufficiently secure. The New York Times pointed out that the content protection 
mechanism of the BD standard was superior to that of the HD DVD. Although the BD 
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and HD DVD standards had both adopted the A.A.C.S. encryption mechanism, the 
BDA also used an additional software-based component that made it possible to modify 
the copy protection system on new discs if the old system had been penetrated by 
hackers (Markoff, 2007):
This appears the question of why the HD DVD standard did not use the same content 
protection technology as BD. The New York Times demonstrated that this problem was 
caused by Microsoft:
Interestingly, the hacker’s video demonstrating this breach of security is still available 
on YouTube, where it had originally been posted by  someone calling him/herself 
‘hack247’. It has now been viewed more than 174,000 times. In the video, the hacker 
claims that a file labelled ‘tkdb.cfg’ was the critical key  to decrypting A.A.C.S. 
protected movies26.
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26 More information is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOlKg9sIc2k
Figure 7.6 A Snapshot of the Hacker’s Video, as Posted on YouTube
Source: YouTube
According to the hacker, now that this file has been hacked, anyone can decrypt the 
content of HD DVDs. When I Googled the file name, I found that  many hackers claim 
to supply ‘BackupHDDVD’, a software tool which is said to be able to decrypt a user-
owned A.A.C.S.-protected DVD. These software suppliers also claim that  users can 
then play it  back using HD DVD software. After Muslix64 had supplied hacked 
material, many other hackers then also provided relevant information which was 
immediately diffused to other internet users. As a result, the weak encryption system of 
the HD DVD standard undermined both its own legitimacy and the support of 
Hollywood studios. It may also, cause other stakeholders to adopt  the BD standard 
instead, which would give the BDA an advantage in offering a wider range of content.
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I am unable to locate in the dataset any official announcements from Toshiba and the 
HD DVD camp, responding to the actions of the hacker and discussing their copyright 
protection mechanism. This may show that the HD DVD camp  did not use debating or 
other discursive strategies to defend or explain themselves, argue, or express opinions 
concerning this instance of hacking. Not  discussing the copyright protection 
mechanism, however, is likely  to erode confidence of critical stakeholder in the 
standard, and reduce the possibility  of their supporting it. There is no information in the 
dataset drawn from the BD site concerning hacking of BD players or PS3, at  least until 
the end of the standard war. We can conclude that this comparison implies that the BD 
standard had better copyright protection technologies than the HD DVD standard.
This discussion illustrates a main issue in the standard war. It shows that without an 
effective debating strategy, negative information may erode the legitimacy of the 
standard and its network effects. In this case, this was because solving the issue of 
copyright was the main expectation of the Hollywood studios. The news of hacking 
demonstrated that the copyright protection of the HD DVD standard was weak. 
7.2.11. Discursive Activities: Spokespersons 
This study defines a spokesperson as a person who is responsible for representing a 
company to the media. The study has already shown, in its section on collective action, 
that the BDA has a Promotion Committee, the BDA’s overall aim was to produce an 
united policy for the standard, and in order to provide itself with an unambiguous voice, 
it appointed a spokesperson. This was a finding only of the BD camp, and not of the HD 
DVD camp. This study will argue that having a spokesperson was very helpful in this 
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standard war, and that, in general, collective action influences discursive activity in 
standard wars.
Initially, I did not examine the role of spokespersons in the BDA. However, when my 
Japanese interviewee informed me that three BDA committees included people with this 
role, I was prompted to search for further information within the dataset. This was 
because the BDA’s official website does not give the names of every member of each 
committee. I therefore only  used ‘spokesperson’ as the keyword for my search in the 
dataset. The main advantage of the BDA is that it can present a ‘unique voice’ to 
communicate information about the BD standard and construct meanings for it.
According to the media report (The New York Times) in the dataset, the DVD Forum 
itself did not  have a spokesperson during this standard war, unlike Toshiba, although 
their spokesperson, Keisuke Oomori, appeared only once in the New York Times, on 15 
September 2004. The report says:
In this report, Oomori argued that Sony’s acquisition of MGM would not have any 
impact on the HD DVD camp. In contrast, the BDA’s first spokesperson was Marty 
Gordon, the vice president of Philips. In the San Jose Mercury News on 10 August 
2005, he confirmed that  the BDA was committed to offering the strongest possible 
content management system.
Marty Gordon, Josh Peterson and Andy Parsons all appear in media reports (e.g., 
Belson, 2005) in the dataset, as spokespersons for the BDA. In 2005, Peterson was 
Director of Strategic Alliances for H-P’s optical-storage solution business. When 
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Microsoft backed the HD DVD standard in 2005, Peterson had acted as a spokesperson 
for it. However, when H-P then forced the BDA to adopt the open content  protection 
mechanism, Peterson was not put forward as a spokesman for the BDA in media 
reports. Andy Parsons appears in the media report (Kerschbaumer, 2004) collected for 
this study in October 2004. At that time, he was Senior Vice President of Advanced 
Product Development for Pioneer Electronics (USA). In 2005, when he appeared in 
further media reports, he held not only this position but  also that of spokesperson for the 
BDA. Later, Parsons was responsible for many announcements of official information 
and gave many  media interviews. In contrast, there do not seem to be any references in 
the dataset to an official spokesperson for the HD DVD camp, while Keisuke Oomori, 
the spokesperson for Toshiba, himself only appeared once in these media reports, and 
his name could not be found in any later reports.
The head of the Promotion Committee, Andy Parsons of Panasonic, is also the BDA’s 
most senior spokesperson. At the time of my interview in Japan, Andy Parsons was 
President of the BDA. As my earlier discussion of membership structure suggested, the 
presence of a senior manager of Panasonic on the Promotion Committee ensured that 
the company’s decisions and promotional policies would not contradict those of the 
BDA. This was because Panasonic was one of the facilitators of the BDA.
7.2.12. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: Organizing Promotion
After the practices of promoting and spokespersons on discursive activities, the BDA 
presents the importance of organizing promotion on collaboration structuring 
capabilities in the standard war. This strategy is defined as the use by institutional 
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entrepreneurs of collaborations to define campaigns and utilize strategies, in order to 
promote and target standard and relevant technologies to relevant audiences. Like 
discursive activity in a standard war, promotion means that institutional entrepreneurs 
define and approve promoting and marketing campaigns in collaborations, and then the 
members of those collaborations create their own relevant campaigns. Without an united 
plan, institutional entrepreneurs are unable to produce the required ‘unambiguous 
voice’ for their audiences. This may create suspicion and lead to misunderstandings 
within the market. Moreover, it may also negatively  influence the network effects and 
product performance of a standard, or even the resources of institutional entrepreneurs 
themselves.
One of the main problems of the DVD standard, for instance, is that there were too 
many formats, something which purchasers found confusing. The DVD standard had 
been introduced to the market in 1995, and the its large number of sub-formats meant 
that consumers had become very confused. Different types of discs were often not be 
compatible with other players. In this situation, institutional entrepreneurs needed to use 
their collaborations to produce an integrated standard. Moreover, throughout standard 
wars, institutional entrepreneurs may  have to confront many different attacks from 
rivals and queries from stakeholders. In order to create an unambiguous voice and an 
integrated policy, institutional entrepreneurs need promotion teams which are 
responsible for dealing with these arguments and promoting such integrated standards.
According to the BDA’s by-law v.1.9, its promotion committee strategically promotes 
the BD standard in various ways, including advertising campaigns, showcases and 
293
education and training programs for audiences. So far, this committee has established 
promotional teams in America, Europe, Japan and the Asia/Pacific region, and China.
Before the BDA or other member companies announce any information to the media, it 
must be endorsed by a BOD meeting. The communication of information and 
construction of meaning are very critical to the BDA. This is because these decisions 
are made by the BOD. Moreover, the chair of the Promotion Committee is its 
spokesperson in the BDA. With the chair of the Promotion Committee as its 
spokesperson, the BDA can maximise a guarantee that no media message will contradict 
the policies of the BDA or mislead the audience.
In this way, the BDA possesses a promotional team and a spokesperson who are 
responsible for the promotion of relevant information and technologies to markets. 
Indeed, the possession of a committee responsible for the promotion of a single voice 
for the BDA is a major difference between them and the DVD Forum. This is because 
the BDA understands that an integrated media message is critical in a standard war, as 
correcting the misunderstandings of the audience or of stakeholders may be a costly 
task. Moreover, misunderstandings will also leave space for rivals. 
In short, during 2002 to 2006, both camps established the collaborations to deal with 
many different tasks. Although many practices were happened at the same moment, in 
general, the institutional entrepreneurs should establish a certain extent of power, 
legitimacy, and the specifications of the new standard first. By  using these resources and 
prototypes of the new standards, they can provide compelling reasons to increase the 
likelihood of the adoption by publics and other prospective organizations. 
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To summarize, in the collaboration structuring capabilities aspect, this study claims that 
five categories should be included in the capability. These are ‘the institutional 
entrepreneur’s portfolio’, ‘the structure of membership’, ‘product development 
activities’, ‘frequent communication’ and ‘organizing promotion’.  
Collective action in standard wars not only leads to interactions between the resources 
of institutional entrepreneurs but also produces network effects and product 
performance. With effective capabilities, collective action can lead to the consolidation 
of an institutional entrepreneur’s resources. In its analysis, this study will demonstrate 
that these capabilities can assist institutional entrepreneurs to maintain and develop 
relationships with critical stakeholders, which then lead to increases in their power and 
legitimacy. Moreover, when institutional entrepreneurs satisfy the requirements of 
critical stakeholders and respond to their expectations, they will engage further in 
collaboration and invest their resources in projects of change, such as product 
development activities and promotion. Furthermore, in order to retain and increase 
competitive advantage, institutional entrepreneurs need to manage collaborations 
effectively. In its standard war, the BDA established a hierarchical membership structure 
which assigned different responsibilities and obligations to different members. Within 
their collaboration, the BDA also produced additional strong network effects and 
product performance, as in the cases of BD+ and PS3.
This section has also shown that effective collective action can lead to discursive 
activities, a relationship which was not presented as part  of the conceptual framework in 
Chapter 5. For instance, the BDA’s Promotion Committee is responsible for the 
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generation of promotional policies and market campaigns. If it  has these integrated 
plans, the BDA can generate an unambiguous voice and avoid excessive costs when 
dealing with questions and suspicions of the audiences. 
Table 7.4 Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s Actions in Collaboration 
Structuring Capabilities
Collaboration Structuring 
Capability
Sony Toshiba
The institutional 
entrepreneur’s portfolio
1. Its portfolio was the 
companies establishing 
the BDF then deliberately 
invited several companies 
to diversify the portfolio. 
1. Its portfolio was Steering 
Committee of DVD 
Forum. 
The structure of 
membership
1. BDA’s structure of 
membership has multiple 
functions, including 
create, uphold, and 
promote. 
1. DVD Forum mainly 
focuses on the function of 
technical and verification. 
R&D activities 1. BD standard successfully 
integrated with PS3. 
2. BD standard successfully 
developed the additional 
copyright protection 
technology: BD+
1. It did not integrate the 
standard with Microsoft’s 
Xbox 360. 
2. It did not develop further 
protecting technology on 
copyright for their critical 
stakeholders. 
Frequent communication 1. BDA has four general 
meeting in a year and 
many times of meeting in 
each committee. 
1. The dataset does not have 
evidence to showing 
frequent communication 
in DVD Forum. 
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Collaboration Structuring 
Capability
Sony Toshiba
Organizing promotion 1. The promoting discourse 
and strategies are 
endorsed by BDA 
meeting. 
2. Having the teams in the 
committee which is 
responsible of promoting 
the standard around the 
world. 
3. Establishing 
spokesperson in the BDA. 
1. According to the 
available data, DVD 
Forum did not generate 
unambiguous voice as 
BDA. 
2. Due to data limitation, 
specialized promoting 
team in DVD Forum can 
not be identified. 
3. In the dataset, only one 
spokesperson can be 
identified. 
Source: Author
In this way, this study suggests that institutional entrepreneurs need to use product 
development activities and relational closeness to determine who their critical 
stakeholders are in standard wars. Product development activities can be viewed as task-
related criteria, which focus on the operational requirements of technological objectives. 
Relational closeness is a partner-related criterion, which has more to do with the 
qualities of the partners, and impacts on both the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
coordination. In other words, institutional entrepreneurs should use concentric circles to 
depict their stakeholders. Companies in the inmost circles have the most intensive 
product development activities and close relations with institutional entrepreneurs. The 
new typology can be seen as one of the theoretical implications of this study. 
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Table 7.5 Additional Findings Concerning Collective Action
Findings from Collective 
Action
Findings
Collective action leads to 
discursive activities
The BDA case shows, having integrated plans can generate 
an unambiguous voice and avoid excessive costs when 
dealing with questions and suspicions of the audiences. 
Traditional definition of 
stakeholders may need to 
be refined in standard 
war. 
This study suggests that institutional entrepreneurs need to 
use R&D activities and relational closeness to determine 
who their critical stakeholders are in standard wars. 
Collective action leads to 
interactions between the 
resources of institutional 
entrepreneurs. 
1. Critical stakeholders management and collaboration 
structuring capabilities can assist institutional 
entrepreneurs to maintain and develop relationships with 
critical stakeholders, which then lead to increase in their 
power and legitimacy. 
2. When institutional entrepreneurs satisfy the requirement 
of critical stakeholders and respond to their expectations, 
they will engage further in collaboration and invest their 
resources in changing project. 
3. Institutional entrepreneurs may confront pressures from 
different stakeholders. They should deliberately respond 
their pressures. Otherwise, their responses may conflict 
with their stakeholders then cause negative outcomes. 
Source: Author
This study also figures out some specific attributes of discursive activities in the 
standard war, including ‘framing’, ‘promoting’, ‘debating’, ‘undermining’, and 
‘spokesperson’. Sony and Toshiba generally did not use a single strategy at any one 
time, but more often used a group of strategies, such as ‘framing’, ‘debating’ and 
‘undermining’, in combination. In order to clearly present these findings, the study will 
discuss each attribute separately. The main data sources for this research are all media 
reports in the dataset and the news archive of BDA’s official website.
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Table 7.6 Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s Actions in Discursive Activities
Discursive activities Sony Toshiba
Framing 1. Providing compelling 
reason to frame the 
change is necessary. 
2. Sony used three famous 
engineers to create the 
new specifications of BD 
standard quickly. 
1. Providing compelling 
reason to frame the 
change is necessary. 
Promoting 1. To promote that the 
standard was legitimized 
by critical stakeholders 
and motivate other 
companies to engage in 
the camp. 
2. To further strengthen 
their existing framing 
strategy. 
3. To promote end products.
1. To promote that the 
standard was legitimized 
by critical stakeholders. 
2. To further strengthen 
their existing framing 
strategy. 
3. To promote end products. 
Debating 1. Actively using statistics 
or comments from 
stakeholders to debate its 
own standard. 
2. Revealing the debating 
discourses in 
technological exhibitions 
for catching  media 
attention. 
1. Certainly, it actively used 
debating strategy, 
including stakeholders 
and exhibitions. However, 
it did not well debate 
some critical events. 
Hence, it caused negative 
consequences to HD 
DVD. 
Undermining 1. Transforming Toshiba’s 
action into an 
opportunity, Sony 
developed the BD+ and 
forced critical 
stakeholders to choose a 
specific standard to 
support. 
1. To undermine the BD 
camp by using 
Microsoft’s engagement 
and relevant 
specifications. 
Spokesperson 1. Actively used 
spokespersons to provide 
unambiguous voice to 
audiences. 
1. Did not actively use 
spokesperson in the 
standard war. 
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Source: Author
The section of discursive activities has presented many arguments about standard wars. 
Firstly, by  using discursive activities, institutional entrepreneurs can increase and 
strengthen their power and legitimacy. This was shown by the BDA’s engagements of 
Hollywood studios, when its use of discursive activities to promote those engagements 
constructed the meaning that the BDA had greater support from critical stakeholders 
than HD DVD. This information conveyed the additional message that Sony had more 
connections and areas of cooperation with important companies. Thus, Sony’s power in 
this standard war grew further. Equally, the BDA’s addition of the BD+ to the BD 
standard constructed another message to the audience that the BDA had researched and 
developed more patents and technologies to make the its standard even stronger.
Secondly, the use of discursive activities can increase network effects and product 
performance of standards. For example, the use of promoting strategies helped 
institutional entrepreneurs to increase the sales figures for disc players and PS3. 
Additionally, the more Hollywood studios, game software developers and publishers 
were acting in collaboration with the BDA, the more their game software and movie 
titles increased the network effects of standards.
Several additional findings derive from this section. Firstly, the study showed that 
interaction effects exist between discursive activity and collective action. Although 
Chapter 5 suggested that collective action and discursive activities should be discussed 
separately, these findings show that the effects of interaction should not be ignored. In 
this standard war, institutional entrepreneurs promoted the performance of collective 
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actions to stakeholders and markets through the use of discursive activities. For 
instance, the BDA announced that critical stakeholders including Disney and Lionsgate 
were collaborating with them. The announcement not only communicated this to other 
companies and markets, but also constructed the meaning that the BDA was increasing 
its support from Hollywood studios. The study shows that collaborations also give rise 
to discursive activities. By using spokespersons, institutional entrepreneurs can present 
unified messages which answer the criticisms and suspicions of their audiences.
Secondly, this study aims to determine the role of core employees in standard wars. As a 
result, it  enables me to introduce another category, the effect of human resource 
management on core employees and individual social capital. In the section on framing 
strategy, this study showed that three ‘master’ engineers assisted the BD standard to 
rapidly promote itself to other engineers who had worked with these masters. Sony, 
Panasonic and Philips saw these master engineers as core employees, and as one of their 
competitive advantages.
Institutional entrepreneurs cannot expect core employees to actively promote new 
technologies to engineers who work for other companies, unless they nurture these core 
employees. Since the skills of these core employees are of great importance to 
institutional entrepreneurs, and as they are valuable and rare, companies need to use 
specific human resource practices to increase the these core employees’ commitment to 
them. Companies should also assist these core employees to establish their personal 
social capital. By doing this, institutional entrepreneurs can use this personal social 
capital to explore opportunities and motivate other companies to engage in the project 
of change. They can also use core employees to frame and promote new technologies. I 
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will further discuss the role of human resource management in terms of core employees 
and personal social capital in Chapter 8.
Finally, when I discuss issues of power and legitimacy, I will discuss the ways in which 
their influence affects the relationship between them. My Japanese interviewee told me 
that these three masters ensured that the BD standard was rapidly adopted by engineers 
in other companies, because these other engineers had personal relationships with the 
masters. The opinions of these engineers may  have influenced the decisions of their 
companies in their standard war. If they have organizational social capital, the power 
and legitimacy held by institutional entrepreneurs can easily  lead to collective action. If 
they  have also effective structural social capital, institutional entrepreneurs can easily 
accumulate power and legitimacy  using collective action and discursive activities. This 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. In general, the study  aims to propose a 
new category, which not evident in the literature review for standard wars and 
institutional entrepreneurship.
Table 7.7 Additional Findings Concerning Discursive Activity and Institutional 
Entrepreneur’s Core Employees
Findings from 
Discursive activities
Findings
Discursive activities lead 
to strengthening 
institutional 
entrepreneur’s power 
and legitimacy. 
1. Especially, using critical stakeholder’s words, this 
information conveys the additional message that 
institutional entrepreneurs had more connections and areas 
of cooperation with importance companies. Its power can 
be grew further. 
2. Equally, it shows another message to the audience that the 
institutional entrepreneurs had researched and developed 
more patents and technologies to make the standard 
stronger. 
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Findings from 
Discursive activities
Findings
Discursive activities lead 
to increasing network 
effects and product 
performance. 
The institutional entrepreneurs can increase network effects 
and product performance of standard by promoting the 
standard and critical stakeholders’ signals. 
Interaction effects exist 
between discursive 
activities and collective 
action. 
1. In this standard war, institutional entrepreneurs promoted 
the performance of collective actions to the audiences by 
using discursive activities. 
2. By using the activities, institutional entrepreneurs can 
present unified messages which answer the criticisms and 
suspicions of their audience. In turn, they can motivate 
other prospective companies to engage in the changing 
project. 
The effect of human 
resource management on 
core employees lead to 
their social capital then 
lead to collective 
actions. 
Institutional entrepreneurs should nurture their high value 
and unique employees (core employees) to actively promote 
new technologies. Institutional entrepreneurs should also 
assist these employees to establish their personal social 
capital. Then, they can use this social capital to explore 
opportunities and motivate other companies to engage in the 
project of change. 
Source: Author
7.3. 2006-2008, Marketing War
In general, both camps launched the new disc players and other products associated 
with the new standards in markets and put much more efforts on seeking exclusive 
supports from their critical stakeholders. Many product  development activities were 
completed at the moment. Rather than prospective organizations, both camps tried to 
convince consumers to adopt the new products and relevant complementary  products in 
order to increase the network effects of the new standards. 
According to the conceptual framework, this study expects that product performance 
will positively  lead to network effects in standard wars. However, because of data 
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limitation, the detailed market numbers, such as the sale amount of the new disc players, 
game consoles, and etc., the study  can not confirm the causal relationships between 
product performance and network effects. 
7.3.1. Product Performance
In a standard war, product performance is defined as the way in which the technical 
quality and price of a product are developed by institutional entrepreneurs and must 
satisfy stakeholders and customers. According to this definition, product performance is 
decided by institutional entrepreneurs and their partners in a standard war, and is both 
stakeholder-oriented and customer-oriented. In other words, a good product  should 
satisfy the requirements of both parties. I collected the information used in this section 
from media reports and from Datamonitor.
As discussed in the previous sections, Sony and Toshiba both had strategies for product 
performance. Firstly, both firms used blue-laser technology to develop the BD and HD 
DVD standards. In order to save production costs and to shorten the production line 
from DVD to the HD DVD standard, the substrate layer used by Toshiba was not as thin 
as that of the BD standard. Although this decision resulted in a straightforward upgrade 
to the production line, it  also resulted in a sacrifice of capacity. In contrast, Sony used a 
thinner substrate layer to produce the BD standard. Although the BD production line 
could not be upgraded in the same way, the capacity of the BD standard was greater 
than that of the HD DVD. As a result, capacity and production costs were the two main 
issues in the framing, promoting, debating and undermining strategies of both camps 
which they used throughout the standard war as part of their discursive activities.
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Secondly, Toshiba claimed that the HD DVD players had backward compatibility  with 
DVDs. This strategy had a great deal of support from Hollywood studios at the 
beginning of the standard war. In contrast, Sony  did not promote the compatibility  of 
disc players but of games consoles. In other words, the PS3 was not only compatible 
with BD players but also with PS2 game softwares. The aim was to utilize the installed 
base of the PS227  and then rapidly to increase the economic scale of BD players by 
using network effects.
Thirdly, copyright protection was the most important issue in this standard war. Sony 
used this issue to successfully win the attention of Hollywood studios, and attract their 
support for the BD standard. In contrast, Toshiba’s strategy was to attract the support of 
end users. This was because, for customers, allowing disc content to be copied onto PCs 
was a easier and cheaper way for customers to share this content.
Fourthly, Sony and Toshiba had different pricing strategies in this standard war. Toshiba 
used a lower price strategy in an attempt to rapidly increase the economic scale of the 
HD DVD players, a strategy which was successful. HD DVD, however, used a higher 
priced games console, the Microsoft  Xbox 360. Toshiba and Microsoft did not combine 
the HD DVD and Xbox 360, but used HD DVD players as an add-on. Customers had to 
buy additional HD DVD players and plug the Xbox 360 into them. In contrast, although 
Sony decided to use a higher price to promote the BD players, the PS3 was perfectly 
integrated with them. As a result, the market share of BD disc players, including that of 
the PS3, was greater than that of the HD DVD disc players. Table 7.5 gives this 
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27 Due to the huge installed base on PS2, all PS3 module support for PS2 backward compatibility. 
information in detail, in order to clearly demonstrate the differences between PS3 and 
Xbox 360.
In this standard war, Microsoft priced the HD DVD drive at just $199 (see Table 7.5). 
This pricing strategy was mistaken. The 20GB version of the PS3 was priced at  $499, 
whereas the equivalent version of Microsoft’s Xbox was priced at  $399. In other words, 
if consumers wanted to purchase a Xbox 360 with an HD DVD drive, they would have 
had to pay almost $600. Moreover, the Xbox 360’s WiFi adapter is optional, but the 
equivalent adapter is integrated into the PS3. As the report does not give the price of the 
adapter for the Xbox 360 ,the final price could be even higher than $599. The combined 
result of these strategies was to make consumers choose the PS3, because of its better 
price and value. 
Table 7.8 Comparison between Sony PS3 and Microsoft Xbox 360
Hardware Connectivity DVD Games Cost
Sony PS3 20GB Version
Bluetooth 2.0, an 
Ethernet port 
and four USB 
docks
Integrated BD 
player
Backwards 
compatible with 
DVD
In 2007, 50 
games are 
expected to be 
available by the 
end of the year
20 GB version
$499
60 GB version
$599
Microsoft
Xbox 360
Option to 
purchase WiFi 
adapter
Core version:
Three USB 
docks, Ethernet 
port
20GB version:
Wireless 
controllers
DVD player
Additional HD 
DVD drive 
available for 
$199
c130 titles with 
c.65 of those 
available for 
Xbox Live Multi 
play
Backwards 
compatible
Core version
$299
20 GB version
$399
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Sources: Business Insight, Datamonitor
However, this evidence does not show why Microsoft used this pricing strategy, and 
why Toshiba and Microsoft decided that their games console should not be directly 
integrated with the HD DVD player. This decision clearly  gave Sony and the BD camp 
another chance to increase the size of the market for the BD standard. As a result, the 
PS3 can be seen as a Trojan horse in this standard war. Additionally, its predecessor, the 
PS2, had a considerable installed base. Toshiba and Microsoft’s strategies could neither 
contain the growth of the PS3 nor increase the sales of the HD DVD standard. Although 
both camps used games consoles in order to promote their standards, therefore, different 
promoting strategy led to different outcomes in this standard war.
As a result  of this, The Wall Street Journal reported in August 2007 that Toshiba had 
taken the lead in hardware sales, because of the lower price of HD DVD players 
(McBride, 2007). However, the BD standard had taken a big lead in sales of film titles, 
because of the PS3 and because it had gained widespread support from Hollywood 
studios.
Except for the price performance, Sony and Toshiba struggled for the other 
performance, including capacity, copyright protection, backward compatibility, and 
video and audio. The capacity and copyright protection performance have been 
discussed in the foregoing sections. In general, the BD standard has better performance 
on copyright protection and capacity. The HD DVD standard has better backward 
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compatibility performance. Both BD and HD DVD have similar performance on video 
and audio. 
All HD DVD players are backward compatible with DVD and CD. Essentially, because 
of the structure of the single-lens optical head, both red (the basic technology of DVD 
standard) and blue laser (the basic technology of BD and HD DVD standards) diodes 
can be used in smaller, more compact HD DVD players. However, this optical head 
constrains the capacity of the HD DVD standard. Because, the red laser needs thick 
substrate layer to store data. In order to account for backward compatibility, the HD 
DVD standard used more thick layer than the BD standard. Thus, the standard can also 
read DVD discs. In other words, primary specification of HD DVD standard constrains 
its capacity. However, the HD DVD standard can provide full backward compatibility. 
On the aspect of audio and video quality, both standards allow various technologies to 
provide better result. Both BD and HD DVD standard have similar audio quality. Sony’s 
first BD disc player did not provide HDMI technology but Full HD 1080p. However, 
basically, customer’s AV receiver (like TV) should support 1920x1080 pixels. 
Otherwise, customers can not enjoy the best quality of video. 
In general, this study has demonstrated that the product performance in this standard 
war was mainly  driven by collective action and discursive activities. This was because 
the specifications of the products (their capacity, compatibility, production costs, video 
and audio quality and copyright protection systems) were developed and theorized 
collaboratively, while the pricing strategies for disc players and game consoles were 
also decided by the BDA and the DVD Forum. Moreover, institutional entrepreneurs 
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used various discursive activities to frame, promote, undermine and debate their own 
advantages and disadvantages of their rivals. In this standard war, Sony successfully 
convinced many Hollywood studios that the capacity  and copyright protection of the 
BD standard were better than those of the HD DVD standard. The price of the PS3 was 
also cheaper than that of the Microsoft Xbox 360, when it was part of a combined 
product. Besides, the study  suggests that both standards provide very  similar video and 
audio quality. Although the HD DVD standard is compatible with DVD discs, it 
sacrifices its storage capacity. In this way, the effective product performance (capacity, 
copyright protection and price) of the BD standard led to greater network effects. The 
evidence for this will be discussed in the next section, on network effects.
Table 7.9 Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s Actions in Product 
Performance
Product performance Sony Toshiba
Using blue-laser technology Yes Yes
Backward compatibility No (BD players)
Yes (PS3)
Yes (both HD DVD players 
and Xbox 360)
Copyright protection Yes (AACS and BD+) Yes (AACS)
Price High price on BD players
Low price on game console
Low price on HD DVD 
players
High price on game console
Capacity High Low
Production costs High Low
Source: Author
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7.3.2. Network Effects
‘Network effects’ are defined as the effects that one user of a product or service has on 
the value of that product or service for other people. In this standard war, the network 
effects of disc players came from complementary products, such as film titles and game 
consoles. This variable shows once again why Hollywood studios and games consoles 
played such critical roles in the standard war. I collected the data for this section from 
Euromonitor. However, the database only  provides the data from 2005 and the duration 
of standard war is from 2002 to 2008. That is why I only  compare the data from 2005 to 
2008. 
At the very start of this standard war, Hollywood studios were seen as critical 
stakeholders. This was because widespread support from Hollywood studios had been a 
critical factor in the victory of JVC VHS in that earlier standard war. Moreover, in order 
to strengthen their product performance, Sony and Toshiba deliberately  invited leading 
consumer electronic manufacturers, who were their critical stakeholders, to join them in 
their collaborations. In order to successfully generate these network effects, both camps 
used collective action and discursive activities to motivate critical stakeholders to join 
their collaborations, manage them as symbiotic members, use their comments to 
endorse the standards, and argue against  market suspicions in order to strengthen their 
commitment to the standards. This is the reason why Toshiba gave financial incentives 
to Paramount and DreamWorks to persuade them to back the HD DVD standard instead 
of the BD standard.
310
On the other hand, both camps also used game consoles to promote the standard, as 
games consoles produce their own network effects through their use of gaming 
software. Furthermore, the installed base of games consoles provided a good platform, 
paving the way for the disc players. As I mentioned in my section on the history of 
Sony, when the PS2 was released, it  contained a DVD player as well as upgraded music 
and video features. By 2006, Sony had sold 100 million games consoles and 1 billion 
units of gaming software. As long as gamers wanted to upgrade to the PS3, millions of 
PS3s would seed the market for BD players, providing huge economies of scale and 
performance for Hollywood studios, which are typically reluctant to back two rival 
standards. Furthermore, since the advent of the PS2, Sony’s game consoles have had 
internet capability. Sony needed the PS3 if it  was to maintain its dominance of the game 
console industry, as well as in the emerging market for internet video downloads (The 
Economist, 2006). From the moment Sony unveiled the PS3, on 17 November 2006, all 
its models have had built-in BD players. The 20GB model did not have a Wi-Fi 
connection, although the 60GB model did. The aim of this was to enable all users to 
experience the high-definition quality of BD. This was important because pre-teens 
(aged 7-12) and teenagers (aged 13-19) are the most important consumers of games 
consoles. Sony  can enable these users to experience the BD standard with the 20GB 
model. However, with the 60GB, Sony could reach adult purchasers with deeper 
pockets, who could buy videos, films and other complementary products online.
Thus, three months after the launch of the BDP-S1, Sony launched the PS3, the weapon 
which would generate the real network effects of the BD. Two months after the launch 
of the PS3, on 9 January  2007, the BDA announced their figures and the result of their 
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customer survey on their official website 28 . According to this information, the PS3 had 
successfully  seeded BD players into customers’ homes and had became the main movie 
players in their homes (Ramstad & McBride, 2007).
Furthermore, information on the Euromonitor database suggests that the PS3 may be 
successfully  exploiting users of adult video games. The 60GB model allows Sony to 
successfully  target those customers with enough money to enable them to buy the PS3 
and also download complementary  products from Hollywood studios and other content 
providers.
Table 7.10. U.S. Video Gaming Population in 2005 to 2008 (%)
Age Group 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total population playing video games 50.7 50.2 57.1 59.5
Pre-teens (aged 7-12) playing video games 84.6 85.6 87.6 87.6
Teenagers (aged 13-19) playing video games 84.1 85.1 86.6 87.6
Adults (aged over 20) playing video games 45.0 44.0 53.0 56.0
Source: Euromonitor
Table 7.10. shows that teenagers and pre-teens are the main consumers of video games 
consoles. Furthermore, the table also answers the question of why the number of adult 
users increased markedly in 2007. They may have had more money than people aged 
under 20, and so Sony’s 60GB version became the home entertainment centre for this 
group.
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28 More information is available at: http://www.blu-ray.com/news/?id=117
However, we cannot ignore another factor, the Nintendo Wii, as this product introduces 
a new way of playing video games, and has been seen as allowing the industry to 
exploit an entirely  new market. However, as the database does not provide figures for 
the market  of each game consoles, I cannot give exact sales numbers and user profiles 
for either the Xbox 360 or the PS3.
As well as investigating the population of video gamers, this study explored the 
database further and compared the market numbers and statistics of PCs and video 
players. After both camps launched their disc players into the US market in 2006, the 
size of the market for video players per household grew from $17.9 to $19.5 in 2006 but 
fell to $15.4 in 2007, and $15.6 in 2008. Similarly, in the computer market, market  size 
per household grew from $176.9 to $175.1 in 2006 and grew again to $182.3 in 
2007 ,but fell back to $178.8 in 2008. However, the market size per household in the 
video games market grew from $95.4 to $111.3 in 2006, and to $155.1 in 2007, 
reaching $177.2 in 2008. This was mainly because Nintendo, Microsoft, and Sony 
launched their new game consoles in the US market in 2007, and so the numbers sold 
per household greatly increased (see Table 7.11.).
Table 7.11. U.S. Market Size of PC, Video Players, and Video Games in 2005 to 
2008 
(US$ per household)
Products 2005 2006 2007 2008
Computers 176.9 175.1 182.3 178.8
Video Players 17.9 19.5 15.4 15.6
Video Games 95.4 111.3 115.1 177.2
Video Games Hardware 37.3 50.1 75.5 84.4
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Table 7.11. U.S. Market Size of PC, Video Players, and Video Games in 2005 to 
2008 
(US$ per household)
Video Games Software 58.1 61.2 79.5 92.9
Source: Euromonitor
According to this per household table, although PCs also received a boost in 2007, the 
rate of growth was not  bigger than that  for video games hardware. The reason for this is 
that Microsoft’s new operating system, Vista, did not greatly  increase the market. This 
software system did not encourage many customers to buy new PCs. Using Microsoft’s 
operating systems to seed the HD DVD players was not, therefore, a successful action 
in this standard war (see Table 7.12.).
Table 7.12. The Yearly Growth Rate in PC, Video players, Video Games in the 
U.S. Market (%)
Products 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8
Computers -0.1 5.6 -0.8
Video Players 10.1 -19.7 1.9
Video Games 17.7 41.3 15.5
Video Games Hardware 35.6 52.9 12.9
Video Games Software 6.3 31.7 18.0
Source: Euromonitor
According to this table, the yearly growth rate for video games is more than that for 
computers and video players. In particular the yearly  growth rate of video players in 
2006-07 was –19%. The reasons for is that Wii, Xbox 360, and PS3 were all launched in 
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2006. They not only increased the overall sales figures for video, but also eroded the 
market of some existing video players. In order to prove the theory, I will further 
explore the U.S. customer’s expenditure in the relevant category in Table 7.13.
Table 7.13.
Expenditure by U.S. Consumers on Audio-Visual, Photographic, Information 
Processing, Other Recreational Items and Equipment, Gardens and Pets, 
2005 – 2008 ($)
Categories 2005 2006 2007 2008
Audio-visual, Photographic and Information 
Processing Equipment
2,277.2 2,398.0 2,486.8 2,491.5
Other Recreational Items and Equipment, 
Gardens and Pets
1,696.6 1,795.8 1,874.4 1,897.1
Source: Euromonitor
According to the definition in the database, spending on equipment for the reception, 
recording and reproduction of sound and pictures is part of the category  designated as 
‘consumer expenditure on audio-visual, photographic and information processing 
equipment.’ ‘Consumer expenditure on other recreational items and equipment, gardens 
and pets’ includes spending on video players and video gaming hardware and software. 
This table of expenditure shows that customers in the US have fixed expenditure in 
these two categories. It also shows that  Microsoft’s new operating system, Vista, did not 
boost the market very much. This software system did not make many customers buy 
new PCs. This shows that using Microsoft’s operating systems to seed the HD DVD 
players was not a successful action in this standard war.
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As a result, this study can confirm that institutional entrepreneurs use their power and 
legitimacy  by  performing collective actions and discursive activities to motivate and 
manage stakeholders, and to theorize and develop the specifications of their products in 
collaborations. At the same time, they also use discursive activities to promote their 
products, and to defend themselves against the accusations of rivals and stakeholders. In 
this way, product performance satisfies their stakeholders. All of these actions result in 
increased network effects.
Table 7.14. Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s actions in Network Effect
Network effects Sony Toshiba
Using Hollywood studios’ 
pre-recorded content to 
generate network effects
Yes Yes
Using game consoles to 
promote the standard
PS3 Xbox 360
Using PC operating system 
to promote the standard
No Yes, but Vista did not boost 
the market very much. 
Source: Author
7.3.3. Critical Stakeholders Management Capabilities: Seeking Exclusive Support
The institutional entrepreneurs’ collective action and discursive activities are continuous 
in the standard war. Although the study discusses the most of the relevant activities in 
the second phase, the study distills some specific practices (seeking exclusive support 
and giving incentives), which can be categorized into critical stakeholders management 
capabilities. Because, the institutional entrepreneurs only used these practices to the 
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critical stakeholders, who are capable of providing considerable functional and 
symbolic resources to the institutional entrepreneurs. 
The term ‘seeking exclusive support’ can be seen as a process of seeking the exclusive 
support of critical stakeholders in standard wars. Having exclusive support means that 
content providers will only  produce complementary products to a specific standard then 
the standard can steadily increase the network effects of economic scale by using 
complementary  products. Before the joint announcement by Microsoft and Toshiba, 
Hollywood studios’ support to the HD DVD standard was inclusive, even though 
different Hollywood studios had separately joined both parties. After the Microsoft 
event, Paramount announced that they would end their exclusive support of the HD 
DVD standard (Edwards, et al., 2005). On 21 October 2005, the New York Times also 
reported that Warner Brothers had announced that they had ended their exclusive 
support of the HD DVD camp and were now inclusively supporting the BD camp 
(Belson, 2005).
Before the studios made their announcement, Paramount, Warner Brothers and 
Universal had all exclusively supported the HD DVD standard, and controlled 45% of 
the market for that generation of discs (Belson, 2005). On the other hand, those studios 
that were in the BD camp (Lionsgate, Sony Pictures, Disney, and 20th Century  Fox) 
held about 45% of the US DVD market. Indeed, if MGM’s film library was included in 
the figures for the BD camp 29, it  held almost  50% of the DVD market. In this way, the 
announcement from Paramount and Warner Brothers put pressure on the HD DVD 
317
29  In 1989, Sony acquired the American film and television production company Columbia Pictures for 
US$3.4 billion. The company was renamed Sony Pictures Entertainment in 1991. In 2004, MGM was 
purchased by a group led by Sony. According to media reports, by buying MGM's studio and its film 
library, Sony was trying to move the long battle over the new DVD format in its direction (Belson & 
Sorkin, 2004).
camp. In other words, after the engagement of Windows in Toshiba camp, the HD DVD 
camp began to lose their advantage over the main providers of content in this standard 
war. 
7.3.4. Critical Stakeholders Management Capabilities: Giving Incentives 
The term ‘giving incentives’ is defined as a process in which tangible or intangible 
resources are used to attract the engagement of critical stakeholders. In August 2007, 
The Wall Street Journal reported that Paramount and DreamWorks had announced that 
they  had chosen the HD DVD standard instead of the BD. Paramount said explicitly 
that this was because they wanted to put  all their resources behind one format. In fact, 
Toshiba had offered huge financial incentives, such as marketing support and cash 
payments (McBride, 2007). The market share of the HD DVD standard’s disc players 
was better than that  of the BD players, because of its cheaper pricing strategy (McBride, 
2007). However, if sales figures for PS330  had been added to the market share for disc 
players, the BD standard was clearly far more successful than the HD DVD standard. 
Therefore, following the announcements from these two studios, Toshiba was left in no 
doubt that the network effects and product  performance of the HD DVD standard were 
far behind those of the BD standard. It did not intend to surrender so easily, however, 
and used a strategy to win back the commitment of these two critical stakeholders.
According to the reports of the journalist, Sony also developed incentives to encourage 
critical stakeholders to join the BD camp. This journalist  claimed that at the very 
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30 ‘PS3’ is the official abbreviation of PlayStation 3. This is the third home video game console produced 
by Sony Computer Entertainment and the successor to the PS2 as part of the PS series. The PS3 competes 
with the Microsoft Xbox 360 and the Nintendo Wii, as part of the seventh generation of video game 
consoles. In order to successfully promote the BD standard, Sony included it in the PS3. In other words, 
consumers can use the PS3 to watch BD discs.
beginning of the collaboration, Sony gave a percentage of future royalties to founder 
companies as an incentive. In this way, even institutional entrepreneurs could offer as an 
inducement a share of future sales, rather than money upfront.
Although the example proposed in seeking exclusive support practice was happened in 
2005, logically, the practice is the goal of critical stakeholder management capabilities. 
In the standard war, both institutional entrepreneurs understood the critical 
stakeholders’ expectations and responded their requirements in order to their exclusive 
support. Although these two practices were continuous throughout the standard war, 
discussing them in the final phase, the study can further highlight the importance of 
critical stakeholder management capabilities in the standard war. 
To summarize, this study  has shown that the management of critical stakeholders is 
important in institutional entrepreneurship. Its findings have also described the process 
through which institutional entrepreneurs can successfully persuade critical 
stakeholders. Moreover, this study has also determined that the traditional definition of 
stakeholders (e.g. Mitchell et  al., 1997) may  not be appropriate in this context. In this 
way, the dataset and analysis show that a new typology of stakeholder is emerging in the 
form of the institutional entrepreneur. 
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Table 7.15. Comparison between Sony and Toshiba’s Actions in Critical 
Stakeholder Management Capabilities
Critical stakeholder 
management capabilities
Sony Toshiba
Understanding expectations 1. Focused on practicing 
copyright protection 
mechanism for BD. 
1. Focused on practicing 
cheap manufacturing 
process for HD DVD. 
Responding to requirements 1. Including AACS, Sony 
further developed BD+ to 
BD standard. 
1. Only adopted AACS as 
the copyright protection 
mechanism. 
2. Further announced that 
the standard would open 
copy system to users. 
Seeking exclusive support 1. Increasing Hollywood 
studios’ support to 45%, 
either inclusively or 
exclusively. 
1. By using cheaper 
production costs, before 
Microsoft’s engagement, 
Toshiba held certain 
Hollywood studios’ 
support in US market 
(45%). 
Giving incentives 1. According to the 
journalist’s opinion, Sony 
gave a percentage of 
future royalties to founder 
companies as an 
incentive.  
1. Toshiba gave huge 
financial incentives to 
Paramount and 
DreamWorks for their 
exclusive support. 
Source: Author
7.4. Additional Findings of Data Analysis
Except human resource management on core employees and their personal social capital 
discussed in the foregoing sections, this study further figure out one new category: 
media influence. In the literature review, Freeman (1984) does not pay much attention 
to media, even though he recognizes that the media is a stakeholders in the business 
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environment. He claims that the media represents a form of external change for 
managers who wish to succeed in the current environment. Furthermore, studies of 
relevant standard wars and of institutional entrepreneurship, also do not pay attention to 
the role of media influence.
Apart from routine reports, the media also analyzes the strategies of companies and 
reviews their products, action which form part of a standard war. A journalist’s analysis 
of the competing standards may influence the perceptions and interpretations of the 
audience. In addition, the media influences the relationship between institutional 
entrepreneurship  in standard wars and its network effects and its product performance. 
The media may also intervene in the relationship between the resources of institutional 
entrepreneurs and institutional entrepreneurship  itself in a standard war. In this way, the 
media is not directly involved in standard wars but  has the power to influence them, 
because it can influence the interpretation and perception of their audience. 
In a sense, the media does not have a direct stake in standard wars. They  have no 
interest in and cannot directly influence the institutional entrepreneur’s R&D activities 
and their marketing and promoting actions. On the other hand, institutional 
entrepreneurs are eager to tap into media power in their discursive activities. The media 
has to stand in a neutral position in their daily news reports. Excluding commentaries 
(editorials, columns, reviews, and so forth), the media has to balance their stories to 
report both voices. However, CEOs and top executives can actively influence the 
behavior of information intermediaries and other external constituents by  engaging in 
interpersonal processes toward influencing journalists (Westphal & Deephouse, 2010). 
Drawing on social exchange perspective, when someone receives a personal favor, he or 
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she feels socially obligated to return it (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Further, the 
perspective indicates that  reciprocity  has affective basis. Hence, CEOs and top 
executives can motivate positive affect by means of interaction with journalists. People 
tend to feel gratitude toward those who provide them with socio-emotional benefits 
(Flynn, 2005). On the other hand, reciprocity has an instrumental basis. The 
instrumental basis for reciprocity is to increase the likelihood of receiving benefits in 
future interactions. For instance, top managers can use the firm’s advertising budget to 
influence journalists who can do some favors for the firm in the future. Hence, the use 
of advertising budgets can be viewed as a strategy to influence media reports. Hence, 
drawing on the instrumental basis, Top managers can properly use their media budget to 
provide favors to in an instrumentally  motivated effort to influence the way the various 
events in the standard war is being presented and interpreted in the media.
In general, using the original conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 5, this study has 
discovered several new categories, including ‘human resource management of core 
employees’, ‘the social capital of core employees’, and ‘media influence’. It also 
modifies the framework, including the relationship between collective action and 
discursive activities, and suggests that there is only weak evidence for the relationship 
between product performance and network effects. This will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8. New Theoretical Framework, Discussion, Limitations, and 
Future Research
In this chapter, the theory built  from the empirical data is presented in the form of a new 
theoretical framework. Following the data analysis, the topics of human resource 
management and social capital of core employees and the influence of the media are 
added to the original conceptual framework. The original framework is the main body 
of the new theoretical framework. The findings from the media reports and the 
interviews were used as means of elaborating the existing framework, apart from where 
this concerned the relationship between product performance and network effects. I 
attempted to do more research in the Euromonitor database to find other figures which 
could elaborate this relationship, but it proved impossible to do this.
According to the findings, the case study portrays Sony  as ‘heroic change 
agent’ (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) or overemphasizes 
Sony as a rationalistic changing agent. Indeed, the study  may give a concluding image 
of the successful institutional entrepreneur is easy to live up to. Today, in contrast, 
scholars are paying more attentions to the concept of institutional work, referring to the 
purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at  creating, maintaining, and 
disrupting institutions. Rather than a specific social actor, the concept suggests that 
every  social actor is capable of creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions in daily 
life. 
However, this study suggests that heroic agent is not capable of solving everything in 
institutional entrepreneurship. Firstly, even in a mature field, heroic agents may face 
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unexpected events and make mistakes at  all time. Because, they are human beings. 
Although they have bounded rationality, they still have knowledge and the capacity of 
reflexivity as well. They are capable of learning the new think from the experience and 
further adjusting their actions in the future. Thus, trial-and-error may happen to heroic 
agents in institutional entrepreneurship. Secondly, even a mature field has only one 
dominant institutional logic, it does not mean that the institutional logic could dominate 
everything. Otherwise, this study, the BD case using institutional entrepreneurship 
perspective, will not exist. Consequently, the key point should not be put eyes on 
whether or not Sony was a rationalistic or heroic agent in the standard war. Rather, the 
study suggests how institutional entrepreneur is capable of ‘shaping’ the outcome 
towards a success. 
I will firstly show how the findings elaborate the original conceptual framework in 
Section 8.1. More importantly, the section will directly answer the research questions 
proposed in Chapter 1. Section 8.2 presents the new theoretical framework, and 
demonstrate what I established on the basis of the original framework. I will then briefly 
present the new model. In the succeeding sub-sections, I will discuss the existing body 
of theoretical work concerning these ideas and connect it to the empirical data from this 
case. The following section (Section 8.3) has two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
discusses the analytical propositions of the study, while the second compares and 
contrasts it with existing studies, including studies of standard wars and institutional 
entrepreneurship. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this study. Finally, Section 8.5 
will discuss possible future studies. Based on the findings of this study, I propose that 
studying the changing practices of institutional entrepreneurs using a configurational 
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approach, and studying the role of social capital in institutional change processes both 
have potential for future research.
8.1. The Response to the Research Questions
By using critical stakeholders management capabilities, collaboration structuring 
capabilities and discursive activities, yes, organizations may defeat its competitors in 
standard wars. The findings show that the power and legitimacy of institutional 
entrepreneurs can be viewed as important resources in the implementation of standard 
wars. In the literature review, I suggest that institutional entrepreneurs gain a certain 
amount of power and legitimacy as a result of having crucial positions in networks and 
social relationships. Further, I suggest  that effective power and legitimacy  lead to the 
collective actions and discursive activities of institutional entrepreneurs. Both Sony and 
Toshiba chose critical stakeholders in order to motivate other prospective organizations 
to engage in their projects. For this reason, they adopted the same partner selection 
strategies. Geringer (1988) suggests that the optimal partner in collaborations should be 
comparable in sophistication, be of a similar size, and have goals which fit  with those of 
institutional entrepreneurs. The findings show that both Sony and Toshiba put a great 
deal of effort into attracting such critical stakeholders to join their camps.
This study  also establishes that  several constructs lead to the collective actions and 
discursive activities of institutional entrepreneurs. These constructs are: networking 
with critical stakeholders and core employees, experience of previous standard war, 
main business segments of critical stakeholders, and performance of star products of 
institutional entrepreneurs. Comparing Sony’s and Toshiba’s strategies shows that their 
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different levels of power and legitimacy contributed to the outcome of the standard war. 
In other words, Sony may successfully convince critical stakeholders and prospective 
organizations to engage in the BD camp. Sony had also valuable experience of previous 
standard wars, even though it had lost  those wars. Although Sony had a strong position 
in the relevant industries and strong support (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), other 
prospective organizations initially ignored the importance and influence of the BD 
standard, and chose to support Toshiba’s HD DVD standard. 
In contrast, Toshiba had also strong support (from the DVD Forum), similar experience 
of previous standard wars, and an established position in the relevant industries. 
However, it  failed to make the audience believe that the HD DVD standard was better. 
Thus, although it had first mover advantage, Toshiba was defeated in this standard war. 
This study show how the institutional entrepreneur can use its resources of power and 
legitimacy to enact efficient collective actions and discursive activities.
Following the previous section, this study shows how collective action (critical 
stakeholders management and collaboration structuring capabilities) and discursive 
activities should be managed in a standard war. In general, yes, these findings also 
answer the three sub-research questions proposed in Chapter 1. 
This study  defines these activities as core concepts and as gaps in the existing studies of 
standard wars. By  reviewing the literature, I show that the role of stakeholder and the 
importance of critical stakeholder have been ignored. It  is a gap in standard war studies 
which needs to be filled. Following the literature review, I argue that the role of critical 
stakeholders should receive more attention in studies of institutional entrepreneurship 
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and standard wars. Institutional entrepreneurs need specialized practices (i.e. critical 
stakeholder management capability, including understanding expectations, responding 
to requirements, seeking exclusive support and giving incentives) to manage their 
relationships with their critical stakeholders. On the other hand, generalized practices 
(collaboration structuring capability, including the portfolio of institutional 
entrepreneurs, membership structures, R&D activities, organizing promotion, and 
frequent communication) are used by institutional entrepreneurs to manage collective 
actions involving all member organizations (including critical stakeholders). These 
include establishing membership  structures, assigning missions to different member 
organizations, establishing unambiguous discursive strategies and appointing 
spokespersons. Institutional entrepreneurs use these generalized practices to structure 
hierarchical collaborations in standard wars. Having collaborations with critical 
stakeholders as well as a large number of member organizations, institutional 
entrepreneurs use a hierarchical membership  structure to manage their actions and 
obligations. Both Sony and Toshiba established widespread collaborations in relation to 
research and development of the specifications of their new technologies. However, 
according to media reports, Sony had better outcomes in terms of R&D activities, 
promotion and internal communications than Toshiba. To summarize, this study not 
only fills a research gap  related to stakeholders and critical stakeholders but also 
proposes several practices for the management capability.
This study also highlights the strategies used by institutional entrepreneurs when 
managing discursive activities. This is another gap should be filled in the relevant 
studies. In Chapter 3, I used discursive activities to integrate the role of framing. 
Following the findings, I replaced the role of framing proposed by  social movement 
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studies with ‘framing’ in discursive activities, which are analyzed in this study. To some 
extent, the role of ‘framing’ strategies in this study replaces the diagnostic and 
prognostic framing proposed by previous works (e.g., Battilana et al., 2009; Markowitz, 
2007; Misangyi, et al., 2008). I identify four further strategies in standard wars: 
‘promoting’, ‘debating’, ‘undermining’, and ‘use of spokespersons’. These strategies 
further illustrate the ways in which institutional entrepreneurs devise and promote 
unified discourses and information to competing firms throughout standard wars. In this 
way, the lack of research into framing and discursive activities in the existing standard 
wars studies can be remedied.
In order to decrease information asymmetry, communicate information, and construct 
meanings for external groups, both Sony and Toshiba devised various discursive 
activities. Collective actions and discursive activities are interrelated, as is shown by 
information from the BDA. The BDA’s promotion committee and its spokespersons 
were responsible for initiating promotional strategies, and for constructing an 
unambiguous voice. In order to ensure that there was only ‘one voice’, the BOD of 
BDA had the right to review every single promotional strategy. From the limited 
available information about the HD DVD camp, it appears that the HD DVD camp did 
not have the same function in relation to its promotional committee and promotional 
sub-groups. Several events indicate that effective discursive activities were able to 
motivate prospective organizations which initially supported the HD DVD standard to 
change their minds, and also to increase the commitment of BDA members. The 
findings therefore show that discursive activities may facilitate the collective actions of 
institutional entrepreneurs. In addition, an outcome of Sony’s collective actions and 
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discursive activities was a further accumulation of their power and legitimacy that can 
be used in the standard war.
Finally, studies of standard wars and technology entrepreneurship emphasise efforts to 
increase network effects and improve product performance. In the literature review, I 
suggest that institutional entrepreneurs may  increase and enhance network effects and 
product performance by means of effective collective actions (including critical 
stakeholder management) and discursive activity. I originally proposed that effective 
product performance can lead to network effects. However, due to limitations in the 
data, I was unable to verify this causal relationship.
 
Existing standard war studies show that a specific new technology  can generate greater 
network effects by  having more member organizations which are capable of producing 
complementary  products. Furthermore, this study  suggests that effective collective 
actions (critical stakeholder management and collaboration structuring capabilities) may 
lead to better product performance which satisfies the requirements of critical 
stakeholders and the public (examples of this include BD standard’s copyright 
protection and the marketing war between Sony PS3 and Microsoft Xbox 360). 
Moreover, effective discursive activities in marketing campaigns can also lead to 
(perceived) better product performance. In this vein, the findings of this study match 
those of Suarez (2004) and of Kaplan and Tripsas (2008).
To summarize, yes, the research questions are answered by the findings in this study. 
Organizations may defeat their competitors in standard wars by  using critical 
stakeholders management and collaboration structuring capabilities (collective action) 
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and discursive activities. The study also suggests what practices should be used in the 
processes. The study figures out that collective action have inter-relationship with 
discursive activities. Hence, the findings also suggest that using discursive activities to 
external groups does not contradict with collective action but enhance the commitment 
of internal group members. They study  may not only respond the empirical findings of 
previous studies but also fill the research gaps (critical stakeholder management and 
discursive activities and their practices used in the process), although the relationship 
between product performance and network effects is not derived from the data. 
However, several new categories are based on the data. The next section integrates these 
new categories within the original framework and allows a new research-based 
theoretical framework to emerge.
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8.2. The New Theoretical Framework
Source: Author
Figure 8.1 illustrates the new theoretical framework which integrates new findings from 
the case study. The solid line represents the main findings from the original framework 
proposed in Chapter 5. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the study 
originally  proposed that product performance leads to network effects, although, due to 
data limitations, this relationship  could not be validated. The new framework therefore 
replaces the solid line with a dotted line. Chapter 5 also placed critical stakeholder 
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management and collective actions together in a dotted square. As a result of the data 
analysis, they  have been replaced by ‘critical stakeholder management capability’ and 
‘collaboration structuring capability’ (collective action). The dotted square is therefore 
replaced by  a solid square, showing that the roles of these concepts are confirmed by the 
case study.
The new framework integrates several additional findings. Firstly, human resource 
management of core employees may influence the collective actions of institutional 
entrepreneurs through the social capital of these employees. For institutional 
entrepreneurs, core employees are a source of organizational competitive advantage, 
and so institutional entrepreneurs should nurture them in their organizations. HR 
practices should help  them to establish their own social capital. In this way, institutional 
entrepreneurs can use their social connections to promote their new standards.
Secondly, the influence of the media may  intervene in the relationships between the 
actions of institutional entrepreneurs (collective action and discursive activities), their 
resources (power and legitimacy) and outcomes (network effects and product 
performance). The study suggests that media organizations are indirect stakeholders in 
standard wars. Their analyses and product reviews may influence the interpretations of 
the audience. In the following sections, I will discuss these new findings in detail.
8.2.1. Media Influence
In the context, media influence refers to situations in which the media uses its reports to 
directly  or indirectly influence the audience’s understanding and interpretations of a 
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specific event or artifact. Discursive activity, as defined in this study, on the other hand, 
refers to activities by the institutional entrepreneur which convey information to 
audience and influence their interpretations of their standards. In contrast, the media 
analyses and reports the actions of competitors and reviews their products. These 
reports may not be intended to be discursive activities which directly  influence the 
outcomes of standard wars. However, they do so indirectly by influencing the 
interpretations of the audience. Accordingly, they can be seen to intervene in the 
relationships between institutional entrepreneurship  and product performance, network 
effects and resources.
Media influence is categorised in studies of media effects. The tradition of media effects 
research occupies a highly  dominant and influential role within mainstream mass 
communications research. It  is unquestionably  the longest-running tradition within the 
field of audience studies (O’Neill, 2011). This section will briefly introduce the 
development of media effects research.
The research tradition originally focused on the impact of the mass media on society. It 
was represented historically  by the prevailing view of a powerful media which 
exercised direct and powerful effects on relatively powerless audiences. This approach 
assumed to some extent that the mass media were so powerful that they could insert 
their messages into the audience’s minds or that advertising messages could be precisely 
targeted at audiences like bullets.
The second phase of communication research opposed this idea of a powerful media 
and supported the notion that it had only limited or indirect effects. Katz and 
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Lazarsfeld’s (1955) Personal Influence was one of the most influential books in mass 
communication research. It proposed that the effects of the media are diffused through 
opinion leaders who explain and diffuse media content to others. This approach placed 
new emphasis on human agency in the process of media effects. Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955) claimed that the impact of the media was limited by key social actors within 
social networks who mediated the flow of information from it. In this way, the influence 
of the media is more likely to be one of reinforcement than of direct influence.
Following the two-step  flow theory, many different approaches to studying the effects 
of the media have been developed. Instrumental actualization (Kepplinger, Donsback, 
Brosius, & Staab, 1989) is one of these approaches. It is the first approach to explain the 
effect of journalists’ opinions on new content. The basic assumptions are that journalists 
hold their own opinions and share their values, and that journalists determine that most 
events have an inherent conflict-related valence. This means, they support one side 
against the other. Journalists continually use complementary approaches to news 
selection, such as gatekeeping, news factors and news values. Instrumental actualization 
is therefore one of the media’s roles in public life. Audiences rely on media to transform 
information about a considerable number of effects into a manageable number of media 
messages. This process determines not only which information is selected but  also the 
nature and content of messages, such as news (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009).
As the previous sections demonstrate, media such as television and the internet play  a 
critical role in directly influencing the minds of the audience. Their influence is also 
mediated by a nexus of factors, such as opinion formers (like leading users). In news 
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selection processes, journalists also decide which information should be presented to 
their audience.
In this study, I have established that critical stakeholders play a critical role in processes 
of institutional change. In contrast, the media can be viewed as indirect stakeholders, or, 
in other words, these stakeholders who interact with critical stakeholders and can 
influence the projects, even though they are not directly involved in them. They directly 
influence some perceptions of the audience, and also influence the minds of opinion 
formers. They influence other consumers through personal connections, and select 
particular messages which then become media messages. According to the stakeholder 
typology  proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997), indirect stakeholders do not  have enough 
legitimacy  to become involved in the standard war. They also, obviously, do not have 
any urgent requests for the institutional entrepreneurs.
Sony and their critical stakeholders had highly interdependent relationships. The PS3 
and BD standard served as a kind of platform for introducing game and movie titles to 
consumers. The focal firms could rapidly manufacture their products, ship  the disc 
players to stores and then increase the network effects. On the other hand, the media had 
indirect stakeholder relationships with focal firms. Their activities may not directly have 
affected the outcomes of the standard war. However, the media did intervene in the 
actions of focal firms. Intervening positively, they helped the focal firms to 
communicate information and construct  meanings to audience. However, they also may 
have generated negative impressions which were not approved by focal firms. For 
example, at  the end of the standard war, some media reported that the HD DVD player 
had been hacked. Media reports also influenced the perceptions of Time Warner 
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shareholders. This forced the firm to boost its DVD sales, and the CEO suggested that 
Warner Brothers should choose the BD standard over the HD DVD. For these reasons, 
the media are conceptualized in this study as indirect stakeholders which may influence 
the processes of standard wars.
To summarize, the media may influence the audience in standard wars, where the 
audience includes critical stakeholders, member organizations, prospective consumers 
and competitors. In the new theoretical framework, the influence of the media is seen to 
intervene in the relationship between institutional entrepreneurs and the audience in 
standard wars.
8.2.2. Human Resource Management of Core Employees
This is another new finding in the study. However, it  is merely a tentative one. 
According to my Japanese interviewee, Sony, Panasonic, and Phillips have master 
engineers separately. The role of these engineers shows the importance of interpersonal 
network in the standard war. However, there are no media reports validating this point, 
and further interview with these engineers was not possible. Researching a PhD thesis is 
a learning process. Although there is no sufficient evidence to support the importance of 
the master engineers, due to my education background, I strongly  sense that this could 
be critical in standard wars. This study  suggests that  good human resource management 
(HRM) of core employees can help  them to create their own individual social capital 
which will benefit the collective actions of institutional entrepreneur. 
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The relevant HR practices are categorised as strategic human resource management 
(SHRM). It covers the HR strategies which are adopted by companies across their entire 
business, and attempts to measure their impacts on the firm’s performance, including 
financial and behavioral performance (Boxall, Purcell, & Wright, 2007). SHRM 
emphasizes human capital contributions, strategic capabilities and the competitive 
performance and advantages of an organization (Lengnick-Hall, Lengnick-Hall, 
Andrade & Drake, 2009, Barney, 1991). Apart from resource-based and human-capital 
views of the firm and its strategic contributions, Leana and Van Buren (1999) were the 
first researchers to explore the role of SHRM in creating social capital. They defined 
organizational social capital as a resource which reflects the character of social relations 
within the firm. For this reason, employment practices that promote stable relationships 
and strong norms create organizational social capital, which itself yields benefits. 
Further, Collins and Clark (2003) examined the social networks of senior management 
teams as sources of organizational competitive advantage in high technology firms. 
They  used a sample of 73 technology  firms, and their results supported their predicted 
relationships. The social networks of core employees mediate the relationship between 
HR practices and firm performance (sales growth and stock performance).
Firms can use core employees to obtain mutual investment and benefits by  using trust 
and relationships with external partners (Kang, Morris & Snell, 2007). In the case of the 
facilitators, the masters were core employees who possessed valuable and firm-specific 
human capital which provided the core knowledge base. The knowledge base is a 
primary source of competitiveness. The critical engineers provided the foundation for 
these firms’ core competencies (Grant, 1996). In this standard war, Sony  and the other 
facilitators exchanged new knowledge across organizational boundaries (Kang et al., 
337
2007).These knowledge flows may facilitate interorganizational learning by expanding, 
refining, and modifying the stocks of knowledge of the firms. 
The social capital of core employees facilitates institutional entrepreneurship within 
standard wars in at least three different ways. Firstly, the core employees may use their 
weak and non-redundant social ties (Granovetter, 1985) to obtain entrepreneurial 
opportunities by  means of identifying and utilizing novel information or knowledge 
from a variety of sources. Secondly, the relationships in which core employees are 
involved may become characterised by  dyadic trust, which refers specifically to trust 
between two parties who have direct experience of each other (Lewicki & Bunker, 
1996; Portes, 1998), Dyadic trust may  facilitate knowledge sharing and exchange with 
others who have had experiences with core employees or the focal firms. Finally, shared 
component knowledge, which refers to the knowledge of specific parts, rather than the 
whole (Henderson & Clark, 1990), allows core employees and their relational partners 
to better understand and interpret new knowledge.
Consequently, having HR practices towards core employees may be important. For 
example, Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) suggest that flexible work structures can help 
to facilitate diverse and transitory connections among core employees and their partners 
by using temporary project teams and assignments. Snell and Youndt (1995) suggest 
that firms can use result- or output-based systems to manage and reward the 
performance of these flexible work systems. This is because the activities of core 
employees may involve exploratory  and/or entrepreneurial actions. It is difficult to 
measure their performance using pragmatic routines and job outlines.
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To summarize, the study suggests that human resource management of core employees 
(eg. the three master engineers) can be extrapolated to form part of the emergent 
theoretical framework based on my theoretical sensitivity. By means of good human 
resource practices in relation to their core employees, organizations are more capable of 
using their connections with other engineers in other organizations to create value and 
exploratory learning capability, and to establish dyadic trust and common understanding 
of new technologies. In this way, individual social capital may be caused or stimulated 
by institutional entrepreneur’s HRM of core employees. 
8.3. The Conclusions of the Study
This section will present the conclusions of the study, and compare and contrast them 
with previous studies. Section 8.3.1 will outline the main conclusions of the study, 
giving four points which show how concepts from institutional entrepreneurship 
research can contribute to an understanding of how standard wars are won. Section 
8.3.2 will compare and contrast these conclusions with previous studies of standard 
wars and of institutional change.
8.3.1. Conclusions: Analytical Propositions
Based on the analysis and theoretical framework, this section will present several 
analytical propositions. They will suggest connections between two or more of this 
study’s critical concepts.
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1.The profiles of critical stakeholders change over time. Deliberately  selecting and 
coordinating critical stakeholders in collaborations may result  in positive outcomes 
for institutional entrepreneurs in standard wars.
In standard wars, the attributes of critical stakeholders may change over time. At an 
early stage, institutional entrepreneurs choose to cooperate with critical stakeholders 
with whom they have high relational closeness and collaborative R&D activities. At this 
stage, the basis, specifications and blueprints of new technologies are determined 
appropriately. Institutional entrepreneurs are able to use their existing achievements in 
these areas to persuade other critical stakeholders and prospective organizations that the 
new technologies they are developing are achievable and appropriate to their interests. 
At a later stage, when these new technologies are presented to the market, institutional 
entrepreneurs choose to cooperate intensively with critical stakeholders with 
complementary  products. At this stage, technical specifications are finalized. The main 
task is to promote the finished products to the markets as quickly  and in as large 
quantities as possible. In the BD-HD DVD case, disc players needed many 
complementary  products and services, so other stakeholders became critical at this 
stage. Content providers (such as Hollywood studios, game software developers and 
publishers), as well as retailers had stakes to Sony and Toshiba at this stage.
Thus, before they  engage in standard wars, institutional entrepreneurs have to decide 
which critical stakeholders to invite into their collaborations. The advantage of this is 
that these critical stakeholders are then able to express their expectations and exchange 
opinions about the development of new technologies within the collaboration. They 
gain an  understanding of each other’s requirements, and then achieve agreement. In 
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turn, the developers of specifications are more likely to turn these agreements into 
technical specifications. Manufacturers of complementary products are then willing to 
put more effort to producing such products.
Throughout this process, institutional entrepreneurs make efforts to secure the support 
of exclusive critical stakeholders. One of the ways of achieving this is to provide them 
with various incentives to reinforce their commitment. Institutional entrepreneurs may 
ideally  choose critical stakeholders who, to a certain extent, have prior relationships and 
mutual understanding. In this way, they can save time and other costs in terms of the 
development of new technological specifications.
In conclusion, this study indicates the importance of the ways in which institutional 
entrepreneurs manage their relationships with critical stakeholders. In the BD-HD DVD 
case, both Sony and Toshiba invited many critical stakeholders to engage in close 
collaborations and become symbiotic members. Both focal firms intended to engage 
these stakeholders in a process of shared common fate in this standard war. If such a 
process is successful, critical stakeholders may put more effort  into the standard war. On 
the other hand, institutional entrepreneurs may also suffer considerable loss in such 
processes. In this case, when Microsoft and Toshiba opened the copyright protection 
mechanism, the HD DVD camp lost some content providers. The news about the hacker 
also showed that the HD DVD standard could not provide effective copyright protection 
to content providers. It follows that if institutional entrepreneurs betray critical 
stakeholders or break their agreements with them, the cost could be considerable (Ford 
& Ford, 1995).
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2.Well-structured collaborations may result in positive outcomes for R&D activities 
of technical specifications and promotional campaigns in standard wars.
Institutional entrepreneurs use collaborations to manage the actions of members, such as 
critical stakeholders and other member organizations. Collaborations are capable not 
only of researching and developing technical specifications but also of promoting 
products in markets. Institutional entrepreneurs strive for symbiotic partnerships with 
critical stakeholders. They  have high levels of communication frequency, mutual trust, 
emotional intensity and reciprocal service (Granovetter, 1985). The number of general 
member organizations is much higher than the number of critical stakeholders. These 
members can further help the development of technical specifications and promotion of 
new products.
In order to sufficiently manage the actions of members and assign responsibilities and 
obligations to them, institutional entrepreneurs structure hierarchical collaborations. 
They  establish generalised (weak) ties with general members. General member 
organizations are connected to a concrete issue in a specific way. They generally follow 
strategies, rather than defining them, which is the responsibility of institutional 
entrepreneurs and critical stakeholders. However, they also have the right to contribute 
to action plans concerning the development new technologies, although these 
contributions must  be approved by the critical stakeholders. On the other hand, 
institutional entrepreneurs tend to have particularized (strong) ties with critical 
stakeholders. These ties involve routines, procedures, and structures that delineate who 
attends particular meetings and who can legitimately make decisions or speak on behalf 
of the collaborations (Hardy et al., 2005). Accordingly, the establishment of hierarchical 
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collaboration structures echoes the findings of network studies. Scholars suggest that a 
high-performing network structure often consists of a mixture of strong and weak ties 
(Uzzi, 1997; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).
In standard wars, collaborations are also capable of promoting products to markets. In 
consumer electronics industries, consumer adoption determines the degree of network 
effects of new technologies. The other aim of collaborations in standard wars is 
therefore to deliver unambiguous information to prospective organizations and 
consumers. This information gives prospective organizations a clear understanding of 
the development and content of the new technologies, while also giving consumers a 
favorable understanding of the value and advantages of new products. Collaborations 
are important for the development of promotion plans in order to increase adoption and 
network effects. Institutional entrepreneurs and their partners ensure that their 
promotional plans correspond to the content of new technologies. This is important in 
order to avoid presenting divergent information and constructing confused meanings of 
new technologies to prospective organizations.
3. Unambiguous information within collective actions and discursive activities may 
result in positive outcomes for the audience of the institutional entrepreneur.
In standard wars it is important that correspondence exists between the technical 
development of the standard and the activities which promote the standard to various 
audiences. Institutional entrepreneurs are capable of managing discursive activities. 
These activities communicate information about new technologies and construct their 
meanings to the audience, who may be internal group members or external groups. The 
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aim of these activities directed at external groups is to make them believe that the 
specific technologies or products are better than those of their competitors and, as a 
consequence, make them adopt or purchase products using the new standard. These 
activities take different forms. For instance, the term ‘undermining strategy’ refers to 
discourses which are intended, implicitly or explicitly, to erode or impede the base or 
foundation of a rival standard and collaboration. By using discourse activities, 
institutional entrepreneurs attempt to make the audience believe that their new 
technologies are better than those of their competitors. Institutional entrepreneurs tend 
to construct the evidence and then convey its hidden meanings to their audiences. On 
the other hand, the performance of discursive activities for internal group members is 
intended to enhance their commitment to collaborations. This study  suggests that the 
use of discursive activities aimed at external groups will also produce effects on internal 
group members. By using the media to convey  information, not only  external groups 
but also members of internal groups will observe the actions and policies of institutional 
entrepreneurs, and understand whether they  correspond with earlier ones. If this is not 
the case, they will reduce their commitment to their collaborations, and then devote 
fewer resources to the change projects.
It is therefore crucial for the institutional entrepreneur to ensure that its discursive 
activities present an unambiguous voice to all of the four groups that constitute its 
audience: its partners, the prospective organizations in the rival camp and other 
independent organizations, leading users and the general public. Firstly, this make it 
easier to increase the collaborative commitment of partner organizations who require a 
clear and credible understanding of performance, future prospects and other critical 
issues which relate to the future of the collaboration. Secondly, prospective 
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organizations are motivated to engage in the projects of the institutional entrepreneur 
when an unambiguous voice convinces them that the development and specifications of 
new technologies correspond well with their expectations. Thirdly, there is a greater 
chance that consumers are convinced to purchase a specific new technology  if they 
receive unambiguous information that the technology has a better product performance 
than those of its rivals.
To sum up, this study suggests that, in order to generate an unambiguous voice, 
institutional entrepreneurs must use discursive activities strategically to frame, promote 
and discuss their standards, and to undermine those of their rivals. In addition, 
institutional entrepreneurs should use skilled spokesmen to ensure an unambiguous 
voice in communications with other companies and markets. In the BD-HD DVD case, 
the spokesmen had a critical role in the standard war. This is because changing and 
influencing the interpretations of the audience are not easy tasks. Using skilled 
spokesmen to consistently express unified information throughout a standard war makes 
it more likely that the audience will interpret the meaning of the new technologies in 
this way.
4.The power and legitimacy  of an institutional entrepreneur result from the 
possession of strong positions in industrial networks and sufficient experience in 
standard wars. The outcomes of its collective actions and discursive activities may 
result in the accumulation of power and legitimacy.
When an institutional entrepreneur initiates change projects in its industries, its 
activities are more easily understood and appreciated by other organizations in the 
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relevant industries if its previous product performance is outstanding and if it is a leader 
in the relevant  business segments. Its previous performance and standing provide the 
institutional entrepreneur with power and legitimacy which can be utilized to gain the 
attention of prospective organizations and the media, and to establish collective actions 
and discursive activities.
This then make it  easier for the institutional entrepreneur to further accumulate power 
and legitimacy from other organizations. If they believe that  the new technologies 
match their expectations and interests, they  are more likely  to invest their own resources 
in the institutional entrepreneur’s change projects, to invest  in collaborative R&D 
activities with institutional entrepreneurs, express supportive opinions of specific new 
technologies, and so on. Such investments may further accumulate the power and 
legitimacy  of the institutional entrepreneur. If they have increased power and 
legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurs can further motivate other prospective 
organizations and critical stakeholders to engage in collaborations and establish 
discursive activities.
In the BD-HD DVD standard war, both Sony and Toshiba were leading companies in 
their industry. However, the findings of this case study do not necessarily  imply that 
organizations which have a less dominant position and less successful existing products 
in their industries will not be able to initiate and win standard wars. Such peripheral 
organizations often have a stronger economic interest than established firms in initiating 
an institutional change project  linked to a technological innovation (Garud et al., 2002; 
Haveman & Rao, 1997; Hirsch, 1986; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986). This study indicates that peripheral institutional 
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entrepreneurs need to establish institutional portfolios with other leading organizations 
in order to enhance their chances of success. By establishing connections with leading 
organizations, the peripheral institutional entrepreneurs are able to obtain a certain 
amount of power and legitimacy  by means of association and linkage (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008).
According to a Chinese proverb, ‘ if you know your enemy and yourself, you can fight a 
hundred battles without defeat’. Following this precept, firms should have a clear 
understanding of their advantages and those of their potential competitors before they 
initiate standard wars. These advantages include the history of the focal firm, its 
business segments, R&D strengths, and interactions with critical stakeholders. Such 
advantages are not easy  to imitate or find substitutes for (Barney, 1991). If they have 
such advantages, institutional entrepreneurs may easily gain the attention of critical 
stakeholders and the media. Furthermore, by understanding the advantages of potential 
competitors, institutional entrepreneurs may  be more able to predict the actions of their 
competitors. To some extent, a firm’s history and experience will affect its future 
strategies (Koch, 2011). An organization’s ability  to succeed relies on the particular 
form of strategic path which is inscribed within it. This path strengthens the importance 
of knowledge of the competitors’ history and position. 
8.3.2 Comparison of This Study with Previous Studies
The section 8.3.2 includes two sub-sections. The first section (8.3.2.1) will compare the 
study with previous studies of standard wars, and show how this standard war differed 
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from other major standard wars. Section 8.3.2.2 will compare this study with other 
institutional entrepreneurship studies.
8.3.2.1. Comparison with Previous Studies of Standard Wars
This section aims to concentrate on explaining the story  of the BD-HD DVD standard 
war, and how Sony was able to defeat Toshiba in this war. It will compare this standard 
war with other major standard wars and show how it differed from them. Generally 
speaking, collective action (BDA), network effects (PS3), and product performance 
(consumers and stakeholder-oriented), which previous standard wars studies have 
examined, were still important in the BD-HD DVD war. Compared to previous standard 
wars, this standard war demonstrates that Sony defeated Toshiba by doing the 
following: managing critical stakeholder groups (including Hollywood studios, retailers, 
PC companies, consumer electronic manufacturers, game developers and publishers), 
establishing a clear and hierarchical membership structure, creating a resilient portfolio 
by synthesizing relevant business segments with the standard and with disc players, 
cooperating with core employees, and taking the importance of discursive activities into 
account. These demonstrations appears the key assets of the key assets of standard wars. 
Firstly, the BDA presented a clear and hierarchical membership  structure in order to 
coordinate, cooperate, and manage the interests and opinions of its various stakeholders 
in a single collaboration. This led not only  to stronger and more consumer-oriented 
technical performance (eg. video and audio) but also better stakeholder-oriented criteria 
(eg. copyright protection, capacity and production costs). It  appears the importance of 
reputations in standard wars. Greenberg (2008) indicates clearly that collaborations and 
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product performance are the key areas in which VHS defeated Betamax. Hollywood 
studios chose the VHS standard over the Betamax standard because its greater capacity 
could decrease costs and save space for retailers. Echoing this point, the capacity of an 
optical storage device was also the critical issue in the BD case of BD. However, in the 
digital era, production costs and product price are less important than copyright 
protection. In the case of BD vs. HD DVD, although Toshiba’s low production costs 
attracted greater attention from stakeholders at the beginning, having a better copyright 
protection mechanism was ultimately more important for its stakeholders.
Secondly, the master engineers of Sony, Panasonic and Philips used their credibility  to 
demonstrate to other organizations the trustworthiness of the BD standard. It appears the 
importance of not only  reputation but also brand names in standard wars. In the VHS vs. 
Betamax case, collective action was the other critical factor which produced network 
effects (Greenberg, 2008; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). It clearly  demonstrates that an 
individual organization cannot beat its rivals without widespread support. This study 
further demonstrates that core employees can play critical roles in a standard war. In the 
BD case, three core employees, the master engineers, were instrumental in organizing 
collaborations which developed the primary  specification of the BD standard. Their 
actions further influenced the perceptions of other organizations that the BD standard 
was trustworthy.
Thirdly, Sony PS3 not only  generated widespread network effects but also synthesized 
BD players and other complementary  products (movie titles and game softwares). 
Previous standard wars studies have demonstrated the importance of network effects 
and how they  are linked to collaborations. It  appears the importance of controlling over 
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an installed based of consumers. For example, Clements and Ohashi (2005) suggest that 
many technological products exhibit network effects, in which the value of the product 
to customers increases with the total number of users. Their study of the U.S. video 
game market shows that establishing links with more games publishers and developers 
means that  more complementary  products (i.e. games softwares) can be produced and 
that network effects can then be produced in the market. According to Besen and Farrell 
(1994), network effects can be viewed as a demand-side economy of scale. This means 
that, since the purchase decisions of buyers are strongly  influenced by their forecasts of 
future sales, “there can be large rewards to affecting these expectations” (Besen & 
Farrell, 1994:118). Thus, in their viewpoint, an inferior product “may be able to defeat a 
superior one if it is widely expected to do so” (Besen & Farrell, 1994: 118). (See also 
Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1986, 1994; Krugman, 1991). Besen & 
Farrell also state that the main reason for the initial success of Microsoft’s MS-DOS 
was not any technical superiority, but rather that it was supported by IBM.
Fourthly, Sony  deliberately  created a group of critical stakeholders (Hollywood studios, 
retailers, PC companies, consumer electronics manufacturers) in this standard war. It 
appears the importances of intellectual property rights and ability  of continuous 
innovation in standard wars. Both Sony and Toshiba gave financial incentives to their 
critical stakeholders. These critical stakeholders possessed the physical and symbolic 
resources which Sony  needed. Having these symbiotic partners, Sony were able to 
rapidly theorize the specifications of the standard and promote the product to the market 
through the standard war. This study explicitly  discusses the role of critical stakeholders 
in the standard war. Other studies only cover this aspect implicitly, although they 
emphasise the importance of collective action. For instance, Garud et  al (2002) 
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document how Sun established a group  of stakeholders in the beginning of their 
standard war, but then kept openly inviting other companies to join the camp. For 
example, in 1995, they announced that their vendors’ alliance included IBM, Oracle, 
AT&T and Intel. At the end of 1996, their list of Java licensees had grown to over a 
hundred vendors. Although they did not establish a formal collaboration like the BDA, 
Java’s licensing mechanism continued to recruit more companies and independent 
developers to the Sun camp. In other words, Sun kept accumulating and enhancing the 
strength of its collective action strategies in this standard war.
Fifthly, Sony and Toshiba were both aware of the importance of discursive activities to 
both internal group  members and external groups. It appears the importance of 
communicating advantage in standard wars. In their standard war, both companies 
constructed clear meaning to their stakeholders step by step. Sony successfully used 
spokespersons to present an unambiguous voice to its audiences. The study shows that 
the media can be seen to intervene in the relationships between institutional 
entrepreneurship  and product performance, network effects and resources. As in the BD 
case, other studies also show the importance of discursive activity. For example, Munir 
and Philips (2005) stress the role of discursive activity in their study of ‘Kodak’s 
moment’. They view Kodak’s main achievement in its standard war as the way  they 
changed the meaning associated with the roll-film camera. Before Kodak introduced the 
camera in 1882, taking a photograph was a complex procedure. In the 19th century, it 
was a ‘professional’ activity  and an ‘upper class’ hobby. However, Kodak successfully 
linked the new standard with a new meaning for the camera. Firstly, they linked the 
camera with the meaning of ‘holiday’. Munir and Philips claim that in its discursive 
activities, the idea of vocation was transformed to the point where people reflexively 
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understood that ‘a holiday without a Kodak is a holiday wasted’ (p.1673). Secondly, 
they  broke the gender divide in photography, by using the camera to symbolize the 
modern, adventurous independent female who was soon to become the company’s 
central image. Finally, they linked the meaning of the camera with ‘family memory’, 
and successfully changed the public’s association of taking photographs from 
‘professional, male, and upper class’ activities’ to ‘holiday usage, family memory, and 
female can-do’. It was also true in the BD vs. HD DVD case that  discursive activities 
were crucial in the process of associating meanings with the new standards. Although 
this case did not produce as clear an advertising slogan as in the Kodak case, Sony and 
Toshiba clearly  constructed their own standards around the meanings of ‘cheaper to 
produce’ (HD DVD) and ‘safer to use’ (BD). As in the Kodak case, both Sony  and 
Toshiba constructed clear meanings to their stakeholders in a step-by-step way. They 
used many types of discursive activities when promoting their standards, undermining 
the alternative standards of their competitors, and discussing the advantages of their 
standards. The study also shows that the media can be seen to have intervened in the 
relationships between Sony  and Toshiba and their product performance, network effects 
and resources.
Sixthly, Sony was aware that they were creating a resilient product portfolio. It appears 
the importance of manufacturing capabilities and strength in complementary products in 
standard wars. The Sony BD standard shows that synthesizing different business 
segments which relate to a specific standard can provide value to both existing and 
prospective stakeholders. Sony has many  different business segments which relate to 
the BD standard. This study  sees their segments and their past experience of relevant 
standard wars as giving power and legitimacy. This study explicitly stresses that power 
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and legitimacy can be seen as resources and competitive advantages of institutional 
entrepreneurs. Leveraging competitive advantages enables a firm to expand, refine and 
modify  its strategies, thereby creating its dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997). This differs from previous studies of standard wars, as they  either do not mention 
the role played by these resources or only refer to it implicitly. The “war” metaphor is 
invoked to describe the competitive interactions between two or more rivals in the 
industry. In order to confront the dynamic environment of standard wars, focal firms 
may proactively leverage their competitive advantages in order to achieve their goals. 
For example, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) indicate that seeking legitimacy  is a 
critical aspect in processes of institutional change. Their study shows how a Big Five 
accounting firm used rhetorical strategies to seek legitimacy in its efforts to 
institutionalise a new organizational form, the multidisciplinary partnership. However, 
they  do not address the fact that effective discursive activity may  lead to accumulation 
of legitimacy. Furthermore, in their study, power is connected to the ability of actors to 
create new institutions by mobilizing resources, and accordingly, is difficult to observe 
directly. On the other hand, Lawrence (2008) stresses that the role of power can be 
observed when agents promote new practices and organizational forms, and standardize 
technologies. However, these studies only  stress implicitly  that power plays an essential 
role. In contrast, this study discusses explicitly  not only the ways in which effective 
power and legitimacy lead to collective action and discursive activity, but also how they 
can be increased by these actions.
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8.3.2.2. Previous Institutional Entrepreneurship Studies
The findings of this study also reflect many critical aspects of previous institutional 
entrepreneurship  studies. Firstly, the study generally echoes Seo and Creed’s (2002) 
view that human beings are reflexive and knowledgeable agents who are capable of 
initiating and implementing processes of institutional change when they are aware that 
current institutions generate contradictions. According to Seo & Creed, the praxis of 
institutional change has three components: (1) the self-awareness and/or critical 
understanding of social actors about institutional contradictions; (2) the motivation of 
actors’ collaborations through collective understanding of their situations; and (3) 
collective actions which change those institutions which have contradictions. As they 
are dependent on leverage of resources and discursive activity, institutional 
entrepreneurs can then use these resources and strategic actions to enhance and increase 
the strength of collaborations in processes of institutional change. All three of these 
components were clearly present in the Sony case.
Secondly, as in other studies of institutional entrepreneurship, communication was 
critical in the BD-HD DVD case. Both the Java case (Garud et al, 2002) and the Kodak 
case (Munir & Phillips, 2005) demonstrate the importance of changing the market’s 
understanding and cognition of standards. The current study suggests that institutional 
entrepreneurs should define the media as indirect stakeholders. According to Fligstein 
(2001), agenda setting is one of the critical skills of change agents, something which is 
echoed in this study, which shows that the institutional entrepreneur should be aware of 
the imprint effect of the media. Institutional entrepreneurs should possess sufficient 
skills to give the media positive information and then to influence the intentions of 
354
reports. Once such positive information is imprinted on the minds of journalists, it will 
be more likely  to appear frequently  in their reports. However, this study  also suggests 
that institutional entrepreneurs should be aware of the dark side of the imprint effect, as 
a result of which negative information can also frequently appear.
Thirdly, the study specifically  indicates that central players are more likely to become 
institutional entrepreneurs because of their experience and product segments. This is 
similar to Suddaby  and Greenwood (2005), and Greenwood and Suddaby (2006), who 
highlight the importance of legitimacy  for the institutionalisation of practices in the 
accounting industry. Their study suggests that central players are able to initiate their 
change projects in cost-saving ways because of the legitimacy and power they have 
accumulated in the field.
Fourthly, this study connotes that the connections of core employees may be critical in 
processes of institutional change. Many studies assert the importance of networks, in 
general terms, but ignore the role played by personal networks. This study found that 
the personal networks of core employees can help the focal firm to establish the primary 
specifications of its standard. Core employees can be seen as a source of an institutional 
entrepreneur’s competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). This shows that  HRM of core 
employees is crucial, as will be discussed later in this study.
Finally, this study proposes a perspective on the process of institutional 
entrepreneurship  which is different from Suarez (2004). The role of structuring 
collaboration and using discursive activities is ignored by Suarez and these activities are 
continuous and cumulative rather than linked to a specific phase. 
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In Chapter 2, this study refers to Suarez’s model (2004, see Figure 2.1). The model 
suggests that  the process of technological dominance is distinguished by  five separate 
phases. Each phase is triggered by a milestone. The model implies that the focal firms 
have to complete the tasks in the previous phase and then go to the next one. He also 
proposes some dominance factors which are crucial for success in different phases 
(Suarez, 2004, 283). In other words, his model helps the researchers and practitioners to 
identify what factors should be accounted for in institutional entrepreneurship and what 
tasks should be completed in different phases of the process. 
Based on the findings of the BD case, this study proposes a focus, which is different 
from Suarez (2004). In the BD case, structuring collaboration (BDA) and using 
discursive activities are seen as crucial. However, these activities are continuously on-
going and cumulative. For instance, when Sony announced the BDF in 2002, the 
cumulative process of collaboration was begun. In 2002, Sony used the eight 
organizations as a symbol to promote the primary BD standard. This information 
constructed a meaning that the standard was endorsed by  a number of important 
stakeholders. In 2004, Sony chose 20th Century Fox as a critical stakeholder to become 
a member of the collaboration. This was linked to the promotion of the copyright 
protection mechanism (BD+) of the standard.At the moment, Sony announced that the 
BDF would transform to the BDA and openly  welcomed other organizations to become 
the member of the collaboration. More and more prospective organizations decided to 
become the member of the BDA since 2004. Later, in order to promote the PS3, which 
was integrated with the BD standard, Sony allied with many game software developers 
and publishers to back up PS3 and the relevant information was announced in many 
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exhibitions. Finally, since 2006, Sony went back to ally with hardware manufacturers 
and Hollywood studios to produce the products associated with the BD standard and 
many complementary products. Sony also kept announcing the relevant information by 
using discursive activities. In Chapter 7, the findings show that more and more 
organizations chose to become members of the BDA throughout the process. Sony also 
continuously used discursive activities to promote the relevant  information and 
construct the meaning of the BD standard to audiences and markets. 
To sum up, the importance of structuring collaboration and using discursive activities 
are ignored by  Suarez. The aim of this discussion is not to reject the contribution of 
Suarez. Rather, it is to complement his model.  The phase-specific dominance factors 
proposed by  Suarez are important but other factors (structuring collaboration and using 
discursive activities) which are continuously cumulated throughout the process of 
institutional entrepreneurship are also important. 
8.4. Limitations of Data
There are two types of data limitation. The first limitation is cultural distance. Japan is 
seen as a society which is relatively closed (Hofstede, 2007). Japanese culture does 
allow outsiders access to internal data and in-depth information about companies and 
collaborations. I was fortunate to develop a personal connection with a senior manager 
from Sony, as, otherwise, I would not have been able to obtain some of the information 
about the BDA used in this study. However, although I had this connection with one 
senior manager in Sony, he was not able to provide me with access to other senior Sony 
managers as supplementary informants. In addition, I sent many  emails to Toshiba 
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managers who were involved in the standard war, asking them for information, but I did 
not receive any replies. I also asked my Sony informant for access to the BDA 
members’ forum but this was not allowed. Hence, the relative closure of Japanese 
culture constituted a barrier that limited my research to data that was openly available.
In order to deal with this data limitation, I collected as many media reports and as much 
complementary  data as possible (see Table 6.1). The media reports contain many reports 
and analyses of Sony and Toshiba’s business activities, strategies, products and other 
value information during the standard war. Industry reports (Datamonitor) provided 
expert analyses and market figures. Statistics from Euromonitor and WIPO provided 
value information concerning Toshiba and Sony’s R&D activities, and the size of the 
video player and games console markets. Toshiba and Sony’s annual reports and their 
archival data gave opportunities to obtain technical information and other news sources 
concerning both camps. I triangulated each data source with other sources. For these 
reasons, I believe that these other data sources can make up for the shortage of 
information from the companies studied.
The other limitation concerns the availability data in the databases used for the case 
study. Firstly, due to the limited availability of data, it  was difficult to access 
information about some of the events described in Chapter 7. For instance, in 2005, 
Toshiba announced that  Microsoft had joined their camp. Microsoft then announced that 
their Vista system would support the HD DVD standard. This joint enterprise came as a 
major surprise for the PC companies in the BDA. However, Toshiba did not integrate 
the Microsoft Xbox 360 into the HD DVD disc players. This meant that the game 
console was not able to act as a trojan horse, in the same way as the PS3. The available 
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data does not make it possible to explore the reasons for Microsoft’s engagement with 
Toshiba, and why the interests of Microsoft were ignored in relation to the launch of the 
Xbox 360. Furthermore, after Microsoft had joined the HD DVD camp, HP urged the 
BDA to adopt the open copyright protection mechanism in the BD standard, as Toshiba 
and Microsoft had done with their standard,. The BDA officially rejected this proposal, 
although this did not mean that HP then left the BDA.
Secondly, the study claims that product performance influences network effects in 
standard wars. However, no data, such as market share figures, proves this viewpoint. 
The Datamonitor and Euromonitor databases do not contain any specific figures for the 
market share of BD and HD DVD disc players. An informal website (blu-raystats.com) 
does exist, which contains weekly and year-to-date market share figures, together with 
percentage market shares, for the BD and HD DVD players since their inception. 
However, this website is not part of any official collaboration or group, but  is the work 
of an individual consumer. The FAQs section states that the accuracy of its statistics 
cannot be guaranteed. It mainly cites relevant  statistics from Neilsen VideoScan and 
data presented by the weekly  Home Media Magazine. Because the website’s accuracy is 
uncertain and I am not able to access the Neilsen VideoScan database to check its 
figures, I do not consider it to be reliable as a source, even though it provides relevant 
market share figures, and so I have not used it in my analysis.
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8.5. Future Research
This section will outline two future areas of research: a configurational approach to the 
changing practices of institutional entrepreneurs, and research into the role of social 
capital in processes of institutional change.
A few theoretical works have been mentioned in this study. The section on critical 
stakeholders mentioned the new development of institutional complexity  (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011), in which each stakeholder may 
represent its own institutional logic. An organization may face multiple coexisting 
institutional logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). In the section on power, the study  outlined 
the developing body of institutional logics. They  provide the organizing principles for a 
field (Friedland & Alford, 1991). It also showed that institutions should not ignore the 
role of power. A few recent scholars (e.g. Rojas, 2010; Suddaby, 2010) have clearly 
highlighted the role of power in institutional change. For example, Rojas (2010) argues 
that social actors may seek power by creating, modifying or supporting institutions.
Based on the findings of this study, I propose some approaches to the study of 
institutional change. To some extent, these new approaches may be relevant to existing 
work. Firstly, I intend to determine the configurational practices of institutional 
entrepreneurs when successfully initiating institutional change. Richardson and 
Thompson (1999) comment that a strategy’s success turns on a combination of external 
fit and internal fit. ‘Internal fit’ refers to a development of coherent bundles of changing 
practices that reinforce one another. An appropriate configuration of institutional change 
practices must then demonstrate external fit, and thus be matched to the needs of a 
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particular institutional change strategy. In a sense, sometimes, a single change of 
practice will result in better performance. However, if such practice conflicts with other 
practices, less positive or even negative performance may then result.
Hence, this study  may require long-term empirical research. Scholars may need to 
determine the best practices of change in institutional entrepreneurship. In other words, 
some practices of change may always better be than others and so all institutional 
entrepreneurs should adopt these practices. For example, Fligstein (1997, 2001) has 
tried to determine the social skills which institutional entrepreneurs require to initiate a 
change process. In general, he suggests that the skills of collaborating and using 
discursive activities are ‘must-have practices’ for agents of change. Researchers can 
then combine different practices of change to achieve their strategic goals and defeat 
their competitors in processes of institutional change.
The second future area of research should be to rethink which theories can be used to 
explain how organizations defeat  competitors in standard wars. This study suggests that 
social capital could be one such theory. The core proposition of social capital theory is 
that social ties constitute a valuable resource for conducting social affairs, enabling 
individuals and social groups to reach outcomes that they could not otherwise achieve 
or only  achieve at extra cost (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992; Putnam, 1995). Social capital 
comprises a set of relationships and shared values created and used by a range of 
individuals to solve collective problems in the present and future. It helps to explain the 
mechanisms involved in creating and exploiting collaborative advantage. It  comprises 
both a network and the assets that may be mobilized through that network (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998:243). Connections and access to resources are linked by social capital 
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theory  to information, influence, social credentials, solidarity issues and so on. The 
discussion of institutional conduits in Chapter 3, shows that using social capital can be 
seen as a mechanism for controlling collaborations (relational system), which can 
themselves also be seen as conduits for symbols, routines, and artifacts.
This study indicates that if they possess effective collaborations (mobilizing resources, 
managing cooperation and coordinations) and an unambiguous voice (developing 
common vision), institutional entrepreneurs can successfully implement institutional 
change. These attributes are also outlined by social capital theory. In organizational 
institutionalism, implementing institutional entrepreneurship can be seen as meaning 
that focal firms are willing to create and capture values through the activation of their 
resources. In order to achieve their goals, focal firms are more likely  to form alliances 
with other companies who have similar intentions. These companies may come from 
different industries. Collaborations may comprise firms with similar goals but divergent 
opinions and interests. If their actions are compromised, such collaborations may not 
lead to the level of performance which is expected of them. For this reason, the 
relational and structural social capital of institutional entrepreneurs can help them to 
establish relationships with other organizations (i.e. stakeholders), and cooperate and 
coordinate their interests and actions within collaborations. Moreover, generating an 
unambiguous voice to the audience requires the construction of shared meanings and 
understandings by institutional entrepreneurs and their partners. Cognitive social capital 
can therefore help them to achieve this goal.
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Appendix 1.  The Face-to-Face Interview Questions to the 
Japanese Informant
Q1. What factors did make Sony to decide to sponsor the BD technology?
Q2. Besides the capacity issue, what are the other technological issues considered in 
the standard war?
Q3. Why did you invite Panasonic to join with you and Philips to sponsor the BD 
standard together?
Q4. How did you decide to invite Panasonic and Philips together and not invite 
Toshiba?
Q5. The number of the members is a critical power in this industry? That’s why you 
decided to establish the BDA?
Q6. How did you invite or persuade other companies to join in the BDA.
Q7. Did Sony use your power to influence critical companies to join to the BDA?
Q8. Did Sony play monopoly leadership in the BDA?
Q9. What kind of leadership? A small group leadership?
Q10. The BOD issue should be decided by three-facilitators companies?
Q11. Do you have any internal publications in the BDA to share or exchange 
information or maintain connections with each other?
Q12. How about this media have any side effect to enhance or maintain the group 
identity within the BDA?
Q13. What is the advantage to Hollywood studios joining the BDA?
Q14. How did you invite these companies to join with you? use media, promotion 
committee? or other resources?
Q15. In 2005, Microsoft announced that the Vista would support the HD DVD format. 
So did these two events have any negative impact on the BD camp?
Q16. Do you have critical events to make Sony or BDA won the format war? Does 
have any other critical events?
Q17. How about NEC? Did Toshiba not have many other supporters to support the HD 
DVD? 
Q18. If you go back to 2002 or earlier, Sony relaunch the BD format again, What will 
you do or will not to do?
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Appendix 2. The Emails Questions to Media Journalist and 
Japanese Informant
Q1. In the BD vs. HD DVD standard war, Sony’s PlayStation 3 (PS3) played as a 
trojan horse seeding BD players to market. However, although HD DVD also used 
Microsoft’s Xbox 360 to promote the standard, the Xbox 360‘s market number was 
not good as PS3. In your opinion, what advantages and disadvantages did PS3 and 
Xbox 360 have in the standard war?
Q2. Microsoft announced that he engaged in the HD DVD camp in 2005. At that 
moment, market and some members in the BD camp believed that the action gave a 
strong support to the HD DVD standard. However, eventually, Toshiba lost the war. In 
your opinion, what wrong strategies did Toshiba do with Microsoft in the standard 
war?
Q3. In the beginning of 2007, New York Times reported that HD DVD player is 
hacked. In your opinion, what influence did it have to Toshiba?
Q4. In your opinion, comparing with DVD Forum, what advantages and disadvantages 
did the Blu-ray Disc Association have in the standard war?
Q5. Some scholars claim that the skills of collective action and communication are 
critical capabilities which should be possessed by focal firms when they are 
implementing standard war. In your opinion, what social skills should be had?
Q6. In your opinion, comparing to JVC VHS vs. Sony Betamax, and Toshiba SD vs. 
Sony MMCD standard wars, what can we learn from the BD vs. HD DVD standard 
war?
Q7. In your opinion, what factors caused Toshiba lost the standard war?
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Appendix 3. Documenting the Processes of Data Analysis
This chapter documents the process of data synthesis in order to generate the 
substantive grounded theory that emerged from that data. Its aim is to explain the 
different stages of data analysis and synthesis which led to the emergence of the sub-
core variables. It will also be important to explain how the data was derived from the 
dataset. This chapter has only  one section, which will show how I generated the open 
codes. Initially, I examined all the media reports to generate the initial open codes. I 
used a similar process to produce the semi-structured questionnaire for the face-to-face 
interview with my Japanese interviewee in Tokyo. 
A3.1. Generating the Codes
The aim of this section is to show how I coded the data openly in order to derive 
implications from its. The study  borrows grounded theory’s principles to analyze its 
material. I used a conceptual framework developed from the literature to analyze the 
dataset, which helped me to analyze the data. Much of this data was about purely 
technical aspects of the standard war and so was not taken into account in the study. 
Without  this irrelevant data, the study produced fewer codes, which were, however, 
more focused.
The structure of Appendix 3 is as follows: ‘names of categories’, ‘extracts’, and 
‘interpretations’. The structure of section will document the collective action and 
discursive activities first, because they are the heart of this study. Then, the study will 
document the rest of variables, power, legitimacy, network effects, and product 
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performance. Table 6.2 shows that  media reports provide many evidences on ‘critical 
stakeholder management capability’, ‘discursive activities’, and ‘product performance’. 
The rest of variables are not clearly presented on media reports. Thus, the study collects 
lots of data from different kind of sources, including WIPO, Datamonitor’s reports, 
Euromonitor’s statistics, interview transcripts, and Sony, Toshiba, BDA, and DVD 
Forum’s official websites. However, including the collaboration’s news archives, the 
market numbers of specific products, such as disc players, game consoles, movie 
studios’ pre-recorded discs, are not available. I tried to use some complementary data to 
infer the possible network effects. Unfortunately, the monthly market  numbers of a 
product produced by a particular standard (BD and HD DVD disc players) is still 
unavailable. Thus, I suggest it as a research limitation and get rid of this theme in this 
study. 
A3.1.1. Codes of Collective Action
‘Collective action’ is defined as a set of communicative practices which take into 
consideration the engagement of, and interactions between organizations. The aim is to 
manage a standard and solve its problems through collaboration. Collective action is 
categorised as part of ‘institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars’. It leads to power 
and legitimacy  for the institutional entrepreneur, and network effects and product 
performance for the standard. It may also interact with discursive activities. This study 
will claim that ‘critical stakeholder management capability’ and ‘collaboration 
structuring capability’ are categories within this supra-code.
A3.1.1.1. Critical Stakeholder Management Capability
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The definition of critical stakeholder has been presenting in Chapter 1 (see the sub 
research question 1). In the optical storage device industry, critical stakeholders mean 
that they can be complementary  product producers, such as movie studios, games 
software developers and publishers, as well as retailers. 
‘Critical stakeholder management capability’ is defined as a process of managing and 
responding to the expectations and requirements of any critical stakeholder who has an 
critical resources in a project or will be affected by  its deliverables or outputs. The issue 
of critical stakeholders is implicitly highlighted in studies of previous standard wars, 
which explicitly  define it as being of critical importance. This is because many media 
reports in the dataset mention the importance of Hollywood studios and retailers. 
Institutional entrepreneurs can convey the message that their standards are supported by 
leading companies in the field by  using discursive activities. This may in turn motivate 
other companies to support the standards. Effective critical stakeholder management 
capability can lead to increased product performance and network effects. If 
institutional entrepreneurs have effective power and legitimacy at the beginning of a 
standard war, they will win the engagement of stakeholders. Institutional entrepreneurs 
therefore need the capability  to manage their expectations. If they  have this capability, 
the standard has the possibility of obtaining first-mover advantage.
Some codes exist which force the researcher to examine not only how critical 
stakeholders can generate network effects, but also how they can help institutional 
entrepreneurs to persuade other companies in the standard war.
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1. Influence of Critical Stakeholders
Extract:
Universal Pictures, Paramount Home Entertainment and Warner Bros. announced they 
would release movies in HD DVD, the new high definition DVD format developed by 
Toshiba and NEC. The studios timed the HD DVD announcement to come well in 
advance of the January Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, where the nation's 
retailers make buying decisions for the coming year. Hollywood hopes to persuade these 
buyers -- and hardware manufacturers -- to get behind a single, next-generation DVD 
format. (Chmielewski, San Jose Mercury, 30 November 2004)
This report shows these studios, from the HD DVD camp, attempting to persuade other 
companies to join that camp. As the literature review suggests, having market-leading 
organizations as part  of its critical stakeholders might help  a focal firm to attract other 
companies to join that collaboration. This is because they can attract other companies 
by using their existing networks. It shows that, firstly, the HD DVD standard had the 
leading position in the market at this point. Secondly, critical stakeholders can use their 
comments might influence further the perceptions and actions of other companies.
2. First Mover Advantage
Extract:
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In addition to the Paramount Home Entertainment unit of Viacom, Universal Pictures, 
Warner Brothers Studios and New Line Cinema also said they would release titles in the 
HD DVD format, which its creators promise will offer sharper images and more of the 
interactive features that have helped make DVD's popular. (Zaun, New York Times, 30 
November 2004)
In March 2006, we commercialized the world’s first HD DVD player, the “HD-XA1”, 
taking the DVD standard forward to the next generation (Toshiba Annual Report: 23, 
2006)
First-mover advantage refers a edge that a company gains by entering a particular 
market before any competitors. The advantages in capturing critical resources create 
incentives for investing in technological adjustment. In 2004, at the very  beginning of 
this standard war, the HD DVD standard had more support from film studios because of 
its cheaper production costs and backward compatibility. In 2006, Toshiba also 
announced that it launched the first HD DVD player in the world. Based on these 
statements, I define that Toshiba had first mover advantage in the standard war. 
3. Backward Compatibility
Extract:
NEC/Toshiba design will be "backwardly compatible" with today's DVDs. That could be 
a significant advantage in the marketplace, saving videophiles from having to replace 
their film collections, or having to use a second player for older discs. (The Economist, 
14 December 2002)
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‘Backward compatibility’ is defined as the ability of a new storage device to work with 
input generated by an older device. This compatibility meant that Toshiba had more 
support from Hollywood studios at the beginning of the standard war, because the 
compatibility can result in lower production costs to Hollywood studios. Toshiba 
announced that HD DVD players would be able to read existing DVDs as part of its 
extension of the DVD standard, an announcement which greatly benefited HD DVD, 
even though HD DVD did not have the greater capacity of BD.
4. Understanding Expectations
Extract:
Eight of the biggest players in technology, consumer electronics and Hollywood 
announced a consortium Wednesday to set copy-protection standards for a new 
generation of high-definition video discs. ... Walt Disney and Warner Bros. studios 
joined with Microsoft, Intel and IBM, Panasonic, Sony and Toshiba to set standards for 
all high-definition discs for computers and consumer electronics devices. ... Group 
members framed the initiative as unlocking new entertainment experiences, rather than 
setting new consumer curbs. (Chmielewski, Mercury News, 15 July 2004)
‘Understanding expectations’ is defined as the process of recognizing the interests and 
requirements of critical stakeholders in standard wars. In the beginning of the standard 
war, some of critical stakeholders established copy-protection standards for hi-def 
standards. This action tried to make both camps know that the protection mechanism is 
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their expectation. Institutional entrepreneurs can collect the relevant information on 
media and/or directly join the group  to understand what they want. In a standard war, an 
effective way of understanding the interests of critical stakeholders is to include them in 
collaboration. 
I also found that the expectations of retailers were represented in the dataset. In a 
standard war, these retailers can also be seen as a type of stakeholder.
(1) The expectations of retailers
Extract:
For dealers, a format war will mean a whole lot of wasted energy on training staff and 
educating consumers to understand the distinctions between the two standards, as well 
as maintaining inventory and providing shelf space for both camps' hardware, blank 
media and pre-packaged content. (Paone, Dealerscope, February 2005)
In addition to Hollywood studios and consumer electronic manufacturers, the other 
critical stakeholder in this standard war is the retailer. This is because their channel is 
the closest to the consumers of the product, and because having two similar standards in 
the market increases their inventory and other costs. 
5. Responding to Requirements
Extract:
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Sony decided to refine the Blu-ray standard in a way that would have far-reaching 
implications for Microsoft. Sony wanted to win the support of Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Studios, long Hollywood's leading advocate for tough anti-piracy measures. So 
Sony agreed to add safeguards developed for Fox by San Francisco's Cryptography 
Research Inc., which could prevent Blu-ray movies from being ripped to a computer's 
hard drive. (Edwards & Burrows, BusinessWeek, 17 October 2005)
‘Responding to requirements’ is the process of replying the expectations of critical 
stakeholders in standard wars. In order to respond to the expectations of a Hollywood 
studio, 20th Century Fox, the institutional entrepreneur, Sony, developed a copyright 
protection technology, with Cryptography Research, and added it to the BD standard. In 
the standard war, both Sony and Toshiba tried to respond stakeholders’ expectations. 
This study defines responding to requirements as the process in which the focal firm 
takes actions to respond to the expectations of critical stakeholders.
6. Seeking Exclusive Support
Extracts:
The studios [Paramount and Dreadworks] won undisclosed financial incentives for 
exclusive commitments to release high-definition movies onto HD DVD only. (McBride, 
Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2007)
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Seeking exclusive support is seen as the process in which the exclusive support of 
stakeholders is sought in standard wars. In this standard war, the most  important factor 
was the size of the share of the DVD market, because, it determined whether the 
standard would gain a large enough number of complementary products to generate 
network effects. Thus, Toshiba used financial incentives to persuade these studios to 
exclusively support the HD DVD standard. 
This code has a sub-code. 
(1) Winning the support of Hollywood
Extract:
The HD DVD group, he [Toshiba spokesman, Keisuke Oomori] said, has made 
''substantial progress standardizing our formats'' and is ''gaining positive understanding 
for our format from the Hollywood studios.'' (Belson & Sorkin, The New York Times, 15 
September 2004)
Toshiba's HD DVDs are very similar to existing DVDs, and could use much of the same 
equipment to make them. That means it's quicker and cheaper, for now, to make HD 
DVDs than Blu-Ray discs."  It's all a matter of [disc-making] infrastructure," says Kanji 
Katsuura, chief technical officer at Memory-Tech Corp., a Japanese disc maker that's 
supporting the Toshiba-led effort. "If the infrastructure is in place, Hollywood won't be 
able to ignore it." (McBride & Dvorak, Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2004)
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The HD DVD camp’s actions reflected the fact that Hollywood was one of the critical 
stakeholders in this standard war. This study defines this action as one which aimed to 
win the support of the stakeholder. Generally speaking, in order to win this support, 
institutional entrepreneurs need to communicate their interim performance and proposal 
to stakeholders.  
7. Giving Incentives
This is defined as the process in which tangible or intangible resources are used to 
attract the engagement of critical stakeholders.
Extracts:
...after offering huge financial incentives like marketing support and cash payments, the 
HD DVD camp got Paramount and DreamWorks Animation SKG to agree to publish 
high-definition versions of their titles on HD DVD only. (McBride, Wall Street Journal, 
25 September, 2007)
It may have been that no money changed hands. But Sony, from what I recall, gave 
member companies a percentage of future royalties, which was worth quite a lot. So 
perhaps they weren’t induced to join by money upfront, but by a share of future sales. 
(Interview with journalist)
Both Toshiba or Sony  gave resources to critical stakeholders which motivated them to 
support their standard.
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I found that the engagement of Microsoft  in the HD DVD camp highlighted the 
importance of critical stakeholder management capability. The BDA also used it to 
further influence the Hollywood studios’ understanding of the standard war. I have 
derived several codes from the engagement of Microsoft.
A3.1.1.2. The Codes of Additional Findings Concerning Critical Stakeholder 
Management Capability
1. The Impact of Microsoft
Extract:
Microsoft and Toshiba yesterday said they would jointly investigate the development of 
High Definition-DVD (HD-DVD) players, in a move that considerably strengthens the 
Japanese consumer electronic group's position in the ongoing format wars over next- 
generation DVDs. Backing from Microsoft will provide Toshiba with additional 
leverage in its battle against Sony over a single, unified format for next-generation 
DVDs. (Sanchanta, Financial Times, 28 June 2005)
Maureen Weber, general manager of personal storage in H-P's personal-systems group, 
said H-P was "shocked" when Microsoft and Intel announced support for HD-DVD. Ms. 
Weber said H-P offered the compromise at a Blu-ray trade-group meeting yesterday in 
Los Angeles. "We're trying to broker a settlement here," she said. (Wingfield, The Wall 
Street Journal, 20 October 2005)
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The engagement of Microsoft can be seen as a turning point in this standard war. Many 
companies believed that Microsoft were giving strong support to the HD DVD camp, 
because its operating system dominated the PC industry. This code indirectly enabled 
me to produce codes in later sections relating to conflicts of interest in collaborations, 
and collaboration turbulence.
2. Contradicting the Expectations of Critical Stakeholders
Extract:
Microsoft and Intel say that Toshiba has proven that its discs can be copied onto hard 
drives and home servers and sent over home networks. (Belson, New York Times, 27 
September 2005)
... piracy is cutting into sales far more than predicted, the studios also reason that they 
should move more quickly toward the new technology because of its superior antipiracy 
features. (McBride & Dvorak, Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2004)
This report demonstrates that, after the engagement of Microsoft, open copyright 
protection contradicted the expectations of movie studios. Sony’s actions concerning 
copyright protection (BD+) (see the ‘Responding to Requirements’ code) further 
influenced the film studios’ faith in the BD standard. The institutional entrepreneur can 
also use the media to communicate its activities to its target companies, and to many 
others. This may directly  or indirectly influence their perceptions, interpretations and 
actions.
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A3.1.1.3. Collaboration Structuring Capability
‘Collaboration structuring capability’ can be defined as a process of establishing formal 
structures and rules, in order to manage effective collaborations in which divergent 
members exchange and share opinions and resources in order to achieve common goals. 
Unlike critical stakeholder management capability, this capability is focused on 
determining the best  ways of managing the actions of members (including critical 
stakeholders) in order to achieve goal. The data in this section is mostly taken from the 
official documents of the collaboration (BDA), and from the public archive. This is 
partly because public access to the DVD Forum is not permitted. 
In a similar way to critical stakeholder management capability, collaboration structuring 
capability not only leads to network effects and product performance, but also interacts 
with discursive activities. This capability  is also able to strengthen the power and 
legitimacy of an institutional entrepreneur throughout a standard war.
As a result not only of the literature but also of the code, I initially focused on the 
relevant actions and strategies of the collaborations.
1. Establishing Collaborations
It can be defined as to arrange a system of act of working with another or others on a 
joint project. 
Extracts:
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Two industry groups are promoting incompatible formats: Blu-ray Disc Founders, a 
consortium of Japanese companies led by Sony and recently joined by Hewlett-Packard 
Co. and Dell Inc.; and the DVD Forum, led by Toshiba Corp. and NEC Corp. (Anthes, 
Computerworld, 26 April 2004)
...Prior to the show [Combined Exhibition of Advanced Technologies, CEATEC], 
members backing the Blu-ray disc announced the formation of the Blu-ray Disc 
Association (BDA). (Dritsas, Dealerscope, November 2004)
Before the BD-HD DVD standard war, Toshiba was part  of the DVD Forum. Sony and 
many other BD founders were also members. In addition, Sony established BDF and 
BDA later in the standard war. I found much more information about this on the BDA’s 
official website, and then responded to the literature on the importance of collaboration.
2. The Portfolio of Institutional Entrepreneur
This is defined as the set of direct ties possessed by  an institutional entrepreneur in a 
standard war. This code initially consisted of two sub-codes. 
(1) Co-founders
Co-founders refers to the group  of companies which jointly  develop a technological 
standard.
Extract:
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NEC Corp. and Toshiba Corp. last week announced a blue laser format for next-
generation DVDs that differs from the version proposed earlier this year by another 
group consisting of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., Philips Electronics, and 
Sony Corp. (Robertson, EBN, 2 September, 2002)
The HD DVD standard was co-developed by  Toshiba and NEC. The issue of co-
founders shows that when establishing a process of technological standard change, 
companies need to collaborate.  
(2) Increase in Leading Members
Extract:
[Blu-ray Disc] It has already garnered the support of many of the largest consumer 
electronics companies in the industry, including Dell, Hitachi, HP, JVC, EG, Panasonic, 
Philips, Pioneer, Samsung, Sharp, Sony and Thomson, as well as most major blank 
media vendors. (Dritsas, Dealerscope, November 2004) 
For two years now, rival camps have been battling over which new DVD format will 
prevail: Blu-ray, which is backed by Sony and a consortium of 170 other companies,
(Grover & Edwards, BusinessWeek, 17 December 2007)
This refers to the fact that the engagements of critical stakeholders and/or other 
companies in the relevant industries increase through collaborations. As more and more 
leading companies joined the BD collaboration, the legitimacy of that standard could be 
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massively increased. The action of announcing that  these leading companies had joined 
the collaboration can also itself be viewed as a discursive activity. Moreover, as so 
many news releases had already reported that the BD standard had greater capacity, as 
well as other relevant issues, this announcement also reflected the fact that previous 
discursive activities had influenced the perceptions of some companies, and then caused 
them to take action. 
3. The Structure of Membership
This is an result of the process of professionalisation, and a set of rules which explicitly 
defines the responsibilities and obligations of all members of a collaboration. The code 
is from BDA’s by-law (v.1.9). Based on the limited information about HD DVD, I only 
can access the membership structure of DVD Forum from its website. 
Extract:
Membership in the BDA is open to any entity that demonstrates interest and engages in 
developing, improving or otherwise supporting the Blu-ray Disc Formats in accordance 
with the objectives. (BDA by-law v.1.9)
Board of Directors: Companies participating in the Board of Directors are active 
participants of the format creation and key BDA activities. They are selected from the 
Contributors by election. The board sets an overall strategy and approves key issues. ... 
Contributor: Contributors are active participants of the format creation and other key 
BDA activities. They can be elected to become a member of the Board of Directors. ... 
General member: General membership provides access to specific information from 
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Committee discussions. A general member can attend general meetings and seminars. 
They can participate in specific Regional Promotion Team activities and specific CC 
activities. (BDA Global site: http://blu-raydisc.com/en/association/association/
MembershipLevels.aspx )
“Facilitator” means the Director designated by the BOD to facilitate the BOD meetings 
as a BOD Chair or co-Chair and fulfill the Facilitator duties... (BDA by-law v.1.9)
The BDA has two classes of membership, contributor and general member. They  are 
managed by  the Board of Directors. In addition to these different  classes of 
membership, members may have different responsibilities and obligations. My Japanese 
interviewee told me that  the entire BDA is actually managed by  three facilitators31, and 
is therefore able to generate ‘one voice’.
4. R&D Activities
The term ‘R&D activities’ refers to a “systematic investigation or experimentation 
involving innovation or technical risk, the outcome of which is new knowledge, with or 
without a specific practical application of new or improved products, processes, 
materials, devices or services” (Rogers, 1998: 12). This code uses the BDA’s by-law 
(JTC and CC) and DVD Forum’s TVG.
Extract:
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31 According to BDA by-law v.1.9, facilitator means the Director designated by the BOD to facilitate the 
BOD meetings as a BOD Chair or co-Chair and fulfill the facilitator duties in BOD and BDA’s general 
meetings. 
The BDA has a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Compliance Committee (CC) to 
create, uphold and test new innovations to the BD standard. (BDA by-law v.1.9)
According to this BDA by-law, the JTC coordinates and accelerates technical 
discussions in or among Technical Expert Groups, as well as submitting technical 
proposals to the BOD for approval. It also presents the technical viewpoint of the BDA, 
using strategic guidelines determined by the Promotional Committee. In order to 
guarantee consistent  end-user experience, the Compliance Committee also ensures the 
compatibility and interchangeability of all BD products. It supports rapid and broad 
acceptance of the BD standards in relevant industries. The definitions of sub-groups in 
DVD Forum are not available. 
5. Frequent Communication
Frequent communication is defined as the ways in which institutional entrepreneurs 
have formal communications, involving exchanging and sharing opinions and 
approving decisions, with other members of collaborations. Due to data limitation the 
term ‘frequent communication’ is used only to describe formal communication.
Extract:
A general meeting shall be held once a year upon the call of the BOD. Such meeting 
shall be notified by the secretary in writing to all members at least thirty (30) days prior 
to the scheduled meeting date. At each general meeting, the BOD shall report a 
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summary of the activities of the BDA during the past year (including adoption of Blu-
ray Disc Formats), as well as the plan for the next year’s activities. (BDA by-law v.1.9)
In addition to this, according to BDA by-law v. 1.9, each committee also has its own 
meeting. The aim of the general meeting is not only to exchange and share opinions and 
to appoint  the official positions, but also to maintain relationships between members. 
The relevant information in DVD Forum is not available. 
6. Organizing Promotion
This study defines ‘organizing promotion’ as the use by institutional entrepreneurs of 
collaborations to define campaigns and utilize strategies, in order to promote and target 
standard and relevant technologies to relevant audiences. The media frequently  reported 
promotional messages from both camps, so this section chooses only a few extracts.
Extract: 
The promotion committee formulates a strategic approach to promote BD formats in 
various product categories. It creates and participates in events and activities that: 
promote BD formats, showcase BD products, educate and train key audiences on BD 
formats and technology, promote compatibility of BD products and create a community 
for General Members of the BDA. (The BDA Structure, http://www.blu-raydisc.com/en/
association/structure.aspx)
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According to the BDA by-laws v. 1.9, promotion means that institutional entrepreneurs 
define and approve promoting and marketing campaigns in collaborations, and then the 
members of those collaborations create their own relevant campaigns. Without an united 
plan, institutional entrepreneurs are unable to produce the required ‘unambiguous 
voice’ for their audiences. This may create suspicion and lead to misunderstandings 
within the market. Moreover, it may also negatively  influence the network effects and 
product performance of a standard, or even the resources of institutional entrepreneurs 
themselves.
7. Enhancing the pool of movies
Extract:
With the exception of Sony's movie division, which includes the Columbia and TriStar 
studios, that naturally backs the Blu-ray format, the movie studios have so far avoided 
backing one standard despite intense lobbying by both the Blu-ray and HD DVD 
groups. By buying MGM, Sony will be adding another studio to the list of Blu-ray 
backers, and a catalog of 4,000 movies that could be issued exclusively in the Blu-ray 
format. (Belson & Sorkin, New York Times, 15 September 2004)
Buying MGM  might not have seemed an obvious strategy for winning this standard 
war. However, if these studios were owned by  a focal firm, it was not surprising that 
they would at least inclusively support that firm’s standard. 
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A3.1.1.4. The Codes of Additional Findings Concerning Collaboration Structuring 
Capability
1. Collaboration Turbulence
The term ‘collaboration turbulence’ refers to a collaboration characterised by chaotic 
jolts or attacks from competitors.
Extract:
H-P was "shocked" when Microsoft and Intel announced support for HD-DVD. Ms. 
Weber said H-P offered the compromise at a Blu-ray trade-group meeting yesterday in 
Los Angeles.(Wingfield, Wall Street Journal, 20 October 2005)
If Hewlett leaves the Blu-ray group, it could put pressure on Dell, another Blu-ray 
member, to follow. This would provide a huge lift to Toshiba, which has recently lost 
ground to the Blu-ray group in the battle for allies in Hollywood and Silicon Valley. 
(Belson, New York Times, 17 November 2005)
Microsoft’s support of the HD DVD standard caused a severe shock for HP, one of the 
members of the BDA’s BOD. HP’s actions demonstrates that institutional entrepreneurs 
can attack the collaborations of its competitors.
2. Conflicts of Interest in Collaborations
Extract:
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While still supporting the Blu-ray format, Hewlett took the unusual step of announcing 
its request as the board members of the Blu-ray group met in Los Angeles. The move 
signaled a potential rift in the Blu-ray camp between consumer electronics giants like 
Sony, Panasonic and Samsung, and computer makers like Hewlett and Dell. In a 
pointed ultimatum, Hewlett said that if the additional technology was not added to the 
Blu-ray format, it would consider switching allegiances and backing the rival standard, 
Toshiba's HD-DVD. (Belson, New York Times, 20 October 2005)
Microsoft’s engagement in Toshiba camp did give the pressure on HP. HP’s actions 
signal that there is a conflict interest between consumer electronic companies and PC 
companies. 
A3.1.2. Codes of Discursive Activity
The term ‘discursive activity’ can be defined as the actor display[ing] or tr[ying] to 
draw other people’s attention to the meaning of an object or action that goes beyond the 
object or action’s intrinsic content or functional use (Zott & Huy, 2007: 70). The critical 
stakeholder management and collaboration structuring capabilities of institutional 
entrepreneurs can be promoted through discursive activities. In turn, by using discursive 
activities, institutional entrepreneurs can motivate stakeholders to join collaborations 
and so further strengthen product performance and network effects. Discursive activities 
also have interaction effects with the power and legitimacy  of institutional 
entrepreneurs.
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Sony and Toshiba both mostly used discursive activities to communicate and construct 
meanings not only about the outcomes of collective actions, but also about capacity, 
production costs and copyright protection issues throughout the standard war. These 
three issues also reinforced their product performance.
1. Framing
The term ‘framing’ can be defined as the use of various verbal and non-verbal 
discourses to construct the identification and expression of a novel understanding of a 
problem, and to explicitly  provide compelling reasons to support the new vision being 
promoted.
Extract:
... senior vice president of the Blu-ray Disc Group at Sony Corporation of America, says 
the next format may be the last packaged media. "Having Panasonic, Pioneer, Sony, and 
Philips involved is a pretty strong representation of core technologies for optical disc. 
The key issue is to make sure that we could maximize the capacity on the disc. (Block, 
Emedia, March 2004)
A key advantage for HD DVD and a big selling point to manufacturers is the fact that 
the technology allows disc manufacturers to use their existing DVD plants and 
equipment to produce HD DVD discs. (Paone, Dealerscope, January 2004)
Media reports mainly stated that both standards could provide greater capacity than the 
DVD standard. In later media reports, and in their other supplementary  documents, 
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Toshiba independently framed the HD DVD standard’s advantages as being lower 
production costs and the BD standard’s is being greater storage capacity. 
There are three sub-codes here. 
(1) Highlighting the Issue of Capacity
Capacity is the ability of the disc to store content.
Extracts:
The Sony-Matsushita-Philips camp last February unveiled its new DVD concept, called 
Blu-Ray. It uses a 0.1mm disk substrate layer that allows up to 23Gbytes of storage on 
one side of a DVD. (Robertson, EBN, 2 September 2002)
A thinner substrate means the laser can get even closer to the data. The closer the laser, 
the smaller the focus spot. As a result, a dual-layer Blu-ray disc has room for 50GB of 
data (25 GB on each layer), while the HD-DVD format can only hold 30 GB (15 GB on 
each layer). (Kerschbaumer, Broadcasting & Cable, 25 October 2004)
This greater capacity  can be seen as the competitive advantage of the BD standard. In 
the previous standard war, between VHS and Betamax, Sony had learnt that capacity 
could be a critical feature of a storage device. At the very beginning of this standard 
war, both Sony and Toshiba defined their advantages, and the BD standard was shown 
to be better than the HD DVD standard in this particular issue.
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(2) Highlighting the Issue of Production Costs
The term ‘production costs’ refers to the sum of all the costs associated with the 
manufacturing of a specific product.
Extract:
That requires new tooling and equipment, raising production costs. The NEC-Toshiba 
blue laser has the same 0.6mm disk layer used in the current DVD red laser standard. 
The two companies [Toshiba and NEC] claim that DVD makers could switch 
production much easier and come to market much sooner. (Robertson, EBN, 2 
September 2002)
Although Sony and Toshiba both possessed blue laser technology, they had different 
strategies in this standard war. Sony defined the BD standard as a brand new 
technology, while Toshiba defined the HD DVD standard as an extension of the DVD 
standard. In this vein, Toshiba defined that lower production costs is the main 
advantages of HD DVD standard in the standard war. 
(3) Highlighting the Issue of Copyright Protection
Extract:
The studios also have a huge stake in the change to the new technology because they 
now make more money from DVD sales than from box office sales. They also lose 
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millions of dollars a year from pirated DVD's. (Belson & Sorkin, New York Times, 15 
September 2004)
Both formats provide ... advanced copy protection, making it harder for pirates to copy 
movies. (McBride, Wall Street Journal, 9 December 2004)
Copyright protection prevents digital content from being copied, and so copyright 
protection mechanisms are one of the issues which concern Hollywood studios.  When 
Hollywood described this issue as being a critical one, it  could be seen as the main stake 
of these content providers in the digital era.
In addition to these three codes, this study will present in the following sections the 
additional codes which relate to discursive activity.
2. Promoting
Extract:
A key advantage for HD DVD and a big selling point to manufacturers is the fact that 
the technology allows disc manufacturers to use their existing DVD plants and 
equipment to produce HD DVD discs. Recently in New York, Toshiba and NEC 
presented two companies, disc replicators Ginram and Memory-Tech, that are doing 
just that. That could mean cheaper discs down the road than Blu-ray. (Paone, 
Dealerscope, January 2004)
One of the biggest advantages of BD, according to Sony, is its robust copy protection. 
"The physics of information retrieval at Blu-ray densities mandates changes to the disc 
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form factor and to playback hardware architecture,"  says Mitchell. "These facts create a 
unique opportunity in that content protection can be based on interactions between 
three elements: software, hardware, and the physical disc. (Block, Emedia, March 
2004)
This study defines ‘promoting’ as giving publicity to a standard, collaboration and/or in 
order to increase its sales, adoption and awareness among the public. In the standard 
war under discussion, both parties used media discourses, conferences, technological 
exhibitions and other products to seed their standards into customer’s homes. In order to 
ensure that the new standard is rapidly adopted by  its audiences, institutional 
entrepreneurs need to use promoting strategies to increase the likelihood of its adoption.
3. Undermining
An ‘undermining strategy’ can be defined as the active use of discourses to implicitly  or 
explicitly erode or impede the base of a rival’s standard or collaboration.
Extract:
Fidler [senior vice president of the Blu-ray Disc Group at Sony Corporation of 
America] said that the proposed HD-DVD format lacks "wow factors,"  while BD-ROM 
boasts a new copy protection scheme currently in development by Matsushita, Philips, 
and Sony; a Java programming environment; better navigation and graphics 
capabilities; Internet connectivity integrated into a BD-ROM player for downloading 
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additional materials, including subtitles for foreign language content; and plenty of 
room for data storage. (Yoshida & Hara, EBN, 17 November 2003)
Institutional entrepreneurs are generally less likely to explicitly use undermining 
strategies. The “wow factor” was proposed by one of the Sony top manager, Mike 
Fidler. By using undermining strategy, institutional entrepreneurs aim at promoting their 
advantages of own standards. In this standard war, the institutional entrepreneurs acted 
the undermining strategy with restraint. Undermining actions are normally accompanied 
by promotional activities. Nevertheless, I found one explicit undermining action in the 
dataset, which I coded as a stakeholder rebellion.
(1) The Stakeholder Rebellion
Extract:
Last month, after offering huge financial incentives like marketing support and cash 
payments, the HD DVD camp got Paramount and DreamWorks Animation SKG to 
agree to publish high-definition versions of their titles on HD DVD only. (McBride, 
Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2007)
The studios won undisclosed financial incentives for exclusive commitments to release 
high-definition movies onto HD DVD only. (McBride, Wall Street Journal, 21 August 
2007)
The term ‘stakeholder rebellion’ refers to the departure of a particular stakeholder from 
a collaboration in order to join a competing collaboration. The relevant information 
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shows that Toshiba used financial incentives to invite these studios to give their 
exclusive support to the HD DVD standard. Consequently, both studios said that they 
would give exclusive commitment from BD standard to HD DVD standard. Could we 
say, because of this, that giving financial incentives could be seen as a kind of 
stakeholder management? The answer is ‘yes’, and the giving of these financial 
incentives has been so coded in a previous section. This code is the outcome of giving 
incentives to critical stakeholders. 
4. Debating
‘Debating’ can be defined as the ways in which institutional entrepreneurs deliberately 
defend and explain their actions and behaviors when these are challenged by their 
competitors in the media.
Extract:
[After Paramount, Universal, and Warner Bros. announced that they would support the 
HD DVD standard in 2004. At the moment, Disney chose the BD standard]Bob Chapek, 
president of Disney's Buena Vista Home Entertainment [one of the BDA’s BOD], said 
the studio's decision was based on its belief that Blu-ray will provide a superior 
experience for consumers. He thinks the interractivity, in particular, is better on Blu-
ray, allowing commentary or game-playing overlaid onto the movie. (McBride, Wall 
Street Journal, 9 December 2004) 
It's all a matter of [disc-making] infrastructure," says Kanji Katsuura, chief technical 
officer at Memory-Tech Corp. [became Toshiba’s partner in the early 2004], a Japanese 
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disc maker that's supporting the Toshiba-led effort. "If the infrastructure is in place, 
Hollywood won't be able to ignore it."  (McBride & Dvorak, Wall Street Journal, 29 
November 2004)
Using a debating strategy, institutional entrepreneurs can defend their existing 
announcements, actions and policies. The strategy can also be accompanied by 
promotional strategies. Using stakeholders to debate the actions of institutional 
entrepreneurs can further strengthen their legitimacy  and power. If it ignores the 
importance of debating in a standard war, an institutional entrepreneur may suffer 
considerable losses.
5. Spokespersons
The study defines spokespersons as individuals who are responsible for representing a 
company in the media. This code was first highlighted by the BDA by-laws and media 
reports. I then researched the topic in more depth.
Extract:
Anyway, yes, we have what we call a promotional committee, and the chair of the 
committee is the general spokesperson for the BDA. Mr Mazuda from Panasonic is 
currently the chair of the global promotional committee. ( Interview in Japan)
According to this, every public announcement by the BDA must be approved by  the 
BOD. By doing this, the BDA was able to generate an unambiguous voice in the 
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standard war. I also examined other spokespersons in this standard war, and it was clear 
that BDA’s spokespersons were more active than those of Toshiba or the DVD Forum.
A3.1.2.1. The Codes of Additional Findings Concerning Discursive Activity
1. Technological Exhibitions
Extract:
When it comes to high-definition DVD recording, CEATEC [Combined Exhibition of 
Advanced Technologies] proved that the Blu-ray formal is making serious advances 
toward the future. Prior to the show, members backing the Blu-ray disc announced the 
formation of the Blu-ray Disc Association (BDA) and welcomed its first member from 
the content industry, 20th Century Fox. (Dritsas, Dealerscope, November 2004)
The article strongly  suggests that technological exhibitions, such as CEATEC, CES (the 
Consumer Electronics Show), and so forth, played a critical role in this standard war. In 
technological exhibitions, institutional entrepreneurs are able to announce critical 
information to different media at a single time and place, and can also use a variety of 
different discursive strategies, sometimes in combination with each other. In the dataset, 
many discursive strategies are shown in the media reports of exhibitions.
2. Hacking
Extract:
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The new intrusions came less than a month after a programmer calling himself 
Muslix64 announced in a Web forum that he had unraveled at least part of the HD DVD 
protection system. Muslix64 released free software that allows users to insert HD DVDs 
into their computers and make copies of those films without the original encryption. 
(Stone, New York Times, 17 January 2007)
In the beginning of 2007, New York Times reported that the HD DVD player was hacked 
by Muslix64. The dataset does not contain any media reports giving Toshiba’s response 
to this instance of hacking. The lack of action from Toshiba and the HD DVD camp, in 
response to the hacking, shows that when, institutional entrepreneurs do not give proper 
feedback or debate to negative information, they  may suffer negative outcomes in 
standard wars. 
A3.1.3. Codes of Power
In this study, power has been discussed in chapter 4 and 5. This study  uses soft power 
(Nye, 2004), derived from illusion, the exploitation of the tendencies of others, and time 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), for presenting the role of power in the standard war. 
Presenting their experience on the previous standard wars, showing their relationships 
with leading companies in markets and their understanding about the expectations of 
critical stakeholders and other member organizations, institutional entrepreneurs can 
brainwash other organizations that they have understand the audience’s expectation 
toward the new standards. In this vein, institutional entrepreneurs keep a space of 
illusion for their audience that their new standards will be successful. Hence, having the 
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power, institutional entrepreneurs can further motivate other actors to engage in projects 
of change. This study produces two codes (networking and experience of previous 
standard wars) to analyze the power. 
A3.1.3.1. Networking
Three codes are included in the category: ‘networking with critical stakeholders’, ‘core 
employees’ networking’, and ‘continuous collaborative patent applications’
1. Networking with Critical Stakeholders
This is defined as the degree of direct  links, frequent communications, collaborative 
R&D activities, and intimate contact which an institutional entrepreneur has with its 
critical stakeholders.
Extracts:
With all 10 of Blu-ray’s founding members retaining their seats on the DVD Forum’s 
17-member steering committee... (Yoshida & Hara, EBN, 17 November 2003)
...many companies such as Philips, Toshiba and Panasonic, among others. We were 
talking to each other, or engineer were talking to other engineers... And, you know, we 
had the DVD Forum for the BD issue,. Then, yes of course, we also discussed things 
within the DVD Forum. (Interview in Japan)
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Some media reports state that Sony, alongside other BD founder-members, held 
positions on the Steering Committee of the DVD Forum (Yoshida & Hara, 2003). 
Especially, DVD Forum also gives an opportunities for Sony, Toshiba, and other 
companies for discussing the development of next-generation optical storage standards. 
This networking was a reason why Sony chose particular companies to establish the 
Blu-ray Disc Founders and these companies also hold the position in the DVD Forum. 
2. Core Employees’ Networking
This refers to the ways in which core employees working in focal firms can convey 
information and influence employees of other companies through personal connections.
Extract:
...there are some really distinguished engineers in Sony, Panasonic and Philips. And 
these three engineers led discussions with these other companies... Actually, these three 
engineers were really respected by engineers in other companies. They are really what 
we call innovative engineers, and are very famous in the industry. Engineers in other 
companies were taught by these three men. (Interview in Japan)
Due to the contacts and credibilities that came from these engineers, the BD standard 
could rapidly establish its specifications and obtain support from other companies.
436
3. Continuous Collaborative Patent Applications
This refers to continuous applications for rights to an invention regarding to the new 
standard during the standard war. The applications may be individually  developed by 
institutional entrepreneurs or collaboratively developed by institutional entrepreneurs, 
critical stakeholders and/or the organizations engage in the rival camp. 
Extract: 
[The data is collected from WIPO database]
This code responds the guidelines of power in chapter 5. To sum up, Sony and Toshiba 
applied for a considerable number of optical patents individually  and collaboratively 
(with critical stakeholders and prospective organizations) between 2002 and 2008. It 
can be interpreted as showing that they apply regularly for optical patents every year. 
A3.1.3.2. Experience of Previous Standard Wars
‘Experience of previous standard wars’ can be defined as practical knowledge and skills 
which are derived from participation in the events and activities of previous standard 
wars, and are relevant to the current standard war. The idea is derived from media 
reports and interviews.
1. The Previous Standard War between VHS and Betamax
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Extract:
Sony ''can pose a more credible threat to launch on their own,'' ... ''On the other hand, 
Sony of all companies has been badly burned by having new technologies launched in 
two formats.'' Sony was the big loser in the battle over the video cassette format, with 
VHS becoming the dominant format over Sony's Betamax. (Belson & Sorkin, New York 
Times, 15 September 2004)
This is not the first media report to state that the standard war between BD and HD 
DVD was similar to that between VHS and Betamax. This media report  presents that 
Sony has experience in launching new technologies in standard wars. In a sense, Sony 
know how to launch a standard war. 
2. The standard war between SD and MMCD
Extract:
Sony and Philips insisted that the MMCD was the best solution ... Disc safe, I’m not a 
engineer, so I cannot tell it clearly. But the disc safe is basic. For example, the DVD and 
BD technology. BD is safer. We have protection technology. (Interview in Japan)
My Japanese interviewee confirmed an important point  about the previous standard 
which was not highlighted by  the media. That is, Sony mainly  believed that their 
copyright protection mechanism was better than that of the Toshiba SD in this standard 
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war. For this reason, Sony kept promoting the advantages of their copyright protection 
in the standard war between BD and HD DVD.
To summarize, if institutional entrepreneurs have relationships with stakeholders and 
use the connections of core employees, institutional entrepreneurs can rapidly establish 
collaborations and establish the specifications of their standards. In turn, in a standard 
war, power can lead to collective action.
A3.1.4. Codes of Legitimacy
An institutional entrepreneur achieves legitimacy when its actions and strategies are 
seen as being proper, desirable or appropriate within the socially  constructed systems of 
particular fields. Legitimacy  interacts with both collective action and discursive activity. 
If an institutional entrepreneur possesses well-known business segments, other 
companies will be more likely to believe in the potential of its standards and 
performance. Similarly, if it has a large number of consumer electronic products related 
to its new standard, it makes other companies believe that this new standard can be 
achieved.
The next four codes are not represented in media reports. This is because the literature 
showed me that I should look at the role of legitimacy in this standard war. As a result, 
after reading through many supplementary data, including the annual reports and 
database of the focal firm, I developed these four open codes.
A3.1.4.1. The Main Business Segment of Critical Stakeholders
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Extract: 
[The extracts in 7.1.4.1 refers Datamonitor’s Company Profile reports of both camps’ 
critical stakeholders. The relevant information can be referred Table 8.9]
The main business segment is a component of an enterprise that provides a single 
service or product  or a group of related products. Media reports show that Sony and 
Toshiba are both world leaders in electronics. In addition to those for Sony  and Toshiba, 
I reviewed the Datamonitor database reports about  business segments of many other 
critical players in this standard war. According to Koch (2011), the strategies of firms 
are influenced by their histories. For this reason, their main business segments lead to 
the development of their standards, and the discursive activities they  engage in during a 
standard war. Moreover, if they have other high performing products related to the new 
standard, their projects of change will be seen as credible.
A3.1.4.2. The Performance of Star Products
Extract: 
[The relevant information refers to Sony and Toshiba’s Company Profile reports in 
Datamonitor. I also collect their annual reports from 2002 to 2008 to reviewing their 
star product performance in the past. ]
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In the dataset, few media reports mention the star products of Sony and Toshiba in 
detail. For this reason, I collected data from the Datamonitor database and from the 
official websites and annual reports of the companies.
1. Sony’s history
Because of their histories, Sony and Toshiba display outstanding performance in 
specific products. In general, the specialist  area of Sony is consumer electronic products 
while that of Toshiba is the manufacturing of electronic equipments.
Extract: 
[Sony’s history refers to its official website (http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/
CorporateInfo/History/SonyHistory/index.html), its annual reports from 2002 to 2008, 
and Company Profile reports in Datamonitor.]
In general, how Sony  has grown around its audio and video business. It is also capable 
of seeking opportunities in new businesses such as music, film, and games, and, as a 
result, had developed many outstanding consumer electronics before the launch of the 
BD standard. 
2. Toshiba’s history
Extract: 
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[Toshiba’s history refers to its official website (http://www.toshiba.co.jp/worldwide/
about/history.html), its annual reports from 2002 to 2008, and Company Profile reports 
in Datamonitor. ]
Generally speaking, consumer electronic products is not Toshiba’s main business 
segment. Between 2002 and 2008, Toshiba focused solely on the manufacturing of 
electronics equipment, although it won the last standard war (SD vs. MMCD) with 
Sony. More directly relevant to the HD DVD standard were its acquisition of Amuse 
Pictures in 2003, and its signing of an agreement to develop consumer electronics 
devices and PCs in collaboration with Microsoft Corporation.
A3.1.5. Codes of Product Performance
This is defined as ways in which the technical quality and price of products are 
developed by institutional entrepreneurs and have to satisfy  stakeholders and customers. 
Effective collective action and discursive activities lead to strong product performance 
in a standard war. Capacity, copyright protection, backward compatibility, video and 
audio quality, and production costs are coded in previous sections. I also found that 
Sony and Toshiba adopted different pricing strategies for games consoles and disc 
players.
1. Pricing Strategy for Disc Players
Extract:
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...[“]If people don't know why it's important to them, why should they care what the 
price is?" "This is why we have a natural curve with an early-adopter group of people 
who are very focused on technology and performance," he [Andy Parsons, the BDA’s 
spokesman] explains. ..."This is why our player is $1,800 [BDP-HD1]. We focused on 
getting 1080P, because that is something we knew would resonate with the initial target 
market ...(Mutschler, Electronic Business, May 2006)
Toshiba will sell two players starting in March; one will cost just $499 [HD-A1], half 
the price of the cheapest Blu-ray machines [Samsung BD-P1000], the first of which will 
hit the stores this spring. (Belson & Fackler, New York Times, 26 Feburary 2006)
Toshiba used lower pricing ($499) to promote HD DVD players, while the first BD 
player, developed by Pioneer (the BDP-HD1), was priced at $1,800, and even 
Samsung’s first BD player cost $1,000 (BD-P1000). The BDA claimed that the BD 
camp would inform consumers of the true nature of high-definition. However, Toshiba’s 
lower price meant that HD DVD players had the leading market position when the two 
camps unveiled their disc players in 2006.
2. Pricing Strategy of Game Consoles
The pricing data for game consoles (the Microsoft Xbox 360 and Sony PS3) is mainly 
from the reports of Datamonitor. The report Business Insight – The Future Digital Home 
showed that the final price of the Microsoft Xbox 360, in which the HD DVD device 
was integrated, was higher than that of the all-in-one Sony PS3. Moreover, the Wall 
Street Journal confirmed that the PS3 successfully  seeded BD players into consumers’ 
living rooms.
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Extract: 
The new Sony player, dubbed the BDP-S300, will cost $599, but will have the same 
features and performance as Sony's current Blu- ray player, the BDP-S1 which costs 
$999. It will compete more directly with HD-DVD players costing about $499. Until 
now, the cheapest way for most consumers to obtain a Blu-ray player has been to 
purchase a $499 PlayStation 3 video game console... (Taylor, FT.com, 26 February 
2007)
BD disc players have more expensive price than HD DVD disc players. However, 
Sony’s PS3 just $499. Thus, Sony used cheaper product price on PS3 attracting 
consumers to purchase game consoles rather than purchasing disc players. In this vein, 
the consumers can experience more entertainment from the BD standard, such as movie, 
game softwares, and so forth. This study therefore indicates that the BD standard had a 
better product performance (product price) than the HD DVD standard in this standard 
war.
Apart from the price of disc player and game console, audio and video quality of both 
standards are rarely  mentioned in the relevant media reports. The issues of capacity and 
copyright protection mechanism, the BD standard is better than the HD DVD standard. 
However, the HD DVD standard is better than the BD standard on the compatibility 
issue. 
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3. Product Performance on Audio
Extract: 
[The relevant information of audio quality, Sony BDF-S1 refers to it’s official website 
(http://store.sony.com/p/BDP-S1/en/p/BDPS1#features). Toshiba has removed the 
information from global website. The information refers to Toshiba Canada (http://
www.toshiba.ca/web/product.grp?
lg=en&section=2&group=521&product=5950&category=#details). ]
In general, both disc players provided similar performance on audio. Sony’s adopted 
Dolby Digital32, Dolby  Digital plus33  Decoding, Dolby TrueHD34 Decoding, LPCM35, 
MP3 Playback, DTS36  Decoding, HDMI37  and dts Output. Toshiba’s adopted Dolby 
Digital, Dolby  Digital Plus Decoder, dts, dts-HD38  Decoder, Dolby True HD 
Compatible, MP3 Playback, and HDMITM 39 audio support. Both BD and HD DVD 
standards video specifications have HDMI.
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32 Dolby Digital is the name for audio compression technologies developed by Dolby Laboratories. 
33 Dolby Digital Plus is an enhanced coding system based on the AC-3 codec. AC-3 means audio codec 3. 
A codec is a device or computer program capable of encoding or decoding a digital data stream or signal
34 Dolby TrueHD is an advanced lossless audio codec technology. 
35 LPCM (Linear pulse-code modulation) is a method of encoding audio information digitally. It is used 
for the lossless encoding of audio data. 
36 DTS is a series of multichannel audio technologies owned by DTS, Inc. 
37  HDMI (High-definition multimedia interface) is a compact audio-video interface for transferring 
uncompressed digital audio/video data from an HDMI-compliant device to a compatible digital audio 
device, video projector,  computer monitor, or digital television. HDMI is a digital replacement for 
existing analog video standards. 
38  DTS-HD is a lossless audio codec. It is an extension of DTS which, when played back on devices 
which do not support the high resolution extension, degrades to a core track which is lossy. 
39 HDMITM (HDMI transition minimized) is a technology for transmitting high-speed serial data and is 
used by HDMI video interfaces, as well as other digital communication interfaces. 
4. Product Performance on Video
Extract: 
[The relevant information of video quality, Sony BDF-S1 refers to it’s official website 
(http://store.sony.com/p/BDP-S1/en/p/BDPS1#features). Toshiba has removed the 
information from global website. The information refers to Toshiba Canada (http://
w w w . t o s h i b a . c a / w e b / p r o d u c t . g r p ?
lg=en&section=2&group=521&product=5950&category=#details). ]
In general, both players provided similar performance on video quality. Sony’s adopted 
BD-R40/RE41  read compatibility, BD-ROM 42, CD-R/RW43, DVD Playback, DVD+R44, 
DVD+RW45, DVD-R, DVD-RW Read Compatibility, Full HD 1080p46, JPEG Playback, 
and Screen Saver. Toshiba’s adopted HD DVD/HD DVD-R/DVD/DVD-R/DVD-RW/
DVD-RAM 47/CD/CD-R/CD-RW, and HDMITM with 480p/720p/1080i. The HD DVD 
video specifications allows HDMI technology but the BD standard does not.  
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40 BD-R (recordable) refers to two direct to disc optical disc recording technologies that can be recorded 
on to an optical disc with an optical disc recorder. 
41 BD-RE (erasable) can be erased and re-recorded multiple times. 
42  BD-ROM is a type of storage media that is used to computers and other electronic devices.  It is not 
writable. 
43 CD-RW (compact disc-re-writable) is a rewritable optical disc. 
44 DVD+R is a recordable optical disc. It is similar to, but incompatible with, the older DVD-R standard. 
45  DVD+RW is a physical format for re-writable DVDs. It is incompatible with the older DVD+RW 
standard. 
46 Full HD 1080p is a set of HDTV high-definition video modes that are characterized by 1080 horizontal 
lines of vertical resolution and progressive scan. It means, the image is not interlaced as is the case with 
the 1080i display standard. Sometimes referred to in marketing materials as Full HD. “1080i” is an 
abbreviation referring to a combination of frame resolution and scan type. 1080i and 1080p are both high-
definition display formats for HDTVs. The difference between 1080i and 1080p is in the way the signal is 
sent from a source component or displayed on an HDTV screen. 
47 DVD-RAM (DVD-random access memory) is a disc specification presented by the DVD Forum, which 
specifies re-writable DVD-RAM media and the appropriate DVD writers. It is writable. 
5. Product Performance on Capacity
Extract: 
[Discussing the issue of capacity was the main activities through the standard war.] The 
studios have thrown their weight behind the Blu-ray group because it expects to 
produce DVD's with more storage space than Toshiba's discs.(Belson, New York Times, 
21 October 2005)
Certainly, the BD standard has more storage of capacity than the HD DVD standard. 
6. Product Performance on Copyright Protection
Extract: 
[Discussing the issue of copyright protection was the main activities through the 
standard war.] In recent weeks two big Hollywood studios, Warner Brothers and 
Paramount, that had previously plumped exclusively for HD-DVD have agreed to 
support Blu-ray as well--citing Blu-ray's wide support and strong copyright-protection 
mechanisms. (The Economist, 5 November 2005)
Certainly, the BD standard has better mechanism than the HD DVD standard. 
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7. Product Performance on Compatibility
Extract: 
Designed to maintain full backward compatibility with current DVD disks, AOD 
[Advanced Optical Disc, which is co-developed by Toshiba and NEC] adopts the same 
bonded-disk structure as the red-laser DVD current systems now in use, including the 
same thickness of the substrate disk and the same process for replication. ... [The] disk 
capacity is 15Gbytes for a single-layer ROM disk, 30Gbytes for a dual-layer disk, and 
20Gbytes for a single-layer rewritable disk. The dual-layer rewritable disk is 
provisionally defined as 35 to 40Gbytes. ...  the BD-ROM claims 25Gbyte capacity per 
single-layer ROM and 50Gbytes on a dual-layer BD-ROM disk.(Yoshida & Hara, EBN, 
17 Nov, 2003)
Certainly, because the HD DVD wanted to maintain full backward compatibility with 
current DVD discs, it sacrificed its capacity. 
A3.1.6. Codes of Network Effects 
The term ‘network effects’ is defined as the effects that one user of a product or service 
has on the value of that product for others. Product performance and network effects are 
less evident in the dataset than other topics, such as power, legitimacy, collective action, 
and discursive activity. The data about product performance can be found in related 
media reports and supplements, but there are very few media reports in the dataset 
which provide market numbers for disc players and their complementary products. 
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Although Nielsen Videoscan provides these numbers, they were not available for 
research. For this reason, I used Euromonitor to search for the population of video game 
users, and the market size and yearly growth rate of PCs, video players and video games 
in the United States between 2005 and 2008. In addition, by comparing consumer 
expenditure for different sectors (audio-visual, photographic and information processing 
equipment against. other recreational items and equipment, gardens and pets), I tried to 
determine why  using Microsoft’s Vista system did not assist the HD DVD standard. 
Although we cannot ignore the effect of Nintendo Wii’s intervention in the game 
console market, the Wall Street Journal’s report confirms that the  network effects of the 
PS3 was greater than those of HD DVD standard.
1. Generating network effects by PS3
Extract:
Yet Blu-ray has taken a big lead in sales of movie titles. Blu-ray discs are 
outselling HD DVDs by about 2-to-1 this year. That's in part because so many 
people who bought Sony's PlayStation 3 game console, which also plays Blu-ray 
discs, have bought some high-definition movies. Plus, supporters of the Blu-ray 
technology have had an edge so far in brokering deals with movie studios for 
exclusive distribution of titles. (McBride, Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2007)
...in a new survey by Sony of more than 10,000 PS3 owners, more than 80% of 
respondents indicated that they planned to purchase Blu-ray movies for their PS3s, and 
about 75% of respondents said their PS3 would be a primary device for watching 
movies. (Ramstad & McBride, Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2007)
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Based on the limited information, I was able to show that the network effects of the BD 
standard were greater than those of HD DVD in this standard war, a result, to some 
extent, of the price difference between PS3 and Xbox 360.
Due to data limitation, however, I was not able to confirm whether product performance 
led to network effects in this standard war. So I tried to search the relevant information 
in Euromonitor database. 
2. Video Game Population in US
Extract: 
[Based on Euromonitor’s data, I searched U.S. video gaming population in 2005 to 
2008. See Table 8.13. ]
In the U.S., teenagers (13-19 years old) and pre-teens (7-12 years old) are the main 
consumers of video games consoles. The number of adult users (aged over 20) 
increased  in 2007. Sony’s PS3 may became the home entertainment center for this 
group because they have more money for purchasing the game consoles. 
3. Market Size of Home Entertainment Products
Extract: 
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[Based on Euromonitor’s data, I search U.S. market size of PC, video players, and 
video games in 2005 to 2008. I further searched their yearly growth rate in the time 
period. See Table 8.14 and 8.15. ]
PCs received a boost in 2007 because of the launch of Microsoft’s new operating 
system. The yearly growth rate for video games is more than that for computers and 
video players. Because Wii, Xbox 360 and PS3 were launched in 2006. They not only 
increased the overall sales figures for video, but also eroded the market of some existing 
video players. 
4. Expenditure on the Relating Products
Extract: 
[Based on Euromonitor database, there are two categories named “audio-visual, 
photographic and information processing equipment” and “other recreational items 
and equipment, gardens and pets”relating to the products discussed above. See table 
8.16. ]
Customers in the US have fixed expenditure in these two categories. Spending too much 
money on a specific product will push other products out from their shopping lists.  
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A3.1.7. The Codes of Additional Findings Concerning Unseen Literature
After open coding, I was able to define a new group of very interesting topics, which 
could be studied further in the future. All these findings are implicit in the dataset. They 
derive from literature and my background research. 
The relationships between these additional findings and the variables discussed earlier 
are derived from the literature and the data. In this section, I will document the ways in 
which these findings emerged. The detailed discussion of this will be in Chapter 8.
1. Human Resource Management of Core Employees
This concept can be defined as the process of managing permanent employees 
comprising the central and foundational group that provides the skills essential to an 
institutional entrepreneur in a structured and thorough manner.
Extract:
...as I mentioned before, the three excellent engineers have connections with engineers 
in other companies. That’s why they succeeded in establishing the new format. 
(Interview in Japan)
My Japanese interviewee told me that the existence of the three ‘master’ engineers was 
one of the factors which won this standard war. This study has outlined their role in the 
BD camp. It is not only  their knowledge that can be seen as competitive advantage, 
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however; their personal connections were also very important as a way of winning 
attention and motivating other companies to join the project of change. This issue has 
been discussed in studies of human resource management (e.g. Lepak & Snell, 1999), 
but could be further examined in future studies of institutional entrepreneurship. As a 
consequence, HRM  of core employees may intervene in the relationship between the 
resources of the institutional entrepreneur and the activity of institutional 
entrepreneurship  in standard wars. Higher performing HRM of core employees may 
positively reinforce the relationship.
2. Personal Social Capital
This finding is based on theoretical work on human resource management studies, 
rather than on media reports, and is defined as the provision of personal resources for 
social benefit. Human resource management studies suggest that, by using personal 
social capital, organizations can explore and exploit opportunities, and create value. 
Personal social capital also mediates between human resource management of core 
employees and collective action.
3. Influence of the Media
It can be defined as the ways in which mass media affect how their audiences think and 
behave in institutional entrepreneurship. My subject as an undergraduate was 
Journalism, so I am familiar with the outcomes and performance of the media in mass 
communication. No media reports about this standard war outline the influence of the 
media itself. However, I recognize that the influence of the media may intervene in the 
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relationship  between the resources of the institutional entrepreneur and the activity  of 
institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars. This is because journalists’ analyzes of 
standards may influence the perceptions and interpretations of the audience. In addition, 
the influence of the media can intervene in the relationship between institutional 
entrepreneurship  in standard wars, and its network effects and product performance. 
This is because product reviews and analysis in the media can also influence the views 
of the audience. In this way, the media may play a critical role in a standard war. The 
media also can be seen as an indirect stakeholder in a standard war. Although the media 
are not directly  involved in standard wars, they  have the power to influence them, 
because they can influence the interpretations and perceptions of their audience. This is 
why the BDA has a spokesperson to maintain its relationship with the media.
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Appendix 4. The List of Critical Concepts in this Study
Institutional entrepreneurship: Activities of actors who have interest in particular 
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing one (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004: 957). 
Critical stakeholder: Reputational actors who have critical resources for the 
organization’s R&D activities, manufacturing and marketing as part of processes of 
technological standard change. The participation of such stakeholders directly 
contributes to the new standards of focal firms, in both functional and symbolic terms. 
Standard: A set of specifications to which all elements of products, processes, formats, 
or procedures under its jurisdiction must conform (Tassey, 2000: 588). 
Standard war: The process of which a focal firm competes with a number of other firms 
who propose alternative plans until one new technology emerges as the victor. 
Collaboration: Cooperative, inter-organizational relationships which rely  on neither 
market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control to ensure cooperation and coordination 
and, instead, are negotiated in ongoing, communicative processes (Lotia & Hardy, 2008: 
366). 
Discursive activities: The actor display[ing] or tr[ying] to draw other people’s attention 
to the meaning of an object or action that goes beyond the object or action’s intrinsic 
content or functional use (Zott & Huy, 2007: 70). 
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Network effects: The effect occurs when the value of a product or service to a consumer 
is contingent on the number of people using it. 
Institutional entrepreneurs: Actors create a whole new system of meaning that ties the 
functioning of disparate sets of institutions together (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007: 
957). 
Institutions: Supra-organizational patterns of human activity  by which individuals and 
organizations produce and reproduce their material substance and organize time and 
space (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 243). 
Power: The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion. 
Legitimacy: ‘A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity  are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 571). 
Collective action: A set of communicative practices which take into consideration the 
engagement of, and interactions between organizations. 
Critical stakeholder management capability: A process of managing and responding to 
the expectations and requirements of any critical stakeholder who has an critical 
resources in a project or will be affected by its deliverables or outputs. 
456
Backward compatibility: The ability  of a new storage device to work with input 
generated by an older device. 
Understanding expectations: The process of recognizing the interests and requirements 
of critical stakeholders in standard wars. 
Responding to requirements: The process of replying the expectations of critical 
stakeholders in standard wars. 
Seeking exclusive support: The process in which the exclusive support of stakeholders 
is sought in standard wars. 
Giving incentives: The process in which tangible or intangible resources are used to 
attract the engagement of critical stakeholders. 
Collaboration structuring capability: A process of establishing formal structures and 
rules, in order to manage effective collaborations in which divergent members exchange 
and share opinions and resources in order to achieve common goals. 
The portfolio of institutional entrepreneurs: The set of direct ties possessed by  an 
institutional entrepreneurs in a standard war. 
The structure of membership: An result of the process of professionalization, and a set 
of rules which explicitly defines the responsibilities and obligations of all members of a 
collaboration. 
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R&D activities: a “systematic investigation or experimentation involving innovation 
technical risk, the outcome of which is new knowledge, with or without a specific 
practical application of new or improved products, processes, materials, devices or 
services” (Rogers, 1998: 12). 
Frequent communication: The ways in which institutional entrepreneurs have formal 
communications, involving exchanging and sharing opinions and approving decisions, 
with other members of collaborations. 
Organizing promotion: The use by institutional entrepreneurs of collaborations to define 
campaigns and utilize strategies, in order to promote and target standard and relevant 
technologies to relevant audiences. 
Framing: the use of various verbal and non-verbal discourses to construct the 
identification and expression of a novel understanding of a problem, and to explicitly 
provide compelling reasons to support the new vision being promoted. 
Establishing collaborations: To arrange a system of act of working with another or 
others on a joint project. 
Promoting: Giving publicity to a standard, collaboration and/or in order to increase its 
sales, adoption and awareness among the public. 
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Undermining: The active use of discourses to implicitly or explicitly erode or impede 
the base of a rival’s standard or collaboration. 
Debating: The ways in which institutional entrepreneurs deliberately defend and explain 
their actions and behaviors when these ae challenged by their competitors in the media. 
Spokespersons: Individuals who are responsible for representing a company in the 
media. 
Product performance: Ways in which the technical quality  and price of products are 
developed by institutional entrepreneurs and have to satisfy stakeholders and customers. 
Human resource management on core employees: The process of managing permanent 
employees comprising the central and foundational group that provides the skills 
essential to an institutional entrepreneur in a structured and thorough manner. 
Influence of the media: The ways in which mass media affect how their audiences think 
and behave in institutional entrepreneurship. 
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